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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to investigate the origins and process of 
contemporary uneven development, regional disparities and political 
violence as reflected in the recurrent civil wars in Sudan. 
The Study confirmed the general outcry from the masses, that socio- 
economic and political disparities and injustices imposed on the Sudanese 
people by Anglo-Egyptian Colonialism have been continued and expanded by 
the neo-colonial state under the Sectarian Jallaba leaders who inherited 
both political and economic power, after political independence. 
All peaceful demands for socio-economic and political equality and 
justice by the masses from the most backward areas have always been 
violently suppressed by the neo-colonial state. As a result, several 
political and liberation movements including SPLA/SPLM emerged. 
The Study argues that all attempts by successive governments in Khartoum 
to solve the current problems have failed because they did not correctly 
recognize the root causes of the problems and have instead continued to 
impose Islamization, Arabization and the policies of 'divide and rule' as 
a strategy to maintain the status quo and to strengthen the process of 
economic and political alienation of the majority of Sudanese people. 
The author concludes that the most acceptable solution to the majority of 
Sudanese people would be to replace what this thesis characterizes as a 
settler neo-colonial state, with a new national democratic secular 
federal state in which the Sudanese people, regardless of race and creed 
can live in peace and prosperity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 A Prelude 
The process of contemporary uneven development, underdevelopment and 
regional disparities in the Sudan had its origins in mercantilist 
penetration following the establishment of Arab Settler colonialism in 
Northern Sudan in the 17-18th centuries. This process was re-imposed by 
Anglo-Egyptian colonialism through which selected areas in Northern 
Sudan, underwent major socio-economic and political modernization. 
The neo-colonial state which was inherited by the Arab settlers and 
Arabized riverain elites, after political independence in 1956, equally 
re-imposed these processes of regional disparities and uneven 
development. The failure of the neo-colonial state to resolve these 
problems of regional disparities has precipitated the emergence of the 
current political violence which has characterized Sudanese politics 
hitherto. 
In this chapter, a number of concepts relevant to this thesis will 
briefly be defined, and analysed. These concepts include uneven 
development, under-development, development, dependency, settler 
colonialism, merchant capital, "Jallabaism", sectarianism despotic 
orientalism, bureaucratic feudalism and class. In this thesis, 
'development' will be used to mean the "structural transformation of the 
economy, society, or policy and culture ... that permits the self- 
generating and self-perpetuating use and development of the people's 
potential. "1 In the Sudanese case, development would mean the total 
transformation of the traditional or pre-capitalist economy into either 
socialist or capitalist modes of production. It would equally mean the 
same transformation of traditional political systems into either a 
"capitalist" or a "socialist" political system. This transformation of 
traditional socio-economic and political features, or structures is 
usually accompanied by economic growth and social progress characterized 
by the rise in the level of per capita income and standard of living of 
the people involved, and the integration of the entire society into the 
new political and economic system. Furthermore, real development is also 
accompanied by the emergence of the division of labour, and attendant 
forms of social stratification. 
2 
The concept of.. settler. or internal colonialism will be used in this 
thesis to refer to a situation where a, foreign minority of settlers have 
been able to establish political hegemony over the indigenous people, who 
are also subjected. to economic domination, exploitation and repression. 
The concept of settler or internal colonialism has been used to explain 
the current political and economic crisis of South Africa, by Wolpe, 
Blauner, Cassanova, Emmanuel, Johnson and many others. Similarly Hechter, 
Drakakis-Smith and others have used this concept to analyse Celtic fringe 
experience in Britain's national development. 
2 
The above mentioned scholars have offered their views on both concepts, 
ie. colonialism and internal or settler colonialism. Wolpe states: 
... colonial relationship is conceived of as occurring between 
different countries, total populations, nations, geographical 
areas or bgtween peoples of different races, colours and 
cultures. " 
Wolpe went on to say that: 
. the colonial relationship is characterized, in a gener4l 
way as involving domination, oppression and exploitation. " 
Bluaner expresses the following: 
5 
"The colonial order in the modern world has been based on the 
dominance of white Westerner over non-westerners, of colour, 
racial oppression and the racial conflict to which it gives 
rise, are endemic to it, much as class exploitation and 
conflict are, fundamental to capitalist societies. " 
He went on to say: 
"Colonialism traditionally refers to the establishment of 
domination over a geographically external political unit, most 
often inhabited by people of a different race and culture, 
where this domination is political and economic, and the 
colony exists subordinately to and dependent upon the mother 
country. Typically the colonizers exploit the land, the raw 
materials, the labour, and other resources of the colonized 
nation, in addition to formal recognition is given to the 
differences in power, autonomy and political status, and 6 
various agencies are set up to maintain this subordination. " 
Casanova further stated that, 
"Internal colonialism corresponds to a structure of social 
relations based on domination an I exploitation among 
heterogeneous, distinct groups. " 
All these features constitute the core of internal colonialism and are 
applicable to the Sudanese case, whereby Arab minority settlers have been - 
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dominating, exploiting and oppressing the majority African indigenous 
national groupings using state institutions or power to achieve and 
maintain their political and economic hegemony. The most important aspect 
of the Sudanese case is that the Arab ruling minority has continued to 
deny the majority of the Sudanese population equal rights, equal justice, 
or an equal share in economic and political resources. The Arab national 
group has continued to do everything it can, not only to emphasize and 
perpetuate its alien Arab character, but has tried various means to 
transform this African majority into weak, inferior and dependent 
subjects. 8 
Merchant capital or the Jallaba defines people who are professionally 
engaged in commercial operations with the aim of accumulating wealth or 
profits. The term will also be used to describe any Sudanese involved in 
the accumulation of wealth, directly or indirectly. 
Sectarianism will be used to refer to a system of religious sects, 
specifically of Islamic character and which are organized for political 
gain by certain self-proclaimed religious families. Here, Ansar, 
Khatimiyya and Hindujja would be cited as the main examples. 
Oriental despotism is used to refer to a system of rule in which the 
leader claims a divine right to rule. According to Umberto Melotti, a 
oriental despotic ruler, 
"... tends to present himself, whether as-high priest, son of 
heaven or son of God, as the intermediary between men and the 
divinity or even as God himself, in as much as he is the 
trustee of life and death, the guarantor of fertility of the 
world. "9 
Melotti went on to say that: 
"The concentration of so many powers, economic and political, 
religious, moral, civil and military, in a single individual is 
one of the most unmistakable cultural traits of societies 
founded on the Asiatic mode of production. "1° 
It is these features which make the Sudanese case relevant to the Asiatic 
mode of production as described by both Marx and Engels, which Mel&tti 
has considerably analysed in his work, and accordingly the Sudanese 
sectarian dominant families fall within his description or oriental 
despotic rulers. 
Bureaucratic feudalism refers here to a system of state power in which 
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specific families permanently control the state apparatus in-a similar 
manner to the landlord who controls his serfs or tenants. The most 
important aspect is the positions within state institutions which are 
gained through inheritance and not through qualification. In Sudan the 
Author obtained information about students who were employed, not because 
they possessed the appropriate qualifications, but because they were from 
particular families. ' 11 
The term 'class' will be used to refer to'social classes existing in any 
capitalist society. This is because Sudan. is considered to be a 
capitalist country, where various modes of production including 
capitalist are in operation. 
The dominance of capitalist'modes of production in Sudan is reflected in 
the policies adopted by the neo-colonial state. The distribution of 
development projects by the so-called National Development Commission 
have been uneven, that is by giving development projects and political 
positions to a particular group within a certain region or by 
concentrating all development schemes-in one or two regions only, while 
other regions receive less than one quarter of the national development 
programmes. Here the Northern Sudan (which includes Khartoum, Blue Nile 
and Northern Regions) hadand still has continued to receive more 
developmental projects than other regions i. e. Eastern, Western and 
Southern Sudan combined. The concentration of socio-economic and 
political development in the Northern Sudan-is one'of the main causes of 
backwardness and poverty in the Southern Funj, eastern, southern and 
western Sudan, and has cited as one of the most important factors in the 
current civil war between SPLA/SPLM and the Government forces. 
The term under-development is used by dependency school theorists (ie. 
Paul Baran, Gunder-Frank etc. ), to describe how Europe and North America 
had and still have prevented the so-called less developed countries from 
developing and regenerating. Using India's experience under British 
colonialism as a classical example of under-development, Baran asserted 
that India, had been prevented from developing and regenerating as 
predicted by Karl Marx. Instead, India "experienced only the destruction 
of her traditional economy and society, and after that nothing but the' 
chronic catastrophe of the last two centuries. " 
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The reason for this, 
according to Baran, was that the capital accumulated in India was not 
invested there: "there can be no doubt that had the amount of economic 
surplus that Britain his torn from India been invested in India. India's 
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economic development to date would have borne little similarity to the 
actual sombre record. "12 Baran as we have noted was refuting Marx's 
contention that the "process of industrialization was to occur in India 
as a result of investment by British capitalists. This conclusion is only 
reinforced by his qualification that the process would not benefit the 
masses directly. " 
In her study of the Sudanese capitalist class, F. B. Mahmud states: 
".... the majority of the now leading edible oil capitalists in 
Khartoum originally accumulated their capital in Western.... 
(and Southern) Sudan. They transferred all their capital, 
especially the industrial capital and re-invested it in 
Khartoum. The research also revealed that pump-scheme 
agricultural capitalists who were compensated, for their 
schemes after the 1968 'Agrarian Reform' nearly re-invested 
their capital from agricultural in industry in Khartoum. It was 
also evident from the previous documentation of the . 
capitalists' careers in Western (Eastern and Southern) Sudan 
that the regular tendency of capital transference from this 
region (and others) to Khartoum is still going on: the reverse 
movement was never found to have taken place. "13 
It is this planned transfer of resources from other regions to Khartoum, 
Gezira, Port Sudan and Northern Provinces which perpetuates poverty, 
backwardness, uneven development and under-development in Sudan. It is 
equally the concentration of infrastructure facilities in the Khartoum, 
Port Sudan and Gezira areas that has had immense consequences on the 
concentration of capital in these areas. Dr. Mahmud asserted that in 1978 
"73% of the industries in the country and 76% of the industrial 
establishments.... were located in the Khartoum area alone". 14 
This study begins with the assumption that these processes must be. 
studied historically since present problems are determined by past 
events. 
History tells us that the penetration of British colonialism in most of 
its colonies especially in Africa, was marked by policies of uneven 
development, under-development, regional inequalities, 'indirect rule' 
and political violence leading to problems of national integration. 
Capital accumulation in the colonies and its transfer to Britain was a 
basic feature of British Colonialism especially in Africa. 15 The colonial 
power started by establishing the colonial state and its various 
institutions. Educational and administrative systems were geared to serve 
the objectives of the State. Towns and cities were created as 
administrative centres in what were rural areas, and the exploitation of 
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the rural areas by the urban, continues. Modern transport and 
communications were established to link the most important areas where 
raw materials are to be found and other important commodities, for export 
to Britain. The importation of British goods was encouraged, and the 
Sudanese economy - especially in the Northern Sudan - was integrated into 
the capitalist world economy. 16 
At this stage, the colonial state subjected the selected areas for both 
socio-economic and political transformation - that is to say, the 
capitalist mode of production and political institutions which were 
created replaced the pre-capitalist socio-economic and political 
institutions where colonialist exploitation of economic resources was 
concentrated. Consequently these areas became more developed than other 
regions where colonial administration had not concentrated the 
exploitation of its raw materials. Economic investment was concentrated 
in agricultural production with cotton as the major crop, which 
consequently created or transformed Sudanese agriculture into a 
monocultural system, and remained dominant throughout the colonial 
period, and even during the first twenty years of post independence. 17 
In areas where the colonial state did not concentrate exploitation of 
resources, indirect rule was dominantly applied, whereby the colonial 
authorities in each district or province appointed local representatives 
to manage tribal affairs, using local customary laws or structures on 
behalf of colonial authorities. Local courts were empowered to settle 
tribal disputes and individual cases and to collect tributes and poll 
taxes for the colonial authorities. Chiefs were also given the 
responsibility of constructing and maintaining feeder roads or local 
roads in most cases using forced labour. The tragic fact of indirect rule 
was that it did not require any form of education (ie. Western oriented 
education) nor any major expenses to run the system. So education and 
modern administrative training were neglected, for they were unnecessary. 
As a result, educational differences between various regions ensued. The 
differences in terms of development were enormous, in that modern trade, 
a working class, an intelligentsia, capitalist classes (which includes a 
bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie) and political parties or organizations 
emerged in those regions where direct rule was dominantly applied, with 
only limited application of indirect rule in the rural areas. The case of 
Southern Uganda, Southern Nigeria, Northern Sudan, Southern Ghana etc. 
may be cited as classical examples of British colonial creation in 
Africa. 18 
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The development of nationalism and class struggle was therefore 
influenced by the level of education and the degree of political 
consciousness. It was not surprising that the movement for independence 
was organized and led by the national grouping in the most advanced area 
and by intellectuals representing the interests of national capital and 
the petty bourgeoisie in the towns. 19 
During the struggles for independence the leaders of the national 
movement appealed to all national groupings for support, including those 
of the backward areas. The leadership of the movement blamed the colonial 
authorities for the prevailing social injustice and inequalities, and 
promised to solve them immediately after independence. But after having 
thrown out the colonial regime, it was only people from the advanced 
areas who obtained the benefits of independence, in the form of state 
power, high positions in the state, state contracts and loans etc. 
leaving the people from the less developed areas devoid of power and out 
in the economic cold. 20 
The inheritance of political power by the national bourgeoisie that had 
accumulated wealth and political influence during the colonial phase, 
resulted in the continuation of old forms of economic production, 
appropriation and exploitation prevailing under British colonialism. This 
marked the establishment of a new era, the neo-colonial era, whereby the 
bourgeois state pursued the inherited colonial patterns of capitalist 
modes of production. The only major difference was, and still is, that 
while formerly capital accumulation, exploitation and penetration was 
mainly controlled by British colonial administrators, both political and 
economic aspects of the post-independence phase was under the control of 
bureaucratic petty bourgeois classes, which continued to serve their 
former colonial master through the comprador, national capitalist and the 
multinational corporations, which continued to exploit, expropriate and 
dominate both the national economic and the bourgeois ruling classes to 
this day. 21 
It is because of its class composition and orientation that the new 
leadership of the post independence period and even the current one has 
invariably failed to solve the main problems of socio-economic and 
political change, particularly the problems of regional inequalities, 
poverty, uneven development and under-development. On the contrary, they 
have continued to follow a path of development which has not only widened 
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the income gap between the more advanced areas and the less advanced 
ones, but has also precipitated political violence between the 'haves' 
and 'have notes'. Such violence has continually threatened stability in 
Sudan. 
Similarly, experiments in liberal democracy have led to the emergence of 
corrupt institutions not expressing the interests of the masses, but 
serving the interests of the minority ruling clique. As a result, bitter 
struggles between the masses and ruling bourgeois group emerged, which 
developed into the current class struggles. The struggle of the people 
has been, and continues to be weak because of the ability of the ruling 
class to divide and rule them. In fact, in Sudan, tribalism, racism, 
religion, ethnicity and regionalism have been used to divide the Sudanese 
masses, so as to effectively weaken them. Col. Dr. John Garang, Chairman 
and Commander in Chief of SPLM/SPLA in his appeal to the Sudanese on the 
founding of the Movement in 1983 stated the following: 
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".... the oppressor has time and again employed various policies 
and methods of destroying or weakening the just struggle of 
our people, including the most notorious policy of 'divide' 
and 'rule'.... the oppressor has divided the Sudanese people 
into Northerners and Southerners. The North itself, they have 
classified our people into Easterners, Westerners, Halfawein 
and the so-called 'Awalad el Bled' .... while in the south, the people have been politicized along tribal lines (eg. 
Nuers, Baria, Zande or Equatorians). The oppressor has also 
divided us into Muslims and Christians, into Arabs and 
Africans. Tomorrow when these divisions become outdated, the 
oppressor will contrive other ingenious schemes for keeping 
the Sudanese people and their just struggle divided and weak. " 
This passage showed exactly what most Sudanese are experiencing today. 
The Sudanese experience in some areas differ a lot from the general 
African examples cited above. The Sudanese case resembles the 
Zanzibarian', Libyan, Mauritanian, Tunisian, Moroccan etc. experience. The 
most important common features include the establishment of Arab settler 
colonialism, with sectarian Islamic oriental despotic (dictatorship), 
autocratic rule. Other unique characteristics common to these cases 
include the emergence of imams, sheikhs, kings, princes, sultans, 
jallabas, landlords and feudal orientated sectarian family parties in the 
countries mentioned above. These groupings control the state's 
institution and the national economy as if they were their private family 
companies and property. Here the African majority is subjected to 
apparently permanent repression, domination and exploitation. 
23 
In the Sudanese case, the Arab and Arabized ruling national group has 
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subscribed to the notion of Arabization, Islamization and assimilation of 
the non-Arab majority. And that politically and economically the African 
majority is displaced, marginalized and forced to live as destitutes 
whether or not they are Muslims. 24 
An attempt by the African majority to resist injustice peacefully is met 
by the state with strong suppression and repression. And the state 
accuses them of being anti-national unity, anti-Arab and anti-Islam or 
foreign agents. In addition, the state uses massive propaganda on 
national television, radio, in newspapers and magazines etc. calling upon 
all Muslims and Arabs to unit against Imperialism and other enemies in 
order to protect the "Umma Islamiya and Arabiya" (ie. Islamic community 
and nation. The leaders of the Arab settlers and Arabized riverain. 
tribesmen would then call upon the Islamic Community to conduct a Holy 
War (Jihad) against all the infidels or pagans. Various verses from the 
Ouran (Islamic Holy Book) and the sayings of the prophet Mohppmed are 
cited, especially the ones that urge the believers (Momineen) to 'kill 
and be killed in the name of Allah for their kingdom is heaven and 
paradise', and their leaders would then say several times "Allah Aksbar" 
(God is great etc. ). 25 
Furthermore all the attempts by the progressive intelligentsia to 
mobilize all the oppressed and the exploited Sudanese against the 
dominant ruling elites failed because the ruling elites have managed to 
convince members of their national groupings to defend the hegemony of 
Arab national groups in the country. As a consequence, the weak struggle 
for social progress and social justice, the actual problems being 
subsumed by issues of racism and religion between the Arabs and Arabized 
groups on one hand and the majority African masses on the other. The 
former uses state coercion or violence to suppress the latter. The 
victims on both sides are always the "have nots". 
The neo-colonial state has continued to favour policies of uneven 
development which it had inherited from Anglo-Egyptian colonialism. The 
two senior secondary schools which were established by the British 
colonial state were only increased by one school after seven years of 
political independence. 26 Similarly, intermediate and Primary education 
was neglected and only four intermediate schools and a dozen primary 
schools continued to exist until 1963 when the Islamic religious primary 
and intermediate schools were created by the military regime, plus two 
primary teachers training schools. On the health and economic development 
10 
level, there were no hospitals but a dozen health centres and dressing 
stations, no modern roads or communication systems with the exception of 
one oil mill and one textile industry, while most of the region was (and 
still remains) in a state of pre-capitalism. The only signs of capitalist 
presence in the region were the state employees in the towns. Arab and 
Arabized riverain traders, some of whom were scattered in the villages, 
engaged in looting and exploiting the ignorant and inexperienced local 
population with impunity. 
It is this backwardness in education, industrial and economic 
development, plus uneven distribution of political resources that 
precipitated the early political violence in Southern Sudan, as well as 
other less developed areas. 27 
While the political parties in the Sudan were established early in the 
1940s, political parties in Southern Sudan came into being in 1950. Of 
course, the involvement of Southern Sudanese in national politics goes 
back to the 1920s when the White Flag League was established by Sudanese 
officers and former officers and prominent among these were Southern and 
Western Sudanese, which included Ali Asdel Latif, Zein Al Abdin Abdel Tam 
Surur Rustom, Abdel Fadil Almaz, Mohammed Bakhiet, Obeid Hag Al Amin, 
H0 san Fadl Al Mula, Ihabit Abdel Rahim, Suliman Mohammed and many 
others. 28 Under the 'Closed District Ordinance', the Black Power was 
divided, weakened and destroyed, politically and economically. 
Finally, it is important to state here that in Sudan the policy makers 
and most academics have used capitalist theories in analysing, planning 
and executing state economic and political policies without that much 
success hitherto. It is the apparent failure of the mainstream theories 
to offer any comprehensive solutions to the current Sudanese politco- 
economic crisis that has precipitated the author to seek alternative 
theoretical frameworks in order to redefine, re-analyse, re-examine or 
reformulate Sudanese problems of social change. So it is therefore 
proposed that the Marxist Class analysis will be applied throughout this 
thesis as the main theoretical guideline. Similarly those views of the 
dependency which are relevant to the Sudanese problem will be referred to 
also. 
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1.2. A Brief Review of Literature on the Sudanese Contemporary Political 
Crisis 
The literature on Sudancan be classified into two: 
(a) that written by scholars who are influenced by the Modernization 
School of thought and , 
,: -ý ý ,. 
(b) those scholars influenced by. the, Dependency School of thought and/or 
neo-Marxism and Marxism as well. 
It must be stated from the outset that most of the literature on Sudanese 
contemporary problems, has been-written by-scholars who are influenced by 
Western liberal ideas, whether they are Sudanese nationals or foreigners, 
and they include Mohamed Omer Beshir in his work on South-North 
relations or conflicts, ie. The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict 
(1967), Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (1975) and The Southern 
Sudan (1972); Muddathir Abd äl Rahim's contribution includes Mshkelt 
Ganoüb el Sudan (The Southern Sudan Problem) (1965), Imperialism and 
Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study of Constitutional and Political 
Development - 1899-1956 (1969), Fourteen Documents on the British Policy 
in the Southern Sudan, 1899-1947 (1968); 'Abud Baker El Obeid's Political 
Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement (1980); Oliver'Albino's The 
Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint (1970); Robert 0 Collins; ýThe Southern Sudan: 
1883-1878 (1962), The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective (1975), 
Shadow in the'Grass (1984); Yusuf F. Hassan's The Arabs and the Sudan, 
From the Seventh to the Early Sixteenth Century (1967); 0. Agunda's 
Arabism and Pan- Arabism in Sudanese Politics (1973); -F. Nadel "The Nuba" 
in T. Asad (ed. ) Anthropology and the Colonel Encounter (1973); M. Said 
Beshir's The Crossroads of Africa (1965); Bona Malual's People and Power 
in the Sudan (1981); Philip A. Gaboush's The Growth of Black 
Consciousness in Northern Sudan (1973) and lastly M. Wai Dunstan's 
contribution (ed. ) The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National 
Integration (1973) underlines our selected representative of the 
literature, in this section. 
The above mentioned scholars share many theoretical outlooks. That is to 
say, they are not only influenced by modernization theories (Western 
Liberalideas) but apparently approach the Sudanese problems from similar 
Perspectives. They all define, analyse or approach, the contemporary 
Sudanese problems in terms of various paradigms such as religion (eg. 
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Christianity versus Islam), race (eg. Arab versus African), region (eg. 
Southerners versus Northerners or Westerners), tribalism, ethnicity, 
slavery, British Colonialism etc., while economic inequalities or unequal 
distribution of political and economic resources are given low attention, 
ie. economic and political injustice being considered as secondary 
aspects in the overall crisis. 
On the other hand, British Colonialism is still being blamed for having 
created the South-North conflict and the current uneven development or 
regional inequalities, without reference to the role of Egypt, as a 
partner in Anglo-Egyptian colonialism. The British are blamed for their 
'Southern Policy', and the 'Closed District Ordinance' whereby Southern 
Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Northern Funj were governed separately and 
people from various closed areas or regions were not allowed to travel to 
the Northern Sudan without permission from the Colonial government in 
Khartoum. 29 The same policy was also applied on the people from the 
Western Sudan specifically in the Nuba mountains. 
For these writers, Sudan is culturally, religiously, racially, 
linguistically and politically divided into two, ie. South and North 
Sudan. The North which is defined to include Eastern, Central, Northern 
and Western Sudan, is apparently assumed to be homogeneous, because the 
majority are Muslims and speak Arabic and are therefore considered as 
Arabs, rather than Muslims, which is misleading and absurd. For the 
people in this area are not homogeneous, nor are the majority of the 
people Arabs, as claimed by the beneficiaries of the system. On the other 
hand, although Arabic is spoken by a majority as a second language, it is 
clear that language alone does not create homogeneity; otherwise, the 
Irish, the Scottish and the Black British in Britain or the Blacks in the 
United States of America, would not have any problems against the 
dominant classes in these respective communities. The fact that the 
majority of Sudanese people are not Arabs, and this majority, including 
the Arabs are equally poor, oppressed, exploited and dominated is 
dismissed as foreign or imperialist propaganda. The existence of class 
struggles which has precipitated the emergence of various political and 
liberation movements not only in the Southern Sudan is generally denied. 
All non-Arab political movements in Sudan are treated as either regional, 
racist, tribal, ethnic or a foreign agency. The Rural . olidarity which 
emerged after the overthrow of Nimiere as a movement of all the 
oppressed, the dominated and the exploited Sudanese masses, is merely 
reduced to anti-Arabs, anti-Islam or foreign conspiracy to destroy 
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Sudanese state. 30 To most of these Western-oriented writers or scholars, 
the main problem in the Sudan which deserves any attention at all is the 
British created 'Southern problem'. 
It is from this negative approach that the study of class formation, 
class struggle, underdevelopment, uneven development and regional 
inequalities in the Sudan has not only been neglected but discouraged by 
the Arab dominant ruling national grouping which claims that such a study 
is not only without foundation but against the principles of Islam (a 
part of political ideology of the dominant ruling group). 
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The Sudanese state has therefore, ruthlessly suppressed or oppressed 
progressive ideas and any literature related to it and had to move or 
dismiss the legally and democratically elected members of the Sudanese 
Communist Party in 1967 from the Constituent Assembly in Khartoum, which 
was a clear case of corrupting the democratic institutions to serve 
particular interests. 32 
Apart from the above mentioned weaknesses of a theoretical nature as 
shown by the literature we have just mentioned, there are other 
weaknesses being held by some writers especially those from the dominant 
ruling national grouping, who tend to argue that colonialism or foreign 
exploitation, expropriation, oppression, and domination in the Sudan only 
began with Turco-Egyptian colonialism in 1820.33 
Arab Imperialism and Colonialism which penetrated the Central, Eastern, 
Northern, and Western Sudan as early as the 10th Century and was 
vigorously involved in the slave trade, which had devastated the Sudanese 
population by nearly 6 million in 1898 and which has not been examined 
because it would create anti-Arab sentiments among Sudanese Africans who 
were the victims. 34 Furthermore, Arab Imperialism and Colonialism 
destroyed the indigenous Sudanese socio-economic and political systems 
and established four Sultanates by the end of 15th century; for example 
in the Western Sudan (Dar Fur Sultanate), in the Central Sudan (Fung 
Sultanate) and two Nubian Sultanates in the East and the Northern Region, 
and subsequently established an Arab dominated settler colonial state in 
the Sudan, has been considered a blessing to the area, rather than as 
destructive as such. 35 The fact that this minority of dominant Arab 
settlers have not only been exploiting, oppressing and dominating the 
indigenous people who are originally non-Arabs and Muslims, but claiming 
that the Sudan is an Arab Nation and that those living within its 
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boundaries must accept Arabization, Islamization and assimilation or 
otherwise, has not been condemned or rejected as foreign imperialism but 
instead praised and accepted as natural. 36 
Finally, for the Arab oriented writers, Arabization and Islamization in 
the Sudan is important and meant more than modernization and civilization 
to non-Arab indigenous people in the Sudan, who are fallaciously 
considered as primitive, backward and Godless people. It is also falsely 
believed by both ruling grouping and most of the Arab oriented writers 
that, it is only through Arabization and Islamization that the Sudanese 
problem of national unity, socio-economic and political injustice can be 
solved. 37 As a result of these false assumptions, formulations, 
conceptions, and even wrong interpretations of our current crisis, no 
solution has been possible. 
The last part of the selected representative of the literature on the 
Sudanese socio-economic and political crisis is the written works by neo- 
Marxist and Marxist writers. Our survey of the literature in question has 
indicated that this is scarce or rather limited. The scarcity of 
literature is not due to lack of interest by the neo-Marxist and Marxist 
oriented scholars in the Sudanese situation, but on the contrary, it is 
due to oppressive and suppressive policies carried out by both the 
Sudanese state and the ruling minority group which has been controlling 
both economic and political power in the Sudan since independence. As 
such attempts by neo-Marxist and Marxist scholars to participate in or 
contribute to the current debate, has been in many cases suppressed and 
explains the dominance of academic reaction in the country, simply 
because of financial and political support given to them. 
The written works by both neo-Marxist and Marxist scholars, on the 
contemporary Sudanese socio-economic and political crisis, include F. B. 
Mahmoud's unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, "The Origins and Development of the 
Private Capitalist Class: A Socio-Political Analysis" (University of 
Hull, 1978) and "The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development? 
(London, 1984), I. K. Mohammed's unpublished Ph. D. Thesis entitled, "The 
Effect of Capitalism Upon the Past and Future Development of Pre- 
capitalist Agriculture in Sudan, with Special Reference to the Nuba 
Mountains Region" (University of Leeds, 1981), T. Barnett's Thesis 
entitled, "A Sociological Study on the Gezira Scheme in the Sudan" 
(University of Manchester, 1973), Carole Collins' article entitled, 
"Colonialism and Class Struggle in the Sudan" (in the Middle East 
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Research and Information Project, Merip, 1976), Norman O'Neill's article 
entitled, "Imperialism and Class Struggle in Sudan" (in Race and Class, 
1978), Michael Wolfers' article entitled "Race and Class in the Sudan", 
in (Race & Class, A Journal for Black and Third World Liberation, 1983), 
Joseph Garang's Statement on "The Question of the South: Economic and 
Regional Autonomy" published by the Review of African Political Economy, 
1983 and a few others by the Sudan Communist Party, plus the latest work 
by T. Niblock entitled "Class and Power in the Sudan: The Dynamics of 
Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985" (1986) and the Political Manifesto and 
other SPLA/SPLM documents. 
The above-mentioned writers have, or share, many common theoretical 
perspectives and historical outlooks, especially Fatima B. Mahmoud and 
I. K. Mohammed who treat uneven development, underdevelopment or regional 
disparity. Furthermore, both directly define the Sudan in terms of two 
regions (South and the North, which are in turn racially and religiously 
divided into Arabs and Africans and Muslims versus Christians. Both 
failed to address themselves to the problems of uneven development and 
the class struggle which has been ensued therein hitherto. In addition, 
very little has been covered by almost all writes in this respect. 
Barnett was more concerned with the Gezira Scheme, while O'Neill, Collins 
and Garang's articles were very useful. They were not comprehensive in 
terms of covering the contemporary issues which have led to the emergence 
of various political movements and liberation movements all over the 
country, most of which are not only committed to social and economic 
justice or equality, but are also committed to total destruction of the 
present Sudanese State which is not only based on sectarianism, but is 
controlled and run by only three families (ie. The Mahdi, the Hindi and 
the Mirghani) plus a few others whose interests are represented and 
protected by the three families mentioned above. 38 Although these Marxist 
oriented writers recognize socio-economic factors as major causes behind 
what is popularly known as the South-North conflicts, most of them ignore 
what has been going on in the Central, Eastern and Western Sudan where 
various political and liberation movements have taken strong measures 
against all kinds of exploitation. These writers never seem to have 
anticipated that the oppressed, the exploited and the dominated masses of 
the Sudan would one day unite against the oppressor and the exploiter and 
would seek to bring down or destroy the dominant bourgeois class and the 
neo-colonial Islamic State, through which backwardness, poverty, uneven 
development and various inequalities and injustices have been 
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perpetuated. 
Perhaps T. Niblock's recently published work could be classified as very 
useful although like others, he has failed to recognize the possibility 
of a united front by the oppressed national groupings from the most 
backward areas, who have suffered and continue to suffer regardless of 
their religious, ethnic, tribal racial or regional background. 
Furthermore, Niblock's classification of national and regional movements 
failed to see that sectarian political parties or movements were and 
still are not national in any way, and yet he treated them as national. 
Niblock's work approaches Sudanese politics in terms of socio-economic 
perspective, that seeks to explain the dynamics of Sudanese nationalism 
and what has happened since independence. Niblock emphasizes the economic 
and social structures built up under the Condominium (1898-1936) using 
the concept of class to explain the situation. Niblock disagrees with 
those who argue that the concept of 'class' was exclusively formulated 
with a view to explaining the workings of Western industrialized 
societies and is ill- suited to analysis of African and Arab societies. 
For Niblock, since economic differentiation has been taking place in the 
Sudan, like any country where capitalism has already penetrated, class 
analysis should equally be applied, specially when this differentiation 
has political effect on the Sudanese society. Niblock defines 'class' in 
terms of ' economic differentiation which places differences in earnings 
and wealth within the context of the sources of income, in the structure 
of economic production and organization! ' 
Finally, whatever weaknesses there are in the works written by both neo- 
Marxist and Marxist writers, on the Sudan, we feel that their approaches 
are more appropriate than the approaches by those who are Western liberal 
oriented writers who tend, in our view, to support the policies of the 
ruling class, which are dominantly oppressive and exploitative. 
Furthermore, the fact that both neo-Marxist and Marxist writers are 
committed to the exposition of the weaknesses of the capitalist dominant 
ruling classes and are also committed to the total liberation of the 
oppressed, the exploited and the dominated Suktanese masses make their 
approaches more acceptable than others. 
It is important to mention briefly that the literature on the Sudanese 
political crisis has been enriched by recent works of Mansour Khalid 
entitled the "The Government They Deserved" (1990), and "John Garang 
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Speaks" Abel Alier's work, "Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements 
Dishonoured", and several articles in "The Search for Peace in the 
Sudan" edited by Francis Deng Majok and Spranching J. L. Spaulding (1987). 
For simplicity this thesis is divided into nine main chapters and several 
sections. Each chapter has a section on footnotes. 
Chapter One is divided into three sections, the first section being a 
general prelude to the Sudanese political crisis. In this section a 
selected number of concepts assumed to be relevant to the Sudanese case 
are examined. 
Section two briefly reviews a selection from the literature on the 
Sudanese contemporary political crisis. The last section consists of a 
list of notes and references. 
Chapter Two is subdivided into eight sections. While the first three 
sections discuss briefly the historical background and political and 
social geography of Sudan, the remaining five sections trace the origins 
of foreign colonial penetration, domination, exploitation and oppression 
of Sudanese people from the early mercantilist period down to the current 
capitalist era. 
The emphasis in this Chapter is on the five points set out below: 
1. The slave trade and looting of material resources which devastated 
both human and material resources in the Sudan. 
2. Arabization and Islamization which culminated in the establishment of 
Arab settler colonialism. 
3. The role of Turco-Egyptian colonialism in regard to Items 1 and 2. 
4. The role of a Mahdist State in the development of items 1 and 2. 
5. The role of Anglo-Egyptian colonialism in the development of No. 2 
above, and also its role in the development of regional inequal- 
ities, uneven development and under-development in the Sudan, and the 
creation of the modern capitalist state in the Sudan at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. 
The final part of Chapter Two examines various policies adopted by Anglo- 
Egyptian colonialism during its colonial period towards various regions, 
with emphasis on Southern Sudan. The Egyptian attitude towards the 
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creation of a separate Sudanese nation to be followed by independence is 
to be examined in this Chapter. 
Chapters Three and Four examine and analyse the role of sectarian and the 
Jallaba class in the process of under-development, uneven development and 
regional inequalities. On the top of that, these chapter examine the 
means and ways being used by the Sectarian Merchant Capital in order to 
influence or control national politics, since independence. These 
chapters also examine the relationship between wealth, religion, race and 
class with emphasis on the role of merchant capital. The emphasis will be 
on the experience of Southern Sudan. 
Chapter Five examines and analyses the role of political parties in the 
under-development of the Sudan in general and Southern Sudan in 
particular. In this chapter, the military and its intervention in 
Sudanese politics will be examined and analysed., Here the emphasis will 
be laid on the role of the army in the under-development and uneven 
development of the Southern Sudan, in terms of representation in the 
national army, national police etc. 
Chapter Six examines and analyses the policies of the Neo-colonial, 
Islamic State in connection with distribution of national socio- economic 
and political resources which in turn determines the level of socio- 
economic and political progress of the entire country. In the Sudan, the 
state controls all natural resources, such as land and minerals. It also 
controls 90% of the country's industries, 90% of banks in the country and 
in addition, the state corporations are the largest in the country. As a 
result, the State employs roughly 80% of the educated and trained 
Sudanese nationals. In the Southern Sudan, the state employs almost all 
the educated southerners in various state departments. This is because of 
the lack of private investment in the industrial and agricultural 
sectors, which may require trained Southerners, so the role of the state 
in every aspect of development in the Sudan is crucial. It will be argued 
that those who control the state control the socio-economic and political 
life of the Sudanese nation. 
This chapter also examines and analyses the class nature of the neo- 
colonial Islamic state, the concept of relative autonomy of the state, 
and the role of the financial oligarchy and the traditional sectarian 
religious leaders in the development of modern state. 
While emphasis is laid on the policies of the neo-colonial Islamic State 
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towards the Southern Sudan, its policies towards other less developed 
regions are also examined and analysed very briefly. 
This chapter sets out to examine and analyse the consequences of the 
above mentioned policies of the neo-colonial Islamic State in the country 
in general and the Southern Sudan in particular. 
Chapters Seven and Eight examine and analyse the dynamics of the class 
struggle and its effects on national integration in the Sudan. It further 
examines and analyses the events which led to the emergence of several 
political and liberation movements in the less developed areas in the 
Sudan in general and Southern Sudan in particular. Political and 
liberation movements to be examined and analysed include both the White 
Flag League and the Black Bloc which originated in the Khartoum region 
and which influenced Sudanese politics from the 1920s to 1950, the 
General Union of Nuba Mountains, the Darfur Development Front, Beja 
Congress, the Union of Southern and Northern Funj and Ingesna, the Sudan 
Rural Solidarity and the Union of Sudan African parties. The main 
emphasis will be laid on the events which precipitated the emergence of 
SPLA/SPLM. Of course a brief mention will be made to Anya-nya I and II 
which emerged in the Southern Sudan before SPLA/SPLM. 
The examination and analysis of attempts to resolve the Sudanese 
political crisis is the main point of departure. This includes Koka Dam 
agreements, the DUP and SPLA/SPLM Agreement, the Saddiq's Government 
peace initiatives and many others. 
In this Chapter, the role of external political and economic factors in 
the Sudanese crises will also be briefly examined and analysed. The 
emphasis will be laid on the role of the Arab countries, especially those 
with economic and political interests in Sudan. 
Chapter Nine is a brief summary of the complete thesis and conclusions 
drawn. The final parts of the thesis contain notes and references, 
appendices, maps and some tables. 
20 
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1 
1. This definition contains most features, reflected in most definitions 
offered by students and scholars of dependence and modernization 
schools. 
2. The concept of Internal Colonialism has also been used in the 
Sudanese case by Abdel Rahman Abaker in his unpublished Ph. D. thesis 
entitled "Uneven Development and Regional Disparity in the Sudan: the 
case of Kordofan and Darfur". University of Sussex, 1985, pp. 42-51. 
Similarly Michael F. Lofchie in his book, Zanzibar: Background to the 
Revolution, Princeton University Press, 1963, has described the 
development and the collapse of Arab Settler colonialism in Zanzibar. 
3. Wolpe, Harold: "The theory of Internal Colonialism": The South 
African. Case, in, Beyond the Sociology of Development Economy and 
Society in Latin, America and Africa. (ed. ) Oxaal, I., 
Barnet, T. and Booth, David. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975, 
pp. 244. 
4. See Harold Wolpe, op cit p. 231. 
5. Bluaner: views quoted by Harold Wolpe in an article entitled, "The 
Theory of Internal Colonialism, as in 3 and 4 above. 
6. See 5, op. Cit. - 
7. Casanova, P. G., "Internal Colonialism and National-Development" in' 
Studies in Comparative Development, Vol. I, No. 4,1965, p. 27 
8. This study has discovered that those Southern Sudanese who have been 
totally Arabized, cut links with their non-Arabized families because 
they are ashamed of themselves. In-the Arab community, they feel 
inferior and had to depend on Arab politico-religious leaders, 
spiritually and economiodly. The Arabized southerners had to adopt new 
Arabic names, new Arab dress, and a new lifestyle which reflects 
Arabic culture. In Gezira, some members of the Ansar who were 
Arabized had-to worship the Mahdist family, and had to hand over to 
the Mahdi family, children to work as if they were slaves. 
9. Melotti. Umberto, Marx and the Third World, Forwarded and (ed. ) by 
Malcolm Caldwell. MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1972, pp. 70-71 
10. See Umberto Melotti, op. cit. pp. 71-73. 
11. Baran, Paul. The Political Economy of Growth. Marzain and Mansell, 
N. Y., 1957. 
12. See Baran, Paul, op. cit, 
13. Mahmud, F. B., The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development Zed 
Books Ltd., London, 1984, pp. 94-95. 
14. See F. B. Mahmud, op. cit.. 
15. See F. B. Mahmüd, ibid. P. 38. 
16. Garang, Joseph. Economic Development and Regional Autonomy Khartoum, 
1971, p. 18. 
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17. See Joseph Garang, op. cit., pp. 20-32. 
18. See Joseph Garang, ibid., p. 24. 
19. See Joseph Garang, ibid. p. 22. 
20. See Joseph Garang, ibid., p. 30. 
21. See F. B. Mahmud, ibid., pp. 43-44. 
22. De Mobier, J. Garang. "Appeal to Sudanese People on the Founding of 
SPLA/SPLM, 3rd August, 1983, pp. 1-2. 
23. Lofchie, M. F., Zanzibar: Background to the Revolution as mentioned in 
2, ibid., p. 125. 
24. See Michael F. Lofchie, ibid. pp. 127-129. 
25. Yoha Abdel Gadier, Sudanese Personalities, forwarded by Abdel Rahman 
al Rafai, Khartoum, October, 1952 (in Arabic), pp. 30-34. 
Furthermore, the sectarian political parties have used all these 
Islamic propaganda to mobilize their supporters in the Sudan. 
26. It is common knowledge in Sudan that Rumbek and Juba which were 
established by the British Colonial Government were the only 
secondary schools in the South until the 1970s, when Malakal Senior 
Seconday (in Arabic) was opened. 
27. The problem of uneven development is a common problem in the Sudan, 
especially among the people of Southern Kordofan, Darfur, Southern 
Blue Nile, Beja areas etc. e. g. I. M. Kursany Q& Bashir Omer on 
Kordofan, Abdel Rahman on Darfur and Kordofan, have studied the 
subject. 
28. An interview with Dr. Mohammed Adham, the founder of the Black Bloc 
in 1938, Black Cooperative Society and the People's Democratic Party, 
conducted by the Author in Khartoum in November 1987. Dr. Adham told 
the author that those leaders of the White Flag League who were tried 
and executed were all non-Arab and non-Arabized Sudanese and that the 
only Arab sentenced to death (Al Bana) was released because he was a 
Government agent. This is contained in the Ewart Report, 1925 on the 
1924 troubles. 
29. The Closed District Ordinance was a law adopted by the British 
Colonial Gövernment to keep out both Arabs and suspected people from 
entering Southern and Northern Funj, Nuba Mountains and Southern 
Sudan. It was the Apartheid policy adopted for the Sudan, to isolate 
those areas considered by the British as troublesome areas. 
30. Abdel Rahman El Farah, Security Adviser, in the Umma Party, told the 
author that all members of Sudan Rural Solidarity are racist against 
Arabs and Islam, on 20.10.87 in Omburman. 
31. See Fatima B. Mahmud ibid. 
32. In 1968 eleven members of the Sudan Communist Party were expelled 
from the Constituent Assembly, because they had opposed Islamic Laws 
proposed by the Umma Party of Omdurman and by other Sectarian 
parties. 
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33. Most writers on Sudanese political history from the Arab and Arabized 
national group,. who had-discussions with the author refused to, 
consider the Arab invasion of 1350 as Imperialist and colonial 
expansion. They equally rejected the hypothesis that Arabs have been 
colonizers in Sudan, and they became Sudanese through intermarriage 
and became political leaders without force being used. 
34. See Table 1, third row, in Richard Lobban, "Sudanese Class Formation 
and the Demography of Urban Migration" in Helen I. Safa (ed. ) Towards 
a Political Economy of Urbaniztion in the Third World Countries, 
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1982. P. 67. 
35. Dr. Nuri Ahmed'of'the Department of Politics', University of Khartoum 
told the author that the coming of Arabs to Sudan was a blessing to 
primitive Africans. 14/5/87 in Khartoum. 
36. Interview with Abbass Fakir Saddiq's Adviser on the Southern Sudan in 
Khartoum, ibid. 
37. This viewpoint is held by members of the National Islamic Front who 
have argued this in their political rallies in Khartoum, attended by 
the Author - from June to October 1987. 
38. This point is discussed by several writers including Ushari A. 
Mahmud, Tim Niblock, Fatima B. Mahmoud just to mention a few. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE 
SUDAN 
2.1 Introduction 
The history of the Sudan, like the history of most African countries was 
documented by foreign explorers, both Muslims and Christians, slave 
traders, Western Europeans, Americans, Arabs etc., whose objectivity was 
apparently doubtful. Most of those foreigners involved, did not know the 
African languages, let alone their cultures. Therefore, the historical 
accounts which form the basis of the contemporary Africa, with Sudan 
included, should be treated as unreliable, because the early explorers or 
writers lacked inside information or depth of knowledge of local history 
or customs. Most of the documented materials were misleading. For 
example, the claim that the African continent has no history is 
sufficient evidence of European, American and Arab prejudice against 
African people. 
Before the coming of colonial forces, whether Arab or European, Africa 
was most probably a land of plenty, justice, freedom and relative 
equality. 1 Africa had its own civilization and powerful empires. But all 
these were destroyed by the Arabs, and their European collaborators or 
allies, when they were seeking gold, labour (slaves) and various 
materials or goods in order to diversify their economic resources which 
forced them to invade and colonize other countries which they were able 
to defeat. 
The defeat of Africans by well-armed Arabs and Europeans led to the 
colonialization of Africa and devastation of its human and material 
resources for several years. 2 The penetration of all these foreigners led 
to the institutionalization of the slave trade, and the emergence of 
merchant classes, landlords and foreign religious sects and institutions 
with Christianity and Islam as dominant features of the colonial legacy 
in Africa. 
The establishment of white and Arab settler colonialism together with 
various institutions, marked the highest stage of Arab and European 
imperialism in Africa and other continents. 
Under-development, uneven development and regional inequalities in Africa 
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was created by the above-mentioned settler colonizers including the 
whites in Southern Africa and Arabs in Sudan, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia, 
Morocco etc. where indigenous people are second class citizens, the 
majority of which are destitute. 
This chapter attempts to show the development of Arab Settler 
colonialism, and the emergence of Arab hegemony in Sudan, with the help 
of Anglo-Egyptian colonization. The role of British colonialism in the 
penetration of capitalism and liberal democracy will be analysed. 
2.2 Political Geography of the Sudan 
The Sudan is the largest country on the African continent, of nearly a 
million square miles, with a population of nearly 22 million. Like the 
rest of African countries, the present boundaries which constitute the 
modern Sudan were created by the British colonial authorities in 1903. 
They were not created to serve the aspirations of all national groupings 
which constitute the current population of the Sudan. But they were drawn 
up on the basis of mere administrative convenience and economic 
interests. 
3 As a result the people who originally constituted the 
population of this place "Sudan" were fragmented and many tribes found 
themselves divided into two, each in a different country. For example, in 
the Southern Sudan such tribes, like the Nuer, Anuak and Marle have some 
of their members annexed to Ethiopia and the Sudan as well. The Acholi, 
Madi and Kakuwa are also victims of the colonial random policies with 
some of their members divided into two, some in Sudan and others in 
Uganda, while Zande tribes have similar experiences, some in Zaire and 
others in Sudan. In Eastern Sudan, some of the Beja tribes are also 
victims of such division with some of their members in Ethiopia, while 
others are in Southern Funj. At the same time, the Southern Funj tribes 
are divided into two, with some in Ethiopia and the majority in the 
Sudan. 
Equally, true are the names which were used by various foreign invaders, 
merchants and travellers to describe the people of Africa and various 
regions. For example, Congo (now Zaire), Gold Coast (now Ghana) and many 
others had different names before colonialism and during it and after 
independence. The Sudan or its regions had different names before Arab 
colonialism. Due to a lack of proper historical records on various 
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regions of the Sudan, the author was unable to give specific names for 
the Southern, Eastern and Western Sudan which were used during or before 
the mercantilist period. 
However, history tells that the EgyptianSprobably were the first to have 
contacted and influenced people of the Northern region (ie. Nubians), 
which was called 'Tanchsu', which meant the land of 'Nahasu', a name 
still being preserved in Dar al Mahass among the Nubian until now. 4 The 
same history tells us that both the Greeks and Romans who conquered Egypt 
and extended their occupation into Nubian and the Funj kingdoms called 
the area 'Ethiopia' a name which was used to cover areas from Egypt, 
Northern Sudan and present day Ethiopia. 5 
The present name 'Sudan' is usually traced back to the slave and 
Mercantilist period which the long distance Arab traders and slave 
raiders called this area 'Bilad al Assudan' which simply meant in 
Arabic the land of the 'Blacks'. 6 This term was probably used as early 
as ten or more centuries ago and was specifically used to describe the 
belt of African territories lying South of the Sahara desert and 
extending from Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean and not referring to the 
present modern Republic of the Sudan.? 
In its modern sense the term Sudan (or the British Sudan) was given 
following the Anglo-Egyptian conquest in 1898, while other territories 
under French colonialism were named as the French Sudan, which included 
the present Mali, Chad)Central African Republic, Guinea, Senegal, Benin 
etc. After independence the name Sudan became the official name of the 
country, which geographically has borders with eight countries, ie. in 
the East Ethiopia and the Red Sea, in the North Egypt, in the North-West 
Libya, in the South Kenya, Uganda and Zaire, and in the West Chad and the 
Central African Republic. 
2.3 Political Importance of Population in the Sudan 
A reading on the contemporary development of Sudan has indicated to the 
author that demographic investigations and analysis especially during the 
last census of 1983 are of great importance to both public and the neo- 
colonial Islamic state. In the Sudan there has always been three or more 
basic reasons for regarding the results of any census as being very 
important. The first reason has been that both the dominant ruling class 
and the national policy makers have tried to impose an Islamic 
Univer ; 
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constitution because they claim that Muslims are the majority as shown 
by the census of 1956 and the others which followed later. Since those 
who had inherited political and economic power from the British Colonial 
State have to justify and legitimize their continuous domination, 
exploitation and oppression of the masses. This was done by claiming that 
the Sudanese Society and country are politically divided into two, South 
and the North, Muslims and non-Muslims (or Christians), or into Arabs and 
Africans. 
8 
Here the North which is claimed to include East, West, North 
and Central Sudan is regarded as Muslims'., and Arabs', region, who are also 
considered as majority, while Southern Sudanese are regarded as mainly 
Pagans with strong Christian political leadership and the population in 
this area is considered as minority. 
9 
It therefore follows that since the majority population in the Sudan are 
Muslims the national constitution should reflect their interests and 
beliefs (ie. political cultures based on Sharia), and that also the 
Sudanese government or state should be under the control of Muslims who 
constitute majority in the national parliament or constituency assembly, 
and the minority should abide by the views 'of the majority. ' 
10, 
The second. important reasons are the. cultural and racial elements. 
Although the Sudan is generally described by, foreign observers andsome 
scholars as multi-cultural, multi-racial,, multi-linguistic, multi- 
religious, multi-ethnic, multi-tribal or microism and macroism of Africa, 
the ruling class which is composed of dominantly Arab settlers and the 
Arabized riverian tribes has continued to claim that Arab culture and 
language should be the'only legitimate basis under which the contemporary 
Sudanese Society be built upon. 
11 It is argued that the term Arab-should 
not be limited to racial aspects but should be used in the-cultural 
context, whereby all those who are Muslims and have accepted Arab 
cultures should be regarded as'Arabs. Therefore those who are Muslims and 
speak Arabic, even as a second language, are-regarded as Arabs culturally 
and religiously. 
12 It'is from this assumption that the dominant ruling: 
class has justified their claim-that the Sudan is an Arab State. Volls 
has asserted that: 
".... the Northern parts of the Sudan had been incorporated into' 
the Islamic World by. the beginning of the 19th century. -Along 
with this process of Islamization was a parallel one of 
Arabization, so that despite the linguistic and ethnic 
diversity in the Northern Sudan (ie. East, North, Central and 
Western. Sudan inclusive), an Arabic-Islamic Society-emerged 
especially among the educated, portions of the population. "13 
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It is this 'educated portions' with massive financial and political 
support by all Arab countries under the leadership of Egypt, Libya and 
Saudi Arabia whose interests are served by the Arab settlers and their 
supporters or collaborators in the Sudan. 14 The success of Arab settler 
colonialism in the Sudan is measured by the extent to which their 
domination, exploitations and oppression is maintained and carried out 
with impunity if not with less cost. 
Furthermore, their success depends on how many more Africans or 
indigenous Sudanese rather could consider and continue to consider 
themselves not only Muslims but Arabs. Volls also pointed out that: 
"Most of the Sudanese political leaders (ie. from the North) who 
articulated Sudanese nationalist sentiments in the 20th century 
considered themselves to be Arabs. The common Arab heritage was 
one of the elements frequently cited by the proponents of the 
unity of the Nile Valley. These Arab Sudanese political leaders 
also dominated politics at independence. They brought the 
Sudan... into the Arab League. Within that framework the Sudan 
is an Arab country, although in strict ethnic historical terms 
the majority of the Sudanese are not Arabs. "15 
It is this fact that an Arab minority settler community who came to Sudan 
either as invaders, slave traders or merchants or religious teachers or 
semi-prophets, has established its authority with support of external 
powers (first Turco-Egyptians and the British) over the majority of the 
indigenous citizens. This established minority has again and again 
divided the majority using various means in order to maintain its 
hegemony over them. 16 
The third important reason is that the result of any census is used as a 
criterion for economic and socio-political development by policy makers 
and political leaders. There is a general belief among people from the 
most backward, poor and underdeveloped areas that they are so, because 
the government have made them that way. 17 The government of the Sudan is 
therefore regarded as northern controlled and dominated, which is there 
to serve northern interests. Even among the tribes from Western, Eastern 
and Central Sudan, who are usually claimed by the ruling national group 
as members of the Muslim community and ruling group this is the accepted 
view now. Here the leaders of the traditional political parties including 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Umma Party, National Unionist Party, etc., use 
census results to defend the concentration of development projects in 
Khartoum and central regions. The policy makers who are active supporters 
of the dominant ruling-class and who plan and implement policies which 
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perpetuate poverty and backwardness in the under-developed areas 
including the Southern Funj, Eastern, Southern and Western Sudan. It is 
these planners and executors who have been defending the uneven 
development policies by claiming that the North gets more share of the 
development schemes because its population is higher than other 
regions. 18 
According to the Solidarity Brothers' Report of 1981 all Sudanese 
governments, whether under military or civilian politicians, have used 
population classification (and distribution? ) as a criterion for the 
allocation of political and economic resources throughout the country. In 
theory, it is argued by planners, that the area with the highest 
population should receive more funds, more schools, more economic 
projects, more representatives in the parliament and in the cabinet, more 
officers in the army, police and prisons. Consequently, Khartoum, 
Northern region and the Gezira area as well, received and continue to 
receive a higher share of political and economic resources than other 
regions combined. 19 
It is for these important reasons and others, that the dominant ruling 
class had to control all the censuses and their results in order to 
manipulate them to serve its interests. The distortion of the census 
figures, according to Voll, is to make the Arabs the majority, so as to 
maintain their hegemony over the Africans. 
With the exception of the 1955/56, census which was conducted by the 
British colonial authorities and the Sudanese from the Arab oriented 
national grouping, which gave Africans 70%, Arabs including the Arabized 
riverian tribes 29% and others only 1%, was given to them. The subsequent 
censuses which were conducted by the dominant ruling class gave Arab 
ethnic groups 40% of the population, making them one single majority 
among a fragmented tribal groupings although Africans were given roughly 
60% of the whole population. 20 (See Tables 2.1,2.2,2.3 and 2.4. ) 
The ruling class, fearful of the African majority, adopted the (British) 
infamous policy of divide and rule towards Africans. Here the same census 
is used to describe or define (or group) the Sudanese into various tribes 
such as the Dinka, Nuer, Fur, Ingessa, Funj, Nuba etc., while the Arab 
oriented group has been treated as one single political and racial 
group. 21 It is this policy of divide and rule which has been responsible 
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TABLE 2.1: THE MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS IN SUDAN ACCORDING TO THE 1956 CENSUS 
No. Of Pop. in 1956 Total % Characteristics Main Location 
------------ 
Arabs 
----------- 
3,989,537 
---------- 
39 
--------------------- 
Varying admixture 
---------------- 
East-West 10 
Semitic; immigrant Degrees N. & 
and indigenous 16 Degrees N. 
Negroids and 
- ---------- 
Hamitic speakers. 
----------------- - ------------ 
Southerners 
---------- 
2,825,937 30 
---- 
Nilotic, Nilo- 
-- ------------- 
Three Southern 
Hamitic and Provinces 
------- 
Sudanic Negroids. 
----------------- ---- ----------- 
West Darfur 
------------ 
902,798 
--- 
9 
---- 
Indigenous 
- ----------- 
Western Dafur 
Negroids with some 
Hamitic and slight 
Semitic elements 
------------ 
Beja 
----------- 
623,528 
---------- 
6 
--------------------- 
Indigenous Hamitic 
---------------- 
Hills and 
speaking. plains between 
Nile and Red 
Sea 
------------ 
West 
----------- 
592,450 
---------- 
6 
--------------------- 
Negroids immigrants 
---------------- 
Scattered 
Africans from Chad, Niger throughout 
etc. 
---- 
Sudan 
-------- 
Nuba 
----------- 
572,935 
---------- 
6 
--------------------- 
Indigenous Negroes 
---------------- 
Hills and 
Plains of 
Southern 
---- - 
Kordofan 
-- ----- 
Nubian 
------------ 
330,032 
--------- 
3 
--------------------- 
Negroid admixture 
---------------- 
Nile downstream 
with Hamitic and from 4th 
Semitic speaking cataract 
------------ ------------ - 
people 
Funj 173,548 
-------- 
1.7 
--------------------- 
Indigenous Negroes 
---------------- 
Abyssinian 
foothills and 
------------ ------------ --------- --------------------- 
Southern Gezira 
---------------- 
Included are also 156,009 West Africans with non-Sudanese Status; 37,697 
Sudanese of West African and Congolese origin and 648 Belgian Congolese. 
Source: Quoted by Prof. K. K. Prah, in "African Nationalism and the 
Origins of War in the Sudan. " in LOw\Journal Vol. 2,1986, 
Khartoum. 
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TABLE 2.2: NUMBER OF ARABS AND ARABIZED NORTHERN SUDANESE. WEST AFRICANS 
AND EUROPEANS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN, 1955/56 
-------------------- ------------------ 
Arabs and 
---------------- 
West 
------------------- 
Regional Arabized Europeans 
Northerners Africans 
-------------------- 
B. G. Region 
------------------ 
2,500 
----------------- 
1,280 
------------------ 
300 
Equatoria Region 1,560 840 966 
Upper Nile 
-------------------- 
7,070 
------------------ 
2,577 
--- - ------ 
650 
TOTALS 
-------------------- 
11,130 
------------------ 
- -- ---- 
4,697 
----------------- 
------------------ 
1,916 
------------------ 
Source: Prepared by the author from 1956 National Census taken by the 
Sudan Government. 
TABLE 2.3: RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN JUBA TOWN, 
1960/1971 * 
Class of Residential Area No. of No. of Others TOTAL 
Southerners Northerners 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1st Class: Tijara, Hay 
Jallaba, Juba one, 
Muwazin Cinema Hay Mataar 20 78 2 100 
2nd Class: Malakal, Nimra, 
Talata 15 84 1 100 
3rd Class: Alta, Bara, Buluk, 
Kosti, Kator, Maläuya, 
Kassaba and Saucra 45 54 1 100 
4th Class: Matar Ghabat, 
Mumaridin Batari police, 
Prisons 98 1.5 0.5 100 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Prepared by the Author based on estimates of the composition of 
urban population (Juba) before 1972. 
* Before 1972 over 90% of senior state employees in Southern Region were 
Northerners and 99% of merchants were Northerners in Juba, while 100% 
in most Southern towns. 
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TABLE 2.4: RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN JUBA 1974/82 
--------------------------- -------------- 
No. of 
--------------- 
No. of 
-------- ------- 
Class of Residential Areas Southerners Northerners Others Total 
--------------------------- 
z 
-------------- 
x 
--------------- 
-x 
-------- 
x 
------- 1st Class 
Ministerial Quarters 100 100 
Hay Mozafien I 99.5 0.5 100 
Juba University Staff 
Quarters 50 49.5 0.5 100 
2nd Class 
Hay Jallaba 5 94.5 0.5 100 
Hay Cinema 100 100 
May Matar 100 100 
Tijara 100 - 100 
Hay Malakal 90 10 100 
Malakiyu 80 20 100 
Nimr Talata 85, 15 100 
Muzafien II 100 100 
3rd Class 
Kosti 80 20 100 
Buluk 100 100 
Kator 98 2 100 
Hay Niem 98 2 100 
4th Class 
Ghabat 100 100 
Batari 100 100 
Police 100 100, 
Prisons 
i -, 100 100 Munguki 100 100 
Nyakure 100 100 
Army Quarters 40 60 100 
Atalabara 98 2 100 
Wildlife Quarters 100 100 
Hay Mumoradhien 
---------------------------- 
100 
-------------- -------------- --------- 
100 - 
----- 
Prepared by the Author, based on the study, conducted by Regional Ministry 
of Housing, Juba, 1982. 
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for various struggles between or among tribes, such as Dinka versus Baria 
or Mandari, Latuka versus Toposa or Didinga or Nuer against Shilluk or 
Zande against Dinka, or Nuba against Fur or Funj against Ingessna etc., 
which is more reflected in the division of the Southern region into 
three, namely Equatoria, upper Nile and Bahir El Ghazel regions in 1983. 
Furthermore, this policy of 'divide' and 'rule' affected the proletariat 
or the working class who were divided along ethnic, tribal and racial 
lines. 
The most tragic thing about the Arab and the Arabized poor is that they 
have been blindly supporting the sectarian Jallaba and political leaders 
regardless of the fact that they have suffered the same as other Sudanese 
from the most backward areas. K. K. Prah correctly pointed out that: 22 
"Indeed the tragedy of the Sudan is that many of those who claim 
to be Arabs are actually mainly Nubian Africans who have been 
culturally Arabized. " 
Indeed the divisions of Sudan society into various dichotomies has 
affected national integration and national building. Table I shows the 
main ethnic groups in Sudan according to the 1955/56 census prepared by 
the British Colonial authorities before political independence. 23 
2.4 Historical Background 
The Pre-mercantilist period 
The pre-mercantilist period or pre-colonial society in Sudan was largely 
a closed and traditional one, based on tribal chieftainships as a form of 
government, or small kingdoms, such as in the case of the Shuluk, Zande, 
Anuak etc. with rural subsistence economies or rainfed agricultural 
communalism, tribute paying, barter, animal breeding or pastoralist etc. 
There was no shortage of land, nor was there a market economy. 24 
The early kingdoms in Sudan and various tribal governments scattered over 
the vast land of Sudan did not attempt to, or were not able to unify the 
country and establish a single kingdom or an empire. 
History tells us about the ancient powerful kingdoms in Nubia, Funj and 
Darfur. The Nubian kingdom of Taraqah was reported to have conquered and 
colonized Egypt for a number of years. 25 But there are no available 
records indicating any attempts to expand towards Southern Sudan apart 
from slave raids. 
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The Greeks, Romans and the Egyptian colonial authorities, which colonized 
Northern Sudan, did not succeed in entering Southern Sudan, let alone in 
annexing it. The existing records show that the Turco-Egyptian 
colonialism was the first to extend its rule into Southern Sudan. 26 
Between the tenth and fourteenth centuries, only Northern and Central 
Sudan were converted to the Christian faith while most of Sudan remained 
pagan until the Arab invasion and colonization of Northern Sudan in the 
15th Century. 27 
As for the historical background of Southern Sudan, Sir Harold 
MacMichael, one of the leading administrators of the British colonialism 
in Sudan had this to say: 28 
... of the history of the Southern sphere, the home of the 
negro, nothing is known and little can be guessed, save that 
from the beginning of time. 
"... Tattooed cannibals danced in files.... 
"... And 'Blood, ' screamed the whistles and the fifes of the 
warriors, 'Blood, ' screamed the skull-faced, lean 
witchdoctors. " 
So the history of the Southern Sudan, like the history of Africa has 
suffered for some time from the ignorant assumptions held by most 
Europeans (especially the British writers) who wrongly "assumed that if 
the South has a past, it was not worth knowing. "29 Other authors who have 
not even tried to find out, assumed that it was not possible to know it 
and Arkell (another colonial administrator in the Sudan) "Boldly claimed 
that before 1821 the Southern Sudan had no history. "30 Douglas H. 
Johnson, himself a British scholar, in his The Future of the Southern 
Sudan's Past wrote: 
"The problem has not been so much the lack of a past as lack of 
sources giving the records of the past. With the creation of 
written records concerning the Southern Sudan during the 
Egyptian invasion of the Sudan, it is not so much the South's 
history that begins as its historian's interest in the Southern 
Sudan. "31 
Indeed the problem has not been the lacking of the past history but a 
lack of interest in the history of indigenous African people in the Sudan 
as a whole with the exception of Northern Sudan specifically the Nubia 
region from the first to the sixth cataract down to the Gezira region in 
Central Sudan. N. M. Sherif, Director General of Antiquities and the 
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National Museum of the Democratic Republic of Sudan has this to say: 32 
"With the exception of Northern Region (Dongola) research in the 
culture history of the different regions of the Democratic 
Republic of Sudan has long been hampered by various factors, 
mainly the personal motives of early archeologists who found 
their interest almost only in the Northern Region. The Southern 
Region until five years ago was in archeological terms "terra 
incognita. " 
The modern history of Sudan is therefore based on reports by European 
travellers, missionaries, colonial administrators and the Arab-Egyptian 
merchants, and governed by historians and archeologists who are friends 
and have an interest in the Northern region only (ie. Nubia). This was 
confirmed by Sir Douglas Newbold, who was Governor of Kordofan (1932-38) 
and Civil Secretary of the Sudan (1939-45) when he boldly made the 
following statement in a lecture delivered at the Arab Centre of 
Jerusalem in October, 1944, quote: 33 
".... whatever ethnologists may say, the Northern Sudanese regard 
themselves as Arabs in no uncertain fashion and I regard it as 
a privilege, and a repayment, of debt of friendship which I owe 
them to uphold their contention by concrete evidence at this 
Arab centre. " 
Whatever evidence that authors like Newbold may have, should be valued 
cautiously, for they carry personal bias, based not on any authentic 
facts. In other words, only the collaborators, who serve the interests of 
the colonial powers, are always treated as heroes, civilized and 
intelligent. Those who opposed colonialism and neo-colonialism are 
considered as primitive, and backward or savage and do not exist in the 
books of the colonial powers, whether the British or the Turco-Egyptians. 
They are only referred to when being used as an example of 'primitive' in 
the books of the colonial anthropologist, so the ancient history of Nuba 
mountains and the entire Southern Sudan, which for centuries resisted 
foreign penetration from the early centuries to the 19th century when 
they were finally subdued and colonized. 
Although there are no traces of ancient history of the Southern Sudan in 
history books before the coming of the Arabs, the Old Testament (the 
Bible) has recorded some contacts of the Nilotic tribes of the south with 
the ancient civilizations from the middle-East - especially the Jews. The 
Good News Bible (an American version) clearly asserts in Isaiah, Chapter 
18, verses 1-7 "God will punish Sudan" and in verses 1-2 it says: 34 
"Beyond the rivers of the Sudan, there is a land where the sound 
of wings is heard. From that land ambassadors come down the 
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Nile in boats made of reeds. Go back home, swift messengers! 
Take a message back to your land divided by rivers, to your 
strong and powerful nation, to your tall and smooth-skinned 
people who are feared all over the world. " 
and verse 7 says: 
"A time is coming when the Lord Almighty will receive offerings 
from the land divided by rivers, this strong and powerful 
nation, this tall and smooth-skinned people, who are feared all 
over the world. They will come to Mount Zion, where the Lord 
Almighty is worshipped. "35 
The only major weakness with the above-quoted passages is that it lacks 
specific dates including the year from which such contacts were made. 
Another weakness is that these passages do not show the length of time 
through which contacts between the Nilotics and the Jews was maintained. 
Furthermore, the passages do not show the extent to which the people from 
the Southern Sudan were integrated into that civilization, or they do not 
show the type of political and economic systems prevailing in this area 
during these contacts. 
Finally, whatever the Arabs, the Egyptians or others say about the 
history of the Southern Sudan, the truth of the matter is that the 
Southern Sudan does have a history. The main problem with this history is 
that the colonial authorities (whether Arabs, Egyptians, Turks or the 
British) were prejudiced by their racial dislike of all Africans which is 
explained by the absence of proper records of the African history and 
ancient civilization before the penetration of Arab and European slave 
raiders. 
2.5 The Mercantilist Political Economy I (from the 15th to 18th 
Centuries) : The origins of Arab settler colonialism in the Sudan. 
2.5.1 The Origins of Slavery and Oppression in the Sudan 
The history of Sudan is a record of foreign penetration, colonization, 
exploitation, domination and expropriation of Sudanese human and economic 
resources - whether by Romans, Greeks, Turks, Egyptians, British or 
Arabs. All the foreign colonizers' interests lay in extracting gold, 
ivory, rhinoceros kin and slaves. While Nubians qualified as slaves for 
Romans, Greeks and Turks, the black population in the Western, Central 
and Southern Sudan and Southern Funj were chosen by the Arabs, Egyptians 
and Syrians as ideal domestic servants after castration, if they were 
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male. A great number were used as agricultural labourers without rights, 
while a few went to serve in the army during the Islamic wars. 36 The 
Northern and Central Sudan had always been the first to be colonized. 
Under the Egyptians, Romans, Greeks and Arabs, different types of 
transformation were experienced. The Greeks and Romans, after converting 
Egyptians to the Christian faith, did the same in Northern and Central 
Sudan. Consequently, Western or Christian civilization was adopted by 
Nubian kingdoms of Alwa and Maqurra and the Funj kingdom of Sennar. 
European trade and system of economy and political structures were 
adopted in these regions. Markets, ports and money were all introduced 
and some kind of economic and educational system were also established. 37 
As for other regions, such as Eastern, Western and Southern Sudan, where 
colonialism did not penetrate, these remained unknown to foreign 
travellers, merchants and colonial administrators and were regarded as 
primitive, without any past history. 38 Since all people have a history, 
we regard the denial of the existence of a past history for some tribes 
or peoples in the Sudan as an act of ignorance or is a consequence of 
being influenced by racial bias or prejudice. 
Although slavery may have been practised in the Sudan before the coming 
of Arabs, during 12th or 13th centuries, it was either insignificant or 
limited in scope to the Northern and Western Sudan which were easily 
penetrated by foreigners. In any case, if it was practised, it did not 
devastate the population, as it did in the latter period of Arab 
penetration. Prof. Hassan, an authority on Arab penetration in the Sudan 
stated that: 
"Slave trade in Africa was under the control of Arabs, who became 
the wholesalers of African slaves and African products such as 
ivory, ebony, gold, skins, ostriches, gum etc..... "39 
Sudan was, therefore, a victim whose population was devastated by the 
Arab slave traders. Prof. Prah asserted that: 
of.... nearly six million slaves were exported to Egypt and Arabia 
including Turkey, and possibly to Europe. "40 
The Nubians and the Beja who were the first to suffer from the early 
slave trade conducted by the Arabs, Europeans, Egyptians and later the 
Turks, were able to resist and transferred the burden to Southern Funj 
and Western Sudan. 41 
While the Beja escaped to their mountains, the riverain tribes made 
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various deals with Egyptians first and later with Arabs, where they 
agreed to raid slaves and supply the Arabs and Egyptians with 350 slaves, 
and gold, ivory, ebony and rhinoceros horns all to be looted from 
Southern Funj, Western Sudan and this time from the Southern Sudan in a 
limited number. This marked the beginning of collaboration between the 
riverain Nubian tribes and all the slave traders which ended only with 
the abolition of the entire slave trade in Sudan by the British in the 
1920s. 42 
Between about 1300 and 1500 the Nubian kingdoms Funj kingdom and Western 
Sudanese tribal kingdoms or chieftainships were overrun by Arabs coming 
through Egypt and Arabia. 43 The first to be affected were the two Nubian 
kingdoms of Alwa and Maqurra followed by the Funj kingdom. The Bedouin 
Arab tribes which defeated both Nubian and Funj Christian kingdoms 
consisted of two groups, the Juhayna and Banail Kenz who were in the 
Eastern desert of Egypt as nomads, after the Arab conquest of Egypt in 
6th centuries. 44 These Arab tribes which had been raiding the Nubian 
tribes from first and second cataracts, for centuries, finally defeated 
the Nubian tribes in 1316. The Arab Sultan "Al Nasir Muhammed who 
captured King David of Maqqurra replaced the Christian king with a stooge 
weak Nubian tribesman who pretended that he was a Muslim. "45 This was 
followed by the conversion of the Christian cathedral into a Muslim 
mosque. The non-Muslim population was threatened, intimidated and those 
who resisted by violence were enslaved and sold. The population was 
forced to pay heavy tribute to the Muslim rulers. 46 
This period was marked by an influx of Arab nomads into the Sudan, 
raiding, looting, raping and stealing property and slaves throughout, 
until they were stopped by the Swamps and the Southern tribes in the 
frontline, ie. the Dinka, Nuer and the Shilluk tribes. 47 It was this 
period when other Arab pastoral groups such as the Kababesh and Baggara 
spread through the deserts of the western Sudan looking for grazing lands 
and they settled in Northern Kordofan and Darfur. 48 The Judham Arab tribe 
went as far as Karima. The latter waves of Arab nomads who were fleeing 
from Mamaluks of Egypt went further to the Savanna of Southern Kordorfan, 
Darfur and Wadai. 49 There were attempts to invade northern Bahr el Ghazal 
and a part of Dinka lands but the Arab nomads were forced to retreat. But 
slavery, looting of cattle remained the normal contacts between Arab 
tribes and Southern tribes. 
The effect of the Arab-controlled slave raids was the breakdown of tribal 
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cohesion. Many Dinka or Nilotic tribes were forced to immigrate to East 
Africa in 1500. The sections of Nilotic tribes such as the Acholi, Luo, 
Langi and many others left the Southern Sudan. Certain tribes had to flee 
into the swamps of Southern Upper Nile to escape slave raids. These slave 
raids and the looting of wealth continued until 1821 when Turco-Egyptian 
colonialism took the entire Sudan just to raid slaves, loot cattle, gold, 
ivory, gum, rhinoceros horns etc. 
According to Yusuf F. Hassan the Arabs and Egyptians brought the slave 
trade to Sudan as early as the 17th century. 50 The Arabs finally settled 
in Northern Sudan, it was the Arabs and Egyptians who brought the slave 
trade to Sudan as early as the 17th century. 49 The following section will 
trace the manner and ways used by the Arab conquerors to Arabize, 
Islamize and assimilate the Riverian tribes from Northern Sudan and how 
Beja tribes in the East and various tribes in Western Sudan were Arabized 
and Islamized and the extent to which the affected tribes benefited. 
2.5.2 Arab Settler Colonialism and the Process of Arabization, 
Islamization, and Assimilation in the Sudan 
'Colonialism' is defined by the International Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences as "the establishment and maintenance, for an extended time, of 
rule over an alien people that is separate from the subordinate to the 
ruling power. " While 'colonialization' is described as being the 
"settlement abroad of people from another country to a foreign country as 
in the case of white settlers in South Africa, British in America, Arabs 
in Zanzibar before the "revolution. " Colonialism is therefore identified 
with the rule over peoples of difference race, inhabiting 
"lands separated by salt water from the imperial centre. More 
particularly, it signifies direct political control by foreign 
powers, the Arabs in the case of the Sudan. Some further 
features of a colonial situation are domination of an alien 
minority, asserting racial and cultural superiority over a 
materially, inferior native majority. "51 
The Sudanese Arab settler colonialism, like the white settler 
colonialism in South Africa, lacks the geographic separation of 
colonies from the imperial centre but can be at least partially 
brought within the colonial rubric because of the dominant group. 
"Arab, where as the majority who are ruled are of different race 
and colour and have been subject to various exploitation, 
domination and oppression by this foreign oriented elements who 
have claimed that Sudan is not only a Muslim country but Arab 
as well by the right of conquest and nothing else. "52 
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To understand this complex situation further, we must go back to 1500- 
1821 which marked the beginning of Arab settler colonialism in the Sudan. 
Historical records tell us that about 1300 and 1500 the Sudan (ie. 
Northern, Eastern, Central and Western Sudan) was overrun by Arab 
speaking Muslim tribes namely Juhyna and Banuil, Kanz, which after 
defeating indigenous kingdoms (ie. Maqurra, Alwa, Funj, and Darfur etc. ) 
destroyed Christian institutions and structures and power and replaced 
them with Arab-Islamic institutions and structures, which led to the 
emergence of Sultanates in Northern, Central and Western Sudan. Abu Baker 
el Obied in supporting evidence of Arab hegemonic penetration in the 
Sudan wrote: 
"The Arabs who came as conquerors and then as traders, were the 
most successful in settling in the North and interfered in the 
politics of the Northern Nubian Kingdom, which eventually 
disintegrated through Arab infiltration and marriage. The 
result of this was the total transformation of Nubian by the 
end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th centuries and the 
establishment in 1504 of the Islamic Kingdom of Funj which 
lasted until 1821. "53 
The establishment of Arab settler colonialism in the Funj Kingdom by the 
end of 1504 was indeed a great success for the Arabs who had a permanent 
problem of land shortages because of the deserts which had a limited 
capacity for grazing and cultivation. The influx of Arab pastoralists or 
herdsmen into Northern Sudan crowded the entire area and was only solved 
by further movement towards the centre and Western Sudan, where they 
could settle peacefully. 54 The Arabs who wanted to get out of desert 
misery and poverty rushed into the Sudan and spread all over the Eastern, 
Central and Western Sudan, plus the Southern Funj. The only places where 
the Arabs failed to penetrate and settle were the Nuba mountains and 
Southern Sudan. The Arabs were met with strong resistance by powerful 
Nilotic tribes which include Dinka, Nuer and Shulluk, and which forced 
the Arab nomads to retreat towards the Western Sudan. 55 Darfur and 
Kordofan were mostly affected by Arab penetration. The indigenous tribes 
were displaced from their lands and most of them became landless. The 
dominant modes of production continued to be subsistence agriculture, 
pastoralism and accumulation through looting, extracting gold, ivory etc. 
from the local population. Slave raids became the normal relations or 
contacts between Arab settlers in what is loosely called Northern Sudan 
which includes Northern, Eastern, Central and Western Sudan and Southern 
Funj. The Nuba Mountains and most of Southern Funj tribes were able to 
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stop Arab settlement in their areas until the Turco-Egyptian forces 
finally defeated them. Even so, their resistance continued. Consequently, 
Arabization and Islamization were limited to the so-called Northern 
Sudan. 56 
Through looting and raiding indigenous Sudanese people, the Arab invaders 
were able to accumulate great wealth and power in the Sudan. 57 The Arab 
merchants imitating what prophet Mohammed the founder of Islam had done, 
claimed to be prophets in their own world of operation. Prophet Mohammed, 
who was himself a merchant, was regarded as a symbol of the Muslim 
Community's unity, and likewise, several commercial centres were set up 
by the Arab settlers, most of whom claimed (as they still do), to be 
descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. 58 Instead of converting people to 
Islam, the raiding of slaves, looting of gold, ivory, rhinoceros horns, 
ebony and hides, and confiscation of land and other property (including 
cattle) became the normal practice of the Arab settlers. 59 
Then the Arabs imposed Islam and Arabic culture. Local cultures and 
beliefs were destroyed by force. Wendy R. James in her study of Southern 
Funj tribes observed that: 60 
"the people of the Southern Funj, in all their variety, their 
formally incompatible principles of social organization and 
their antagonisms are .... being drawn into one social framework: that of Islam, Arabism and the economy and politics 
of the state. " 
James went on to describe how the processes of Islamization and 
Arabization in the Southern Funj was carried out, and she wrote that: 
"the existence of a network of immigrant Northern Sudanese who 
spend most of their lives in small villages or communities and 
who dominate them in economic and political terms.... has 
affected local people and made them to identify themselves with 
culture and norms of the dominant Arab group. "61 
James further states that: 
"it is the village merchants who control a great deal of the 
affairs of the rural Sudan as a whole. .... where local people 
are so divided and so unsophisticated in monetary economics and 
national political affairs, it is the immigrant trader who 
becomes extremely influential, in local and national 
affairs. "62 
The Northern traders though of little education themselves use money to 
win friend and converts to Islam and in James' words, the Arab traders 
who are hard working men in their line of production were 'generous and 
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sociable and often speaking local languages; ' which won them friends too. 
Marriage was and still is another important aspect of the process of 
Arabization and Islamization. James assets: 
"By such means as establishing marriage ties, generous credit 
facilities and hospitality, the merchants often acquired 
friends and allies among the local Umda, Shaykhs (Arab titles 
adopted locally) and other important men. Many of the latter 
adopted Islam and Northern habits of dress and so on, to 
increase their own standing with the merchants. The 1968 
elections in the Kurmuk District was almost entirely run by 
merchants and those they had supported and pressed into.... "63 
The importance of the above quoted passages is that they have shown 
exactly how Arab settlers and the Arabized Riverain tribes, have 
penetrated, dismantled or destroyed local political cultures and economic 
institutions in various regions and replace them with Islamic and Arab 
institutions and structures. The above-mentioned quotation further 
highlighted the trends through which both Arab settlers and Riverain 
tribes from Nubia region continue to operate in order to establish their 
political and economic hegemony over the majority of the Sudanese 
people. 64 
Unlike the white settlers in Southern Africa whose philosophy is based on 
the so-called 'Apartheid', Arab settler colonialism, like the French, is 
based on assimilation and integration of the colonized people, who are 
regarded as having inferior cultures, religion, economic and political 
systems, which should naturally be replaced by the Superior Arab 
cultures, religion and political system. 65 The Arabs who came to Sudan as 
invaders, teachers, merchants continue to claim that it is their duty to 
civilize the Africans from the jungles, by converting them to Islam and 
later to Arab culture. 66 
Finally, between 1500 and 1800, the Arab settlers were able to establish 
three Sultanates, Darfur (in the Western Sudan), the two Sultanates of 
Dongola and Soba or Alwa, and the most powerful of them all - Funj 
Sultanate of Sennar, which briefly conquered both the Nubian Sultanates 
and Darfur before its own collapse in the 18th century. 67 Besides the 
sheikdoms established everywhere, there were merchant centres in all the 
areas where Arabs have been able to settle. In short a primitive 
capitalist class emerged which controlled 90% of wealth, including 
slaves, cattle, lands etc. 68 The indigenous Sudanese, with the exception 
of the Riverain tribes, were either forced to flee into Swamps in 
Southern Sudan or the mountains of Nuba or Ingessna to escape slavery, 
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domination, exploitation and oppression. 69 In addition to this group, 
well established Islamic religious sects, all under the leadership of 
Arab settlers, assumed the position of 'prophet' (Even today these people 
can be found. ) These prophets or Fakis were both political and religious 
activists, who spread Islam and Arabization, consigning those who 
resisted to slavery. 70 
As the Southern Sudan, Nuba and Funj tribes who vigorously resisted Arab 
penetration, became natural enemies of Islam and the Arabs. Consequently 
the people of Southern Funj, Southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains were 
regarded as a natural slave reservoir for the Arab settlers and their 
collaborators, until the Turco-Egyptian Conquest in 1821. 
2.6 The Mercantilist Political Economy II: (1821-1881) 
Turco-Egyptian Colonialism: Its Aims and Strategies 
Although by the 1820s Arab settler colonialism was fully established in 
Northern, Eastern, central and a great part of Western Sudan, there was 
no central authority or government nor a centralized political centre 
under which the three Sultanates were managed or governed. 71 Each 
Sultanate was run independently under an Arab Sultan. In other words, the 
Sultans did not try to develop a unified nation-state in spite of the 
fact that they did not lack cultural or linguistic homogeneity in order 
to achieve statehood, as was the case in Europe. The Arab merchants were 
primarily interested in slave raids, cattle raids, gold, theft or 
looting. In short economic raids with slavery as a strong component were 
their aims, rather than the development of a modern nation. 72 Therefore, 
the whole area was segmented and divided into various sheikhdoms under 
Sultan or Islamic religious and commercial leadership. Major trading 
networks were established in these regions (Central, Eastern, Northern, 
and Western regions), which are now loosely described as the Northern 
Sudan. 
The Funj rulers of the Sennar sultanate, once they had spread their 
authority over most of the Northern Riverain Sudan in 1504-5, developed a 
system of Administered trade with the outside world. 73 The type of trade 
which was practised was largely based on slaves, gold, gum, skins, ivory, 
rhinoceros horn, civet, ostrich feathers, all. of which were exchanged for 
European and Egyptian goods which included clothes, perfume, camels, 
spices, soap, sugar and cotton manufactures. Trade with the Egypt-Arab 
Peninsula, India and the Indies was carried on through the Red Sea port 
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of Sawakin and while trade with Egypt was carried on by way of the desert 
caravan routes. 74 
Besides the administered international trade which was monopolized by 
Sultans and their supporters, domestic trading with subsistence 
commodities was also organized under Arab monopoly to accumulate local 
wealth. The main agricultural crops included sorghum and millet on 
rainfed land and some cotton and dates in the Northern, Central, and 
Western Sudan. 75 So when the Turco-Egyptian soldiers invaded Northern 
Sudan it was found that there was a loose confederation of Sultanates, 
run by Arab settlers who were more interested in trade than in the 
establishment of a modern nation-state. 
Finally, like all colonialists or imperialists, the Arabs were much more 
concerned with exploitation and expropriation of Sudanese material and 
human resources in order to serve exclusively Arab interests. Examples of 
similar experiences to the Sudanese case include Zanzibar and some West 
African countries like Senegal, where Arab settler colonialism was 
rejected and reduced to an Arab legacy in the form of an Islamic culture 
and religion, which, in reality, are nothing more than Arab cultures and 
customs. 
Therefore, the origin of the modern Sudanese state can be traced to 
Turco-Egyptian colonialism under Mohammed Ali Pasha, the Viceroy of 
Egypt, who conquered the Sudan in 1821. Turco-Egyptian colonial 
authorities in the Northern Sudan were able to integrate Eastern Central 
and Western Sudan without much resistance from the Arab settlers who were 
both commercial and political leaders at that time. As for the Southern 
Sudan, it took the Egyptians nearly half a century to penetrate Southern 
Sudan, ie. Bar El Ghazel, Upper Nile and Equatoria regions. 
But the important point to make here is that the Turco-Egyptian 
authorities were able to establish a central authority in Khartoum, from 
where all the regions were governed, with an effective administrative 
set-up in the Northern Sudan (ie. Khartoum, Gezira and the Eastern 
Sudan). Other regions, such as Southern Sudan, Southern Funj and Nuba 
Mountains resisted both Arab and Turco-Egyptian imperialism and 
colonialism, were subsequently subjected to organized slave raids and 
looting. Both Arab settlers and the Riverain tribesmen who had 
surrendered or succumbed to Turco-Egyptian exploitation, domination and 
oppression where they benefited first financially and later politically. 
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The Arabs and Riverain tribes became collaborators and power sharers 
before the end of Turco-Egyptian colonialism in 1881.76 
Mohammed Ali's main objectives for invading and conquering the Sudan were 
three: political, economic and territorial expansion. Politically, 
Mohammed Ali wanted to build his own independent power base and an 
independent country 'Egypt' from the Ottoman Empire. Ali's second 
objective was the need to have viable economic and material resources. 
Sudan was therefore to offer Mohammed Ali her gold, ivory, skins, ostrich 
feathers, gum, cotton, grain and most of all, slaves, who were to become 
the basis of his army for his new country. The conquest of a large 
country like the Sudan with its immense wealth satisfied Mohammed Ali's 
ambition which was his third and final objective. 77 
This period was marked by two developments, the first being the 
intensification of the slave trade or raids into Southern Sudan, Southern 
Funj and Western Sudan, especially the Nuba mountains. The Riverain 
tribesmen and Arab settlers participated in the slave trade vigorously, 
as agents for the Turco-Egyptian authorities, capturing 10,000 slaves 
annually for Egypt alone. Many tribes were almost extinguished, such as 
the Balanda, Bongo, Kerisch in the Southern Sudan who were decimated. 
Others in the Southern Funj and Nuba Mountains suffered a similar fate 
and perhaps suffered even more. 78 
The second important development marking Ali's period was the 
consolidation of Arab settler colonialism in the Northern, Western, 
Eastern and Central Sudan, which had been in progress since the 15th 
century. In addition, Mohammed Ali's authorities in the Sudan were able 
to introduce modern capitalist agriculture in central Sudan for 
cultivation of cotton, sorghum, millets etc. Influential Arab and 
Riverain tribal families were given large tracts of land in return for 
their support or cooperation with the regime. All collaborators with 
Turco-Egyptian colonialism were granted several privileges, ranging from 
land, positions in government departments to property. Most of these 
privileged people became overlords to the poor whose lands had been 
stolen. 79 
The Turco-Egyptian colonial administration by 1850 had subjected the 
Northern, Eastern, Central and Western Sudan to heavy taxation, tribute 
paying and other exploitative practices. Peasants suffered most, for 
their lands were confiscated and given to supporters of the colonial 
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government and from there they were forced into serfdom under the new 
landlords. 80 Since one of the main aims for conquering the Sudan was to 
loot and plunder the wealth of the country, raids were increased, 
exploitation of gold, ivory, rhinoceros horns, gum etc. was also 
increased. Samin Amir described the Turco-Egyptian colonialism in Sudan 
from 1821-1881 as a pre-capitalist imperialism of an oriental 
mercantilism that adopted a process of primitive accumulation similar to 
that of the European mercantilism. Amin stated that: 81 
"In the conquered zones.... The Egyptian army destroyed the old 
chiefdoms and subjected the villages to taxes in kind (ie. 
livestock, grain for the purpose of feeding the administration 
and the army of the conquerors. Sheikhs were created by the 
Egyptians and made responsible for tax collection. Some of 
these supporters became rich through wrongful accumulation of 
wealth and stealing of best lands from the indigenous masses. 
Thousands of peasants were taken away and attached to the lands 
of Egyptian Beys as half slaves and serfs. Three quarters of 
the slaves raided and wealth looted were taken to swell the 
Egyptian treasury. The peasant hunted (as slaves) by the Arab 
nomads and impoverished by the Sheikhs, flocked to the market, 
towns, .... a craft industry, distinct from agriculture grew 
up. it 
Theobold asserted that: - 
to.... exploitation, slave raids and violence remained throughout 
the Turco-Egyptian administration, which the colonial 
government used to impose its policies on the local tribes as 
well as Arab settlers. "82 
Consequently, the existing slave raiders or traders, plus the new 
arrivals became very rich. The merchant class, the landlords and the 
Egyptian soldiers also became rich, leaving the majority of the 
indigenous population either serfs, slaves, landless or poor. 83 
The Turco-Egyptian administration which was desperately looking for more 
wealth failed to develop productive forces and this placed a limit on the 
degree of exploitation. But instead of encouraging the development of 
productive forces, they increased the practices of slave hunting and 
heavy taxation. In that the Turco-Egyptian authorities were able to use 
one faction of the peasants against some others. 84 
The Arab settlers and Arabized Riverain tribes participated in the slave 
and other types of'raid. The whole slave trade/raids were devolved on to 
the Arabized tribesmen. Consequently, the intensification of the slave 
trade had led to the emergency of a powerful slave owning class and slave 
traders. 85 Many Arab settlers and Arabized Riverain tribesmen were able 
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to establish big slave-trade enterprises. 
"Up to 1850 it was the Egyptian Army itself that hunted for 
slaves and robbed the Sudan of local products. After that date, 
the soldiers handed the job to Sudanese nomads, particularly 
the Baggara, who sold the slaves they seized to Turkish, Copt, 
Syrian and European merchants established under the aegis of 
the Khedive. These operations quickly entailed changes in the 
social system of the nomads concerned, their clan organization 
was succeeded by 'nomad feudalism', founded on a territorial 
basis, and dominated by warrior nobles. "86 
Samuel Baker estimated the number of slave traders to be 1500 by 1867. 
The Turco-Egyptian administration which had feared the rising power of 
the slave traders had tried to curtail their power, without much success. 
The slave traders who became powerful then defied the Turco-Egyptian 
authorities. 87 In Bahr el Ghazal region a notorious powerful arabized 
riverain tribesman, known as Zubier Rahama led an army of slaves and 
defeated government forces. The government was forced to recognize him as 
governor of Bahr el Ghazal. Zubier extended his influence over Darfur 
after first defeating the Chief of the Rizigat tribe in Southern Darfur 
and later defeating the Sultan of Darfur and conquering El Fashir in the 
name of the Turco-Egyptian administration. Zubier was deceived and came 
to Khartoum, where he was forcefully deported to Egypt, because it was 
feared it would create more problems for the Turco-Egyptian colonial 
authorities. 88 Although Zubier's son Suleiman tried to manage and 
maintain what his father left him, he was defeated and killed by the 
colonial forces. But his stepbrother, Rabin, fled with a faction of slave 
traders and their army of slaves to Chad, where he formed a small Kingdom 
that later withered away. 
Of course there were many powerful slave traders like Zubier and family 
who strongly resisted Turco-Egyptian domination, and the new policies 
that were against human trade - 'slavery' - and other inhuman practices, 
and who tried to transform their slaves into serfs, following the drop in 
prices for the slaves, which also led to the narrowing of the market 
capacity. Furthermore, the strong resistance to slave raiders in the 
southern Sudan made slave trade too risky and very expensive to run. 89 
Another important aspect of Turco-Egyptian colonialism in the Sudan was 
its change of policy towards the slave trade itself. The British who had 
a strong influence in Egypt pressurized the Egyptian leaders to abolish 
the slave trade in the Sudan, which was accepted and executed. The 
dismantling of the slave trade and its established institutions, which 
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the Turco-Egyptian authorities had helped to build up was a tremendous 
undertaking, but the freeing and emancipation of all slaves within the 
Turco-Egyptian domain and their transformation into equal citizens 
provoked widespread hostility among the Arab settlers and Riverain 
tribesmen of Northern Province, who had been benefiting from the inhuman 
and infamous business for centuries. 90 So the struggle between the Turco- 
Egyptian and the so-called Sudanese nationalists began. The Turco- 
Egyptian authorities on the other hand, turned their freed slaves into a 
cheap labour-force for agricultural production. The abolition of the 
slave trade was not fully implemented for the slave trades could use 
various means to procure slaves. Therefore, to a great extent both the 
British and the Egyptians had to use soldiers in order to control raids. 
The abolition of the slave trade in the Sudan did not affect the incomes 
and profits of slave traders alone. It equally affected the revenues of 
the Turco-Egyptian colonial state. Consequently, the state was forced to 
increase taxes, duties, fines etc. on both rich and poor alike. 91 The 
effect of heavy taxes, the abolition of the slave trade and the 
curtailing of power of both Arab settlers and Arabized Riverain tribes 
was the political and economic crisis which eventually precipitated 
violent confrontation between the Turco-Egyptian and the Arab settlers 
and the Arabized Riverain tribes which culminated to the overthrow of the 
Turco-Egyptian colonial state in 1881 by a collection of various groups 
ranging from dissatisfied slave traders who had lost their only source of 
income, the peasants who felt alienated after their lands were stolen, to 
politicians who felt that Turco-Egyptian authorities had deprived them of 
their political and religious supremacy, plus various financial benefits 
which go with such positions and others especially the slaves and the 
poor who were deceived that they will be free when Turco-Egyptian 
colonial power was removed. 92 
Finally, Turco-Egyptian colonialism before its overthrew by the Mahdi 
forces had established some local industries such as indigo, iron and 
gold miners and textile mills which created modern forms of capitalist 
ownership in the productive section but only among the Egyptians, Arab 
settlers and a few Arabized Riverain tribes. The introduction of large 
farms throughout the Central region and Commercial Centres led to the 
emergence of a capitalist or a commercial class and rich landlords. 93 
On the other hand many indigenous people, especially from Eastern, 
Western, Central and Southern Funj and Southern Sudan were destitute, 
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landless and poor. Here are the roots of uneven development, regional 
inequalities and under-development which face the contemporary Sudanese. 
The Mahdi State, Anglo-Egyptian colonialism and the later post- 
independence regimes ruled the Sudan, and adopted most of the trends 
which were introduced by Turco-Egyptian colonialism, especially the 
collaboration of both Arab settlers and Riverain tribesmen in 
exploitation, expropriation, domination and oppression of people from 
eastern, Western and Southern Sudan and Southern Funj as well. The 
following pages will focus on the role of the Mahdist State in the 
development of under-development, uneven development and regional 
inequalities in the Sudan from 1881-1898. 
2.7 The Mercantilist Political Economy III: (1881-1898) 
The Mahdist Revolution: Objectives and Strategies 
The origin and the objectives of Mahdist revolution are largely open to 
debate, especially when the functions and the practical activities of the 
movement are critically examined. Of course this matter is made more 
complicated when the motives of most vocal and ardent supporters are 
examined also. To its supporters and beneficiaries, Muhammed Ahmed was "a 
leader of the revolution, a father of independence a nationalist leader 
who united the Sudanese tribes in the name of 'Allah'. He drove out the 
alien rulers and landlords, and laid down the foundations of an Islamic 
nation-state. "94 For others within the same supporting group, Muhammed 
Ahmed was regarded and still is, as a (Majaddid) renewer of the Muslim 
faith. He who had come "to purge Islam of faults and accretions. " 
Muhammed Ahmed's repeated statements confirmed the above mentioned 
claims. Others took Muhammed Ahmed as a liberator who rose to destroy 
imperialism, colonialism, slavery and other inhuman practices which were 
inflicted on the Sudanese masses by Turco-Egyptian colonialism. P. M. Holt 
described all these beliefs as interpretation of the consequences of 
Mahdist revolt rather than an appreciation of his motives', which implies 
that there might have been hidden objectives besides the ones made public 
to Muslim community. 95 
The concept of Mahdism was probably introduced to the Sudanese by the 
Arab invaders, religious teachers, merchants and slave raiders through 
the barrel of a gun or sword or "the Daggers of Islam" or "the Quran". 96 
It is held by Muslims particularly Arabs, the race from which the Prophet 
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Muhammed emerged, that at a time of crisis in an Islamic Community, there 
is always a great hope that God would send a deliverer to redeem the 
people of 'Allah', who would either reform the existing society or 
replace it with a new, pure Islamic society where Sharia and the Prophet 
King rules justly and equally. 
97 
So after the death of Prophet Muhammed many Khalifas, reformers or 
Prophets emerged-The later reformers which appeared in the 18th and 19th 
centuries included Muhammed Ibn Abd al Wahhab the founder of the 
Wahhabist Movement in Arabia., P. M. Holt asserts that: -'8 
"At times of 'crisis-in the-Islamic world the appearance, of. a 
Mahdi, claiming 
divine sanction to overthrow the old order and 
set upon a new theocracy is not an uncommon development. " 
Holt goes on to say that: 
"Two medieval Mahdi had established durable political regimes 
Ubaydallah, the founder of the Fatamid dynasty in North Africa 
and Egypt in the 10th century and Muhammed Tumart whose 
followers, the'Almohads had conquered and ruled both-West 
Africa and Moorish Spain in the 12th century. There had been 
others more recently, including one who assailed and was 
defeated by Bonapag's French troops in Egypt at the end of 
the 18th century. " 
During the period of Muhammed Ahmed revolution, there were nearly a dozen 
religious sects established by the Arab settlers in the Sudan. Muhammed 
Ahmed himself belonged to one of these sects known 'as "Sammaniya" a 
Tariqa brought to the Sudan from Hejaz of Arabia in the 1770s. This 
religious sect became the basis of Muhammed's Movement. The 18th century 
which was seen as a period of revival of Islamic-growth, witnessed the 
emergence of several Tangs developed as cults around a religious leader 
who also had economic position in the local communities. 
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These Tariqas or religious sects in the Sudan were patronized by the Arab 
settlers with the exception of a few under the Arabized. Riverain 
tribesmen. It is through these Islamic organizations that the poverty and 
backwardness of the majority of Sudanese people were and still are being 
perpetuated. 
101 The founders and supporters of these religious sects were 
originally engaged in the slave trade which seribusly. devastated the 
Sudanese indigenous population before the abolition of slavery. These 
religious sects were and still are powerful, in that, their quarrel with 
Turco-Egyptian colonial authorities over the abolition of slave trade 
resulted in the overthrow of the entire system of government. 
102 The 
religious leaders were able to mobilize the oppressed to support the 
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anti-Turco-Egyptian movement hoping to benefit at the end of the 
struggle. In fact, after the overthrow of Turco-Egyptian colonialism only 
particular groups benefited and the oppressed continued to suffer as 
before, ie. slavery continued and the looting of the innocent population 
increased even more under the Mahdist State. 103 
On the other hand, viewed from the eyes of the oppressed, the exploited, 
the dominated or the raided tribes, the humiliated slaves, the landless 
serfs, the displaced peasants and the poor, Mahdist State was just 
another Arab ethnic-oriented organization whose leaders like Abdullah 
Ta'ashi, Zubier Pasha and others were anti-Egyptian, Turks and the 
British because the slave trade was suppressed. For others it was nothing 
but a fanatic Arab settler movement using non-Arab tribes especially the 
Nubian tribes in the North. 
Holt also sees so much weakness in the Mahdist Movement, especially when 
he pointed out that: 
".. . Abdallahi Ibn Muhammed, the son of the soothsayer of 
Ta'ashi, a tribe of Baggara living in the Darfur .... shared 
the expectation of the coming of the Mahdi, which was current 
in the Sudan (among the Arab oriented) in this period, and he 
had on one occasion hailed Zubier Pasha (another Dungulawi) as 
the Mahdi. But Zubier refused to accept the role and passed out 
of Sudanese history. Abdallahi coming to Muhammed Ahmed may 
well have been the decisive event in turning the Dungulawi 
teacher's thought towards assuming the Mahdism. In these years 
also Muhammed Ahmed made two visits to Kordofan and stayed a 
while in El Obeid, where political intrigue and resentment 
against the local administration were Life. "104 
Of course the fact that this idea of Mahdism originated from Arab 
circles, those whose interests and positions have been forcibly disrupted 
by the new masters, 'the Turco-Egyptian overlords', who found themselves 
alienated or displaced wrongly, were the first to support and fight for 
Mahdism, confirmed the existence of strong ulterior motives behind the 
Arab initiatives to create a new force (Mahdism) against Turco-Egyptian 
colonialism to enable them to regain whatever they had lost. It was after 
Muhammed Ahmed had accepted the position of Mahdi, that the struggle 
against Turco-Egyptian colonial regime started to gather momentum. 
Furthermore the fact that Abdallahi Ta'ashi an Arab immigrant and settler 
became not only Deputy to the Mahdi but took complete leadership after 
the death of Mahdi five years later, where he persecuted almost all 
Danagala leaders, could only explain the extent to which Arab settlers 
were and still are powerful. 106 It is perhaps this Arab connection which 
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induced all the leaders of the Mahdist movement to be pro-Arab, if not 
claiming to be Arabs themselves. It is equally because of this Arab 
connection, that most of non-Arab Sudanese became victims of Mahdist 
terrorism, particularly the people of Southern Funj, Southern Sudan and 
the Nuba mountains. The only beneficiaries of the Mahdist State besides 
Arabs, were the Riverain tribes from the Northern Sudan. 105 It is from 
this standpoint that many critics have concluded that the Mahdist 
uprising was nothing but an Arab conspiracy or planned strategy with the 
objective of regaining what they had lost which included political power, 
slaves and/or economic resources. 
Of course, we accept that the so-called Mahdist Revolution was after all, 
a rebellion organized by those who were opposed to the new policies 
banning the slave trade in the Sudan. The Author has tried to find the 
reason the Arabs had to choose a Dangala as a 'prophet or Messiah', when 
Abdallah al Ta ashi the architect of 'Mahdism' in the Sudan, could have 
proclaimed himself a 'Messiah'. There may be more than one answer to that 
enquiry, but my own interpretation is that the Arab settlers thought that 
they would not be able to command enough support from the indigenous 
Sudanese against the Egyptians if the Sudanese themselves were not only 
involved, but were the active ringleaders in the struggle. Besides the 
Arab settlers knew that the slaves, the peasants in the North and Central 
areas, plus the Southern Funj, the Western and Southern Sudanese tribes 
were against them as well. For their own role in the slave raids, and 
looting of lands and properties from the Sudanese people was great. In 
short, the Arab settlers knew that they were and still are aliens and 
colonialists themselves and therefore could not as yet assume being 
Sudanese until several years later when their political and economic 
power was well established as characterized by their control of the 
Sudanese State, and economy. William Deng Nhial stated that: 107 
"Arab settlers are able to get support from the Arabized Riverain 
tribes (ie. Damgala, J'alyin etc. ) because they shared and are 
still sharing common interests such as slaves, cattle, ivory, 
gold, rhinoceros horn etc. which the Egyptians were trying to 
monopolize so as to deprive the latter of their important 
source of profits. " 
From this passage, we can understand why the Arabs first approached 
Zubier pasha (one of the notorious slave traders from Dangala tribes and 
asked him to be a Mahdi, because Zubier had every reason to hate the 
Turco-Egyptians and the British following the death of his son, who was 
killed by the colonial state. Although for some reason unknown to us yet, 
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Zubier reluctantly rejected the offer and before he could change his mind 
he was forced into exile in Egypt and his Zaribas were finally destroyed. 
Again William Deng Nhial has this to say: 
"Although there has always been some conflicts between Turco- 
Egyptian colonialists and Arab settlers over boats, slaves, 
looted gold, ivory etc. for sometime, the relationship between 
both worsened when the old basis of cooperation and 
collaboration ceased to be profitable following the Turco- 
Egyptian colonial authorities' acceptance of the British demand 
to abolish slavery.... These policies affected directly the 
interests of both Arab settlers and the Arabized Riverain 
tribes. "108 
The Mahdist revolution from the start failed to liberate the real 
oppressed, the dominated, the exploited, the serfs the landless and the 
slaves. It also failed to unite even the so-called Northern Muslim 
community, let alone the animists or the pagan tribes of the Southern 
Sudan and Nuba mountains. 109 
The Mahdist Movement committed several mistakes which greatly affected 
its support. The first mistake is probably the identification of Muhammed 
Ahmed 'the Mahdi' not only with Arab world but claiming that he was a 
direct descendant of Prophet Muhammed of Arabia, the founder of the 
Islamic faith. The result of such a claim automatically identified the 
Mahdi with rich Arab merchants, slave traders etc. which have been 
exploiting, oppressing and dominating the indigenous tribes. Here the 
Mahdi was also quoted to have stated that his mission included the 
purification of Islam and to liberate all Muslims in order to establish a 
pure Arab Islamic Empire, from Sudan down to Egypt and the Arabian 
peninsula which of course exclude non-Muslims and Arab Sudanese. 11° 
The second mistake committed by the Mahdi was that his immediate 
supporters or followers consisted of looters, slave raiders and others. 
In other words, Mahdist supporters consisted of three main groups. The 
first one consisted of what Holt described as the genuinely 'pious men 
who were his disciples in a religious sense. ' But could such disciples 
like Abdallah Ta'ashi be regarded as a "genuinely pious man"? Albeit! It 
is difficult to accept that. The second group of supporters was composed 
of men of the Northern and Riparian tribesmen particularly Danagala, the 
Mahdi's own tribe and Ja'alyin plus Shagqia who are cousins to the 
Danagala, some of whom had emigrated to Western Sudan, Central and 
Eastern Sudan where they spread the message. Holt asserted that the 
Mahdist supporters included: - 
".... The Danagala and Ja'alyin of the dispersion who had settled 
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on the Southern Fringe of the Arab Sudan penetrated the White 
Nile and Bahr el Ghazal and worked as boatmen, traders and 
soldiers of fortune in the great opening up of the South. 
Directly and indirectly, the livelihood of many of them was 
connected with the slave trade and Gordon's policy, culminating 
in the harrying of the Jallaba, had struck at the roots of 
their prosperity. These men were neither theologians nor 
devotees but they cover their political and economic interests 
with a veil of religion, since the institution of slavery was 
not as such repugnant to Islam.... "111 
The third group which supported Mahdism, consisted of militant Arab 
settlers mainly the Baggara and their cousins the Ta'ashi, the tribe of 
Abdullahi Muhammed who ultimately took over the death of Mahdi in 1885, 
and became Khalifa. Both tribes traced their origins to one of the Arab 
tribes in Arabia, and which supported Mahdiya because of various benefits 
obtained through 'Jihad' (Holy War). Holt also pointed out that: 
".... the Baggara displayed another characteristic of nomads. 
Their support to the Mahdi was governed by short-term 
consideration, a campaign against a town or a rapid victory and 
seizure of booty was the limit of their willingness to 
participate in the Jihad. "112 
Perhaps the only genuine supporters were those peasants of non-Arab 
orientation who were also against Turco-Egyptian colonialism. Because of 
heavy taxes and looting of their property by government-controlled raids 
these peasants had hoped that the Mahdi rule would liberate and relieve 
them of all the injustice, exploitation, oppression and domination which 
they had suffered for generations but on the contrary, the Mahdi system 
reinforced the very suffering whereby many peasants lost to "Awalad al 
Bled" the true citizens. 113 
By such composition and support, the Mahdist revolution and its 
supporters should not continue to claim that it is a national movement, 
for it did not command the total support of the Arab settlers, let alone 
the non-Arabized Sudanese. 114 
In the Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains for example, the Mahdist 
Movement was just another foreign exploiter, oppressor and colonizer 
whose objectives were slave raids, and looting of ivory, gold and so on. 
Under Mahdiya, the Arab settlers and the Arabized Riverain tribes, were 
able to establish themselves politically and economically. Local 
industries were set up under the control of the rich Arab and Arabized 
tribes in Northern and Central Sudan. Furthermore, the Arabization and 
Islamization of many tribes from both Kordofan and Dar Fur were 
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completed. It was also during this period that most of the indigenous 
tribes in the Southern Funj, Eastern and Western Sudan were Arabized and 
Islamized. 115 
Finally, the Mahdist rule was not free from internal nepotism, tribalism, 
corruption, power struggle schism and racialism or ethnic conflicts and 
the exploitation of the masses and was bogged down by all these and was 
also exacerbated by mismanagement during the reign of Khalifa Abdallah, 
whose system of rule continued with policies which were first followed by 
Turco-Egyptian colonialism. 116 
Nevertheless, the short period of Mahdist rule (from 1881-1898) was 
characterized by excessive state intervention in the system of land 
tenure which was all in the interests of its supporters. That is to say, 
vast lands or territories were transferred from disloyal tribes or 
factions to loyal ones and consequently large areas of Arable land turned 
into waste, after the occupants had been either massacred or forced to 
flee or emigrate further south or on to the Nuba mountains. New farming 
methods were introduced, or a few industrial settlements were established 
at this period. The dominant modes of production, included subsistence 
farming, serfdom, tribute paying and slaves were the main labour force 
for the Arab settlers, and for most of the Arabized riverain tribesmen. 
The land distribution helped in the creation or the emergence of various 
classes among the Arabs and the Arabized tribes. Consequently semi- 
feudal, merchant, semi-capitalist and landless classes including slaves 
emerged. 117 It is these rich merchants, landlords and the like which 
later constituted the core of the current Sudanese bourgeoisie in the 
Sudan during and after Anglo-Egyptian colonialism. 118 
The history of the Mahdist state was full of crises most of which were 
within the making of the leadership and it was these crises that made 
Anthony Sylvester conclude that: 119 
"the record of their (Mahdist) years of Khalifa Abdallah's rule 
was appalling. What with wars, famine and pestilence, the 
population.... was estimated to have been reduced from about 8 
million to six. The dream of Mahdism was shattered. " 
It was therefore mismanagement within the system that contributed to the 
defeat of the Mahdist State in 1898, by the Anglo-Egyptian Forces, which 
led to the final disintegration and destruction of the entire system. 
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2.8 The Anglo-Egyptian Colonialism and the Penetration of 
Colonialism in the Sudan 
2.8.1 The British Colonial Policies and the Development of Contemporary 
Uneven Development in the Sudan 
The British colonial state from the start established its political and 
economic centre in Khartoum in the Northern Sudan. It was this area which 
first came under complete domination of Egyptians, Romans, Greeks, Arabs, 
Turks and finally the British. Like the Turco-Egyptian colonialism, 
Anglo-Egyptian colonialism, used the Northern Sudan as a base from which 
further territorial expansion took place. It thus provided the first 
sources of support for military conquests of other regions of the Sudan. 
Secondly, it was the prime experimental base for foreign exploitation, 
domination, expropriation, and oppression. It was in this area where 
capitalist production was not only first started but, it was the area 
where exploitation of human and economic resources was concentrated. Its 
fertile lands were converted into a commercial commodity to be sold and 
bought through the colonial state. John 0. and Sarah P. Voll confirmed 
this point when they wrote as follows: 
"Once the British had established military security, their first 
priority in the economic sphere was to provide security of land 
tenure in both rural and urban lands.... In the ordinances 
following reconquest two guiding principles were followed: 
first that no land sales would be recognized without a valid 
title and second, that continuous possession of lands created 
an absolute title. 
"The Titles of Lands Ordinance (1899) established Commissions in 
the various provinces to settle questions of landownership. In 
general, ownership was given to those who could demonstrate 
cultivation for several years: .... Lands for which there were 
no private claims were assumed to belong to the government an 
assumption formalized and extended by the Land Acquisition 
Ordination (1903) which allowed the government to expropriate 
any land, rural or urban required for a public purpose. "120 
By 1903, all the lands in the Sudan were legally either owned privately 
by individuals or publicly by the colonial regime. We also see that land 
became an asset and has value which could be exchanged in the market like 
any commodity. These ordinances or land laws were made and applied in the 
Northern Sudan only (ie. Northern, Eastern, Central and Western Sudan 
without Nuba Mountains). In the Northern Sudan, cultivators were 
recognized as landowners even in tribal areas as tribal lands were broken 
up into individually held plots. 121 By that practice alone, the whole 
North was transformed into land owners and non-land owners which is 
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actually a pre-requisite condition for capitalist development. 122 
In the Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains, on the other hand, land 
ownership was not legalized and where there were no land disputes, they 
were to be settled on a tribal basis according to local customs. 
The Central Region of the Northern Sudan was considered by the British 
colonial authorities as the best for their agricultural strategy. As 
such, agricultural development and as well as exploitation of 
agricultural resources was established there. Agricultural development 
under British colonialism took three forms: general agricultural 
extension efforts, pump schemes, and most important of all, the major 
irrigation projects. Agricultural extension work included modification of 
crop varieties, water projects and veterinary and forestry measures. 
Pumping schemes were initiated by the colonial state to irrigate the semi 
desert lands which were useless, since gains were more uncertain in the 
North. The establishment of pumping schemes encouraged the population in 
the North to move from subsistence production to commercial farming, 
which led to the development of markets for agricultural products. As 
directed by the colonial authorities, farmers were forced to cultivate 
cotton, as a major crop in their farms. 123 
The third important point in this scenario is the establishment of the 
Gezira Scheme, which was the largest British agricultural plantation in 
Africa. The Gezira scheme is over 2 million acres, stretching over a very 
large and fertile plain between the Blue and White Niles South of 
Khartoum. The scheme is state-run within the general framework of 
commodity exchange and it is, in this sense, a state capitalist 
enterprise. Labour power remains the major instrument of production, 
which is assisted by a large number of tractors. The number of tenants, 
who are permanently engaged in this scheme has been increasing throughout 
the years during and after colonial rule and stood in the 1980s at nearly 
1,300,000. At present it employs a labour force of about 100,000, 
covering both essential and permanent workers. The colonial authorities 
directed that cotton should be the main crop so that the British textile 
industry in England could be supplied with good quality fabric. 124 
The establishment of land ownership and the conversion of land into cash 
community marked the actual penetration of capitalism in the Northern 
Sudan. Capitalist penetration in the North was rapidly enhanced by 
establishment of railway lines in all major towns to link them with 
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Khartoum (eg. Darfur, El Obeid Kassala, Port Sudan, Wad Medani Atbara, 
Dongola, Wein). Furthermore, the establishment of the Gezira scheme which 
precipitated the emergence of various economies in the complete 
integration of the Northern Sudan into the world capitalist economy. In 
other words, large commercial or capitalist farms were established in the 
central Sudan and Northern Region as well, and consequently rich farmers 
and tenants emerged, together with large numbers of landless and 
agricultural labourers. 125 
This period was marked by the development of various social structures, 
characterized by the emergence of the capitalist mode of production in 
the North. Here the capitalist mode of production which is defined as an 
articulated combination of relations and forces of production is 
characterized by the existence of the following conditions: 126 
1. Production must take the form of commodities - ie. use value must be 
produced; 
2. Labour power is sold as a commodity by the proletariat; 
3. Labour power is divorced from the ownership of the means of 
production and reproduction, the ownership of these means is 
monopolized by the bourgeoisie; 
4. Socially necessary labour time takes the form of the production of 
wage goods by the proletariat; 
5. Surplus value is produced by the proletariat and reaped by the 
bourgeoisie and 
6. Surplus value is realized in the form of monetary profits after the 
sale of commodities in the market. 
It is the existence of most of the above-mentioned conditions in the 
Northern Sudan that clearly signifies various social and economic 
differences between regions, designated above as backward, under- 
developed and poor on one side and those developed and advanced on the 
other. That is to say, commodity production became dominant in the North 
especially when both colonial authorities and the Arab settlers had 
collaborated to exploit agricultural and human resources of the Sudan. 
While the other less developed areas were and still are dominated by pre- 
capitalist economic features, because the British had refused to exploit 
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their resources, claiming that it was more expensive to do so in the 
Southern Funj, Southern Sudan and many parts of Western and Eastern 
Sudan, than it was in Khartoum, Gezira, Port Sudan and Dongola 
regions. 127 
Industrial development under British colonialism was also concentrated in 
the North. The main purpose of British colonial capital's expansion in 
the Sudan was to make the country both a market for British finished 
goods and a supplier of raw materials to British Industry. The British 
colonial administration according to Dr. F. B. Mahmud was able to 
establish ten industrial establishments and only one was in Southern 
Sudan, while the remaining number was concentrated around Gezira, 
Khartoum and Port Sudan. These industrial undertakings (which included 
edible oil, textiles, hides, shoes, soap, syrups and squashes, 
confectionery etc. ) employed various technicians, skilled and unskilled 
labour or skilled labour in the North. Even the Nzara textile complex was 
under the management of Northern trained staff with labourers from 
Southern Sudan. The establishment of these industries marked the 
development of modern industry in the Northern Sudan. Consequently 
Sudanese labour became integrated into the international capitalist 
division of labour. 128 
Regional inequalities in terms of industrial development in the Sudan 
began during Anglo-Egyptian colonialism. After independence there were 38 
industrial establishments in the North, compared with only two in the 
South including the oil mill in Yirol and the Agro-industrial complex at 
Nzara which collapsed after independence. 
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Table 2.5 shows the allocation of development funds in Southern Sudan 
under three investment programmes implemented by the Sudan Government 
between 1946 and 1961. The first 5-year Development Programmes of 1946-51 
envisaged an investment of LS 14.6 million in the Public Sector for the 
whole country. The share of the Southern Sudan was LS 1.3 million, which 
represented 9% of the total amount invested. This LS 1.3m was distributed 
as indicated in Table 2.5 below, with the Zandi Scheme under the 
Management of the Equatoria projects Board receiving 1 million Sudanese 
pounds. The remainder was distributed to various sectors. As shown by the 
table, allocation to education, health and steamers were included. The 
amount allocated for education health and steamers was relatively small 
as reflected by the number of hospitals, schools and steamers available 
in the South between 1946-51. 
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TABLE 2.5: THE FIRST 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 1946-51 FOR SOUTHERN 
SUDAN 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Scheme Expected 
Expenditure 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LS 
Building grants to mission 82,000 
Capital to establish education projects 1,000,000 
Equatoria oil mill 20,000 
Katire and Yei seasoning kilns 13,000 
Housing for Forestry Dept. Staff 11,000 
Katire saw mill 11,500 
Yambeo experimental farm 28,000 
Juba: extension water supply 17,000 
Malakal: extension water supply 8,000 
Wau: Extension water and electricity 40,000 
Malakal: Extension to electricity supply 13,000 
Juba: Extension to electricity supply 2,200 
Telegrph lines Rimbek-Yirol-Shambe 11,000 
Telegraph lines Wau-Tonj 10,000 
Malakal Dairy 3,000 
Nutrition investigation in Equatoria 2,300 
1,272,000 
Main allocation to roads: 
Amadi-Lingasi 22,735 
Torit-Kapoeta 23,336 
Wau-Awiel 5,000 
Zande District Sideroad 14,583 
Paloich-Malakal 1,500 
Gangok-Bentiu 1,500 
68,654 
Source: Sudan Southern Sudan Investigation Team, National Resources and 
Development Potential Resources, 1955, p. 311. 
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TABLE 2.6: SOUTHERN SUDAN'S ALLOCATION OF DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN THE 
1951-56 PROGRAMME 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Scheme Estimated 
Expenditure 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LS 
Investigation into Production of alternative cash crops 
(rice, coffee and sisal etc. ) 143,000 
Plant for forestry 35,210 
Saw Mill for Aloma Plateau 5,000 
Improvement of Yambio Research Station 35,900 
Experiment in grain storage in the south 13,500 
Part of mechanized crop production 25,000 
Subventions to non-government schools 400,000 
Juba and Yambio Prisons 37,400 
Juba and Malakal Fishery Experiment 36,700 
Juba: Development of aerodrom facilities 10,000 
Juba court house 6,000 
Nuba Mountains-Malakal telephone development 386,000 
Maridi P. W. D. housing 8,800 
Malakal town drains 3,250 
Yei town water supply 8,000 
Maridi town water supply 53,000 
Road projects * 45,010 
Maridi survey office and housing 12,850 
Malakal veterinary training school 11,250 
Tsetse survey and reclamation 75,000 
Veterinary facilities in tsetse areas 7,150 
Move of veterinary sub-H. Q. from Yirol to Rumbek 6,287 
One livestock improvement centre 25,000 
Southern Development Investigation Team 105,000 
------------------------------------------------------- 
1,492,307 
----------------- 
Source: Sudan, Southern Development Investigation Potential, 1955 (p. 32). 
Team, Natural Resources and Development 
Table 2.6 shows the allocation of development funds to the Southern Sudan 
in the 2nd 5-year Development Programme of 1951-56, which was raised 
twice from LS 24 million to LS 34 m and again to LS 45. Million Sudanese 
pounds. The Southern Sudan was allocated only LS 1.5 million which 
represented roughly 4.4%. This programme, like the first one laid more 
emphasis on provision of social services which accounted for 27% and 
physical infrastructure (27%). The productive schemes received only 17% 
of the funds and public utilities 13% and administration plus others. In 
the third 5-year Development Programme, ie. 1956-61 the Southern Sudan 
received very little share of the total funds allocated for the 
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developmental purpose. 
2.8.2 The Sudan Question: Egyptian imperialism over the Sudan 
The Evolution of the Modern Sudan State and the Claim over Sudan 
Historically the establishment of the modern Sudanese state was marked by 
various political crises. One important crisis was the claim by the 
Egyptian imperialist and colonial oriented leaders over the Sudan as an 
Egyptian province or region. Both the ancient and modern history of the 
Sudan has indicated that various contacts and relations existed between 
the Nubians in Northern Sudan before Turco-Egyptian colonialism in 1820. 
This history shows not only Egyptian contacts but expansion of their 
colonial domination over all the regions which later constituted present- 
day Sudan. 130 
For centuries Egyptian leaders and their supporters, whether they were 
Kings, Sultans, Pharaohs or Presidents have always tried to colonize or 
annexe the Sudan, probably for three main reasons. 
1. Most importantly to control the source of the Nile, which provides 
the Egyptians with water, without which the Egyptian nation would 
perish. 
2. To procure slaves, gold, timber, ivory, rhinoceros horns, 
agricultural lands etc., which were important to the economic 
livelihood of the state. 
3. to expand and extend imperial domination over others, so that 
political and territorial control would contribute to the prosperity 
of the colonial power. 131 
Although Egypt had succeeded in looting Sudan of its human and economic 
resources, especially in the North, it was rather difficult to penetrate 
and colonize the whole of Sudan until the 1860s. There were several 
reasons for the Egyptian failure to penetrate deeply into Sudan. One of 
these was the resistance against Egyptian colonialism by the Nubian 
kingdoms, Funj Kingdoms and various tribes in Western and Southern Sudan. 
For example, Egyptian leaders, whether Arabs, Turks, Greeks or Romans had 
to sign contracts with Nubian Kings to supply the them with what they 
most required, rather than exercising colonial domination. On top of 
that, the Nubians were at one time, able to defeat the Egyptian colonial 
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forces. As a result, Egypt was then colonized for several years by this 
section of the Sudanese people (ie. by the Nubian Kingdom of Napata - 775 
B. C. to 350 A. D. ). 132 
The conquest of the Sudan by the Turco-Egyptian colonial forces in 1820 
and the establishment of Egyptian hegemony in the area. It marked an 
important phase in Egyptian hegemony in the area, marked an important 
phase in Egyptian ambition, ie. to control the source waters of the Nile, 
and the slaves and economic resources of the Sudan. For the Egyptians it 
was a great achievement to annexe the Sudan. For the Sudanese, it was a 
great disaster, destructive to both the people and economy of the 
country. Millions of black Sudanese were enslaved and exported to Turkey, 
Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula between 1821 and 1881 compared with the 
limited number of slaves which had been shifted before. In addition, the 
indigenous Sudanese, particularly in Southern Funj, Southern, Easter, and 
Western Sudan were looted of their lands and property. While the 
population was terribly decimated and local societies destroyed, the 
Egyptians and Arabs were engaged in a massive campaign of terror. 
The Egyptian claim over Sudan as one of its regions, which was made to 
the British before the final arrangement for the expedition to reconquer 
the Sudan, re-affirmed its traditional interest in having the Sudan as 
part of Egypt. It was only after the British government in London had 
agreed to Egypt's terms that Egyptians provided funds and nearly three 
quarters of the soldiers and administrators who later defeated the 
Mahdist forces in 1898.133 
After the conquest, the Egyptian crown made it clear to the British "that 
geographically, culturally and racially, Egypt and Sudan are one and the 
same country, and therefore demanded that the British should leave the 
running of Sudan in the hands of the Egyptians. 134 Another demand was 
that Britain should withdraw its forces from Sudan and help the Egyptians 
to unite the people of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown, so that 
the inhabitants of the Upper Nile could share the aspirations and 
prosperity of their more advanced brethren in the lower part. "135 
Britain, on the other hand, did not keep its early stated position, and 
therefore took a firm stand against the Egyptian claim. The British told 
the Egyptians that Sudan was a separate country, with different people 
from them and that it was Britain's duty to train and prepare the 
Sudanese people for self-government until they could choose for 
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themselves the future status of their country. 136 
For nearly two decades the struggle between the British and the Egyptians 
over the future of the Sudan was carried on without any Sudanese 
involvement. Those Sudanese caught up in this scenario were exclusively 
Arab settlers and the so-called Arabized riverain tribes, while the 
Africans, who make up the majority of the population, were ignored, not 
being consulted until only a few years before independence. 137 If what 
the British told the Egyptians was true, why had the Egyptians and some 
Sudanese tribes insisted on maintaining this unpopular claim? Another 
question that should also be asked is to what extent were or are the 
Sudanese racially and culturally identical to the Egyptians? The best way 
to answer these questions would be first to examine the social and 
political composition of the Sudanese people in order to find out the 
extent to which the Egyptian claim was justified. 
The Sudan, whose new boundaries were drawn up by the British in 1903 
include Southern, Eastern, Central, and Western regions. The people of 
the Sudan are usually described as being diverse in culture, language, 
ethnicity, tribes, races, religions and politics, and may be set in three 
groups: 
1. Those who comprise people who identify themselves as Africans and 
include Muslims, Christians and Animists. They are mainly found in 
Southern Funj, Southern, Western Sudan, some parts of Eastern and 
Central Sudan. According to the 1956 census, this group formed the 
majority of the population (ie. about 70%). Sudan's history shows 
much violence in African-Arab relations on the one hand, and the 
Egyptians and their collaborators on the other. With such a violent 
background, it would not occur to Egypt to call the ex-slaves, the 
looted, the oppressed, the exploited and dominated Sudanese 
brothers. Equally, Egypt would not expect the Africans to condemn 
either themselves or their descendants to permanent slavery, 
domination, exploitation and oppression, by accepting the so-called 
unity with Egypt. Therefore, this group was naturally opposed to any 
plan for unity with Egypt, and the opposition would be carried 
through at any cost. 
2. A second group may be described as Arabized Sudanese. They were 
composed mainly of the riverain tribes from the old Kingdom of Nubia, 
bordering Egypt, who emigrated and settled in almost every region in 
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the Sudan, but particularly Central, Eastern and Western Sudan. This 
group does have a traditional link with Egypt, due to its 
geographical and historical position. Here history tells us that the 
Egyptians and Riverain tribes had colonized each other in turn and 
had various socio-economic and political effects on each other. 
History also tells us about the Nubians' suffering caused by Egyptian 
and Arab slavery, exploitation, oppression and domination, most of 
which was carried out through Egypt. Although there has been a 
measure of social and cultural integration between the Nubians and 
the Egyptians following the Arab conquest in the 14th century, when 
the people from these areas (Nubia and Egypt) were Arabized and 
Islamized, the Nubians always viewed the Egyptians as colonialists. 
This was confirmed by the Turco-Egyptian invasion of the Nubian 
region and the final conquest of the whole Sudan in 1821. For 60 
years, the Egyptians exploited, expropriated, oppressed and dominated 
the Sudanese. In 1881 a Nubian led movement (The Mahdists) overthrew 
the Turco-Egyptian colonial powers. 138 This defeat and the 
establishment of an independent Mahdist state in Northern and Western 
Sudan marked a very important stage in the evolution of modern Sudan 
later on. Although the Mahdists were defeated after 13 years' rule 
over most of Sudan, the message was clear enough for both the British 
and Egyptians that colonialism had to be removed, if necessary by 
force. It was therefore only to be expected that the Arabized 
Riverain tribes should be opposed to any unity or integration with 
Egypt following their historical experiences under Egyptian 
colonialism. 139 
3. This last group comprises Arab and Egyptian settlers in the Sudan and 
they came in various capacities to loot, exploit, dominate and 
oppress the Sudanese people. Numerically this group is less than 10% 
of the population of the Sudan, while the Riverain tribes represent 
nearly 20% of the population. Because of its historical background, 
this group had every reason to support the Egyptian claim. If Egypt 
had to claim any part of the Sudan at all it should only be the 
Northern region, with its capital at Dongola. This is popularly known 
to the Egyptians as the 'Southern Valley' of the 'Nile Valley'. 140 
This could only be justified in two related ways. Firstly, by the use 
of imperial might over the colonial people as legitimizing the 
occupation of lands by right of conquest or 'might is right'. Under 
this condition Egypt knows is that it may be easy to conquer the 
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Sudan but it is not always so easy to rule, or even to exploit, 
dominate or oppress the people with impunity. 
Secondly, for historical and geographical reasons, Egyptians and 
Nubians (but not the whole of Sudan) could make any claim of each 
other - as enemies, friends, brothers or foreigners, Muslims or Arabs 
etc. 141 The fact remains that though some tribes of Nubian origin may 
be found in Southern Egypt which may support this point, it does not 
justify the integration of the entire country. 142 
The importance of the above brief analysis of the Egyptian claim over 
Sudan, is that it shows us how complex Egyptian/Sudanese relations are. 
It equally clearly what the British Colonial authorities had to do 
towards the establishment of a separate Sudanese state until independence 
in 1956. 
The direct and active cooperation between the British colonial 
authorities and the Arabized Riverain tribes against the Egyptians 
contributed to a general anti-Egyptian attitude throughout the Sudan. The 
Arabized Riverain tribes, under the Mahdi family who had organized the 
Ansar sect from the remnant of the defeated Mahdist Army and supporters, 
were able to organize a political party with the British support. On the 
other hand, the Arab settlers led by the leader of the Khatimiyya 
religious sect organized a Party with massive political and financial 
support from the Egyptians. Consequently the British and the Egyptian 
governments were each concerned with how to appease their respective 
alliances and as a result, only the members of these groups benefited 
significantly in terms of the educational, economic and political 
facilities received. It was these special favours granted to both Arab 
settlers and the Arabized Riverain tribes which for the various regional 
inequalities existing today. For example, the Mahdi grandchildren were 
given enormous wealth which included land, covering the entire district 
of Abba Island and Cash. The entire housing complex of the former Mahdist 
State including the House of Wealth, Bet al Mal became part of Mahdist 
property. Consequently the Mahdist family became one of the richest in 
the Sudan. The British in their attempt to win over the Egyptian 
supporters, especially the Mirghani family, bribed the family by giving 
it enormous wealth, including lands, money and positions in the colonial 
state, leaving those outside these two circles in the cold, ie. giving no 
economic and political favours to non-Arabs and leaving them instead 
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poor, backward and underdeveloped. 
It is important to mention here, that the political movements and parties 
which emerged in the Sudan in the 1920s and up to independence were 
effectively influenced by Egyptian and British policies over the future 
of the Sudan. For example, the Egyptian oriented political movements and 
parties included the White Flag League (1924), the Graduate Congress (of 
the 1940s), the Ashaqqa (1945), the National Unionist Party (1950s), and 
finally the Democratic Unionist Party (1980s), while the British 
supported pro-independent movements and political parties including the 
Umma Party under the Ansar leadership (1945), the Liberal Party of the 
Southern Sudan (1950s), Muslim Brotherhood (1940s), the Republican 
Brotherhood (1950s), the Unity Party of the Southern Sudan etc., which 
stood firm and continued to oppose the Egyptians and their supporters 
until independence and after. 
The final episode in this scenario was marked by various events in the 
Sudan. The first problem was the Southern Sudan's opposition not only to 
the unity with Egypt but to the unity with the Northern or Arab dominated 
regions which were nicknamed 'the Northern Sudan' (which included 
Western, Eastern, Central and Northern regions, plus the Southern Funj). 
This Southern problem as it is popularly known contributed greatly to 
Egyptian defeat for most Northerners were more concerned with unity for 
the Sudan, rather than unity with Egypt. 
The second problem was the emergence of factions within the pro-Egyptian 
group which weakened tremendously the Egyptian expectations. The disunity 
within the pro-Egyptian political party 'the National Unionist' brought 
into being a new anti-Egyptian political party known as the People's 
Democratic Party under Sheikh Ali Abdel Raham a former supporter of unity 
with Egypt. It was therefore this change of position in the majority of 
members of the National Unionist party that induced the leadership to 
agree with the pro-independent group, and on Ist January, 1956, Sudan 
gained its political independence. This marked the final blow to Egyptian 
territorial ambition to annexe Sudan. 
Although the Egyptians and the British lost overall control of Sudan 
after independence, they were and still are, able to maintain their 
political and economic linkages with the post-colonial state. This has 
been inherited by the traditional and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, who, 
because of their economic and political weakness, became dependent on 
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their former imperial masters, and consequently formed alliances with the 
British, the Egyptians, the United States of America and others and this 
has made the entire Sudanese State and people dependent upon foreign 
capital until the present day. 
The neo-colonial state in the Sudan ensured the transfer of Sudanese 
resources to both Britain and Egypt through various wars. For example, in 
1958, Egypt bought Holfa District in the Red Sea Region displacing the 
local population to live in poverty. More disappointing was the failure 
of Egyptian government to pay 15 million pounds which it had agreed to 
pay and the failure of Sudanese governments to solve the problems created 
and imposed on the Halfaween. Consequently, the people of Half4 were 
reduced to beggardom, while Egyptian farmers who benefited from the 
distributed lands, prospered and progressed at the expense of the Sudan. 
Finally, the 1969 Coup by Colonel Nimiere went a great deal to serve 
Egyptian interests. Nimiere arbitrarily imposed the digging of Jongelei 
Canal against a strong opposition from the southern people in 1975, in 
which two students were killed by police during demonstrations in Juba 
the capital of Southern Sudan and four members of the Southern Region 
Assembly were jailed for five years each for anti-government activities. 
In addition, more water was given to the Egyptians, gold mines in the 
Eastern Sudan and many industrial facilities were granted to Egyptian 
capitalists to exploit and expropriate Sudan's material resources, 
shifting them to Egypt. 
However, in 1980, a military pact between Sudan and Egypt marked a new 
dimension in the Sudanese/Egyptian relations. To crown this military 
agreement, a political integration agreement was made which created a 
joint parliament where both Sudanese and Egyptians were to deal with 
affairs of the so-called 'Nile Valley Nation'. Various aspects related to 
the agreement, including economics and education, were meant to enhance 
rapid or prompt social economic and political integration between the two 
countries. In December, 1982, Nimiere, then the President of the Sudan in 
his address to the Sudanese Nation on Independence Day had this to say: 
"Brothers free revolutionaries our celebration of the 
independence anniversary.... is simultaneous with the March of 
the Nile Valley peoples in Sudan and Egypt along the road of 
integration. The integration for generations and pioneers 
struggled until Sudan's independence was realised despite the 
divergence of their methods. Yet, they agreed with unshaken 
faith that Sudan's independence is a support for Egypt's 
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independence is a shield that protects Sudan's independence. 
Our celebration today brothers, is being held under the canopy 
of integration which is an important example to be followed by 
the Arab Nations. "143 
But the opposition against Nimiere and his policies was sufficiently 
strong to destroy both Nimiere and his Egyptian oriented policies in 1985 
following the people's uprising in April which culminated in a revolution 
which brought to power the very political forces which were overthrown by 
Nimiere and which had been opposed to the so-called unity with Egypt. As 
a result, the military, economic and political integration between both 
countries died a natural death leaving the Egyptians and their supporters 
in the Sudan in utter confusion either to invade the Sudan and restore 
Nimiere's rule or to await the new leadership. The Egyptians took the 
latter approach, hoping that the pro-Egyptian supporters within the old 
National Unionist would be able to maintain not only Egyptian political 
influence but economic exploitation, expropriation and the military 
presence in the Sudan. But things turned out to be different and as a 
result, all the Agreements with Egypt were cancelled in 1985 and the 
relations between the leadership of the Umma Party, the traditional 
Egyptian enemy in the Sudan went from bad to worse, until the recent 
visit to Egyptian Capital on 20th February, 1987 by the Sudanese Prime 
Minister who is also the leader of the John Ansar Religious Sect and the 
Umma Party. According to the London based Arab Newspaper ('Asharq Al- 
Awsat, 21st February, page 1, Vol. 6, No. 3010): "the international daily 
newspaper of the Arabs", Saddiq El Mahdi, the Sudanese Prime Minister 
told the Egyptian people that he came to confirm that the relations 
between the Egyptians and the Sudanese are brothers and no government 
will change that. Therefore the Prime Minister declared that he has 
brought with him what he described as the "Brotherhood Charter" to 
replace what former President Gaoffer Nimiere had done. It was of course, 
not surprising to see the Egyptians readily accepting the Sudanese offer. 
Because what is important to the Egyptians is not the name of Agreements 
but the level of gains which will be received by them. That is to say, 
provided that the neo-colonial state under the Umma Party control, 
continues to allow Egyptian businessmen and merchants to exploit Sudanese 
resources and also the Egyptian government to continue in the 
expropriation and exploitation of Sudanese resources including water, 
then there would not be any major conflict between the Egyptians and the 
dominant ruling classes in the Sudan. But one thing is certain, that 
whatever agreements are signed between the Egyptians and the dominant 
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ruling classes without the general consent from the African majority 
especially those of Southern Sudan, those agreements would be bound to 
fail. The fate of Jonglei Canal in the Southern Sudan and the fact that 
Saddiq al El Mahdi, the Prime Minister of Sudan made very clear to the 
Egyptians that he signed the "Brotherhood Charter" not as a head of the 
Umma Party but only as the head of the present government explain the 
existence of mistrust and fear within the Sudanese public against the 
former colonial power, and this has indicated that the unity between the 
Sudanese and Egyptians may not be realised at all, unless, the Sudanese 
people have resolved their own political crisis first including the 
problem of national unity and national integration characterized by the 
struggle between the Arab settlers and Arabized riverain tribes on one 
side and the Africans on the other. 
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3 CHAPTER 
THE ROLE OF SECTARIAN JALLABA IN THE UNDER-DEVELOPMENT AND UNEVEN 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUDAN: I- THE CASE OF OTHER LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter attempts to examine, and analyse the role of the Sectarian 
Arab Jellaba in the process of under-development and uneven development 
of Nuba Mountains, Southern and Northern Funj and other less developed 
tribes in the so-called Northern Sudan. 
An attempt will be also be made to trace the origins of the use of 
sectarianism and Jallaba in Sudan, with special emphasis on Ansar of 
Mahdi. Khatimujya and Usuufiyya-Himdiyya. It will be argued that the 
ulterior motive of Sectarian traders in Sudan has not been to spread the 
Islamic faith as some pretend, but to loot material resources wherever 
they have commercial operations and to perpetuate poverty among the 
masses. The current civil war in Darfur between the Arab and African 
tribes. the political violence in Nuba Mountains, Southern and Northern 
Funj and the state sponsored Kasha in Khartoum, Port Sudan and Wad Medani 
are a few examples which have been caused by the effects of exploitation. 
oppression and domination by the Jallaba. 
3.2 Some Theoretical Issues 
This Chapter seeks to investigate the role of the merchant (Jallaba) 
class, in the process of uneven development in Sudan. 
The notion of a "sectarian" merchant class (i. e. Jallaba class) is used 
in this chapter to describe a class of merchants or petty traders who use 
the Islamic faith (religion), Arabism (racism) and merchant capital (or 
class) as the dominant ideas in Sudanese society. 
Sectarianism here specifically refers to a system of religious sects 
known in Islam as "Sufism". By Sufism is meant an'Islamic mission, 
involving the spread of the Islamic faith through teaching and 
propagation by religious teachers and in the Sudanese case, by merchants 
or slave traders. 
' As for the term Jallaba, it refers to petty traders or 
merchant capitalists, who engage in the circulation of consumer goods and 
services in a given capitalist market. In the Sudanese experience, an 
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Islamic religious leader can be a landlord, a merchant capitalist, an 
industrial capitalist, a member of Parliament (Assembly), and at the same 
time he can be a Prime Minister or a President or minister etc. In most 
cases, leaders who hold constitutional positions appoint agents to manage 
their various businesses capitalist (farms, shops etc). 
2 
In the Sudanese case, all-the leaders of Islamic Sects who are Arabs, or. _ 
claim to be of Arab origin, preach that they are a members of al Sharaf, 
i. e. the descendant of the prophet Mohammed and therefore are his -1 
representative on earth or Immam or Kalifa. 
3 
Almost all the Arab settlers 
in the Sudan promote the belief that they themselves are prophets in 
their own right. 
4 
Consequently, they persuade their slaves and adherents 
to worship them as well. In addition, tombs of the dead Arab Islamic 
leaders are also worshipped; for example those of "Cuba" Mahdist Tomb in 
Omdurman, Guba El Sharif Yusuf al Hundi Massalomiyaya, Guba El Hadi Abdel 
Kohman al Mohadi (the former Imam in Omdurman) and several hundred others 
scattered in Gezira, Khartoum, Omdurman, Eastern and Northern Sudan. 
While the sectarian Arab merchants have been able to enslave several 
millions on the one hand. they have equally been successful in 
transforming more than half of the population of the Sudan and have 
eventually become traders or merchants in both attitude practice as well. 
The consequences of such a development have been detrimental not only to 
the national economy but also to nation building and unity. The collapse 
of the Sudanese economy, specially in the public sector. characterized by 
the existence of black market hoarding, smuggling, exorbitant prices in 
the market are evidence of the role of the Jallaba class in the Sudanese 
society. 
In general, there are debates over the historical role of merchant 
capital in the transformation of social formations. Some, including 
Engels, have argued that merchant capital was the vehicle by which 
capitalism replaced feudal'society. Marx was quite clear in arguing that 
merchant 'is not capable by itself in promoting and explaining the 
transition from one mode of production to another' and this system 
presents everywhere an obstacle to the real capitalist mode of 
production. 
5 Marx further argued that merchant capital not only does not 
control the production process, 'but tends rather to preserve it as its 
pre-condition. '6 In viewing the general impact of aggressive and 
egotistic behaviour of merchant capital, Marx asserts, 
"Merchant capital, when it holds a position of dominance, stands 
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everywhere for a system of robbery so that its development 
among trading nations of old and modern times is always 
directly connected with plundering piracy, kidnapping slaves 
and colonial conquest. "6 
Some scholars have argued that the "under-development of currently 
backward countries reflects the debilitating effect of merchant capital 
on these countries .... 
" It is also argued that merchant capital, allied 
to the most reactionary elements of the local pre-capitalist ruling class 
magnifies their power and block the emergence of capitalist relations of 
production. 7 Furthermore, a general observation by some scholars is that 
"merchant capital by definition is divorced from the sphere of 
production and each mode of production is defended by the 
social relations in which production is organized. Therefore, 
merchant capital cannot determine the basic nature of society, 
but rather superimposes itself upon societies whose essential 
character is determined independently of it. Merchant 
capitalism is not a definitive social and economic system but 
rather a mechanism of control over the exchange of products for 
money. "8 
The Sudanese merchants are no different. Here we witness the Arab 
obsession with mercantile or commercial operations as well as with their 
uncontested slave trade mentality, all of which tend to affect or arrest 
all the attempts to develop the national resources. Their continuous 
looting, plundering and robbing of the poor has led to more poverty and 
suffering. 
Marx and Engels' views on merchant capital and religion in the Arabian 
peninsular are quite helpful in understanding the Islamic religious 
sects. Marx and Engels argued that the dominant ruling class supports 
various ideas or ideologies, such as religion etc., in order to further 
and maintain their material hegemony or interests. This appears to be 
true of all religious sects, whether or not they are Christian, Muslim or 
Confucianist. Marx's analysis of religious ideas was originally concerned 
with Christianity within capitalist society, but at a later period, Marx 
and Engels examined non-European and non-capitalist societies which 
included the Arab, Islamic and the Oriental including India, and China. 
Marx and Engels saw religion as an illusion which is used not only to 
ease the sufferings of the poor, but also to legitimize the wealth and 
position of the dominant ruling class. Marx asserts that, 
"Religion is the sign of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of 
the heartless world and the soul of the soulless world. It is 
the opium of the people ... " 
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and that, 
"Religion acts as an opiate to dull the pain .... but does 
nothing to solve the problem, it is simply'a misguide9 attempt 
to make life more bearable under serious sufferings. " 
Marx further observed that, 
" .... religion encourages cowardice, self-contempt, abasement, 
submissiveness and humbleness and thereby prevents the 
oppressed and the exploited1 rom revolting against their 
oppressors and exploiters. " 
Engels' contribution to this debate on the role of religious ideas in 
various societies is equally significant. In his study of primitive 
religion and early Christianity, plus the reformed version of 
Christianity, Engels argued that "Christianity was originally a movement 
of the oppressed people and that it first appeared as the religion of the 
slaves and emancipated slaves, of the poor people deprived of all rights 
or people subjugated. " Engels provides four ways in which religious ideas 
can dull the pain of the oppressed which are as follows: -11 
1. It promises a paradise of eternal bliss in life after death. And the 
appeal of Christianity to the oppressed classes, lies in the 
promise of salvation from bondage and misery in the after life. The 
Christian vision of heaven can make life on earth more bearable by 
giving people something to look forward to . 
2. Some religions make a virtue of the sufferings produced by oppression 
specially those who bear the burden and deprivations of poverty 
with dignity and humility, will be rewarded for their virtue.. 
Engels affirmatively reiterated the most famous biblical verse. 
which reads, 
"It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle 
than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. " 
Religion thus makes poverty more tolerable by offering a reward for 
suffering and promising redress for injustice in the After Life. 
3. Religion can offer the hope of supernatural intervention to solve the 
problems on earth. Anticipation such as mentioned above can make 
the present terrible conditions more acceptable. I 
4. Religion often justifies the social order and a person's position 
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within it. God can only be seen as creating any ordinary social 
structure in it. 
Another example of how religion functions to mislead the masses can be 
seen in a verse from the Victorian hymn "All things bright and beautiful" 
which reads as follows: -12 
"The rich man in his castle, 
The poor man at his gate, 
He made them, high or lowly, 
And order'd their estate. " 
These passages indicate clearly how Marx, Engels and others conceived the 
role of religious ideas in shaping European societies before the advent 
of capitalism and during the capitalist period as well. They indicate 
that poverty and misfortune in general were seen as divinely ordained as 
punishments for sins committed. Again, any bad situation which causes 
suffering or pain is considered as inevitable, in accordance with God's 
will and therefore encouraging people to accept their sufferings 
philosophically. 13 
Finally religion for the Marxists therefore, does not only cushion the 
effects of oppression, it is also an instrument of that oppression. It 
acts as a mechanism of social control, maintaining the existing system of 
exploitation and domination reinforcing class relationships. It keeps 
people in their place, i. e. the rich - richer, the poor - poorer. By 
making unsatisfactory living bearable, religion tends to discourage 
people from attempting to change their situations, by justifying the 
existing social structure and it dissuades ideas to alter it. By offering 
an illusion of hope in a hopeless situation, it prevents thoughts of 
overthrowing the oppressive system. By providing explanations and 
justifications, for social arrangements, religion distorts reality. It 
helps to produce false consciousness which blinds members of the subject 
class to their true situation and their real interests. In this way it 
diverts attention from the real source of their sufferings and as such it 
helps to maintain the ruling class in power! 
In Sudan, the minority Arab merchant settlers used Islamic religion to 
legitimize various crimes being committed by the Jallaba against the 
indigenous African population for nearly six hundred years all in the 
name of Allah. 14 At present more than half of the Sudanese population is 
living in a state of neo-slavery and some in actual slavery under various 
Arab Islamic religious sects. Consequently, the Sudanese people of 
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various national groupings have been divided or distributed among the 
Arab Islamic sects as clients, servants, slaves, etc. depending on 
ethnic, tribal or regional background. For example a member of the Beja 
tribe may be described in favour of a Danagala or Ja'ali or a Shaqqi may 
stand a better chance than a Fur and apparently Islam has not been useful 
nor helpful in solving the Sudanese problems of social change and 
regional inequalities for Islam not only accepts the existence of masters 
and slaves, the rich and the poor, the ruled and rulers, the weak and the 
strong, but advocates their emergence. For example Koran verses [43.31- 
32] reads: - 
"It is We who distribute among them their livelihood in the 
present life and We exalt some of them above others in degrees 
(of rank), so that some of them may make others subservient 
.... Anl5the mercy of the 
Lord is better than that which they 
amass. " 
The above passage has indicated that prophecy is linked with wealth and 
states that divine inspiration can be transmitted only to the rich and 
not to the poor or righteous. The above mentioned Koranic verse supports 
the uneven distribution of worldly goods and the disparity among-men as a 
result of which some rich people are able to exercise dominion over their 
fellow men. The down-trodden, whether socially, economically or 
politically deprived are exhorted not to lament, but to be content with 
the mercy promised to them by God on the day of resurrection. It has 
already been argued that this text or verse was an invitation to 
negativism, encouraging men to reject the idea of work and content 
themselves with whatever God has given them and they have attempted to 
support this verse by citing other supportive verses and traditions in 
which men are urged to renounce worldly things and be content with little 
possessions. Another important historical fact, confirmed by the 
activities or practices within the contemporary Islamic communities is 
the existence of organized theft, corruption and robbery directed towards 
public property and capital with impunity, specially by the sectarian 
landlords, commercial and merchant capitalists who have political power 
and will. 
It is because of the above mentioned injustice, i. e. uneven distribution 
of socio-economic and political resources, plus serious abuses of human 
rights, that has prompted the author to support the arguments that 
inequality and privilege form part of the very basis of the Islamic 
religion. Furthermore, the existence of slavery as a dominant part of 
Islamic culture (even in the contemporary period) supports the arguments 
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that Islam legitimizes the-exploitation, domination, repression and 
oppression on the grounds of colour, race, or economic, -political and 
social status . 
16 The contemporary crises between the dominant Arab 
national ruling group and the poor Africans in Mauritania, the current 
racist conflict in Iraq where the dominant Arab ruling national group has 
been massacring the Kurds while all the Arab countries are turning a 
blind eye on the matter, and the racist conflict in Algeria between the 
dominant Arab national ruling group and the indigenous Berber tribesmen, 
serve as the most. relevant examples of Islamic and Arab racism today. 
The Sudanese Arabs therefore are not alone in their racial crusade or 
vendetta against Africans in Africa; especially when Africans are forced 
not only to change their names, languages, cultures, and modes of life, 
but also to transform themselves totally into Arabs in order to gain 
admittance into the dominant Arab bourgeois oriental ruling national 
group in these countries mentioned above, including Sudan. The three main 
aspects of Sudanese politics, which are equally shared by countries such 
as Southern Africa, Israel, Iraq, Mauritania and to some extent Algeria, 
-Turkey, Pakistan, etc. include racism (eg.. Arabism, Jewish, White), 
religion (Islam, Judaism, Christianity), and class (i. e. economic and 
political hegemony). Here we see racism being used in the place of 
nationalism or chauvinism. Islam, for the Arabs, is not only synonymous 
to Arabism, but treat both, as one ideology. On the other hand, Islam is 
seen as, living proof of Arab civilization and racial superiority, 
therefore all Muslims should not only accept the Arab language (as the 
language of Islam), and culture, but anything Arabic in character. It is 
by Arabization and Islamization of non-Arab Muslims, that makes him not a 
complete Arab but a peripheral one. The fact that there are political 
violent incidents occur in the above mentioned countries and which they 
have been able to resolve does not point to the argument that Arabism and 
Islamism as ideologies have failed to create a society or just community 
of, equals, which Islamic adherents continued to preach in vain. as there 
has not been any Islamic state whether or not under the most popular 
Muslim leader. Instead what history tells us, and we have confirmed, not 
only in the Sudan, but in those Arab countries under the family dynasties 
with despotic oriental monarchies, who claim to be more Islamic than 
others. 
Again, the Sudanese family based political parties are quite directly 
influenced by the Islamic character of the leaders in question. No matter 
whatever system is adopted, a Western democratic parliamentary system 
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could not succeed as has been shown by scholars and also by the present 
military rulers who have managed to collect evidence to support their 
arguments. 
Finally, it is possible to say here that the Sudanese case falls within 
the Marxist theoretical perspectives. For example, Marx' and Engels' 
views on religion apply to all kinds of religion whether Christianity or 
Islam and the conditions within the present Sudanese society under 
Islamic sectarian forces falls within the description of how religious 
ideas enslave the majority of the people, or made the majority accept 
suffering because they have been deceived that that is what God wishes. 
It is important to point out that to the Sudanese where race, religion ' 
and merchant capital are very strong components, one would find it more 
suitable to use the Marxist views or theoretical perspective on Asiatic 
societies which share a lot of similarities with the Sudanese. In 
addition to that, the Marxist views on Oriental despotism would easily be 
applicable to the trend of party politics and family control through some 
kind of hereditary political base. This is easily seen from the 
structures an, power bases within the Umma party and Democratic National 
Unionist Party, where the leadership of the parties are not elected 
through democratic means because of this birthright. 
It is also possible to compare the Arabian Islamic situation as seen by 
Marx and Engels at that time with how we see it today. For Marx and 
Engels, the Islamic Arab society consisted of two classes only, the 
exploited rural Arab nomads and the exploiting rich Arab Muslim traders 
or merchants in the urban centres. The merchants formed the ruling class,, 
while the Beduin Arab tribes were the ruled. The system of politics was 
described by Engels' as an 'Oriental despotic' monarchy and that the 
entire socio-economic and political set-up fell within the Asiatic mode 
of production, a theoretical perspective used by Marx and Engels to 
analyse the non-European societies, especially Indian, Chinese, and the 
Middle Eastern societies. The dominance of a rich merchant class in 
Arabian case made it fall more within Marxist traditional approach, i. e. 
class struggle which had existed in the Arabian peninsula between the 
rich sectarian commercial class which pretended to be religious and 
appeared to be peace lovers. 
On the merchant capital though straight forward has been made complicated 
by the differences among various scholars. The main issues are on the 
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functions of the merchant capital. Whether or not merchant capital was 
progressive or revolutionary. Whether merchant capital can transform a 
pre-capitalist society into a capitalist one, or whether merchant capital 
can shift to industrial capital etc. Our experience in the Sudan has 
shown that merchant capital has more functions than we could imagine, 
(eg.. religious, economic and political man and leader). It is this 
tripartite nature of the merchant capital in the Sudan that perhaps 
distinguishes it from other merchant capitals in the advanced capitalist 
world and even from that of the Arabian peninsula, currently in Sudan, 
Arabia, Kumahir etc. 
The role of the sectarian merchant capital (Jallaba) in the process of 
under-development and uneven development will be made more clear in the 
following pages and in the next section I will attempt to trace the 
origins and the rise of merchant capital in the contemporary Sudanese 
politics. 
3.3" The Origins of the Use of Sectarianism and the Jallaba 
in the Sudan 
The origins of the use of Sectarianism and the Jallaba in the 
contemporary politics of the Sudan can be traced to the Arab immigrants 
and settlers in Sudan, which has already been discussed in chapter two. 
However, it is important to reiterate here that Turco-Egyptian 
colonialism and the Mahdist state were responsible not only for the 
establishment of the Arab Islamic orientated state but for the 
introduction of Arab Islamic sects in the Sudan in the 18th century. The 
Turco-Egyptian colonial authorities established Islamic teachers brought 
from Egypt and expenses paid by the state, i. e. the Ulamas were state 
employees responsible for carrying out the Arabization and Islamization 
of Western, Eastern, Central and Northern Sudanese, which are linked 
together by the dominant Arab Oriental ruling class as "the Northern 
Sudan" (or one region). The Mahdist Islamic Revolution managed to 
consolidate its political economic and religious power, forcing several 
leaders of different sects to flee into Egypt or the Arabian peninsula. 
For example, the Khafimyya and some members of Gadiniyya and many others 
fled the country. For nearly eighteen years the Mahdists (or the Ansars) 
unsuccessfully tried to unite all the Arabs and the Arabized Sudanese 
under its leadership until its destruction by the Anglo-Egyptian 
colonialism in 1898. 
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The defeat of the Mahdist forces by the invading colonial army led to not 
only the return of those religious leaders who had fled the country, but 
to a new group of Arab religious men also engaged in commercial 
activities who came into the country and spread all over the country. The 
British authorities made it clear that no political organizations nor 
activities were permitted. Attempts by various Arab pretenders to rise as 
Mahdi or Issa with the aim of reviving the defeated Mahdist state was 
severely suppressed and most of their leaders were executed in order to 
prevent anybody or groups of fanatics repeating the same. Another way of 
fighting Arab Islamic fundamentalism by the British was the making of 
alliances to break up the Islamic community into rival groups. Indirect 
rule was also introduced in order to create several competing power 
centres among the Arab settlers and with the colonial government 
supporting the selected allies financially, ( the Mirghani family was the 
first to be given financial support), and land to re-establish and re- 
organize the adherents to the Khatimiya Islamic sect, and this religious 
sect was intentionally set up in order to counteract and oppose any 
religious sect opposed to the British Colonial rule, especially the Ansar 
of the defeated Mahdist State. The Ansar were soon broken up by their 
struggles over leadership of the Ansar, i. e. the Mahdist family versus 
the Khalifa Abdallah's family. The British supported the Mahdist family 
and suppressed the Abdullah family after having massacred several of the 
family members, including Abdallah, during the reconquest. 
Sayid Abdel Rahman al Mahdi and Sayid Ali Al-Mirghani, both landlords and 
religious leaders, were selected as members of the delegation that went 
to England in 1919 to congratulate King George V on the British victory 
in the First World War. This was a clear indication of the existence of a 
strong relationship between the British Colonial Authorities and the 
above mentioned leaders. As a token of complete surrender to the Colonial 
rulers and abandonment of his father's 'revolutionary heritage', Sayid 
Abdel Rahmen presented what was reputed to be the Mahdi's sword to the 
King of England. 
17 
Both Sayid Abdel Rahmen Al Mahdi and Sayid All Al 
Mirghani were rewarded with a knighthood by the British Monarchy and 
Sayid Abdel Rahmen was given back his father's village, known as Abba 
Island where he started capitalist agricultural schemes, i. e. growing 
cotton, sorghum and simsim for export as well as local markets. Sayid All 
Mirghani received similar agricultural lands and by the 1920's both 
religious leaders became not only rich landlords but also became great or 
prominent agricultural capitalists in the Sudan. 18 Furthermore, several 
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Arab families were equally rewarded by the British Colonial rulers either 
with appointments to state institutions or given thousands of acres of 
cultivable land or cash as a result of their loyalty to the Government. 
The consequences of such policies as mentioned above was the emergence of 
over ten or more Arab religious sects, each controlling an average of 
five thousand acres such of cultivable land, especially in Gezira, 
Eastern Kordofan and Northern regions 
19 Niblock, Mahmoud and others have 
documented how the British Colonial authorities encouraged some Islamic 
religious families to become both prominent business holders and 
political leaders as well. Niblock made the following statement in 
support of the above mentioned argument: - 
"In 1915 Sayid Abdel Rahman was given additional land on Abba 
Island. In 1925 he obtained, together with Sayid Abdallah Al 
Fadil and Mohammed Alkhalifa Sharif, a lease of about 600 
feddans of land at Gondal for the growing of cotton. A loan of 
4,500 later converted into a gift was made to him in 1926. By 
1933 he had some 13,000 feddons under cultivation in Abba 
Island, the Funj, the White Nile and Kassala provinces. His 
annual income was estimated at between 15,000, and 40,000 on 
Abba Island alone he had a labour force of about 4,500. He was 
in 1936 by any standard20 economically prosperous and 
politically important. " 
It is quite clear from the above quoted passage and arguments that the 
origin of the use of the Sectarian Jallaba class and sectarianism in the 
contemporary Sudanese politics can be traced to Anglo-Egyptian colonial 
rulers and that they were developed and expanded to a greater extent 
after the independence in 1956. 
The most important point to note is the ability and efficiency of the 
leaders of these Islamic religious sects to be able to control merchant 
capital, religious and political power in a short time before 
independence. Niblock again provided us with some answers, when he 
stated; - 
"In the late 1920's and early 1930's each of Sudan's two main 
religious leaders, Sayid Abd-al Rachman al-Mahdi and Sayid All 
Mirghani began to draw around himself a coterie of educated 
Sudanese mainly graduates in government service, but also 
comprising some educated merchants and private contractors. 
The members of these coteries played a number of diverse roles 
... sometimes business advisers. partners, managers or simply 
contractors. The coteries as a whole constitute a web of 
relationships, where coterie-members tended to develop similar 
view points and possibly to co-ordinate their activities 
outside the coterie. 
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These coteries were (and still are) the instruments through 
which the attitudes and objectives of educated Sudanese were 
shaped and influen2ld by the religious commercial 
establishment ... " 
Finally, the origin of the penetration of the merchant capitalist (the 
Jallaba class), in the Sudan has a similar historical background with 
Islamic orientated dominant ruling class. This is because of three main 
reasons: 
1) Firstly, the founders of the Islamic religious sects in the Sudan and 
merchants capital are Arab settlers, who entered the country in 
various ways and capacities ranging from direct colonial military 
conquest, such as 1350 which violently invaded the three Christian 
kingdoms of Maqurra, Allowa and Sennar. 
2) Secondly, almost all members of merchants capital are members of 
various Islamic religious sects who are simultaneously engaged in 
commercial, political and religious activities. 
3) The members of Islamic religious sects, merchants capital class and 
members of bourgeoisie dominant ruling classes in the Sudan belong 
not only to similar ideological background but have been able to 
make an alliance among themselves, for their common interests. 
It is the multi-functions of the above mentioned groups that have made it 
difficult, if not impossible, for any student of Arab Islamic studies to 
single out from the Arab orientated society and correctly identify those 
who would be described exclusively as politicians, religious leaders and 
merchants. Of course this confusion is based on the Koran, the Muslim 
Holy Book, which states that religion, merchant capital and political 
powers are inseparable and therefore a Muslim Imam can also be a rich 
business man, a landlord and a leading politician in the case of prophet 
Mohammed, Khobfo, Abu Baker, Khalifa Omer Iba el Ketab and many others as 
typical examples of such a case. 
3.4 THE ROLE OF SECTARIAN JALLABA IN THE PROCESS OF UNDER- 
DEVELOPMENT AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHERN SUDAN 
The role of sectarianism and the Jallaba class in the process of under- 
development and regional inequalities, has been of great concern to most 
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Sudanese in all walks of life, i. e. among the intelligentsia, politicians 
and some prominent civilians, among the masses. The leaders of the 
sectarian Jallaba class are accused of mismanagement of the national 
economy, corruption and the enslavement of millions of Sudanese citizens, 
using Islam as its political ideology. 
The findings of this study, which will be discussed below, confirms that 
the Jallaba has tremendously contributed to the uneven development and 
regional disparities in the Sudan, especially in Southern Kordofan, 
Darfur, Eastern Sudan and Southern and Northern Funj and which the 
sectarian bourgeois: class has repeatedly falsely described as the 
'Northern Sudan. ' 
The Anglo-Egyptian re-conquest of the Sudan in 1898 marked a significant 
new development for the sectarian Jallaba class. Right from the time of 
the conquest, those religious leaders whose forces supported the Anglo- 
Egyptian invading forces were rewarded in various ways by the Colonial 
government. The rewards given consisted of the following, 
(1) The appointment of supporters to state positions eg.. Islamic judges, 
tribal sheikhs and religious or any other position in the colonial 
state. 
(2) The granting of a large amount of money to supporters so as to make 
them financially and politically better off than those who had not 
supported the colonial forces. 
(3) The allotment of large areas of agricultural land which would make 
the supporters rich landlords, above other peasants. 
(4) The granting of permission for supporters to keep their slaves for as 
long as they wished to use them. 
The implementation of the proposals marked the origins of the 
contemporary regional inequalities and uneven development in the Sudan in 
general and in the Southern Sudan in particular. It equally marked the 
establishment of most of the current Islamic religious sects in the 
Northern Sudan and their subsequent spread all over the Western, Central 
and Eastern Sudan areas of the country. The Anglo-Egyptian colonial 
forces in the country managed to make various alliances with leading Arab 
slave traders who also claimed to be prophets or Isa. And it was here 
Kitchener, the Governor General, instructed his staff to, "work with ... 
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the better class of natives, through whom we may hope gradually to 
influence the whole population. "22 Abdel Rahman Abaker had asserted that, 
"In order to gain the confidence of this 'better , class' 
Kitchener directed his officers to observe three vital 
principles: - the toleration of domestic slavery, low taxation 
and the e2puragement of orthodox Islam as opposed to 
Surfism. " 
Abdel Rahman Abaker further noted the power or influence the sectarian 
Jallabas had over the colonial authorities especially when the Governor 
General publicly announced that: - 
"Sudanese slaves will remain with their masters so24ong as they 
are well treated and adequately fed and clothed. " 
There is no evidence that the British Colonial authorities never again 
set free those slaves who were left with their masters until 
independence. It is therefore possible to conclude here that the majority 
of non-Arab people currently supporting Arab orientated religious 
families are the offspring of the generation of unreleased slaves. 
The British action was justified by a former colonial officer who stated, 
. although the slave trade was illegal between many of the 
Sudanese slaves and. their Arab masters there had developed in 
the course of years an affectionate attachment like that which 
often prevailed between the Negroes in the Southern States of 
the USA and their owners 2d in such cases the slaves were 
unwilling to break away. " 
It is therefore the so-called "unwilling slaves to break away", from 
their Arab masters which make up most of the current devoted members of 
the Arab orientated Islamic religious sects especially those of Ansar, 
Khatimya-Hindiyya, Trjaniyya and others described by Yahiya Abdel Gader, 
and`Abdel Rahman Abaker to a great extent. A report by the anti-slavery 
and Aborigines Protection Society stated the following, 
"Fugitives are returned by force to their masters ... The Arab 
owners of slaves take earnings from them when wages have been 
paid by the employers ... there are persistent allegations of 
, cruelty 
to the slave ... slaves who are subjected to cruelty 
fear to appeal to the Inspector ... slaves are now being . 
mortgaged urger a system, the full facts of which are not yet 
available. " 
Before the anti-slavery and Aborigines Protection Society could free the 
Sudanese slaves, the Governor General forced them to leave the Sudan for 
good. 
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Yahiya Abdel Gader was probably the first Sudanese to have reacted 
against the policies and practices of the sectarian leaders in the Sudan. 
Yahiya Abdel Gader, in 1952, published in Arabic entitled "Personalities 
from the Sudan, Secrets, Views and Men", devoted a complete chapter on 
the analysis of Islamic religious sects in the Sudan. Abdel Gader began 
by stating that the Islamic religious sects have been able to enslave the 
Sudanese elites or intelligentsia. 27 He described the sectarian leaders 
as, 
(1) Divisive and exploitative, 
(2) Individualistic, egoistic and narrow minded, 
(3) Non-nationalistic, inward looking, 
(4) Undemocratic, dictatorial, oppressive and enslaving. 
The fear of intellectuals towards the sectarian leaders according to 
Abdel Gader was based on historical records, where most of the religious 
sects leadership became allies with the colonial authorities against the 
national movement until the independence period. Niblock, Mahmoud and 
many other scholars have documented the practical stand of the sectarian 
leaders against the nationalists who led the 1924 attempted revolution 
(i. e. the White Flag League). 28 Al Gader asserted that, 
"the penetration of the sectarian forces into the Western, 
Eastern, Northern and Central Sudan has led to various 
exploitation, oppression and suffering among the masses. "29 
Abdel Gader observed that the exploitation, expropriation and the 
oppression of the Sudanese masses was/and (is) carried out by the 
merchants who are agents to the leaders of the Islamic sects. Those 
intellectuals working as state employees and which include the police and 
armed forces, judges, civil servants etc. plus peasants, were classified 
by Abdel Gader as members of various Islamic sects, and were drawn from 
among the merchants, through their daily circulation of various 
commodities among the masses. 
It was therefore through the sectarian merchants or Jallaba class that 
indoctrination, or Arabization, Islamization and assimilation of various 
national groups in the Southern and Northern Funj, Eastern and Western 
Sudan, was carried out, especially in the rural areas where the Jallabas 
had established retail shops etc. 29 
The population of the Sudan, according to Yahiya Abdel Gader was 
estimated as eight million, two hundred and fifty-four thousand, nine 
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hundred and twenty-six (8,254,926), which was divided among various 
orientated Islamic sects. The number of Islamic religious sects 
registered by Abdel Gader were ten, but only five were found to have 
established themselves, economically and politically with more than a 
million and a half as members. All Islamic sects were organized 
hierarchically with Imams or Khalifas as the top leaders, followed by 
agents (Wakels) as assistants to Imams. At the lower level are Sheikhs or 
Mulanas and Fakis whose tasks are to control their respective communities 
in order to maintain support - financially and spiritually. In theory and 
in practice, the Islamic community contributes to the common wealth under 
the supervision of an Imam. The members of the community contribute food 
stuffs to the family of the Imam and his agents, plus free voluntary work 
in the house of the Imam. 
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The distribution of Sudanese Muslims to the existing Islamic sects were 
as follows (refer to Map 3, taken from Sudanese Personalities: Secrets 
Behind the Men, by Yahiya Mohammed Abdel Gader, Egyptian Printing Press 
Company Ltd., Khartoum, October 1952): - 
1. KHATMIYYA 
Khatmiyya Islamic sect was brought to Sudan by an Arab sectarian merchant 
who settled first in Eastern Sudan and later moved to Northern and 
Central Sudan where he was married to an indigenous girl and then became 
involved in both trade or commercial activities and religious propaganda 
until he established his religious sect early in the 19th century. In 
Kassala Province Mohammed Osman established a branch of his religious 
sect in a village he named Mirghani and became quite influential there. 
Although Mohammed Osmän Mirghania returned to Arabia where he died, his' 
sons were able to continue both activities until the Mahdist Revolution, 
where the sons of Mohammed Osman were forced to flee to Egypt, and stayed 
there until the Anglo-Egyptian re-conquest where All and Ahmed 
participated in fighting the Mahdist forces. From the time of the re-, 
conquest until 1952, Yahiya Abdel Gader asserted' the Khatmiyya was able 
to acquire considerable followers especially in the Eastern, Northern and 
Central Sudan. Table 3.1 below, from Abdel Gader, indicates the extent of 
Khatmiyya's influence in the Sudan. It equally shows the political 
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strength of the Mirghani family. 
TABLE 3.1 KHATMIYYA` 
Northern province 
Kassala province 
Khartoum province 
Kordofan province 
Blue Nile province 
Dar Fur province 
446,550 
423.600 
268,200 
79,555 
248,775 
39,950 
Total 1,506,630 
Source: Yahiya Abdel Gader personalities from Sudan, 
Egyptian National Printing Press, Khartoum, 1952. 
The above total of Khatmiyya members does not include those from the 
Southern Sudan, (which the author has evidence to be) existing during 
1952. For example, the 1955/56 population census shows that there were 
more than twenty thousand Arabs and Arabized Northerners in the Southern 
Sudan in various capacities (i. e. traders and state employees). 
Furthermore the elections of 1955 in the Sudan did witness several 
Northern traders in Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal and its 
allies with some Southern Sudanese politicians, contested general 
elections as members of the National Unionist Party (NUP). 
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2. ANSAR 
One of the largest and the most powerful Islamic religious sects in the 
Sudan is the Ansar of Mahdi, under the leadership of the Mahdi's 
grandson. The current Ansar was encouraged and subsequently created as a 
political force by the British Colonial Authorities to counter-act the 
Egyptian controlled Khatmiyya. By 1952, there were more than a million 
members of Ansar which is shown on Table 3.2 below. 
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TABLE 3.2 ANSAR 
Northern province 20,610 
Kassala province 21,180 
Kordofan province 44,700 
Khartoum province 338,700 
Dar Fur province 559.300 
Dar Masalt 20,650 
Blue Nile province 392,540 
Total 1,397.540 
Source: Y. Al Gader, Personalities from Sudan 
Egyptian National Press, Khartoum, 1952. 
3. YUSUFIYYA - HINDIYYA 
The Hindiyya is the third important Islamic religious sect in the Sudan 
which has managed to establish itself financially, politically and 
socially. The founder was an Arab merchant settler, Sayyid Sharif Yusuf 
El Hindi who came to Sudan after the conquest of Northern Sudan Christian 
Kingdoms in the 14th and 15th centuries. After the destruction of the 
Christian Kingdoms of Maqurra and Alwa by the end of the 14th century, 
millions of Arab tribesmen poured into the Northern Sudan smashing their 
way through central Sudan down to Western Sudan where slavery became a 
great business therein. Sayyid Sharif started his trade in Northern Sudan 
and later moved and settled in the Gezira permanently. Sharif built a 
mosque in Gallabat and Massalimayya which became the headquarters of the 
Tariqa. In addition to that, immense agricultural schemes were set up and 
there the family acquired wealth and religious influence over Arab 
settlers, and the Arabized riverain tribesmen. By the end of 1952 the 
Khalifa was receiving substantial financial support from his followers, 
who had to make contributions both in money and kind (eg.. sorghum, fish, 
meat, cattle). But in many cases, the Khalifa was a wealthy absentee 
landlord and a merchant, who received great profit from agricultural 
production and commercial enterprises. 
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The head of Hindiyya is not only religious or economic, but a political 
leader as well, and entered into an alliance with Khatmiyya to form the 
first al Asqqika, later renamed as the National Unionist Party and now, 
the Democratic Unionist Party. All the members of the sect are also party 
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members. Such a practice is found among several Arab religious sects in 
the Sudan, such as Ansar al Sunna, Idrisayya, Sammaniyya, Caderiyya and 
others, who have been able to establish their respective political 
parties and movements, eg.. Muslim Brothers, Republican Brothers, Peoples 
Democratic Party, the Umma Party. Hindiyya was well established and his 
followers amounted to about a million people. Abdel Gader has provided 
Table 3.3 below showing the distribution of the members of Yusufiyya - 
Hindiyya according to provinces. 
The Hindiyya Islamic sect was organized hierarchically with Khalifa as 
the head of the community and the branches in those provinces mentioned 
in the table were (and still are) under the Sheikhs, Wakils (agents) and 
Fakis. The Sheikhs, Wakils and Fakis remain answerable to the Khalifa or 
"Saiyyidi". my master. 
TABLE 3.3 YUSUFIYYA - HINDIYYA 
Northern province 14,195 
Kassala province 213,500 
Blue Nile province 663,400 
Khartoum province 30,050 
Kordofan province 14,300 
Total 935,320 
Source: Yahiya Abdel Gader, Personalities from Sudan, 
National Egyptian Printing Press, Khartoum, 1952. 
4. TIJANIYYA 
Tijaniyya was brought and established in the Sudan by Sidi Muhammed ben 
al Mukhtar ben Abd'a Rahman Ash-Shanqeti. Trimmingham has reported that 
he was a 'rich trader' (including slaves) and that he married over thirty 
wives and his concubines were stated to be numberless and he had more 
than sixty children. 
33 Table 3.4 shows the distribution of the members of 
Tijaniyya Islamic sect according to Yahiya Abdel Cader and goes thus: - 
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TABLE 3.4 TIJANIYYA 
Northern province 23,740 
Darfur province 149,850 
Dar Masabt province 113,250 
Kordofan province 127,288 
Blue Nile province 20,755 
Total 434,883 
Source: Yahiya Al Cader, Personalities from Sudan, Egyptian 
National Printing Press, Khartoum, 1952. 
It is important to point our here that members of the Tijaniyya Islamic 
sect are members of the Democratic Unionist Party based on an alliance 
made among several Arab Islamic sects in order to share political and 
economic power without major differences. The majority of members in the 
Tijania sect are engaged in trade and agricultural farming, especially in 
oil seeds, groundnuts, cotton and Gum Arabic. 
5. GADERIYYA 
The founder of Gaderiyya was an Arab immigrant called Abdel Cader al- 
Jailani who arrived in the Sudan in the 19th century and established 
commercial enterprises, agricultural schemes and a mosque at Gezira 
between Medani and Gadarif. The religious sect continues to have branches 
in the Northern Khartoum, Blue Nile and Kordofan provinces. Table 3.5 
shows the distribution of the members of Caderiyya according to 
provinces. 
TABLE 3.55 GADERIYYA 
Northern province 68,700 
Blue Nile province 165.850 
Khartoum province 22,350 
Kordofan province 31,822 
Total 288,722 
Source: Yahiya Al Cader, Personalities from Sudan. Egyptian 
National Printing Press, Khartoum, 1952. 
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6. OTHER ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS SECTS 
The other Islamic religious sects studied by Al Gader include Shadhiliyya 
Ansar al Sunna and Idrisiyya and Sammaniyya Ismailiyya, which were 
brought to the Sudan by the Arab merchants who were interested in the 
spreading of Islam. The distribution of their followers were shown by Al 
Lader as follows: - 
TABLE 3.6 OTHER ISLAMIC SECTS 
Northern province 
Kassala province 
Kordofan province 
Darfur province 
Dar Masalif province 
Khartoum province 
Blue Nile province 
54.350 
14,120 
394,775 
49,950 
41,300 
22,350 
82,925 
Total 662,770 
Source: Yohiya Al Gader, Personalities from Sudan, Egyptian 
National Printing Press, Khartoum, 1952. 
Apart from the above mentioned religious sects, there were several others 
not covered by Yahiya Abdel Cader and prominent among them are the Muslim 
Brothers and Republican Brothers. Both these religious movements were 
founded by the offspring of the Arab settlers who are not only engaged in 
the spread of the Islamic faith and in the implementation of Islamic 
laws, but also in the establishment of an Islamic State where the Koran 
would be applied to the letter. With the exception of the Muslim 
Brothers, non of the smaller Islamic sects has ever been able to organize 
and set up its own independent political party but has rather amalgamated 
with other leading established Islamic sects such as Ansar, Khafmiyya and 
Hindiyya. 
7. NON-SECTARIAN GROUP 
The non-sectarian group was estimated to have a population of more than 
three million members. The majority of whom are from the Southern Sudan 
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and whose religion differs from that of Islam. It is also possible that 
among the non-sectarian group were Muslims who did not belong to any 
Islamic sect, for various reasons. Table 3.7 shows the distribution of 
members of the non-sectarian group according to the various provinces. 
TABLE 3.7 NON-SECTARIAN GROUP 
Northern province 68,700 
Kassala province 70,600 
Kordofan province 497,770 
Blue Nile province 39,950 
Dar Masalif province 41,300 
Bahr El Ghazal 740,300 
Upper Nile province 849,800 
Equatoria province 630,123 
Total 3,021,473 
Source: Yahiya Al Gader, Personalities from the Sudan, 
Egyptian National Printing Press, Khartoum, 1952. 
The above quoted study of Yahiya Abdel Gader was a major contribution 
towards an understanding of how the Arab controlled Sectarian forces in 
the Sudan have been able to penetrate into the Sudanese society. The 
study showed for the first time the statistical distribution of Sudanese 
Muslims among the Islamic religious sects established by the Arab 
merchant settlers in the North, East, Central and Western Sudan. It 
equally showed an estimated number of non-sectarian members in the whole 
country, and that the'majority of the Sudanese, in the North, East, 
Central and Western Sudan, were members of various Islamic religious 
sects, which meant that the majority of the Sudanese were (and still 
are), under the control of sectarian merchant capitalist - feudalist 
forces. The study further showed that the majority of non-sectarian 
Sudanese were from the Southern Sudan and Nuba mountains, where the 
penetration of sectarian merchant capitalists has been limited partly by 
a strong resistance from the national groupings in those regions. 
The most important central point made by Yahiya Abdel Gader was the 
enslavement of Sudanese Muslim intelligentsia by the sectarian leaders. 
The aforementioned enslavement is evidenced in the sectarian based 
Sudanese Society. 
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In a country such as Sudan it would not be surprising that a number of 
modes of production exist simultaneously from the highly developed 
capitalist industrial and agricultural. The feudal and pre-feudal modes 
of production are still dominant in some parts of the Northern Sudan 
which is considered by existing standards as the most developed area in 
the country. Thus, as a first step, the attempt to measure the level of 
development along the capitalist path needs to be made in order to 
determine the level of ensuing social relations of production. Once we 
have been able to determine what modes dominate, the economy, the 
agricultural sector, etc. we will be able to evaluate the rural economy 
and the resulting class structure. 
In the Sudan we can find pastoralists or peasants, communal landowners. 
capitalists, share croppers and landlords in Abba Island in the Eastern 
Sudan. Northern and Western Sudan have absentee landlords and capitalist 
farmers and feudalism agricultural systems. This is also found where the 
sectarian families have a strong presence, eg.: 
1) Gezira area 
2) Abba Island 
3) Gadarif 
4) Kassala 
5) Northern region 
Most of the landlords are absentees and "tenants" and serfs apparently 
exist in those Arabs mentioned above. Share croppers are found in similar 
areas with those mentioned above and peasants with family farms, etc. 
Equally found in these areas are proper capitalist farms with a labour 
force numbering thousands. Similar structures prevail as the main mode of 
relationship when it comes to political set-ups for the same feudal based 
families who are also political and religious leaders. In one area the 
landlord is the spiritual and political leader of the village or town or 
the landlord is the spiritual, political and commercial (economic) 
leader. The consequences of this was the establishment of neo-slavery 
relation of production. One old man from Dongala told the author that, 
when he was a slave in 1930 in Dongola his master controlled him through 
making him work hard to produce more food for his master. He was given 
enough food to eat but no freedom of movement or choice of food or 
freedom to marry and have children. When he became free he married an ex- 
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slave girl and had children and freedom, but no food. no house, no 
clothes, no security and an empty stomach. 
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Finally, in Khartoum province, Abba Island, Gezira, Kassala Gaderif, Port 
Sudan and Northern Sudan, plus Southern and Northern Funj and Western 
Sudan, the following group are found: - 
1) Landlords and absentee landlords. 
2) Merchants and industrialists. 
3) Family farms. (peasants) 
4) Share croppers. 
5) Capitalist labour force on both industrial and 
agricultural sectors as well as domestic servants. 
Economic, spiritual and political power is in the hands of the landlords 
who are predominantly of Arab nationality or background. The Africans, 
who are the indigenous people of the country, are reduced to second class 
citizens or subordinate elements without political and economic 
importance except in terms of their ability to produce for their masters. 
Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub who was twice prime minister of the Sudan and one 
of the leaders of Umma Party (a political wing of Ansar al Mahdi 
religious sect), stated in this book entitled "Democracy on Trial, 
Reflections on Arab and African politics", the following: - 
"They (the Islamic religious sects) consider the rule of the 
state as booty to be inherited and divided between them to the 
exclusion of t'ýg members of the party who did not belong to a 
Mahdi family. " 
The former president of the Sudan, who himself was a product of sectarian 
forces, Jaffer Mohammed Nimiery. made the following statement against 
sectarianism. 
"Sectarianism in the Sudan was composed of major institutions 
with their own political, economic and military organs. They 
were states within the state with their own security 
machinery, press information army and educational 
institutions. In fact closed cities requiring the necessary 
entry documents and visa .... in some areas sectarianism 
exploited people with no wages except givigg them food and 
drink and the spiritual blessings as well. 37 
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Nimiery went on to assert that, 
"... Sectarianism ... constituted an organic presence in 
different regions, affirming fixed and permanent economic 
interests. These interests appeared in the ownership, by the 
heads of the sects, of enormous tracts of land organized into 
major agricultural projects, employing thousands and 
providing livelihood for thousands of others ... They became 
loyal followers by necessity, not voluntarily, a large human 
reserve that could be3toved in any direction, even against 
their own interests. " 
Nimiery further emphasized that the activities or practices of each sect 
were not harmonious with the "supreme national interests", but, 
"concerned with the narrow interests of its leaders and the external 
political currents supporting them. "37 
Nimiery, as a product of sectarianism, was able to observe various 
political activities when he made the following statement. 
"sectarianism which possessed enormous potentialities was able 
to exercise economic and political subjugation and through a 
false liberal parliamentarian game it achieved the following 
results: - 
1) It became anti-development and its power contradicted its 
political and economic interests. 
2) Through its power of economic subjugation, it was able to 
affect the political influence, through commitment to the rule 
of the liberal parliamentarian game. 
3) Through its economic power, it impeded the spread of 
awareness in its areas of influence. 
4) Through its political position dependent on its sectarian 
influence, it was called upon to effect a balance between its 
interests internally and its external bonds, thus falling into 
the trap of external influence. 
"5) Through its ownership of unlimited productive means in the 
form of agricultural projects exceeding the needs of their 
owners, it was unwilling to develop investment of its 
properties by modern means. This revenue through meeting its 
requirements fell short of covering the individual needs of 
the broad base working class in them. The major part of the 
revenue effected by the efforts of these broad masses went to 
the treasuries of the sectarian leaders under the guise of 
religious deception and ble&gings, similar to the pardons 
bought in the middle ages. 
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The above quoted passage illustrates the views of those who had actual 
experience on the role of the sectarian forces in the current Sudanese 
crises. In 1970, Nimiery was faced with a violent confrontation with 
sectarian forces under the leadership of Imam al Hadi Adbel Rachman al 
Mahdi - who had ordered his followers to fight the Jihad against the 
infidels or Godless. Imam Mahdi was killed by government troops following 
the defeat of his armed militia, with Egyptian military assistance. 
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The 
defeat of the Imam of Ansar forces by the army marked a great turning 
point for the sectarian forces in the Sudan at that time as it eroded the 
political base of the sectarians. It was followed by the abolition of 
native administration in the following year. 
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The influence of sectarianism was again evident when Nimiery was forced 
to make the so-called 'national reconciliation' of which all crimes 
committed by the sectarian forces were forgiven in return for cessation 
of their opposition and an end to the violent confrontation between the 
sectarian forces and the Nimiery regime. 
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As a result of sectarian 
influence, Nimiery, in 1983, vigorously imposed Islamic laws in order to 
win the support of the various Islamic sects including the Muslim 
Brothers. Nimiery finally returned to the ranks of sectarian forces until 
he was overthrown. by the popular uprising in April 1985. 
Equally important was the ability of the sectarian forces to make a 
return to power after the 1986 general elections which were partially 
held in the southern region due to insecurity in the area. 
Furthermore, it is important to mention here that the forces of 
sectarianism in the army could not have been able to usurp political 
power from the alliance of the National Salvation, the trade unions and 
the new forces, had it not been for the massive external financial and 
political support. eg.. USA - President Carter, Shadis, Libya, etc. This 
external connection between the sectarian forces and the foreign 
supporters or allies will be discussed in chapter five. 
Fatima Babiker Mahmud's work entitled "The Sudanese Bourgeois Class" has 
contributed a great deal to the current debate on the role of the 
capitalist class in the Sudan. She asserted that, 
"The process of capital accumulation in the Sudan ... has 
resulted in various disparities ... , regions where 
capitalist production flourished became centres of attraction 
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for labour and consequently became more developed than others. 
The State, which continuously played a central part in 
creating the necessary conditions for capital accumulations, 
re-inforced these disparities by allocating resources and 
centralizing infrastructure in the areas of production and 
centres of exchange and finance. Sudanese society thus 
witnessed regional disparities between the North and Southern 
Sudan. Moreover, these are wide disparities between rural and 
urban areas in the country at large. These disparities are 41 
apparent in incomes, unemployment and access to resources. " 
Fatima went on to say that, 
... It is the process of capital accumulation that created the 
condition 42for uneven development between the ..... 
regions. " 
This process of capital accumulation has been, controlled by the Arab and 
Arabized merchants throughout the whole country, is understood by those 
Sudanese masses conscious of their rights. Fatima has documented in 
detail how Darfur, Kordofan-and Eastern Sudan, plus the Southern Sudan, 
have been subjected to various oppression and exploitation, expropriation 
and the transfer of material resources which this thesis will investigate 
in what follows. The consequences of such exploitation and transfer of 
resources was the emergence of regional disparities and the political 
crisis between the national group from the less developed areas with the 
national grouping from the ruling classes. 
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Fatima also observed that the leading business men, the rich capitalists 
(merchants and farmers), the owners of large private hotels, restaurants, 
private banks, industrial establishments, owners of the private transport 
sector [i. e. buses, taxis, lorries, 'planes), owners of capitalist cattle 
ranges and poultry farms, etc. were dominated by Arabs and those who were 
Arabized. Riverain tribesmen who were originally engaged in commercial 
activities (trading) during the Anglo-Egyptian era, on the present under- 
developed regions of Darfur, Kordofan, the three Southern Sudan regions, 
Southern and Northern Funj and Eastern Sudan, later transferred their 
profits and accumulated capital to the North for further investment. 
Fatima further pointed out that a great number of merchant capital and 
industrial capitalists were able to trace the origin of their wealth or 
capital tc the slave trade in which their ancestors took part. 
The role of kinship, extended family, tribalism and ethnicity were found 
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by Fatima to be enhancing capital accumulation for the existing rich 
families. Here, sons or relatives, are employed as managers to the family 
business without reference to their academic qualification. 
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The role of the Jallaba class in Sudanese politics is another very 
important area through which political power is wield to serve their 
economic interests. Fatima discovered that most businessmen were members 
of various political parties, and she asserted that, 
"The distribution of businessmen studied among the political 
parties was: Umma 38%, PDP 30%, NUP 16%, others ... 16% .... 
In the agricultural sector the Umma party leads with 68% of 
those involved in mechanized farming ... The PDP comes next 
with 14%, with the NUP trailing behind with 10%. The same 
pattern persists in the industrial sector, with 50% belonging 
to the Umma party, 22% PDP and 11% NUP. 
Fatima noted further that among the "younger businessmen with secondary 
school education a vast majority" (75%), belongs to the Umma party ... 
the PDP comes next with 30% of the total sample declaring their 
affiliation to it; the NUP comes last with 16% belonging to it or 37. 
Table 8 below shows the distribution of businessmen according to their 
political affiliation. 
The Sudanese merchants in the Northern Sudan, especially in the national 
capital where the seat of the government is established, were found by 
Fatima to have varied relationships with the state apparatus, notably 
Ministers, State Ministers, etc. She pointed out that, 
"... 78% of the cases studied knew present ministers and deputy 
ministers personally, 32% were found to be close friends of 
ministers and prominent army officers ..., 
8% of members of 
ministers' families, 8% had influence in banks, either through 
members or their families working in banks. 8% had 
partnerships with ex-ministers or employed them as senior 
executives in their establishments. The capitalists interests 
were thus not only safeguarded on the macro-level through the 
control of the bourgeoisie b} also on the micro-level through 
personal relationships .... 
It is sufficiently clear that the Jallaba class, '(merchants, businessmen 
or national capitalists), has been racist. 
The author, while in the Sudan for the collection of research material 
for this thesis in 1987. managed to survey and examine the role of the 
sectarian Jallaba class, in the under-development of various regions. 
104 
including Darfur, Kordofan, Southern and Northern Funj, Eastern, 
Northern, Central and Khartoum regions. The author also visited Juba but 
could not visit Malakal and Wau because normal public and private 
transport had ceased due to the civil war and insecurity. 
The author's main concern was to examine existing relations within the 
sectarian Islamic religious communities in the above mentioned areas, 
their structure or organizational set up. Equally examined were the means 
and strategies being used by the sectarian Jallabas in maintaining neo- 
slaves under their control in spite of suffering and poverty. 
The survey and the study which included personal interviews and 
discussions with random selected individuals was carried out in Khartoum, 
Port Sudan, Abba Island, Wad Medani, Abu Aharas, Rufaa, Genied, Sinja, 
Kosti, Renk, Damazin, Gaderif, Kassala, Abbara, Dongola, El Obeid, Nyala 
El Fashir and Kadugli. In those places, the author managed to visit 
various shanty towns in each area or town-and have discussions with those 
displaced squatters which was beneficial to the author in many ways. 
Our survey began in Khartoum province, specifically in the three towns 
which make up Khartoum, the capital city of the Sudan; namely, Omdurman, 
Khartoum North and Khartoum South and various suburbs and shanty towns 
such as Hag Yusuf, with a registered population of a quarter of a 
million, Hay Maya, with nearly half a million squatters; Hesba near Kobar 
and Khartoum industrial areas, Ombada North and South, Arkamail, Kalakala 
and Patials. In the three towns mentioned above I visited the markets and 
shops and ascertained that all commercial activities were carried out 
under two inter-related commercial sectors, namely formal and informal 
trade sectors. Formal commercial sectors were subdivided into Suk 
Afriengi (or modern shopping centre) and Suk al Shaabi or Arabi (i. e. 
local people's market). The differences between Suk Afriengi and Arabi or 
Shaabi are really quite insignificant. For in most cases similar 
commodities are found in both markets. Perhaps the main differences 
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include the areas in which each sector is located and the size of the 
shops and the type of licences issued in each sector. For example Suk al 
Afrienyyi are located in city centres which is obvious in the three towns 
mentioned above, while Suki al Shaabi are located at the suburbs of the 
three main cities, Omdurman, Khartoum and Khartoum Bahari (North). In 
addition to the above mentioned sectors, there are also groups of retail 
shops attached to each village or suburb known as kanteen, which usually 
operate until the middle of the night. While the latter is specialized in 
selling food stuff, soap etc., the other two sectors are mixed and any 
type of commodity is sold within a regulated time. 
As for the informal sector, it consists of sellers who in most cases have 
no permanent or concrete premises from which to operate or conduct their 
business. In addition, most of the sellers do not have enough capital to 
run a trade and have no commercial or trade licence. The informal market 
is known as Suk al Shamish (open Sunday Market). 
While members of the formal trade are organized and legally recognized by 
the state, those in the informal sector are not. The merchants under the 
formal trade were found to have formed a Chamber of Commerce which is 
equivalent to a trade organization. i. e. an association of businessmen 
who promote commercial and industrial interests of the merchant class in 
the community. 
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It was found by this study that those merchants operating in the Suk al 
Afreinyyi were known as National Capitalists (Jallaba), and were the 
richest with the largest shops and industrial establishments, plus import 
and export business. The traders operating in Suk Haabi are the second in 
line in terms of their possessions. Furthermore, merchants in this sector 
were also involved in commercial transport, i. e. business taxis, lorries 
for commercial hiring etc. Similarly, those in Suk Afriengi we found to 
be the owners of houses and small premises for rent. 
As for those operating in the informal sector, they include hawkers, 
shoe-shine boys, watch and radio repairers, petty sellers for edible 
commodities such as oranges, apples, lemons, spites, cigarettes, mangoes, 
bananas, vegetables, fish, groundnuts, kasiera food, madmas and various 
cooked foods such as boiled eggs, and tassali. In the informal sector it 
was found that most of the goods being sold there were either smuggled in 
or brought in through the black market, making certain goods very 
expensive. These consist of TV sets, videos, radios, suitcases, watches 
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of all types, cameras, gold bracelets, chains, ear-rings, clothes. It was 
also established those engaging in informal trade had no capital of their 
own and were therefore working as agents for these merchants in the 
formal trade sector. 
It was observed that all the commercial operations in Suk Afrienyyi were 
Arab or Arabized national groups plus Arabs from Egypt, Armenians, 
Greeks, Italians etc. While those operating in the informal sector were 
mostly found to be youths from Kordofan, Darfur, Southern and Northern 
Funj and the Southern Sudan. People selling cigarettes were found to be 
Western' Sudanese from both regions and were the second largest group in 
the market, ' whereas those engaged in shoe-shine were mainly youths from 
the Western Sudan, Kuran and Falata. Most watch repairs were carried out 
by the Western Sudanese and the members of the black community in 
z1urman who had been in the city for years engaged in informal trade 
activities. 
In addition, the author found that in almost all urban centres visited 
porters, tailors, street scrimpers, bricklayers, mud carriers, hawkers 
and most labourers in various restaurants, tea-shops were comprised of 
people from the Nuba Mountains, Southern and Northern Funj, Eastern and 
Southern Sudan and not one single Arab was engaged in these occupations. 
Furthermore, drivers, blacksmiths, fishers, domestic servants employed to 
clean shops and toilets were found to be either from the Western and 
Southern Sudan. The same applies to those working on the construction of 
houses in the urban centres and labourers engaged in other low paid jobs 
such as street or road maintenance. Throughout the urban centres visited 
the people employed in these areas were found to have come from the less 
developed areas already mentioned above. 
The author also found that in all the urban centres visited another 
interesting group of informal traders, black marketeers, were dealing in 
money, i. e. foreign currency, foreign travellers cheques, tax-exemption 
certificates from students who have been carrying out advanced studies 
abroad. Local and foreign currencies were being illegally exchanged each 
day. Khartoum and Port Sudan were found to posses a'great number of such 
traders worth millions of (US) dollars, Saudi` Rials, Dinars etc. from 
various Arab countries, pounds sterling, German mark, Egyptian and 
Sudanese pounds. This group operates on the street like hawkers, standing 
at street corners, half hiding, calling out to un-suspecting passers by - 
"dollars (cheque - (sahawah), tourist cheques, Dinar, Kuwaiti Rial, Al- 
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Saudi Gine, Sterlini (pounds sterling), Gine Almani (German mark), while 
carrying Sudanese currency in their hands. Those who have any foreign 
currency or tourist cheques and who were interested in black market 
prices would sell or buy. By moving to another corner or inside a shop 
whose owner was a collaborator, the exchange would take place or 
sometimes a hotel with sufficient privacy was chosen for the transaction 
to take place. 
Most of the traders engaged in this trade were from the Arab or Arabized 
national group with a few Western Sudanese, especially from the Zakawa 
tribe, and a few Southerners working as agents to one Egyptian Christian 
trader in Khartoum city centre. In Port Sudan there were two Dinkas 
youths, six from the Fur tribe, and two from Funj. It was difficult to 
determine the statistics of the people involved in this trade as most of 
these activities were carried out secretly. 
The findings of these surveys were quite striking and clearly indicate or 
point to the root causes of the current Sudanese political crisis which 
is the subject of this thesis. We found that the distribution of merchant 
capital was quite imbalanced as well as the distribution of industrial 
capital, including private banks. Although there was a problem with the 
lack of actual statistics of the total number of merchants in the formal 
sector and retail trades in the informal sector, it was quite clear from 
the number of shops, markets and retail sellers visited, and those 
contacted by the author, that there were profound inequalities in the 
regional participation in the local trade and outside them as well. In 
all the urban centres and villages visited, it was found that almost all 
merchants or petty traders were Arab and Arabized Riverain tribesmen. The 
second largest group was composed of foreign merchants of different 
nationalities, for example there were a few Indians, Pakistanis, Greeks, 
Egyptians, Syrians and Lebanese, those who survived from the Nimiery 
nationalization policy. 47 This was generally true of Khartoum, Port 
Sudan, West Medoni, Juba and even Wau town(s) where a few Greek shops and 
restaurants, plus Pakistanis, Indians and Egyptians were. 
Sadly enough, there were no Southern, Western (even those of Zakawas), 
Eastern or those from Southern and Northern Funj in the Suki Al Afrienyyi 
market (European markets), having shops or industrial establishments, in 
all the urban centres visited and already mentioned. 
In the Suk al Ahaabi, it was also found that most of the traders were 
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Arab and Arabized Northerners and the remainder were from Western Sudan, 
especially from the Zakawa tribe of Darfur, who were found to have been 
engaged in the smuggling of goods from both Ethiopia and Libya. There was 
one southerner who had a canteen at Gazra suburb, otherwise the entire 
trading operations throughout the areas visited was controlled by Arabs 
and Arabized Northerners. 
As mentioned already, the informal sector was dominated by people from 
the backward regions such as Southern Kordofan, Darfur, Southern Sudan, 
Southern and Northern Funj and those of Eastern Sudan from the Beja 
tribesmen. An interesting find was that the majority of thosq engaged in 
the informal, sector were agents of big merchants, for example in the 
field of watches, TV sets, videos, cigarettes and cameras. These goods 
were smuggled into the country by rich merchants who visit Europe and 
rich Arab countries three or more times a year. On their return they buy 
these goods at duty free shops and bribe customs officers, by giving them 
perhaps a video or watch, to allow them to bring numbers of videos, TV 
sets, watches, etc. into the country. 
In j4yala and Obeid the author was able to observe that there is tough 
% 
competition between the Arabized and Arab merchants on one side and the 
members of the Zakawa, Fur and other tribes on the other, over commercial 
activities. For example, in September 1987, the author came upon a fight 
in the market between two neighbours at the market, one a Northern Arab 
and the other a Zakawa. The fight was over customers but built up into a 
tribal fight of Arab vs Zakawa which resulted in two Arabs and one Zakawa 
being killed, although none of them were related to the first two who 
started the fight. They died as a result of racial or tribal solidarity. 
The author found this type of fighting to be common in most of the 
markets of most urban areas visited. The most striking was the social and 
racial divisions in these markets, whether Suk Afrienyyi, or Suk al 
Ahaabi, or Suk al Shamish. The author observed the existence of various 
factions antagonistic to each other. The most visible conflicts were 
mainly related to class, ethnic, racial, tribal, regional and religious 
differences. The racial, ethnic and tribal dimensions were clearly 
demonstrated in the tension and confrontation between those in the formal 
sector and those in informal markets. Most of the members of those 
operating in the latter markets were merely agents of the richest 
merchants, customs officers, police officials, officials from duty free 
shops, some senior political and government officials with access to 
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frequent foreign travel through state visits. They, in most cases, were 
subjected to state sponsored terrorism known as Kash, whereby young men 
from the Southern and Northern Funj, Southern Kordofan, Darfur and any 
black person they found near the suspected people, were arbitrarily 
arrested and taken to a nearby police station where they would be taken 
to court, charged with violation of emergency laws, which have been in 
force since Nimiery's rule. 
Those affected most, were the youths engaged in selling and repairing 
watches, radios and/or selling various spare parts for radios, watches, 
etc. which the formal market could not offer. First the informal sector 
was composed of poor sellers who had to depend in most cases on the Arab 
merchants for a constant supply, without which their only source of 
income would cease. The Jallaba class in Khartoum used the police force 
or the state machinery to oppress non-Arab aspiring individuals whether 
Muslims or not. All Southern Sudanese in Khartoum Gezira and Port Sudan 
were treated as foreigners on some occasions and as a "fifth column" 
waiting for SPLA to attack. The people from the Nuba Mountains, Southern 
and Northern Funj and those of Darfur were treated equally as inferior, 
uncivilized or black. Consequently the author observed various elements 
of discrimination, for example, in Khartoum, Wad Medani and Port Sudan 
the Arab merchants had employed Ethiopian refugees as shop assistants in 
their city centre shops, at various city centres; in their hotels as 
waiters and waitresses, in canteens, retail shops and at retail shops in 
the suburbs, while the youths from Southern Sudan, Fur, and those from 
the Beja tribes were without work and on the streets instead. They were 
being insulted and humiliated by the police who were under the influence 
of the merchants. It was therefore not surprising to find most of the 
police cells visited, were full of detained black youths ranging from the 
age of nine years upwards. It did not matter whether or not one was 
working even in an office -a black Sudanese would be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest regardless of his identity card. The author was thrice 
arrested without proper reason, the charges being connected with the 
breaking of emergency laws and thrice released without trial. The author 
was advised by the Southern Sudanese not to show his identity card when 
arrested on the street by the police, for they would destroy it and take 
him to the police cells. Therefore the author was unable to resist arrest 
and had to appear before the investigator before justice was served. 
The most striking of the racist "Kash" was the arrest of a MP member from 
Nuba Mountains in the market where he was trying to buy some cigarettes 
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in Omdurman Suk Afrienyyi, from a Southern boy. The MP , who was a member 
of the Sudan National Party, led by Rev. Philip Abbas, a member of 
parliament or constituent assembly territorial seat of Hag Yusuf 
Khartoum, the first non-Arab to be elected not only in Khartoum but in 
the areas dominated by the Arab settlers, eg.. Gezira, Funj and Ingessna 
areas since independence. 
The discrimination mentioned above was equally applied on Muslims as well 
as Christians. The criterion was clearly the colour of a person's skin 
rather than class in most cases. In others it was ethnicity mixed with 
class. The author has come to agree with Joseph Garang on the nature of 
class formation and class struggle in the Sudan, when he stated that, 
"the forces of the masses in the country are effectively divided on the 
basis of regional, national grouping under the leadership of 
"intellectual petty bourgeois who rally their people behind them, " and 
that "these petty bourgeois intellectuals mistake their own aspirations 
for power and prestige as the interest of the masses of their national 
grouping. " And because of such effective division class struggle within 
the same society or community against the same enemies (i. e. dominant 
ruling class and merchant class well), was seen or viewed differently by 
different nationalities facing similar oppression, exploitation and 
appropriation at the same period and the same markets dominated by 
merchant capital since independence. 48 
The discrimination and the crises mentioned above were equally applied on 
both Muslims and non-Muslims from Southern and Northern Funj, Southern 
Kordofan or Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Southern Sudan who were found to 
have been classified as Junubeen (Southerners), Gerbeen (Westerners), or 
Falata (i. e. Nigerians who are considered as foreigners), or Abied 
(slaves)., 'Here the racial aspect, supported by solidarity among various 
ethnic or national groups regardless of their class or income differences 
was more vigorously pursued. The main reason found by the author was that 
the Arab and Arabized merchants counteract complaints against them by 
accusing instead the non-Arab Sudanese as being racist anti-Arabs for 
those who are Muslims, and used anti-Islam and Arabs against those who 
are not Muslims. Those Muslims who attempted to fight for economic 
equality were accused of being apostates and therefore communists in 
orientation. 49 
It was not surprising that the merchants have been successful in 
maintaining their monopoly, not only in the field of commerce, but also 
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in controlling the majority Arab and Arabized national group. This 
control was characterized by the support the Jallaba has been getting and 
the extent to which it was able to divide and rule. 
The strongest weapon which all merchants use, whether in a lesser or more 
developed region, was bribery in the form gifts and direct blackmail or 
friendship behind which were various destructive and corrupt motives. The 
merchants, after having managed to monopolize the circulation of all 
essential commodities throughout the country, bribed the police, the 
ministers, the judges and conscious individuals who were suspected of 
being radical. 
After having succeeded in adopting the above mentioned strategies, the 
merchants or sectarian Jallaba began its activities with the hoarding of 
essential commodities, followed by black market activities replacing the 
normal market. The next action was to inflate prices which are designed 
to enhance the accumulation of profit in order to be millionaires as soon 
as possible. 
The main victims in these markets were all the poor masses, who are the 
majority of the people, and the beneficiaries, who were (and still are), 
the merchants class and their allies who are mostly comprised of two 
elements. The first group consists of members of the national group from 
which the merchants in question come from. The basis of their support 
stems from both personal gain and ethnic or racial solidarity as part of 
the appeal made to them by the corrupt merchants mentioned in this sub- 
section. The second group always consists of the corrupt politicians, 
police officers and men, judges and other state employees in various 
other key positions. It was and remains through such arrangements that 
the Jallabas in the Sudan in general and Northern Sudan in particular 
have been able to effectively divide the oppressed and the exploited 
Sudanese masses such that their repressive policies dominated by 
exploitation and oppression were fully implemented without any major 
resistance or opposition. This division is also felt when one is buying 
in the black market where prices differ not only from person to person 
but also from one national group to another. The author witnessed that 
these merchants involved in black market essential commodities such as 
sugar,, wheat flour, especially "double zero" petrol or benzine, had to 
give their so-called friends, various goods at lower prices, below black 
market prices, while non-friends were charged more than ten times the 
normal price with threats to "take it or leave it, without discussion. " 
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In some cases, non-friends were denied any chance of buying goods even at 
the highest price possible, for the interest of the group was above the 
temptation posed by high prices. 
Any complaints against corruption, black marketeering, soaring prices, 
hoarding of essential commodities, were welcomed by the state 
authorities, though no visible actions were ever taken to stop the 
destructive activities within the black market, regardless of various 
crimes being committed daily, including murder. 
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It was quite- clear that members of the Jallaba class were controlling: the 
state administrative and legal agencies and were therefore free to do 
anything suitable for their class interest, no matter whether or not such 
actions were damaging to the national interest. 
This was common knowledge among almost all members of the oppressed and 
exploited various national groups within Khartoum, Wedan, Obeid, Port 
Sudan, Dongola and others visited by the author. The author attempted to 
examine the merchants' activities and ascertain how trade licenses were 
being issued by the local council authorities. Other areas examined 
included the use of state controlled so-called people's courts [mahkama 
el shaabiyya] and the police; the shanty towns in various towns and the 
relations between the displaced people and the merchants; and the final 
area was the private building construction industry and private houses as 
part of merchant capital is a means of accumulation. 
With regards to trade licenses, the author went to enquire from the 
Southern Sudanese as well as the Western Sudanese working in the informal 
sector trade, how some of them had been operating. Some said they had 
been there for twenty years and others between two years and seven years. 
The author asked them why they could not move to the Suk al Shaabi if 
they have had enough capital. The answer was that they were refused 
licenses to carry out business in various towns in the Northern Sudan. 
One Abdel Rahman Kon, a lorry driver, discussed and described his 
experience in Khartoum at length to the author. In brief, he said he came 
to Khartoum on 10th May 1967 with the idea of starting a trade since he 
could not carry out-any commercial operation in the South due to the 
civil war. Kon had Ls-500 as his capital which he earned from the sale of 
his cattle and his involvement in the long distance cattle trade. But to 
his grave disappointment he was denied licenses to establish a retail 
shop if Hag Yusuf suburb, Al Aaihafa, and Abu Amama so from there he went 
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to a shanty town known as "Heshish" (for the black people of Nigerian 
origin, known as Falata), within walking distance of Khartoum city 
centre. 51 Mr Kon managed to settle in al Heshish, and build a hut with 
one room. There he began a retail shop where he sold fruit which was 
usually brought from Darfur or from the Southern Sudan. Mr Kon told the 
author that there were over seven retail shops in the area, but the 
police closed them down on the grounds that they had no license. When 
they applied for a license, the six Nigerians were told that they were 
not allowed to operate a local business, that was only for the Sudanese 
and for the Southern Sudanese. He was advised to return to his region or 
told that he could operate in Khartoum through a merchant based there, 
and have a license as a junior partner. The arrangement was for him to 
travel to Jennena, in Darfur, in order to buy various fruit and shift 
them to Khartoum to be sold in his retail shop under the control of 
Mohammed Awad, the license holder. It was later discovered that he was a 
younger brother of one of the senior police officers, an Arab by origin. 
Mohammed Awad did not invest any cash in the shop, the license was his 
only contribution. Yet Kon told the author that Awad used to receive half 
the profit he made, without paying tax, which Kon did pay. In a period of 
15 years, Mohammed Awad became very prosperous, and he built two retail 
shops. One in Ombada South and another at Al Kuwait, apart from a large 
wholesale store and a shop attached to it at Khartoum North, while Abdel 
Rahman. Kon remained poor, living in a shanty with two huts as the local 
government, the local courts and the police had denied him equal 
treatment as a Southern Sudanese Muslim. 
This study found that some Southern Sudanese were given licenses to work 
in Southern Sudan while residing in Khartoum which included, Dr Gama 
Hassan, former regional Minister of Agriculture, Oliver Batali and a 
group of former Regional ministers who set up import and export business 
offices, such as the White Nile Stock, Sudd, etc., which were found to be 
involved in the quota system of trade. This system operates illegal 
legalized corrupted commercial practices in the whole Sudan dominated by 
the black marketeers, which we shall discuss at length under trade 
license and quota system later in this chapter. 
Finally, no Southern, Western or Eastern Sudanese proper was a merchant 
in Khartoum, Gezira or West Medani, Port Sudan or Dongola because both 
the big merchants and commercial banks could not grant any credit 
facilities as expected. Furthermore, the Arab merchants would like to 
hire a commercial building for merchant purposes. Even when a Southerner 
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has been able'to get capital, he would not be able to hire a shop because 
the amount charged to a non-Arab applicant would be very high. As a 
result, the majority were alienated by the amount charged, while the 
remainder were denied facilities regardless of whether or not they had 
enough money to pay the rent on the premises in question. 
As regards the use of the so-called people's courts, and the police, in 
practice, further the interests of the Jallaba class. The author observed 
in the urban areas visited, that the existence of people's courts besides 
other courts and the number of the members of the above mentioned differ 
from city to city, for example, Khartoum's court had nine members while 
the one'at Wad Medani had five members, Port Sudan's people's court had 
six, Gadarif seven and Obeid three members. 
The most interesting of them all was the one in Khartoum city centre, 
located in the centre of vegetable market near the United Nations 
building, which consisted of nine members under the chairmanship of the 
Deputy Town Clerk of Khartoum. Although similar courts were set up in 
Omdurman and Khartoum North, the one in the city centre of Khartoum was 
quite unique and because of this the author concentrated on attending all 
cases there for nearly one month. It was there that the author was able 
to document the following: - the members of the people's court were not 
professionally trained lawyers, but civil servants politically selected 
to execute a political project which we will discuss at length in chapter 
five. Suffice it to say that the most pressing objectives were to expel 
all new immigrants to Khartoum from Southern and Northern Funj, Southern 
and Western Sudan and those people market as "Fifth Column" and the 
unwanted "Grabeen wa Janubeen. " Under Nimiere's government in 1976-and 
1981-84, thousands of Western and Southern Sudanese were arbitrarily 
arrested and sent to their respective regions, regardless of whether or 
not they were working. The decision to expel these national groups was 
entirely racist because the criterion was colour and race rather than 
crime, lack of work or migration. This study found that none of the new 
arrivals to Khartoum, not only from Northern and Central provinces, but 
Northern Kordofan and Northern Kassala, were expelled. 
It was not surprising to observe that almost all the accused were to a 
greater extent from Western and Southern Sudan, while other blacks, from 
Southern and Northern Funj. Omdurman and other parts of Khartoum were 
identified by their colour - which was indeed racist behaviour. 
52 
The 
other members of the court included senior inspectors of local 
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government, such as Secretary of the Court, Resident Engineer, Assistant 
Commissioner of Public Health, Superintendent of Police, Assistant 
Commissioner of Commerce and Supplies, Assistant Commissioner of Taxation 
and Rates, Assistant Commissioner of Lands and Surveys and the ninth 
member of the said court was a merchant representing the Chamber of 
Commerce (or Gorba Tigara), an organization of the Jallaba class. 
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All the members of the above mentioned court were exclusively Arab and 
Arabized Riverain tribesmen. The same was true of the other courts in 
Omdurman, Khartoum North and also in the Gezira main towns visited, Port 
Sudan, Damazin, Gadarif and Obeid; while in Kassala, Nyala Renk and 
Fashir the members were mixed. 
The terms of reference of Khartoum's people's court, as explained to the 
author by the Secretary of the Court, Sayed Abdel Muniam Mohammed (from 
Dongola province) include the following: - 
a) To prevent workless people from filling up the market place and to. 
stop pickpocketing or theft. 
b) To get rid of hawkers of all types including plastic bag sellers, 
and those without licenses. 
c) To keep the market clean and to sell clean and good food stuff 
including fruit, vegetables, fish eggs, meat, etc. 
d) To control the black market and high inflated prices. to. protect 
poor consumers. 
e) To control corruption and the giving out of various trade licenses 
in Khartoum province. 
f) To ensure that the supply of essential commodities in the market is 
reasonable enough to prevent a monopoly. 
g) to protect those merchants and traders who have licenses, to pay 
their taxes and who have been competing with criminals. 
All the above enumerated objectives were generally good for all the 
consumers and if implemented properly and correctly would not only stop 
various crimes committed by the law breakers, but would make it possible 
for a consumer of poor or low income to have a quite reasonable standard 
of living. 
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The chairman told the citizens watching to move 50 yards away from the 
court, where all the members sat in a row. Eight policemen, under the 
leadership of a corporal were standing behind the court members and where 
the accused were to be seated. The author approached the Secretary of the 
Court in order to ask for permission to sit near the court members so 
that he may take some notes of the court proceedings, after having 
explained to him that the author was doing research and was interested in 
the court activities. The Secretary conferred with the chairman and other 
members of the court and the author was allowed to take notes but was 
informed by the Secretary not to use a recorder. 
Eight young boys, all in rags and bare footed, were brought in by three 
young men in plain clothes. They had Dinka names, Garang, Deng and Mayom. 
The chairman, who had a long stick, called upon the three police 
informers to bring the accused, one at a time, in front of him. No formal 
court charges were made nor any written statement set before the court. A 
young boy of approximately nine or ten years old was brought in front of 
the chairman. He began beating the boy on his back and shoulders with the 
stick. The frightened boy started screaming and the chairman meanwhile 
called him various names "ya kalaba ya afin -ya jenubi arija ila jenub" 
(you dog, you filth or dirt). "What is your name? " The boy, half 
screaming, answered "Kuol Bol", and without any discussion among the 
court members, the chairman ordered the police to , "take him to jail for 
a month and take all his belongings. " This included ten pieces of plastic 
bags worth (Ls 3.00), three Sudanese pounds plus one pound Sudanese in 
cash. All were confiscated. The same beating and insults followed, (such 
as "Falata, Jenubi, dog, filth and go back to your home"). This also 
happened to the other boys; then confiscation of whatever cash and things 
of value they. had in their possession. The police were then ordered to 
take the eight boys down to the prison. In four and a half hours, the 
court was able to see 22 cases and five out of the 22, were fined Ls-50 
each and told not to repeat the offence. They were also told that they 
should go to the council in order to get a license. 
The five who were fined were watch repairers. The total number was not 
easy to know, but the author managed to count 112 young men between the 
ages of 18-30 years old in Khartoum city centre and the nearby Suk al 
Araabi. All of them had briefcases filled with watches, spares, some 
bracelets etc. In a similar manner, the hawkers were ready to flee or run 
away as soon as police or someone from the town council was spotted, by 
those instructed to stand by and watch out and inform the rest to run as 
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fast as possible to avoid being arrested and taken to the above mentioned 
court. 
The next day, the court resumed its activities at 10.00 am in the same 
place and with the same chairman and members. From 10.00 am to 2.30 pm, 
18 people were summarily punished. Two of the accused were women from 
Western Sudan and described as Falata by the chairman, six were watch 
repairers, also described as Falata for they were all black, though three 
were from Southern Sudan. The remainder consisted of hawkers, plastic bag 
sellers, Tasali, kepkepe and groundnut sellers. 
The author attended, the above mentioned court for a period of thirty 
days, commencing on the 1st August 1987, and ending on the 3rd September, 
1987. The author personally witnessed various injustices, beating, abuse 
or insults to the poorest members of society who were struggling to 
survive. Seven hundred and twenty young men, young girls and old women 
were brought to the court within the 30 days. The regional composition of 
the accused were as follows: 300 Southern Sudanese, 250 were Western 
Sudanese, 97 were from Southern and Northern Funj, 58 were women, mostly 
Western Sudanese and the last group were 13 Northern Sudanese. 
The behaviour of the chairman of the court towards fellow Sudanese from 
the Southern and Northern Funj, Southern, Western and indeed any black 
Sudanese brought before the court, was not surprising to most of the 
Southern Sudanese politicians contacted by the author who reported the 
existence of a racist court in the national capital. Instead the author 
was asked to visit the various police cells, prisons and the emergency 
courts in Omdurman, Khartoum North and Khartoum South as well, to see 
whether or not those already imprisoned or in the cells and those brought 
to the courts were different from those in the court attended by the 
author at Khartoum city centre. 
In the Khartoum public or people's courts mentioned above, the seven 
hundred and twenty included watch makers and repairers, 80 in number, who 
suffered most for what the court did to each of them. They were each 
fined fifty Sudanese pounds, regardless of income or profit or capital 
with the watch repairer in question. The court was only interested in the 
Ls. 50 and the watch repairer told not to repeat the offence. According to 
those watch repairers interviewed, the court in question, was instituted 
to terrorize and rob from the poor blacks in order to chase them out of 
Khartoum because they are unwanted migrants. The court was accused by all 
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those from Southern and Northern Funj, Southern and Western Sudan, who 
were victims. 
The watch repairers, like radio repairers, claimed that they should have 
been given trade licenses, like a few others operating inside some shops 
in Khartoum city centre. But the problem was that the number of watch 
repairers were twice as many as those of radio makers and repairers, and 
as such they were not, explained the Secretary of the Khartoum people's 
court, able to get places to hire. Both the watch and radio repairers and 
makers claimed that they have been discriminated against by both town 
council officials responsible for issuing licenses and the merchants who 
refused to allow them to rent parts of their shops. The Arab merchants, 
according to the watch and radio repairmen, would like to employ them 
therein, rather than allowing them to hire or rent shops as independent 
business owners. That is to say, the Arab merchants had wanted them to 
work as watch and radio repairers in their respective shops and to be 
paid wages at the end of the month. But when the watch repairers and 
radio repairers refused, the merchants not only refused to rent their 
shops to them, but reported both to local government officers and the 
police, to get rid of all the hawkers including the watch and radio 
repairers. Consequently, the watch and radio repairers became the object 
of more frequent raids in an attempt to loot or rob them of the small 
savings which they have been able to accumulate during the week and to 
prevent them from expanding or diversifying their trade such that they 
may not compete with Arab merchants. 
The second group who were victimized and fined (LS. 50) fifty Sudanese 
pounds were the 58 women mentioned, with the exception of three; the 55 
women were distributed as follows: 40 women from Western Sudan (i. e. 
Kordofan and Darfur), 6 women from the Southern Sudan, 5 women from 
Southern and Northern Funj and 4 women from the black tribeless Sudanese, 
originating from both Southern and Western Sudan. All the women were 
selling various food stuffs including, cooked eggs, baked kasira, tamiya, 
ground peanut paste, fish of fasiek ground okra, known as wega, shiles 
and roasted ground nuts. Kasira was the most common food item being sold 
by the women, plus slaughtered chickens. Here the majority of low paid 
Sudanese, especially in the urban centres, depend on eating sorghum from 
which kasira is made. Sorghum mixed with wheat or kassaba flour can make 
an excellent alternative choice, instead of more expensive bread which 
was not always in sufficient supply. Furthermore, kasira was the cheapest 
compared with bread of any kind in the market. 
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It was because of its cheapness that many Sudanese, including the well to 
do or rich people, chose kasirra as the main staple food for them. The 
merchants who own the bakeries complained to the local Government 
authorities about kasira being allowed to compete in the market with 
bread, while those selling kasira do not pay rent nor taxes. They argued 
that because kasira is cheaper it is 'winning off' their supposed 
customers. 
5k The merchants were not interested in the Kasira Makers 
paying taxes, but in seeing that they were banned from operating in the 
three towns (i. e. Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman). The response of 
the town councils in the three towns was to impose the highest fines in 
order to drive them out of business quietly, without creating a political 
issue. 
Table 3.8 shows the distribution of the members of the accused brought in 
the people's court in Khartoum city centre in August 1987. It is clear 
that the court in question was racist. However, Nimiere's Government 
attempted to prevent this persecution of poor women on the grounds that 
that women were generally hardworking members of society and never - 
cheated anyone in their current production activities. But in 1987 the 
merchants were able to influence not only the local government 
authorities but the central government which promptly made various 
facilities available to the merchants regardless of the suffering of the 
masses due to such polices. Like the watch and radio repairers, the women 
were told to obtain licences, after having been fined LS. 50 and each 
woman repeated that she would not be given a licence by local government 
authorities. The women told the author that the court in question had 
been oppressive towards them since it was instituted in 1986 and they 
have been paying the same amount almost every fortnight. This was quite 
damaging to them because of their limited resources, especially when they 
had to struggle against black market prices in order to obtain sorghum 
and wheat flour. Any attempt by the women to change things by complaining 
to higher authorities, both in the province (i. e. Commissioner's Office), 
and Ministry of Commerce and Supplies under Dr Abu Harier, who was 
himself dismissed partly because he was against merchants who were 
apparently dominating the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) at that time, 
failed. 52 
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TABLE 3.8 - SUMMARY OF COURT DECISIONS IN AUGUST 1987 - KHARTOUM 
Regional and Ethnic No. of people No. of people Total No. 
identification brought to acquitted punished 
court 
1. Southern Sudanese 300 - 300 
2. Western Sudanese 
(from Kordofan 
& Darfur) 252 - 252 
3. Northern & 
Southern Funj 97 - 97 
4. Women ,. 58 5* 53 
5. Northern Sudanese 
(i. e. Arab & 
Arabized people) 13 13 0 
Total 720 18 702 
Source: Prepared by the author from the proceedings of the people's 
court conducted in Khartoum from 1st August 1987 to September 
3rd 1987. 
* Only five Northern Arab women were arrested, but all were acquitted. 
Those people responsible for the arrest of Arab women were removed. 
The consequence of the failure of the higher authorities to intervene on 
behalf of the poor, women was grave indeed. But unlike the watch and radio 
repairers, shoe polishers and tailors who must be in the city centre 
where their customers are more available in great numbers at a specific 
time, the women, especially those selling kasira, were free to sit under 
any tree or at any local suburb market and the customers will then come 
to them. In some cases, the kasira bakers stay at home and the customers 
will call one after another the author was told by those interviewed. 
Therefore, those suffering, considerably-more hardship. include shoe-shine 
boys, watch and radio repairers and tailors who had to find a way to 
operate at various city centres. 
Perhaps the most affected group was the shoe-shine boys - sometimes at 
the age of nine or ten years, who without any other means of livelihood 
and in hostile surroundings, find themselves being mercilessly beaten by 
police while trying to make an honest living. 
55 
121 
The most striking' racial attitude of the court in question became clear 
to all spectators when on the 15th August 1987,5 women were brought 
before the court. Two of them happened to be of Arab background, from the 
White Nile or Northern Kordofan, which became a problem to the court 
which used terms such as "Falata Junubi, Gerabi. Kelab, etc. " and 
followed by telling the accused to return to her home or region. The two 
Arab women were selling - ready.. baked 'Gurasa', tamiya, kasira and ten 
chickens which were slaughtered at home, without a license. The other 3 
women from Darfur region were found to be selling similar food stuffs. 
The reaction of the chairman to the situation, whereby two light skinned 
women were standing carrying material evidence of the unlawful sale of 
food items were presented was unusual to the local spectators who had 
heard and seen the chairman roaring, shouting and insulting both children 
and youths, women and men, boys and young girls. The chairman usually hit 
them with his stick, though not causing great bruises, but just beating 
people personally before the final sentence was passed. 
The treatment of the chairman to the two Arab women was quite cordial and 
rather remorse in substance. He began by beckoning the two women to come 
near him and he asked them whether or not they were involved in the 
selling of the food items in their possession. The two women replied, 
"yes" and he then asked them to tell him why an Arab lady could do such a 
low job and then he went on to say how ashamed he was. Both women 
answered in turn, each stating that her husband was poor and unemployed. 
The chairman told them both to go and sit behind him until he had 
finished with the other cases. Some of the spectators began to shout 
loudly against the apparent injustice in the court, but the police 
responded harshly with a whip, attacking all those standing around the 
court watching the proceedings etc. and people had to run to avoid being 
hit. The author was sitting on a chair behind the Secretary who had 
allowed him to attend, but the author was told not to write down the 
names of the accused and the names of the members of the court and a 
promise not to quote the chairman's statements to the accused. 
s 
The chairman's treatment of the three non-Arab women was neither rough 
nor cordial, but all the same, he fined them all Ls. 50 each and after 
that he turned to the young men who were waiting. He fined the watch and 
radio repairers Ls. 50 each, followed by his usual warning mentioned 
above. 
The final part of the above mentioned scenario of the court was that 
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after all the cases were seen, the chairman, at 3.00 pm, got up and asked 
the police corporal to discuss with him in private in his car parked a 
few yards away. They were joined by the Secretary and after five minutes 
the corporal returned to the police watching the prisoners and they took 
all the prisoners with them towards Khartoum province police station. 
Before reaching the police station, the two Arab women were set free 
after a brief talk between them and the corporal. The author who was told 
not to follow by the corporal, did so at a long distance. The author's 
attempt to find out from the two women named Amida Mohammed Hassan and 
Kadiega Awad Ahmed about their release was fruitless for they refused to 
talk to the author. Another attempt by the author to find out and confirm 
the common assumption that the Arab women were actually set free from, 
one of the policemen in court was confirmed but the author was warned not 
to quote him. 
The other ten cases of Arabs arrested ended in the same way, i. e. not 
being punished at all by using similar tactics. According to one of the 
police, those responsible for the arrest were told not to arrest 
Northerners or Arabs on the grounds that they have been embarrassing the 
court. The three Dinka boys who were responsible for arresting the 
accused were removed from the market. They disappeared and all attempts 
by the author to trace them and discuss their role failed until two 
months later when the author found them in Port Sudan market. All three 
confessed that they had been bribed by the court. Each was given ten 
thousand Sudanese pounds to keep quiet and in addition they were sent to 
one Maghoub Abdel Rahman, one of the richest merchants in Port Sudan, and 
engaged in smuggling and the black markets in Khartoum, Port Sudan and 
Kassala. 
The scenario above is one of the means through which the Arab and 
Arabized national group maintains its domination over the other national 
groups in the Sudan. It is equally one of may ways for accumulating 
individuals wealth, using state power. The examples which come to mind 
include, Agricultural Bank credit allocations, which favoured particular 
national groups, the distribution of merchandized schemes by the state 
corporation, Military Commercial Corporation and the Military 
Corporation, state contracts, imports and exports licenses, the state 
controlled Duty Free shops, state controlled tourism and hotels 
corporation, Sudan Development Corporation and several commercial banks 
including those controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and many others. 
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The author also found that there were several areas of commercial 
operations which were denied to Southerners in Khartoum and other 
Northern Sudan cities. These areas were found to include licenses for 
resturants, licenses for taxi operations, private commercial bus 
licenses, licenses for the building or construction of houses etc. Here 
licenses were denied to any Southern Sudanese irrespective of whether 
they had money or the ability to own commercial enterprises, or taxis, 
buses, or to operate as building contractors in which areas several 
thousand Southerners were being exploited and cheated by the Arab 
contractors. The Arab contractors used Southern Sudanese builders of 
building engineers who have been denied licenses to set up private 
building or construction firms, applying the same reasons to Southerners 
who were interested in commercial operations in the Northern Sudan urban 
centres. The author found that there were ten Southern Sudanese in the 
field of construction or building who had been working as sub-contractors 
for nearly fifteen years, but were not given a license by local 
government authorities to operate as independent contractors. Through 
such control, the above mentioned sub-contractors could not earn enough 
money to expand their operations or to diversify their business. It was 
found that 90% of the labourers engaged as cheap labour were from 
Southern Sudan, mainly from the upper region, who had migrated to 
Northern Sudan during the first civil war which ended with a peace 
agreement in 1972. 
The author managed to interview eight of the ten sub-contractors 
mentioned above and they told the author that despite the fact that they 
were Muslims, and had connections with some prominent Arab merchants and 
political leaders, they have always been discriminated against and 
treated as subordinates by the people who were less able, in terms of 
work skills and qualifications. In most cases they were people without 
capital and experience, but were imposed on them by the authorities who 
want to benefit and by so doing, the sub-contractors were (and still are) 
marginalized and forced to live in poverty, while others were becoming 
richer instead. The workers who were Southerners were the most victimized 
in the construction industry, for their wages were the lowest since there 
was no law to protect them. 
It was not surprising to also find in Port Sudan, similar discrimination 
organized through the state agencies, including the police, local 
government officials, judicial members (i. e. judges or magistrates), and 
state controlled corporations, against non-Arab black Sudanese. The 
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author found clear evidence of separate racial groupings, namely Arabs 
and Africans. For example in 1988 a fight between African and Arab tribes 
broke out where over 300 people were killed. The cause was connected with 
members of Islamic National Front who organized their supporters from a 
shanty town known as Dar Naeem on a racial basis, i. e. Arab and Arabized 
national group on one side and the Africans in another shanty town known 
as Dar Philip on the other. What interests us in this section, is the 
role of the merchants in the field of circulation of essential 
commodities, provision of transport and others. Dar Naeem was (and still 
is) composed mainly of Arab tribesmen, especially Beni Hamer, while Dar 
Philip was composed mainly of Africans from Nuba Mountains, Southern and 
Northern Funj, the Eastern and Southern Sudan. After the bloody 
confrontation between the two racial groups, the Arabs, who controlled 
the administration, police, judiciary and the merchants, decided to deny 
all services going to Dar Philip on the grounds that the area was a 
shanty town and should not get any services. So Arab traders refused to 
establish retail shops, Arab merchants controlling private buses refused 
to allow any of their buses or taxis to reach Dar Philip. An attempt by 
one rich black merchant from Nuba Mountains, Sayed Azraq Katifouri, to 
help his people when he suggested to the local government authority to 
transform his two lorries into buses to operate between Philip shanty 
town and the city centre was rejected. The authorities in the local 
government refused to give any license to any merchant or trader wishing 
to operate any commercial work including transport, commodity trade and 
health services. Like shanty towns in Khartoum, El Obeid Medani, Dongola, 
and elsewhere, Philip had no services at all, no water, no electricity, 
roads, state schools or health centres etc. While the Arab shanty towns 
in Dar Naeem and Ombada South in Omdurman Khartoum had almost all 
services brought in, not all necessarily supplied by the state, but by 
the merchants who decided to build several huts in these shanty towns and 
hire them out cheaply to those Arab families who could not manage to 
build on their own. 
It is important to mention here that Mr Azraq Katifouri, mentioned above, 
who was elected to be a chairman of the people's committee for Dar Philip 
Abbas, managed to convert his two lorries to buses and establish a local 
restaurant without normal approval from the authorities. The committee in 
question consisted of 16 members, both Muslims and Christians were 
included, not on the basis of religion but on ability of individual as 
explained to the author by the chairman. The restaurant was named 
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"Mutarin al Africa" (African Restaurant). the sixteen members were made 
up as follows: 5 members to represent those from Nuba Mountains, 5 
members for the Southern Sudan, 4 members to represent those of Fur, one 
member to represent those from Southern and Northern Funj and one member 
to represent Beja tribesmen. The representation was determined, according 
to the number of people of each national grouping within the shanty. 
More about Philip shanty town will be discussed in chapter five; since 
our interest here is on the role of traders, we conclude that merchant 
capital or Jallaba class in the Sudan had continued to contribute 
negatively towards the elimination of regional inequalities or conflicts 
among or between national and regional groups or regions. 
In the above scenario about the role of the Jallaba and the experience of 
the Sudanese in iat has loosely been called Northern Sudan, we have 
attempted to show that Jallaba class was racist, tribalist and non- 
national in structure, organization and operation. We have also tried to 
show that members of the Jallaba class were and will never work to 
promote Islamic virtues or principles which they pretend to support or 
propagate, and that this study has found evidence in the business 
dealings, the credit allocation by banks or the rich merchants, to point 
to the racist character of the Arab merchants in the Sudan who tend to 
favour extended families, using approaches which particularly 
discriminates on the basis of race and colour. For in Kordofan, Darfur, 
Southern and Northern Funj and Eastern Sudan, plus the detribalized black 
Sudanese in Khartoum, Omdurman, Heshish in the heart of the national 
capital, Heshish in the heart of Dongola city where black ex-slaves are 
still living in a state of slavery, without education or improvement in 
their living level regardless of the fact that they are all Muslims, have 
no link with rebellion or revolutignary activities taking place in the 
Southern and Western Sudan and Southern and Northern Funj, plus some 
parts of Eastern Sudan. 
In all the market centres visited by the author, it was quite evident 
that black people - whether Muslims or not, Southerners, Westerners or 
Northerners, like in the case of black people in Atbara, Shendi, Dongola, 
Abu Hami ., Wad Medani, Abba Island, Obeid, Fashir, Renk, Damazin, were 
the domestic servants, labourers in the agricultural schemes, porters, 
cheap labour in the construction business, cleaners in restaurants, 
street labourers and road sweepers, and road construction. They were also 
found in great numbers in the informal markets as shoe-shine boys, watch 
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and radio repairers and that 90% of these people were being raided and 
subjected to police beatings and even murder. In contrast, this study has 
found that those who virtually run the black markets were the rich Arab 
merchants, police officers, army officers, ministers and party leaders, 
who have been able to corrupt the law machinery and directed it towards 
the innocent and poor who work night and day in the hot sun of Khartoum 
and Port Sudan to make the rich Arab merchants richer, while those 
producing the wealth continued not only to be poor as evident in those 
urban centres mentioned above, but to be subjected to arbitrary 
persecution, imprisonment and murder. 
It was probably this contrast which led the retired Lieutenant General, 
Joseph Lago, former Anya-nya Commander and leader of the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement, to write a poem after his experience in the Sudan, 
as commander of the Southern Command, President of the Southern Sudan and 
finally the Vice-President of the Republic of the Sudan, to speak of 
'apartheid' on the streets of Khartoum, i. e. 
... apartheid - visible Khartoum segregating Nyankur 
from Um- 
Kalthum ... 
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The above quoted passage reflects the actual experience of most Sudanese 
in the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Southern and Northern Funj, Beja tribesmen 
and the Southern Sudanese, where the dominant Arab and Arabized national 
group has been discriminating against the former in various areas since 
independence. 
The type of apartheid practised by the Arab minority, who have been 
controlling the Sudanese political and economic power since independence 
in 1956, is different from that of South Africa. In the Sudanese case, 
the Arabs use the Islamic faith, wealth of the families and colour as a 
means of segregating the black Sudanese who are in the majority and the 
poorest of the poor in the Sudan. The Beja tribesmen are treated as 
inferior not because of their colour (for some of them are more light 
skinned than the so-called Arabs proper), but because they have been 
resisting Arabization and assimilation. As for the Arabs, anyone who does 
not speak Arabic and also continues to practice his non-Arab cultures is 
considered as an uncivilized black, etc. which is a colonial mentality. 
So in actual fact, the dominant Arab sectarian communities mixed up class 
with race and religion to explain their socio-political and economic 
relations. In practice, race and wealth were found by this study to be 
the main factors determining the general behaviour of the Arab dominant 
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minority ruling roup in the Sudan. For in this study it was found that 
the dominant Arab merchants were discriminating against both Muslims and 
non-Muslims Sudanese of non-Arab national groups. So Islam itself was not 
at all an advantage. 56 
There is enormous evidence to prove this point. One is the persistent 
regional inequalities or disparities between Muslim regions, (i. e. 
Darfur, Kordofan, Northern and Southern Funj and Eastern Sudan on one 
side, and central Khartoum and the Northern regions on the other). The 
shanty towns in Khartoum, Port Sudan and the Blue Nile area where both 
Muslim and non-Muslim poor are suffering, serve as living evidence of the 
argument. Furthermore, the fact that Arab merchants are dominant all over 
the country shows that Arab merchants were able to prevent non-Arab 
people from joining the commercial enterprises until 1980. Anti-Arab 
merchant feelings in Darfur, Nuba Mountains and Southern Sudan, are 
commonplace. For example, the burning of all the Arab shops in Nyala, 
Kudguli, Gisan, Ariabb, Kurmuk Malut, Rimbeck Tonj, and the threat 
between 1981 and 1988 confirmed the anti-Jallaba feelings among the poor 
and the people of the backward areas. 57 
In the following sub-section we will examine the role of the Jallaba 
class in the Southern Sudan, where it will be argued that the members of 
Arab merchants have been able to destroy not only the regional commercial 
groups, but also the southern region economy at large. Muslims and non- 
Muslim poor are suffering and serve as living evidence of our argument. 
Furthermore, the fact that Arab merchants are dominant all over the 
country shows that Arab merchants were able to prevent non-Arab elements 
from entering the commercial sector until 1980. The spread of anti-Arab 
merchants in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Port Sudan, Southern and Northern 
Funj and the Southern Sudan generally, serve as evidence of resistance to 
exploitation, domination and oppression. It is equally evident from the 
burning of all Arab shops in Nyala, Kadguli, Gesan, Amath, Kurmuk, Malut, 
Rebek, Rumbek, Tonj and Theit between 1981 and 1986, confirms the anti- 
Jallaba feelings among the poor and the people of the backward areas. 58 
The attempts to solve the differences created by injustices committed by 
the members of the Jallaba class against the indigenous Sudanese tribes, 
through the newly formed or established Manazime al Dawa al Islamiyya, 
(the Organization for the Propagation of Islamic Faith), failed to 
achieve anything. In 1980 the sectarian Jallabas created a new 
organization known as the Manazima al Dawa al Islamiyya to spread the 
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Islamic faith to African countries. This organization was and, still is, 
being used for obtaining money from the Arab oil rich countries which 
includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Libya and 
others. 
The importance of the organization mentioned above is that many Arab 
Muslims donated millions of. USA dollars in order to provide various 
social services, build mosques, Islamic schools and centres for the poor 
Muslims not only in the Sudan but in other African countries. 
Unfortunately, the Arab sectarian leaders converted the organization into 
their own commercial and financial enterprise, through which they can 
raise millions of Kuwaiti Dinars, Saudi Rials and USA dollars for their 
private businesses. 
The emergence of several banks and companies had Islam attached to their 
names for the sake of appearances, but in practise they were commercial 
banks or enterprises amassing millions or billions of Sudanese pounds and 
USA dollars as well. At the end of 1982, six of the so-called banks were 
privately created by the sectarian leaders under the leadership of Fasial 
Islamic Bank and started its operations since 1978. In 1983, three 
"Islams" were set, up, they included the Tadamon Islamic Bank, the 
Sudanese Islamic Bank and the Islamic Co-operative Bank owned by the Co- 
operative union. In 1984 two more Islamic banks started to operate. They 
were Al Baraka Bank (Sudan) and the Islamic Bank for Western Sudan. 
As evidenced in the report of the banks. the majority of customers were 
Arab merchants who have money to, deposit or put into the savings banks. 
The poor Sudanese did not only not have the money. but did not have 
access to banks in question. For example Fasial Islamic Banks 
shareholders were 21,000 between 1979-1981 and 18.000 of them were 
Sudanese, mostly members of the sectarian Juba who became senior 
officials of the said bank. 
In the distribution of the bank branches and other companies, there was 
an imbalance, and evidence revealed that banking facilities in the Sudan 
were (and still are), concentrated in Khartoum, Gezira, Red Sea Province 
and northern Sudan and of 265 branches operating, different banking 
facilities in 1986,34% were placed in Khartoum province alone. The three 
southern regions had one which was opened in Juba in 1987, while Wau and 
Malakal did not have a branch at the time of writing this thesis. 59 
Similarly, the Fasial Islamic Bank which had concentrated its activities 
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in Khartoum, had 19 branches. Nine of them were in Khartoum while other 
branches were distributed in Gezira, Eastern, Northern, Northern Kordofan 
and Darfur, i. e. within the areas populated by the Arab national group. 
The distribution of various credit or loan facilities were also subjected 
to the conditions characterized by the existence of corruption, nepotism, 
etc. which perpetuated uneven development and regional disparities. In 
fact, the main beneficiaries of all the Islamic banks and companies were 
the Arab sectarian Jallaba who were recruited as managers, accountants, 
clerks, etc., while the majority of the Sudanese masses were alienated. 
As a result, new houses, new cars and businesses were acquired privately 
by those responsible for executing the Islamic projects which consisted 
solely of mosques, Koranic schools and Islamic centres for further 
indoctrination of the poor Muslim communities. Out of 402 mosques built 
by Dawaa Islamiyya between 1981-1986, Khartoum alone had 40%. The author 
was able to count 150 new and old mosques in Khartoum and its suburbs, 
including those still under construction. It was painful to see 
beautifully built and decorated mosques equipped with electricity and 
water, while around them were mud slums, some of them without water pipes 
and sanitation facilities. Most of the mosques were fenced and attached 
to them were Kalwa schools where the poor children sleep on local beds 
made with ropes and full of insects or bugs. In most cases the children 
who benefit from these facilities were not necessarily from the 
surrounding houses or slums or squatters. 
Similarly mosques, Koranic schools and Islamic centres were established 
in a number of towns in Gezira, Southern and Northern Funj, Kordofan, 
Darfur, Eastern and Northern Province. It was still quite evident that 
mosques, Islamic centres and Koranic schools alone could not elevate or 
improve socio-economic conditions of the poor, who were given mosques 
instead of agricultural or industrial projects which would create wealth 
for the material welfare of the poor communities in the so-called 
northern Sudan. What was really needed was, as still is, economic 
investment and proper education for the poor, which the Dawaa Islamiyya 
and its management failed to do, instead the Islamic banks and companies 
were commonly involved with black market smugglers, hoarding goods for 
profit. 
An attempt by the Sudanese Government to control and check Islamic banks 
and companies ended in failure due to political and economic power behind 
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those institutions, until the government was deposed by a group of 
Islamic orientated pan-Arab military officers which did nothing to affect 
that until the time of writing. 
The first Islamic bank in the Sudan, was the Faisal Islamic Bank in 
Khartoum in 1978. The number of Islamic banks increased gradually from 
one to five main banks and over 30 branches. The main banks are: 
1. Faisal Islamic Bank, 
2. Faisal Co-operative Islamic Bank of the Sudan, 
3. Baraka Islamic Bank for the Western Sudan, 
4. The Islamic Industrial Bank, 
5. Commercial Islamic Bank 
21,000 shareholders (of which 18,000 were Sudanese) 
Ls 180 - capital per head. 
These banks were exempted from paying interest to investors or customers 
and bank rates and taxes to the state. All imports by these banks were 
exempt from duty. 
The banks were involved in looting the people and transferring it outside 
Sudan. Blackmarkets for local and-hard currencies emerged. 
The banks are used to create new Islamic companies which include: - 
1. Islamic Commercial Company, 
2. Islamic Insurance Company, 
3. Islamic Industrial Company, 
4. Islamic Agricultural and Manufacturing, 
5. Islamic Credit Company, 
6. Islamic Development Company. 
The banks provided credit facilities to the commercial and agricultural 
enterprises, such as: 
Islamic Insurance Company, 
Islamic Industrial Company, 
Islamic Financial Centre, 
To finance investment in agriculture and industry and manufacturers. 
Islamic Credit Company, Islamic Development Company. 
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3.5 The Organization for the Propagation of Islamic Faith and its 
policies. 
According to Islamic political thought, the Koran and the 'sayings' of 
the Prophet Mohammed form the organic Law of an Islamic state. Here the 
ruler is considered as the high priest, or is the prophet-king. For 
example, prophet Mohammed was the Head of the Government, Commander in 
Chief of the Army and the Prophet of Allah. Similarly, all the Khalifas 
which ruled after him did the same. All organizations, whether social, 
economic or political are considered as Islamic in all aspects. So in 
theory and practice, Islamic political thought does not differentiate 
religion from politics, economic from social matters within an Islamic 
community. 
The Dawa Islamiyya (ie. Islamic Call) was established in Sudan to cover 
political, economic and social aspects of the Sudanese nation, if not 
society. The Manazima al Dawaa al Islamiyva was formed to win, convert 
and reorganize the people to Islam throughout Africa particularly in 
Sudan, in order to establish an Islamic political hegemony throughout the 
continent. The finances of the organization include Fundamentalist 
Muslims from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qutar, Oman, Libya etc. 
The Dawa Islamivva is described by the founders as the first Islamic 
Mission in Africa. 
The planners of the Manazima al Dawaa al Islamiyva avoided the 'Jihad' 
and direct slavery which used to be carried out through military raids, 
invasion and direct colonialism and which was later followed by settler 
colonialism. The examples in mind include the Arab invasion of Africa 
using 'Jihad' and trade which culminated in the establishment of Arab 
settler colonialism in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Mauritania, Northern Chad, Northern Sudan and Zanzibar. 68 The 
consequences of such invasions and settler colonialism was the continuous 
suffering of black Africans and the brown skinned Berbers of North 
Africa, although they share a religious faith and similar skin colour or 
complexion to their Arab masters. 
The role of the Arab merchants in the establishment of the above 
mentioned settled colonial states and the subsequent impoverishment of 
the indigenous population was and continues to be crucial. The Arab 
merchants who claimed to be only the middle-men between the slaves, 
raided communities on the one hand and the existing Islamic states and 
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the European and United States of America slave companies on the other, 
were partners. The latter group were according to the Arab merchants and 
their supporters, responsible for the human trade for they provided the 
initial capital and the guns and soldiers used for raiding and capturing 
the slaves and who were handed over to the merchants, through the so- 
called middle-men, who in reality were slave traders. 
However, the new approach by the Manazima al Dawaa al Islamiyya was 
marked by a different type of invasion using the Fasiel Bank of 
Islamiyya, Egypt, Jordanian and Islamic merchants of Kuwait, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, Arab Emirates, etc. as the war-lords, while the Riverain 
tribesmen and the Arab settlers in the Sudan perform their usual middle- 
man style of participation again. The invasion in question actually 
involved tens of millions of Saudi rials, Kuwait diniars, USA dollars and 
other currencies poured into the Sudan in the name of Islamic virtues as 
propagated by the leaders of the various Islamic organizations. These are 
enumerated below. 
The organisation for the propagation of the Islamic faith in Africa 
consists of the Council of Trustees, responsible for policy making, 
headed by a chairman, the executive body responsible for the 
implementation of the organization's policies and a general secretariat 
or administrative unit to assist the executive with its operations. 
The main objectives of the organization for the propagation of the 
Islamic faith - as its name indicates - include the conversion of 
Africans to the Islamic faith, the indoctrination and radicalising of the 
existing African Muslim communities in order to create not only a pro- 
Arab, but weak African communities dependent on Arab neo-slavery and neo- 
colonial sectarian political and socio-economic organizations whose 
ultimate goal was to loot, rob, exploit and expropriate African manpower 
and material resources. 
The organization which set out 20 ways to gain God's virtues, embarked on 
socio-economic projects first in Sudan and later in some African 
countries considered to have a good number of Muslims. The projects 
include Mosques, Islamic Centres, Koranic (religious) schools, hospitals, 
bridges, agricultural schemes, boreholes etc. 
133 
TABLE 3.9: 'iMANAZIMA AL DAWAA ISLAMIYYA THE EXPENDITURE OF THE PROJECTS 
EXECUTED BETWEEN 1981-1986 
------- 
No. 
------------------------------------------- 
The location of the projects 
------------ 
----------------------- 
Total Amount 
------------------ ------- ------------------------------- ----- 
USA $ 
1 National Capital-Khartoum 5,791,212 
2 Central Region 2,475,406 
3 Upper Nile Region 1,023,706 
4 Equatoria Region 2,369,243 
5 Bahr El Ghazal Region 810,506 
6 Kordofan Region 1.581,508 
7 Eastern Region 11,237,000 
8 Other General Projects 3,392,230 
9 Projects Outside Sudan 765,603 
10 Humane Projects 773,872 
11 Investment on Lands & Trade 1,798,972 
Total 
------- 
32,025,259 
-- ------- 
Source: 
------------------------------------ 
Prepared and translated to English by the 
-------------------- 
author from a booklet 
of the Organisation for the Propaganda of Islamic faith in 
Africa. Published in Khartoum, 1986. 
As shown, all the projects i. e. the construction of various mosques, 
Islamic centres, schools, houses and the digging of bore wells, plus the 
supply of food stuffs, clothes, shoes etc., were carried out by the 
members of the Arab sectarian groups in the Northern and Southern Funj, 
Nuba mountains, Darfur, Eastern region, Central, Khartoum and Northern 
regions. As a result, the Arab sectarian leaders became very rich because 
they looted, robbed and exploited, leaving those who were to be helped 
more impoverished than they were before and as such, the struggle over 
the projects and various material resources offered by the Arab donors. 
Division based on racism took the place of class in those areas mentioned 
above. 
In 1981, the organization equally encouraged the formation of branches 
throughout the Sudan. For the Southern Sudanese Muslims it was a great 
opportunity to organize themselves as Muslims with financial and 
organisational assistance from their fellow Muslims, not only from 
Northern Sudan but from the Arab world. So in the same year, the first 
branch of Managima al Dawaa al Islamiyya was set up in Juba, then the 
capital of the Southern region, and where the most educated Southern 
Muslims were present. 
The regional government in Juba, which came into being after the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, was implemented in 1972. It gave opportunities to all 
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Southern Sudanese, regardless of creed, to hold political positions and 
to benefit from political and economic resources which came into the 
region. So as early as 1974, Mr Ali Tamni Fartak and several others were 
Area and Assistant Secretaries of the Sudan Socialist Union formed by the 
Military Government as the only ruling party in the Sudan. In 1975, Ali 
Tamni Fartak was appointed Regional Minister of Youth and Sports, Saddiq 
Fargalla, Awad Morgan and Ahmed Radi, as assistant secretaries in the USA 
Secretariat, in both province and regional branches with constitutional 
status of state ministers, not as Muslims but as able Southern Sudanese 
leaders. 
By the time the organization for the propagation of Islamic faith was 
established in 1980, there were more than twenty Southern Muslims already 
in leadership positions, for example, Amin Ismial Julla was Director of 
Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Saddiq Fargalla, Deputy Director of 
Regional ministry of youth and Sports, Ahmed Abdel Gader, Director of 
Juba Commercial Secondary School, Sheikh Hassam El Suur, Director for 
Religious Affairs Southern Region, Farouk Akasha became Minister of 
Information and Culture and President of High Executive Council was 
Abdalla Rasas, a Southern Sudanese Major General in the army. 
It was therefore natural that the branch of Manazima Dawaa Islamivva in 
the Southern region was formed and managed by Southern Muslims from the 
above mentioned persons. 
While the Arab merchants in Juba had no problem with the formation of the 
branch of the organization for the propagation of Islamic faith in the 
Southern Sudan, but they had a great problem in accepting the 
organization being led by Southern Sudanese Muslims. So from the start, 
the Arab orientated merchants were opposed to the leadership of the 
branch set up in Juba and those branches which were formed later in Wau 
and Malakal. The differences between the Southern Muslim leaders and the 
Arab merchants reached its highest level in 1981 when the first projects 
of the organization of Dawaa Islamivva were brought to Juba by the Kuwait 
Embassy in the Sudan. The first projects included the building of Munuki 
houses, (250 low-cost houses) Saba Hospital, Friendship Kuwait Primary 
and Intermediate School, all in Juba town. Other projects included two 
hospitals, one in Loa and another in Nimule rural council, plus five new 
mosques and three wells in Equatoria. There was also an Islamic complex 
being constructed in Juba. In the Upper Nile region, agricultural 
schemes, children's centres in Malakal, four mosques and an Islamic 
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Centre in the Renk area and two bore wells were also constructed and 
completed. 
All these projects were contracted to the Arab merchants who used poor 
material to built the above mentioned houses in Muniki, mosques in Juba, 
Mongalla, Yabio, Yei, Renk, Malakal, etc. 
It is important to state here that the Kuwait counsellor's office in Juba 
was responsible for the selection of the contractors and Amin Akasha, an 
Arab merchant, was given the contract and decided to loot the money and 
only use inferior and bad materials for the'buildings. 61 
The second major crisis between the Southern Muslims and the Arab 
merchants occurred at the end of 1982 during the visit of 70 Arab Muslim 
millionaires accompanying one of the Kuwaiti Princes. The Arab delegation 
was received by the Regional Government, led by the President of the High 
Executive Council, and the leaders of the Southern Muslims were present. 
At a lunch party, Southern Muslims of the Organization for the 
Propagation of the Islamic Faith, led by Mr Ali Tammi, attempted to make 
a statement on behalf of Southern region Muslims but the Arab merchants 
in Juba and those who accompanied the delegation, rejected the idea 
and 
(therefore) a great struggle ensued. 
The Regional Minister of the High Executive Council intervened and the 
author, who was Assistant Director for Political and Economic Affairs, 
and acting during the reception as Protocol Assistant Director of HEC, 
was instructed to arrange a meeting between the delegation and the 
Southern Sudanese Muslim leaders in order to present their written 
statement. The paper presented by Ali Tammi to the delegation was a 
complaint against the Arab merchants in Juba and those in Khartoum, 
including the Kuwaiti officials in the Consulate in Juba, about the way 
they had been undermining and ignoring the Southern Sudanese Muslims. On 
top of that, the paper further stated how the leaders of the Dawaa 
Islamiyya in Khartoum had refused to finance certain projects initiated 
by Southern Muslim leaders to serve Southern Sudanese in general and 
Southern Muslims in particular. 
In reply to that, the leader of the delegation, the Kuwaiti Prince, told 
the Southern Sudanese leaders that the matter would be studied and the 
solution soon found and the delegation left for Khartoum the same day 
without any financial assistance to the branches in the Southern Sudan. 
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The above mentioned conflict between Arab merchants and the Southern 
Sudanese Muslims led to the emergence of a short lived union of Southern 
Sudanese Muslims with its headquarters in Juba. The lack of funds and the 
events of division of the Southern Sudan into three regions, led to the 
collapse of the Southern Sudanese Muslims' branch of Dawa Islamivya 
throughout the three Southern Regions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ROLE OF SECTARIAN JALLABA IN THE UNDER-DEVELOPMENT AND UNEVEN 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUDAN : II THE CASE OF SOUTHERN SUDAN 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the term "sectarian Jallaba" was described as a 
group of merchants and petty traders who claim to belong to various 
Islamic sects. They are invariably engaged in various commercial 
activities, characterized by the existence of sellers and buyers of 
various commodities (ie. in the normal market and black-markets). 
For the Southern Sudanese the term Jallaba is generally used to describe 
all the Arab settlers and the members of the Arabized Riverain tribesmen 
regardless of their actual profession! They therefore include 
administrators, teachers Fakis (Islamic teachers) judges, postmen, 
medical doctors and nurses, the police, military and prison officers and 
soldiers and Islamic religious leaders (or Ulemas). The main criterion of 
identification is that one is an Arab or Arabized Sudanese and who 
identify themselves as Arabs and Arabized Muslims. So a southern or 
western Sudanese totally Arabized and Islamized may be described as black 
Jallaba or black Arab (or Arab chol). 1 
The origin of the use of the word Jallaba varies in accordance with each 
region and the period of Arab migration and penetration into the Sudan in 
general and Southern Sudan in particular. What is certain is that the 
term was first used in Northern Sudan to describe the long distance Arab 
traders who entered the country as early as seven or eight centuries 
ago. 2 
The term was probably used after the Turco-Egyptian penetration in the 
Southern Sudan which opened the region for the first time for slave 
traders and other travellers to penetrate into the interior of the 
Southern Sudan. Various crimes were committed by all foreigners including 
the Arabs who were able to establish slave camps and trade or commercial 
centres, which have become administrative towns today in the Southern 
Sudan. 3 However, the period between the Turco-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian 
colonial regimes had witnessed a great exodus of the Arab merchants into 
the Southern Sudan. By the time Sudan reached political independence in 
1956, there were more than twenty thousand Arabs and Arabized Northerners 
established in southern Sudan, from all walks which included merchants 
and state employees and all were involved in some kind of exploitation, 
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expropriation, looting, cheating, oppression and domination. 
In this section I shall analyse the role of the Jallaba class in under- 
development and regional inequalities in the Southern Sudan. An attempt 
will be made to trace the contemporary development and penetration of 
merchant capital in the Southern Sudan from the post independence period 
to the present time. 
4.2 The Jallaba and the Under-Development of Southern Sudan: The Post- 
Indenendence Period 
The role of the Jallaba class in the process of under-development, uneven 
development and the emergence of regional disparities in the Sudan, is 
common knowledge among most Sudanese people of all walks of life. 
The penetration of the Jallaba class in Southern Sudan after the 
abolition of the southern policy by the British Colonial authorities in 
1947, is marked by southern nationalists as the origin of the re- 
establishment of Arab neo-slavery in the Southern Sudan. The unification 
of the Southern and Northern Sudan imposed by the British on the Southern 
people was followed by a transfer of political, economic and commercial 
power to the Arab, and Arabized dominating class from the Northern Sudan. 
In other words, it marked the change of masters for the Southern 
Sudanese: from the 'British Colonial masters to the Arab Colonial 
masters'. 4 The difference was (and still is) that while the British 
considered themselves as foreign colonizers, the Arab settlers considered 
themselves as masters and divine rulers, sent to the black Africans in 
order to civilize and bring them to Allah. 5 
The activities of the Jallaba class in the Southern Sudan during British 
colonial rule and the post-independence period were complex and have 
continued to be so until the present time. According to the 1955/56 
census, there were nearly fifteen thousand Northern Sudanese in the 
Southern Sudan in various corporations and operations, some as merchants, 
petty retailers, traders, owners of "open-Suk markets", or hawkers (Suk 
al Shamish) and restaurant owners, coffee shop, owner butchers, and 
owners of bars (public) bakery retail traders, fruit, cigarette and 
tobacco retailers, owners of grinding mills and owners of lorries, 
trucks, taxis and buses. Within the large urban centres, they were state 
administrators, clerks, book keepers, members of state security, police, 
prison warders and army officers, judges, medical doctors and medical 
assistants. All of them engaged in some kind of trade or commercial 
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activities. Some acted as agents for the rich merchants in Khartoum who 
dealt in coffee, hides or skins, timber or mahogany wood, gold, ivory, 
rhinoceros horns as well as traders in agricultural produce such as 
peanuts or groundnuts, pineapples, bananas, simsim seeds, lulu oil, and 
fish and livestock traders. Table 4.1 shows the total number of different 
nationalities, which include Arab and Arabized Northerners who are 
considered as Jallabas by most Southern Sudanese and who were (and still 
are) seen as looters, exploiters, oppressors, etc. because of their 
activities in general and behaviour in particular. For example, the 
Jallaba, wherever he was, would behave arrogantly or rudely to any 
Southerner, whether in the shops, office or on the street. The worst part 
was and continues to be when southerners are cheated, discriminated 
against, insulted, ignored or oppressed and exploited with impunity by 
members of the Jallaba class. Any attempts against such injustices, ill 
treatment and inequalities were (and still are), severely suppressed. 
TABLE 4.1: NUMBERS OF ARAB AND ARABIZED NORTHERN SUDANESE 
CONSIDERED AS MEMBERS OF JALLABA CLASS IN THE 
SOUTHERN SUDAN IN 1955/56 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Province No. of Arab1 No. West Others 
Jallabas Africans Europeans 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Bahr Ghazal 2,500 1,280 300 
Equatoria 1,560 840 966 
Upper Nile 7,070 2,570 650 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 11,130 4,690 1,916 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Prepared by the author from first population census 
in the Sudan 1955/56 based on the Final Report vol. 
III Khartoum, November 19. 
1. The number of Southern Sudanese traders were not included because 
there were probably none who could be classified as merchants. For those 
who might have been engaged in some trade activities could be classified 
as traders. This was confirmed by a study conducted by Fatima Babiker 
Mahmoud. Fatima Babikers Mahmoud in her study of capitalists stated that 
until 1975 there was not a single Southern Sudanese who could be 
considered a capitalist. Yet the study found southerners who were also 
engaged in trade or commercial activities during this time. For example, 
in Jonglei province (Bon), there were more than six traders of Southern 
Sudanese origin (Dinkas). Fadl Mula Doke, a Western Sudanese and a Dinka 
mother, but later Dinkasized with his three brothers were also engaged in 
commercial activities. 
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The other groups of merchants or traders in the Southern Sudan before 
independence include Syrians, Lebanese, Greeks, Italians, British, 
Americans, West Africans, (mostly Muslims) and Ethiopians engaged in 
various trades or commercial activities, of some kind. 
These in one way or another were competing with members of the Arab 
Jallaba. The difference between the Arab group and others was (and still 
is), that the Arabs saw themselves as owners of the country and heir to 
political and economic power when the British Colonial authorities left. 
While the other group sees and accepts being treated as foreigners, 
temporarily staying there and would eventually return to their homes or 
countries. Furthermore, the Arabs treated (and continued), to treat the 
Southerners as slaves or inferior and primitive and at worst would 
express these feelings face to face with Southerners. 
It was because of the above mentioned behaviour of the Arab elements in 
the Southern Sudan, that led to the 1955 bloody rebellion in which 
members of Equatoria Corps mutinied against all the Jallabas, whether 
they were active merchants, traders or shop-keepers or soldiers, state 
officials, etc. The main reason for the rebellion was the fear that the 
Arabs were going to enslave Southerners after the British Colonial 
Authorities had left. A report from the Commission of Inquiry into the 
disturbances in the Southern Sudan during August 1955, showed the cause 
of the disturbances despite difficulties to which the commission had been 
subjected. The commission was composed of three people; the chairman, a 
pro-Arab judge; a new general manager of Equatorian Projects and thirdly, 
a tribal chief who spoke little Arabic and English. In spite of this, the 
commission managed to show the root cause of the disturbance, which was 
stated as follows: - 
"Since the Southern Sudanese benefited very little from 
Sudanization, they found little or no difference between 
conditions now and conditions previously, and independence for 
them was regarded as merely change of masters. We feel that 
the Southern Sudanese by finding themselves holding secondary 
positions in the Government of their country have a genuine 
grievance. "6 
Similar feelings of disappointment were felt amongst almost all 
southerners including MPs, most of whom were members of northern 
political parties, especially the NUP whose leader ordered the execution 
of the Southern Sudanese who opposed the Northern leaders, as shown in a 
telegram sent by the Prime Minister to the Northern Governors in the 
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Southern Sudan. A letter by the Southern Sudanese members of parliament 
clearly shows the feelings of the Southern Sudanese after Sudanization 
and it reads as follows: 
"The results of the Sudanization here come with very 
disappointing results, i. e. four Assistant District 
Commissioners ..... Well as it appears, it means our fellow 
Northerners want to colonise us for another hundred years. "7 
It is therefore sad to say here that the same attitude of Southerners 
towards Northerners continues to dominate their feelings. The complaint 
about under representation in the National institutions has continued to 
the present. 8 In 1952, the Southern Sudanese presented the Sudan 
Socialist Union their complaint about under-representation of the 
Southern Sudan in all national institutions which included state 
departments and state corporations, the army, foreign affairs, etc. 
The contribution and role of the sectarian Jallaba class to the south- 
north conflicts as reflected in the 1955 disturbance was clear especially 
when those northern traders who had treated southerners as slaves had to 
suffer the same consequences, like the northern soldiers, officers and 
other state employees who came to the south and considered themselves as 
masters. 
The report indicated that a number of people died during the disturbances 
and that : 336 died in total, 261 of which were Northerners, while 75 
people were from the south. More than 150, out of 261 Northern Sudanese 
killed were traders and their families and this explained the degree of 
how the Northern Sudanese traders were hated or resented. As documented 
by the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, the exploitation, arrogance 
and abusive attitudes of the merchants throughout the Southern Sudan was 
responsible, or prompted some southerners to attach northern traders. 
In 1955, the disturbances which resulted in the death of 261 Northerners, 
led to the creation of a new hostile relationship between the Southern 
and Northern Sudanese. The Northerners, who had the Government machinery 
(i. e. the Administration and judiciary, army and the police forces), on 
their side while the Southerners had to pay for those they have killed 
after the British had left. 9 This attitude of revenge was expressed by 
northern traders physically or violently or through the use of abusive 
language on any Southerner who had entered their retail establishments 
since all the commodities such as salt, onions, cooking oil, bread, 
grain, meat, vegetables, clothes and almost any food item to be purchased 
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in the shops were under the control of the northern traders since there 
were no southerners in the commercial field in large numbers. 
There were three to five retail traders in various districts and even 
province centres and villages as well. For example, in Wau, there were 
the families of Gir Rham, Arthur Agany, James Paysama, Gismalla Rassass 
and a large number of Greeks, Italians, Cypriots, Maltese, Belgian, 
Lebanese, Syrians, Jews, Indians and Pakistanis, whose number was roughly 
180 according to the 1955/56 census. 
Before independence the Northern Jallabas had promised to punish, if not 
take revenge against Southerners. Deng and Oduho made the following 
quotations in support of the fear expressed by Southern Sudanese, 
".... in the South, fanatical Arab traders pointed to any 
Southerner who happened to be in sight : baid shwaiya intum 
yekun taht jigmatna' (in a while you will be under our 
feet). "10 
It was after independence following the defeat of the southern revolution 
that Northerners fully took over all the positions which were held by the 
British in the south. All the three provincial governors, 3 deputy 
governors and 6 district commissioners were Northern Sudanese. All 
District Commissioners with the exception of one Yurol, were Northerners. 
Most of the Mumars and Assistant Mumars were Northerners. In addition, 
senior prison warders were Northerners with the exception of two officers 
who were junior. In the police the commandant of police and his 
superintendent of police were all Northerners. Out of 25 police officers 
there were only four senior officers who have under the commandants of 
the Northern senior police officers. 
On the traders side, several thousand traders penetrated all the 
districts urban centres and villages, misbehaving, looting, exploiting 
and robbing all the Southerners within their influence. As for the 
Southerners who were traders before independence, their hopes for 
progress were affected. Those Southerners who had established retail 
shops were faced with bankruptcy for they were squeezed out of the market 
by the richest traders. For example, most Southern traders could not 
progress in Juba e. g. Selaman Lako, Nikadimo Paul, Awad Farigalla Awad, 
Abdel Fadil Agot, George Matakar and several Greeks, Syrians and 
Pakistanis managed to survive up to 1963 when the civil war broke out and 
they were then forced either to sell if possible, or migrate to Khartoum 
or to seek refuge outside Sudan. 
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The consequences of the 1955 defeated revolution (which Arabs and their 
allies, the British had described as a rebellion), was destructive not 
only to the Southern Sudanese elite who led the revolution, but also to 
those who aspired to operate in commercial fields. Like the 1924 defeated 
revolution, the aftermath of 1955 was bloody and many southerners in 
Torit, Juba, Kapoeta, Anzara and many other places in Bahr El Ghazal and 
Upper Nile were put to death. Arbitrary arrest on the basis of false 
testimony and charges or imprisonment and confiscation of property or 
wealth based on false witnesses etc. In short, the aftermath of the 
events in 1955 was a complete disaster for Southerners, especially in 
Equatoria where the revolution started and was vigorously implemented 
there by the leaders of the revolution who were summarily tried and 
executed in the same way as the leaders of 1924 revolution. In spite of 
the fact that more than five hundred Southerners were massacred during 
the disturbance; the Report of the Commission of Enquiry which was a 
state controlled agent designed to distort all the facts, only admitted 
75 Southerners to have been killed. 11 An example may be drawn from the 
massacred in Nzara. A demonstration was staged by the workers trade union 
of Equatoria Projects where 300 workers had been dismissed arbitrarily by 
the board whose members were all Northern Sudanese. The demonstration, 
which was peaceful, turned out to be bloody when the Northern 
Administrators ordered the army and the police to shot at the crowd, 
killing several hundred. One of the Northern traders took to shooting 
southerners who were demonstrating. The Commission of Enquiry testifies 
as follows, 
"Two (maybe more) Northern merchants viz. Mohammed Ali and Abbas 
Hassoun were shooting at the mob also one from a . 22 rifle and the other from an elephant gun. "12 
Similar shootings by the northern army, police and merchants were not 
recorded by any authority including the Commission of Enquiry and it was 
weakness that made William Deng and Joseph Oduho make the following 
comments: - 
"No exact figures of the casualties are available - Placid 
Loboke, the Southern police officer who collected the dead was 
among the first to be shot by Northern firing squads soon 
after the Southern revolt of 1955. The Government figures are 
eight dead at the locus and an uncertain number of dead and 
wounded among those who had escaped. Southern estimates are 
much higher, some putting it at 300. Whatever the figure, 
there is reason to believe that, the number was high. "13 
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Indeed there remain sufficient reason to believe that any state sponsored 
report is always distorted and corrupted. The Wau 1965, Juba 1966, Bar 
1966, the murder of William Deng by the army in 1968, the massacre of 
Southerners in Khartoum on that dreadful Sunday in 1965, and many others 
involved in the death of several thousand are the living ugly face of the 
South-North conflict. Of course the Government report on the Delib 
massacre and the Wau massacre and the explanation given by the Government 
on a quarter of a million Southerners that died between 1986 and 1988 can 
serve as evidence of how dishonest the Sudanese Government has been since 
the 1950's until now. 14 
Here we could say the 1955 disturbances and the outbreak of the Civil War 
which ended in 1972, were clearly disasters not only to the Southern 
elite who had organized and led the nationalist struggle, but also to the 
poor villages and to the few traders who were interested in commercial 
operations. The author was one of the eye witnesses to the destruction of 
the commercial trade by the Arab or Northern Sudanese immigrants. 15 
The role of the sectarian Jallabas (or members of the Jallaba class), in 
the under-development of the Southern Sudan from 1955 to 1971, was common 
knowledge among the Southern Sudanese people. Joseph Oduho and William 
Deng had confirmed the above behaviour of the Arab merchants in the 
Southern Sudan when they wrote, 
... the scornful attitude of Northern traders towards 
Southerners as the administration became more and more 
Sudanese; they insulted Southerners calling them, 'abeid' 
(slave), they interfered in the administration particularly in 
Equatoria. In addition, administrators gave Northerners more 
protection than is normally afforded to ordinary citizens 
because they acted as informants (security men) among 
Southerners. "16 
Apart from the above quoted "scornful and abusive behaviour" of the 
members of the Jallaba class, their activities were quite destructive to 
the progress of Southern Sudanese traders. The activities of the members 
of the Jallaba class in the Southern Sudan can be analysed under three 
related headings as follows: Economic Exploitation and Transfer of 
Capital; Political Violence and the third is Religious and Racial 
Domination. 
4.3 Economic Exploitation under Jallaba 
The British Colonial regime and the Egyptian Government as members of the 
condominium in the Sudan were responsible for the emergence of a merchant 
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capitalist class, almost exclusively of Arab, and Arabized in 
composition. Almost all commercial enterprises and business which were 
held by the British merchants were handed over to Arab merchants after 
independence. 17 These commercial enterprises included the state 
corporations such as Hifrat al Nahas Mines, where carbonate, sulphate and 
copper were mined; oil seeds, market centres, grinding mills, bakery 
shops and tobacco farms and timber plantations; in both Bahr el Ghazal 
and Equatoria, two oil mills of Yirol and Equatoria, Awiel and Malakal 
rice schemes; river transport facilities, dairy cattle farms, set-up by 
the British to supply meat and milk to the urban centres; private cotton 
schemes in the Upper Nile, coffee farms at Kagelu, Yei, Opari, Gold in 
Kapoeta, plus cotton seeds for making oil, sorghum, groundnuts and saw 
mills, Lulu oil, local meat industries and butter, transport markets, 
sugar cane, fruit and vegetables, elephant ivory and rhinoceros horns, 
skins, iron ore, textile industries in Nzara producing clothes, Burlap 
soap and coffee produced in Nzara from small factories established by the 
British in the 1950's, plus the Equatoria project and its board taken 
exclusively by Northerners. The Zande cotton schemes were taken over by 
the Arabs, and 300 Southern Sudanese workers were dismissed from all the 
schemes. The other British Commercial enterprises included banks which 
were only concentrated in the Northern Sudan without a single branch in 
Southern Sudan, the Gum Arabic of Western Sudan and some industries in 
the North. The British firms which established commercial enterprises 
included Gellatly Hankey and Company (which extended operations into the 
interior old established wholesale branches in the main commercial 
centres). 18 Also, British firms were in control of exports and imports as 
well as shipping and insurance. All these were inherited by Northern 
traders or merchants. Other companies include Boxall, the Sudan 
Mercantile Group, Mitchell Cotts and Imperial Chemicals. The Shell Oil 
Company, which came to Sudan in 1931 and built the refinery at Port Sudan 
and had a monopoly of distribution of fuel, diesel, benzine etc. The 
light and power was another British company responsible for tram services 
within the three towns of Khartoum [i. e. Khartoum north, south and 
Omdurman]. All these firms and their assets were handed over to the Arabs 
after independence. While Southerners, including those of Nuba Mountains, 
Darfur and the Eastern provinces plus Southern and Northern Funj, were 
left in the cold. 19 In addition, were state contracts, state controlled 
mechanized schemes and projects, agricultural and commercial loans plus 
housing loans, were given only to the Arab and Arabized national group. 
Trade licenses both for internal and external trade, i. e. imports and 
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exports and local trade were given to the same national group. 20 
The influence of the members of the state apparatus in the Sudan in 
general and the Southern Sudan in particular, was (and still is), great. 
First the state was the biggest monopolist, whether under the British 
Colonial rule or after independence. The state had (and still has) a 
monopoly over the import and export trade. It also established a monopoly 
over the wholesale distribution of sugar or essential commodities which 
the merchants would circulate and prices acceptable to the state which 
had to receive taxes of various kinds. The state also has a monopoly over 
the distribution of agricultural business and house loans and as shown by 
the records, that it had given (and continues to give) to certain 
national groups only, thereby creating various inequalities and under- 
development in the country. 
Southern Sudanese who were already engaged in commercial activities had 
to face fierce competition with Northern merchants who had sufficient 
capital to enter into business risks. 21 In addition, they were denied 
credit facilities by both the rich Arab merchants and the state which was 
(and remains) responsible for public loans for business purposes. They 
were equally denied hire purchase facilities for lorries and either 
charged them three times above the normal market rate or denied them 
transport facilities in order to sabotage any progress for the Southern 
merchants. From 1955 to 1952, there was relative peace and therefore, 
some progress was made by certain Southerners, who resisted pressure from 
Northern traders to go out of business, they included Fadl Mulla Doka and 
his brothers, Seleman Laku and Nkadimo Paul, who built several shops in 
Juba and in Wau. The family of Arthur Agany, Cur Ryan and brothers who 
had built several Kile George, Matak Abdalla Ajak, Locola James, also 
Haggara and several Greeks and Syrians, Awad Lako Paul Jajej, Osman 
Jubara, Awaden Jmbara Ramalatka Jacob (Aggai, Philmon Majok, Nikanora 
Cour Malib, Alfred Wol Stanslans Aballa, Pysama, Samuel Agany, Gabriel 
Kan Ater Donato Arig Molueth, Camillo Dhal Kuac, Benjamin Biel, Johwa 
Majak, Akec Rizgalla, Dominic Mourwell, James Wek and Solomon Malek 
Bullen Geu. 
In Majok and Aiwak Lunak villages, there were over thirty retail shops. 
Majok had twenty retail shops, there were five in Mabui, one in Pukec and 
another in Agutraan. The old Aluak-Luak had eight shops, three in Mayom 
Cuei, Pultit, one at Mager, two at Makur and two at Zara, two at new 
Aluak-Luak and one at Ibathjal. In the Akot area, Karic Pacoong, 
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Cueicook, Yirol, Awerial and the same applied to various villages in West 
and Eastern provinces in Equatoria and Malakal province. Most of those 
mentioned, were ex-colonial officials in the Southern Sudan and later 
joined the Southern political party, the Liberal. 
From 1962 to 1971, most members of the Southern traders or merchants were 
either killed or their wealth confiscated. For example, in the Yirol 
area, Nikanora Cour Malek, together with a small number of retailers were 
massacred in 1985 in Wau. 22 All the retail shops were burnt throughout 
the Southern Sudan. In Akot area, John Majok, a former MP and a trader, 
plus many others, were killed in cold blood in his house in 1966. In 
Pacong Bullen Geu and many others were murdered and property was set on 
fire. In Wau, over three hundred people were massacred while attending 
the wedding of the Cyr Ryan families. 23 
The role of the Jallaba in the killing was great for the Jallaba traders 
became informers or security giving false witness against Southerners 
they considered as rivals. 
As for those who aspired to enter the commercial field, the Jallaba 
managed to stop them getting trade licenses. The denial of trade licen. 
2es 
to Southerners was party policy to prevent able Southerners from entering 
the business field. The local district or assistant district 
commissioners were all under the influence of the Jallabas which meant 
that there was no security or protection for Southerners in the urban or 
sub-urban centres. After the 1955 disturbances, almost all police 
officers in the south and the majority of policemen in the north were 
Northern and Western Sudanese Muslims with the intention of intimidation 
and suppression of any ideas the Southern Sudanese traders may express 
against discrimination taking place everywhere throughout the Southern 
Sudan. 24 
An interview with Southern traders who had survived the seventeen years 
of Civil War has indicated strong anti-Northerner feelings, whether 
against administrators, police and military officers, judges, prison 
officers or merchants, who they said were responsible for the collapse of 
their businesses, death of their colleagues, and the loss of their 
property. They have indicated that the most affected group were the 
Dinkas who had some capital from their bulls which were being taken from 
Bahr El Ghazal or Bor area to Equatoria districts which did not have meat 
and milk. They were refused licenses to start commercial establishments 
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for the sale of meat or milk or to build an abattoir. Apart from denying 
them licenses to start a business, those who insisted on operating 
without licenses were murdered by Northern traders who felt that they 
would not be able to make profits if Southerners were allowed to operate. 
The traders in many cases used the army and the police to kill Southern 
traders and their families by false accusations such as saying that 
Southern traders or school teachers or any Southerner was a member of the 
rebels. Without proper investigation, the army or police would go 
directly and murder the accused, destroy his property and in most cases, 
kill members of this family, on the pretext that they were always members 
of the rebels or "Fifth Column. "25 
Another area where Southerners were discriminated against was in the 
distribution of the mechanized scheme in the Zande agricultural projects, 
Renk Malut, etc. In Nzara Yambio, Southerners who had schemes were 
withdrawn from them and replaced by Arabs after independence. This is in 
addition to the dismissal of more than 400 workers who were replaced by 
Northerners. As for Renk, Malut and Kodok areas, the Northern 
administrators scared off southern peasants from their own lands and 
redistributed them amongst the Arab immigrants at gun point. 26 
An attempt by the southern members of parliament to establish commercial 
enterprises in the north, say for example Khartoum Kosti, Rebek and 
Medani, was rejected. Even those Southerners who were members of the 
northern parties like Umma and the NUP were not all given land. Some who 
were could not get agricultural bank loans and with their limited 
resources they were not able to achieve any significant production on a 
commercial or capitalist production level. The failure to get bank loans 
meant that it was going to be difficult to pay labourers during 
cultivation and harvesting. On top of that, the stores where the products 
would be kept and who was going to buy them in the wholesale market, were 
some of the problems which had and continues to affect the development of 
indigenous merchants and industrial capital in the Southern Sudan 
hitherto. 
Refusal to buy local commodities or agricultural products as purchased by 
Southern retail shopkeepers, was another way of blocking southerners by 
the Arab merchants and their supporters in various districts, sub- 
districts and rural councils. For example, the District Commissioner and 
the police inspector decreed that the Dinka cattle for sale should be 
brought and sold at auction organized and controlled by the Arab 
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merchants. Here, those Dinkas who were interested in buying and had some 
money, were threatened by the police and Arab merchants and told the 
prices of bulls, calves, cows, sheep (both male and female) and goats, 
were fixed at a certain price and that no one should bid beyond that. 
Prices for fish, milk, meat, a kilo of simsim, goundnuts, grain, oil 
seeds etc. were also fixed and no one should pay more than the fixed 
price. In the auction, the Northern traders were able to buy through the 
support of both the inspector of local government and the police, who 
would force the Dinka to give his cow, bull, calf, goats or sheep, for a 
low price. Those who insisted on selling, even at such low prices, in 
many cases would loose everything as they would be arrested on leaving 
town and charged with being anti-Arab and therefore are rebels and whose 
punishment was (and still is), death. So in such cases it was better to 
sell your property at the acceptable price to the Arabs so that you did 
not face death. 27 
Here Southerners were forced to sell their agricultural products at lower 
prices, in return for quite expensive inferior goods, which were offered 
to Southerners in the urban and rural areas. The commodities brought to 
Southerners consisted of salt, onion, beads, cotton clothes for both 
women and men, cooking oil, sugar, tea and ground coffee. Another 
important issue was the resale of all the things bought from Southern 
Sudan whether immediately after having been bought from the auction (e. g. 
fish, chicken, meat, simsim, groundnuts, grain, beans, etc. ), which were 
needed by the urban dwellers. These were sold at five times the prices 
paid at the auction. For the rural areas, the same grain, groundnuts, 
simsim, beans, Lulu oil and cattle which were bought cheaply were resold 
at ten times the prices paid at the auction three months previously. Of 
course the profits made were reinvested in Northern Sudan which was the 
cornerstone of under-development not only in the Southern Sudan alone, 
but also in the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Southern and Northern Funj and 
Western Sudan as well. While northern traders were becoming richer and 
richer, the Southern Sudanese people in general, and traders in 
particular, became more and more poor and lost the will to continue to 
struggle in the commercial field. Even in the areas where tribal chiefs 
were committed to transform the production pattern among their people, 
they were frustrated by both merchants an state officials in the local 
council who were, until 1972, all Northerners. For example, paramount 
chiefs in Yirol district Maker Gum of Rorkec (Majok village), Macar Ijong 
of Apak (Aluak-Luak village), Chuot Chep of Kuacdit, Agok Gac of Luac and 
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Jielek and Aliab chiefs had managed to mobilize their people and 
establish local agricultural schemes producing simsim, groundnuts and 
grain. Each scheme producing thousands of sacks and which were supposed 
to be bought by the Co-operative Society which was set up by the British 
and in which an oil mill was established to produce cooking oil, soap and 
other cream oils until independence. After independence, the oil mills 
and all the assets were handed over to the northern Al district 
commissioner and who, with his assistants, plus the merchants, bankrupted 
the Co-operative Society within two years. As a result, the management 
was not able to buy what had been produced from the chiefs. They were all 
subjected to exploitation and corruption by the merchant capitalist class 
which had established centres throughout the Southern Sudan. 
One of these areas in which the Southern Sudanese were discriminated 
against, was in the employment of commercial agents in various areas by 
the rich merchants in Khartoum, Wed Medani, Port Sudan, Kassals, Obeid, 
Atbara and Dongola, who run their businesses in the Southern Sudan and 
which most of them considered backward. The rich merchants, and rich 
state employees hired people who would accept work in the remotest 
villages in retail shops selling salt, cotton clothes, soap, onions, 
cooking oil and other goods. Apart from this group of absentee merchants, 
there were another group of Arab merchants and state officials living in 
large urban towns in the Southern Sudan like Juba, Awiel and Rumbek, 
while their agents were (are) engaged in commercial activities, 
exploiting, expropriating and transferring profits firstly to the large 
urban centres and later to Northern Sudan. 
Instead of employing Southern Sudanese youths as shop assistants and 
agents, the northern traders decided to import people from the Northern 
Sudan from among the Arabized and Arab tribes. This marked the 
development of regional disparity in terms of merchant capital 
development in the Sudan. Southerners were (and still are) employed by 
Northern traders as domestic servants only. Those who are educated and 
would prefer not to work as domestic servants were isolated and treated 
as enemies spoiled by the Europeans or Christian imperialism. In a few 
cases Southern Sudanese youths were employed as shop agents or assistants 
though their wages were underpaid in order to keep them poor and 
dependent on the master or owner of the shop. But for a Northerner 
employed as an agent, this study found that they were considered as 
partners who would share in the profits earned over one year or so, 
whether or not the agent in question had contributed part of the working 
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capital. As witnessed by the author, many such agents after a year or two 
were able to set up independent retail shops and new agents were 
recruited from Northern Sudan. A Southerner working as an agent had no 
choice but to remain as an agent for as long as his master wished him to. 
For example, in Majak village in the Yirol area, where there were six 
Southerners working as agents out of a total of 20 agents, in less than 
three years Northerners working in the same village were able to leave 
the shop and set up on their own in the same village or another village 
such as Aluak-Luak, etc. Here the Southern Sudanese is a victim of racial 
and capitalist prejudices. All Southerners, whether or not they were 
Muslims, were discriminated against, cheated and oppressed. For example, 
those affected in the South were predominantly Muslims, a few of whom may 
be mentioned her, Abdel Fadil Agok, Abdel Rahman, Suli Fadil Mula Dogo , 
Mohammed Sabih, Awad Bandas Ramadon Chol and several others. 
Finally, from 1965 up to 1972, almost all retail shops in the villages 
throughout the Southern Sudan were destroyed whether they belonged to the 
Southern or Northern Sudanese. All those southerners who were traders 
were either killed by the army, police or merchants, or forced to migrate 
to the urban areas where they were reduced to working as cheap labour. 
The migration of rural people to the urban centres was encouraged by both 
the government and the merchants for three related reasons; firstly to 
deprive the Anya-nya forces from getting food and other services that the 
villagers were providing, which was good for security and the army to 
deprive the rebel forces of services and food. Here, when the villagers 
moved into the cities they would not have a chance to cultivate food 
products from which the Anya-nya may be benefiting. The displaced people 
from the rural areas were settled in peace villages, which were squatters 
camps outside the urban centres. All of them had to receive some kind of 
social benefit from the local government authorities. The squatters had 
to purchase various food items, including grain, soap, cooking oil, 
clothes etc. from the Northern factories on payment of cash which meant 
that they had to seek jobs from the Northern merchants and Northern state 
officials in the South. The displaced people had to compete for their 
food and clothes at the market. It was from this dependence of the 
Southern Sudanese on the urban market which led the merchants to bring 
grain, groundnuts, etc. from the Gezira area and Gadarif for Southerners 
to buy and became a great source of profit for the Arab traders at the 
expense of the poor and innocent Southern Sudanese. Here again, Arabs 
became the beneficiaries and rich, while the Southerners remain poor all 
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the more so because their businesses were destroyed. The cattle traders 
were forced to sell their cattle to the merchants at auctions. The 
Southerners having schemes in Zande and Renk areas were taken away from 
them and they were redistributed to the Northern Sudanese traders. 
At this period of exploitation and domination of Southern Sudanese, 
violence was the law of the day. The author had witnessed the attack on 
unarmed civilian commercial centres in Majak village where 20 retail 
shops and 50 people, including children, were massacred by the army who 
were brougLht to the area by the Arab traders who had intended to rob the 
centre a5. its rich agricultural products. Lorries were brought to carry 
away things expected there, thousands of sacks of groundnuts, grain and 
ari4 
several hundred sacks of green beans simsim. Osman Malik,, the only man 
not murdered and who was arrested, told the author how the stores, houses 
and shops were set on fire and how four lorries were filled with grain 
and simsim, and how innocent civilians were tortured and murdered in cold 
blood. The author was lucky to run away during the attack and was missed 
several times until he reached the safety of the bush and disappeared 
there. 
4.4 Exploitation and Political Violence 
The exploitation and political violence dominated the period between 1963 
to 1972. In all these Southern Sudanese were the losers and the victims. 
The traders and the state officials in the Southern Sudan made their 
alliance on how to treat Southerners. The traders, instead of remaining 
involved in commercial operations, were political agents of Umma, Diep 
and Muslim Brothers. The merchants during the elections were either to 
contest themselves or support a stooge or stooges who would be announced 
to have been elected unopposed. Here the traders began acting as 
informers and security agents and were involved in various crimes ranging 
from blackmail, looting or robbing the weak or powerless, and at worst, 
murdering those they might have permitted to win. 28 Most of the 
candidates who contested the elections of 1966,1968, were stooges 
sponsored by the leading Arab orientated political parties (Umma, PDP and 
NUP), through Arab traders, army officers, police officers and local 
government administrators in the name of national unity. Those who were 
not, were forced to resign or were murdered like William Deng in Rumbek, 
William Nhial in Awiel and many others in Bor, Bentiu and Equatoria, 
where several supposed Arab traders were declared unopposed MPs. 29 In 
addition to that, many Arab traders proposed themselves and were elected 
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through violent threats of death to voters who were told that their 
villages would be burned down and their weather taken away (livestock), 
or they would be killed if they did not vote for them. It was because of 
such repressive policies adopted and encouraged by the state 
representatives, that it was made possible for Arab traders to go to 
parliament representing certain districts, Khier El Awad in Yirol, 
Mohammed El Sharif in Rumbek, Abdel Kaham Tayfour in Juba, Ahmed Mohd 
from Kapoeta and many others in Renk Malakal, Raga and Tonj from 1966 to 
1968 elections. 
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Furthermore, the emergence of cattle camps owned by the army nothern 
administrators and the Arab traders in Wau Rumbek, Awiel Yirol Jong and 
Gogrial was evidence of the exploitation through state legalized and 
organized armed robbery which was conducted in the Southern Sudan. During 
this time, the Arab traders were able to use the racial Islamic faith as 
a means of identification. It was reported in Wau in 1965 that the 
massacre there in the house of Cyr Ryan was racist and all black people 
had been killed whether or not they were Muslims and it was because of 
this fact that led Muslims to join the Civil War against the Arab traders 
and the state under their control, represented by the army, police, 
judges and local government administrators. In the so-called peace 
villages, Southerners could not cultivate in order to feed themselves and 
they were reduced to being dependent not only on state employment, but on 
the Jallabas controlled markets. It was from this period that the idea of 
bringing essential commodities, including grain wheat flour and 'double 
zero', was introduced to the people of the Southern peace villages which 
became virtual commercial or consumer centres where new needs and demands 
which had been unknown to local Southern tribes before. Furthermore, it 
became a source of sexual exploitation for the Arabs who had to leave 
their wives in the Northern Sudan and used the services of prostitutes or 
mistresses from the Southern women who were equally subjected to all 
kinds of abuse including rape, kidnapping, etc. Here the behaviour of the 
Northern Sudanese administrators, judges, police, prison warders and the 
merchants or the members of the Jallaba was colonistic and imperialistic 
towards the Southern Sudanese people in every sense of the word. Their 
behaviour was also racist, exploitive, repressive and oppressive against 
all the Southern Sudanes whether they were Muslims or Christians. All 
Southern Sudanese were (and still are), treated as second or third class 
citizens and outside the system of government in power. 
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Therefore racism, exploitation, the use of religion as a means of 
dominating others, accompanied the penetration of Arab Jallabas not only 
in the Southern Sudan alone, but throughout the country. As we shall see 
in the coming pages, Arab merchants were and still are, concerned with 
capital accumulation, appropriation and cheating or looting of the poor 
using state assistance to achieve their goals. Religious relations 
therefore became less important than racial and economic. 
4.5 Class, Racial and Religious Domination of the Sectarian Jallaba 
This sub-section examines and analyses the class, racial and religious 
activities of the sectarian Arab merchants and petty traders in the 
Southern Sudan. The sectarian Arab Jallaba activities in the Southern 
Sudan, were and continue to be guided by their commercial interests and 
not by religious interests. The Arab merchants in the Southern Sudan have 
never committed themselves to the Government programme of Islamization, 
Arabization and assimilation since independence, nor have they ever 
attempted to initiate any religious programme or emancipate the Southern 
Sudanese Muslims in various southern towns. The Islamic faith and Arabism 
are used only as long as both will further enhance commercial gains and 
not for the sake of religion per se. This attitude or behaviour by the 
Arab merchants goes back as far as slave raids and the slavery period 
when the Southern Sudanese, those from Nuba Mountains, Southern and 
Northern Funj and Ingesna and some other African tribesmen from Darfur 
were considered good for slavery only. But with the war against slavery, 
the Arab merchants and their European collaborators have been able to 
adopt a new slavery system which we can freely term as "neo-slavery", 
whereby the ex-slaves and those considered inferior continue to do the 
same kind of work for very little or no payment at all, i. e. as domestic 
servants, agricultural labour force, labourers and soldiers of various 
ranks. 31 The use of Arab names and Arab culture plus the Arabic language 
during the slave period was a part of the process of indoctrination to 
transform the African slaves not into a complete Arab personality, but as 
half-Arab without any regards to his African past. 32 
While the Arab controlled state machinery of Islamization and Arabization 
during both civilian and military rule from 1956 to the present, 
reflected in the establishment of several Koranic primary and 
intermediate schools in the Southern Sudan and several Islamic mosques 
and Islamic centres, the Arab merchants in the Southern Sudan were 
engaged in discriminating against Southern Sudanese traders whether or 
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not they were Muslims. 
The Arab sectarian merchants are always able to establish their separate 
communities in the Southern Sudan wherever they find business 
opportunities, whether in the villages or towns. First of all, over 99% 
of more than then thousand Arab merchants in the Southern Sudan had to 
leave behind their wives, children and other members of their families in 
Northern Sudan, as did the British and the Egyptian Colonial Government 
in the Sudan. 33 
While exploiting looting and stealing wealth from the Southern Sudan, the 
Arab merchants established semi-apartheid sections within the same urban 
suburbs known as "Hay Jallaba", i. e. the Jallaba residential areas for 
not only the rich, but the upper class. In these areas, brick walls as 
long as three metres were constructed around each house. The local 
government officials, who were all Arabs before the 1972 regional 
government was created, made it clear that no non- Arabized Southern 
Sudanese was allowed to build there. 34 The typical examples of those 
Southern Sudanese Muslims who were devoted to the Islamic faith and had 
adopted Arab names and yet were rejected or discriminated against, 
include the family of Fadl Mulla, Mohd Margan, Abdalla Sulie, Abdalla 
Adam Mangok, Fargalla Mohammed, Awad Bandas, Sheikh Haj Madit Imam of 
Rumbek Mosque, Abdel Bage and many others who became disappointed and 
decided to disregard all the Islamic norms as propagated by the Arab 
merchants who claim and pretend to be the main Islamic missionaries not 
only in the Southern Sudan but in the Western and Eastern Sudan in name 
only but not in practice or deed. The consequences of the failure of Arab 
merchants in the Southern Sudan are clear, e. g. most of the daughters of 
the above mentioned Southern Muslims have been married to non-Muslims or 
Christians in the Southern Sudan against strong opposition from the Arab 
sectarian merchant leaders in the Southern Sudan. Abel Alier, Joseph 
Lago, Dr. Col Dau, Makinei Deng, to mention but a few, were some of the 
examples of Southern Christians who have been able to marry Southern 
Sudanese Muslim girls, using both Christian and semi-Islamic marriage 
ceremonies, such as attending church in order to be married, dressed in 
white garments and white shoes, imitating Europeans on the one hand, 
while singing Arab songs, using Hina (Arab decoration of hands and feet 
of both the bride and bridegroom, etc. ), on the other. In addition, 
payment of a dowry with cows, goats, sheep, money, arrows etc. depending 
on the tribal background of each case but the common basis remains in 
African culture. 
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Further to that, is the refusal of Arab merchants in the Southern Sudan 
to marry their daughters to Southern Sudanese, regardless of their 
religion or social background. Where a Southern Sudanese man may fall in 
love with an Arab girl, the girl's parents will never allow the, marriage 
to take place, unless they elope together or the girl conceives. The 
consequences of elopement or conception have been for the parents to 
disown their daughter and stop any contacts-with her. 
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But at the same 
time, the Arab merchants in the south are able to marry Southern Sudanese 
girls without major problems, depending on the tribal background of the 
girl. The general complaint among Southern Sudanese girls married to Arab 
merchants, has been that they are always treated as concubines or second- 
class wives. Most Southern Sudanes girls who married during the first 
Civil War, were actually raped and were taken at gun point by Arab 
merchants and those state employees in the region. This was a great cause 
of hatred against the Arabs in the South. 
This study has found that nearly 85 per cent of the cases studied, 
indicated that marriage relations broke up after the Addis Ababa 
agreement and all the children born to Southern girls were taken to the 
North, leaving their mothers behind. There were other cases where the 
marriage did not break up but the children were taken away at the age of 
two or more, while their mothers were denied the right even to visit them 
in Northern Sudan until the children were fully Arabized and Islamized 
from the age of ten or more (in some cases only), the children may be 
allowed to return to the Southern Sudan for a period of three months or 
less. During this period the children were kept within the fences without 
coming into contact with local Southern Sudanese children in the town. In 
their houses the children, who returned from Khartoum, were strangers to 
their own mothers due to various indoctrination and changes which had 
occurred while in the Northern Sudan. Southern Sudanese girls married to 
the Arab merchants while still in the Southern towns were also subjected 
to various kinds of transformation and indoctrination. In order to 
achieve that they were stopped from contacting their relatives and may be 
allowed to see them for a limited period only inside the Arab fence. All 
Southern Sudanese when married had to adopt Arab names, dress, mode of 
eating, behaviour and to forget anything non-Arabic. All the same, they 
were called "Khadimat", mistress or slave, not only by the husband's 
family, but by the husbands themselves as well. There are several 
examples of such cases, including five women related to the author of 
this thesis, whose children were taken away from them. When some of them 
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followed their children up to Khartoum, Gezira and Obeid, they, were 
chased away without seeing their children. 
In addition, the Arab merchants never allow their children to attend 
schools in the south. It was found that over 90% of the Arab Merchants 
studied (60 Southern and 80 Northern traders), educate their, children in 
Northern Sudan. Those few Arab children found to have studied in the 
Southern schools were found to be in two categories, namely those whose 
Southern Sudanese mothers were divorced, and the other group composed of 
children whose fathers were killed during the civil strife in the south. 
The consequences of the above discrimination, has been the emergence of a 
crisis not only between the Arab merchants and their Southern Sudanese 
wives but between the entire Arab communities in the Southern Sudan and 
almost all Southern Sudanese people whether Muslims or not. Therefore, 
the claim that the conflict in the south was (and still is), between 
Muslims and Arabs on the one side and Christians and animists on the 
other is misleading or not true. What is true has been the conflicts over 
-economic and political resources and resistance against exploitation, 
oppression and domination by the Arab national group, who has continued 
to concentrate political and economic power in their hands since 
independence. 36 
The Arab merchants failure to employ local citizens as shop assistants or 
agents, and to grant credit facilities or loans to Southern Sudanese and 
the use of abusive language on the Southern Sudanese are among the causes 
of anti-Arab merchants throughout the Southern Sudan. The same causes are 
also responsible for political crises in Southern and Northern Funj and 
Ingesna, Eastern Kordofan and Darfur regions. 
37 
In the Southern Sudan most Arab merchants openly and publicly speak of 
being superior and civilized to all Southern Sudanese, regardless of 
education or religious background. 
38 Similarly, the Arab merchants have 
continued to show that they are members of the ruling national group in 
the Sudan and are natural masters, rulers, and the representatives of 
prophet Mohammed on earth. 
39 Furthermore, the ruling Arab national group 
has continued to employ only the Arab merchants not only as supporters, 
but, as informers or agents against the non-Arab national groupings. 
It is because of these assumptions held by the Arab settlers in the 
Sudan, that made them reject any arrangement which will make them equal 
in status or be politically and economically led by non-Arab national 
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groups, who are in the majority in the country. It is equally the same 
misconception that made the Arab merchants not allow their children and 
families at large to have social contact with Southern Sudanese children 
and families as well. 
The common role and functions of the Jallabas in the Sudan in general and 
the Southern Sudan in particular, were and remain, characterized by 
profit maximization and appropriation of wealth from the poor. 
This study argues that the Southern Sudanese Muslims are among the most 
affected by the Arab repressive and exploitative polices, largely because 
they have been deceived and cheated or misled by the Arab merchants. 
Furthermore, the policies of 'divide and rule', and confusion, using 
Koranic verses and the sayings of the Prophet which are apparently 
unquestionable to Muslims led most of the Southern Muslims to accept 
their low political and economic positions until the first Civil War in 
the Southern Sudan where Southern Sudanese, regardless of religious 
affiliation or creed were and still are subjected to all kinds of 
repression, oppression, domination, suffering, humiliation, etc. The 
massacre in Wau in 1965, Juba in 1966 and many others, affected all 
Southern Sudanese Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 40 
The Muslim Southerners were and still are the less educated Southerners 
in the urban centres. They form the dominant part of those who work as 
domestic servants with the Arab merchants and Arab state officials. They 
form the majority of tailors, blacksmiths, lorry driver, brick layers, 
local builders, bakers labourers, porters, watch, bicycle and radio 
repairers, local mechanics, and assistant drivers, local carpenters 
planers, street sweepers, local council labourers, urban hawkers, drug 
addicts (i. e. Hashish), and are mostly associated with common urban 
crimes including murder, using knives etc. 41 
The above mentioned matters precipitated the Southern Muslims and other 
Southern Sudanese as well, to reject violently all kinds of exploitation, 
oppression, cheating, mistreatment, etc. by anyone, whether Arab or 
African, Muslim or Christian, Southerner or Northerner. In addition, 
Southern Sudanese including Muslims rejected whatever claims were and 
still are made in the name of Islam by the Arab merchants. This 
development was followed by the emergence of anti-Arab merchants 
activities among Southern Sudanese Muslims throughout the Southern Sudan. 
Some Southern Sudanese Muslims went further to allow their children to 
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change their Muslim names and adopt Christian ones instead, several 
examples of these elements were found by the author, ten in Juba alone, 
15 from Rumbek and Yirol and several others were found in Malakal and 
Wau, communities currently in Khartoum area. 42 
The most striking development was the return to the Southern Sudan of 
those Southern Sudanese who were totally Arabized, Islamized and 
assimilated into Arab socio-economic and political structures, in order 
to begin a new life and new family entirely different from that of the 
Arabs. These returnees marked the beginning of the collapse of Arab and 
Islamic cultures in the Southern Sudan. The Southern Sudanese Muslims, 
some of whom were former slaves or of slave origin mentioned, returned to 
the South in 1947 after the Southern policy was abolished. Some members 
of this group were originally a part of the 1924 uprising and others were 
members of the Black Bloc which was formed in Khartoum by the Sudanese 
ex-slaves in the 1940's. 43 
At first, each returnee was committed to the propagation of Islam in his 
respective province or district etc. For example, Major Abdalla Adam 
(Mangok Mabouk) from Rumbek established an Islamic primary school known 
as "Khalowa" and several Dinka children were enrolled. He was joined 
later on by Bakhiet Rok (Rok Reec), Morwel Long, Imam Madit, Abdalla 
Attah and many others, also coming from Rumbek. In Yirol Abdalla Yak, 
Abdalla Cholthok, Agok Amum, Caggai Wut and Akec Jok, to mention just a 
few, were examples of those Muslims and who returned to their areas in 
order to transform Southern Sudanese into Muslims but failed to do so 
even with their children. 44 
It is also important to state here that similar numbers of returnees came 
to various provinces, districts and even to the villages in Equatoria, 
upper Nile and other parts of Bahr El Ghazal with a plan to carry out the 
same programme. But unfortunately they tried hard to Islamize and Arabize 
but were not able to succeed because the Arab merchants in the Southern 
Sudan were not ready to finance Islamic programmes as presented by the 
Southern Muslims. 
The Egyptians who encouraged most of the returnees failed to honour their 
financial obligations which were earlier promised. As a result, the 
programmes collapsed, leaving the returnees only with their new families 
who hardly new Arabic nor Islam. 45 
The collapse of the programme mentioned above was characterized by the 
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changes which affected the returnees. For example, the returnees in Lakes 
(i. e Rumbek, Yirol and Tong) who returned to their villages, became 
tribal chiefs or merchants. Abdalla Adom, who dropped his Arab names, 
culture and religion, began to use his Dinka name, Mangok Mabouk, and he 
became a tribal chief of Eastern Rumbek until his death in 1965. Bakhiet 
became a chief in Western Rumbek after adopting his Dinka name, Rok Reec, 
the same happened to Caggai Wut who became a chief in Tong; Khier Sid 
Awadu became a chief in Tonj, while Abdalla Yak and Abdalla Cholthok 
became chiefs in Yirol. Kok Malok and Marwell Long were also affected by 
the same changes. 46 
This study found sufficient evidence that almost all the Southern 
returnees were de-Arabized and de-Islamized although some of their 
children were given Arab names without necessarily practising Islamic 
five prayers a day. 
4.6 Ten Years of Regional Government Experience and Jallaba Class in 
the Southern Sudan 
This sub-section examines and analyses the role of the Jallaba in 
underdevelopment of the Southern Sudan during the period from 1972 to 
1983 when the autonomous system of rule was established in 1972. When the 
Southern Sudan self-government rule was set up in accordance with 
provisions of Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, the following conditions 
existed in the Southern Sudan: - All the three Governors of the three 
Southern Sudan provinces were all Arab and Arabized Northerners. All 18 
District Commissioners and most Assistant District Commissioners were 
also Northern Sudanese Arabs. Almost all the senior state officials 
throughout the Southern Sudan were Northern Sudanese. Almost all the 
teachers left in the Southern Sudan were Northern Sudanese, for almost 
all the Southerners previously employed in various capacities or 
positions were forced to flee to the Northern Sudan or out of the 
country, or were killed. 47 Almost all the police officers and prison 
warders were Northerners, while the bulk of the policemen, prison warders 
and wild life warders were Northern Sudanese too. All the senior 
secondary schools, i. e. Rumbek, Juba and Malakal, plus all the 
intermediate schools, with the exception of Koranic Arab schools, were 
closed or transferred to Khartoum. All Southern politicians had either 
migrated to Khartoum or fled into exile or have been murdered in the 
Southern Sudan. Almost all Southern traders migrated to Northern Sudan or 
fled out of the country to seek protection as refugees, or were murdered 
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in the Southern Sudan. All army officers and the majority of soldiers 
were non-Southerners. In brief, national political and economic power was 
fully controlled by the Arab and Arabized national groups, not only in 
the Northern Sudan, but in the Southern Sudan as well, especially in the 
urban centres. The only Southern Sudanese within those urban centres were 
the displaced people from the rural areas who were forced to settle in 
the so-called "peace villages", and the detribalized group, usually 
described as the Malakia tribe or no-tribe elements which continue to be 
in a minority with aleatory and ambivalent political and economic 
ambitions. 48 
While the Arabs were exclusively running their urban centres, the Anya- 
nya forces were controlling the rural areas. Transport between various 
provinces and districts was extremely difficult, if not impossible 
without a military escort with tanks and heavy military hardware. 
On economic affairs, the Southern Sudan was economically paralysed. The 
situation in the Southern Sudan was described by Mohammed Hashim Awad as 
follows: - 
"Thus ended the 17 year old Civil War and began the hard fight 
for the reconstruction of the war devastated south. "49 
he went on to stress that, 
"the prolonged strife had caused serious social and economic 
dislocation and development had to start .... from scratch. In 
particular, the countryside, where prior to the disorder some 
94% of the population lived, suffered major setbacks. 
Guerrilla warfare forced the rural population to choose between 
moving into the main towns where the central government 
authority was still maintained or to join the ranks of the 
rebels .... or take refuge in the neighbouring countries. "50 
At the time of implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended 
the Civil War in the Southern Sudan, it was estimated that those who had 
fled into the jungle and crossed into the neighbouring countries of 
Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, Ethiopia and Central African Republic, numbered 
more than a million people with more than half a million dead. 
The zande projects and agro-industrial set up were the only major 
projects in the Southern Sudan, which were closed in 1965 and have never 
reopened, even after the ten years of relative peace after the peace 
agreement was implemented in 1972. The cotton which used to bring revenue 
to nearly 100,000 people in textile production and which used to bring 
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huge revenues and work for thousands of labourers ceased to provide. 
Likewise, the jute proposed schemes in Tonj and Malute were abandoned in 
1967. Many tobacco plantations, sugar-cane schemes, which were to start 
in Mongalla and Malut were not even begun. A cigarette factory at 
Kapoeta, an oil mill at Yirol, rice scheme at Awiel and most of the saw 
mills were put out of action. 51 
Other areas affected by the war included the roads, river navigation, 
school buildings, government offices and houses, hospitals and 
dispensaries or dressing stations in rural areas and towns as well. 
Education had collapsed during the Civil War and the need for education 
materials, health services, roads, etc. were high on the agenda of the 
newly established transitional government in Juba. 52 
The above-mentioned situation indicated the extent to which the entire 
Southern Sudan was affected when the peace agreement was signed and 
implemented in 1972. In other words, devastation during the 17 year civil 
war was not limited to human beings but also destroyed the very 
infrastructure of the Southern economy and social structure. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement which was signed and ratified on 27th March 
1973, granted the Southern Sudanese Government. The establishment of 
regional government in the Southern Sudan was marked by the 
Southernization of the administration, police and prison warders 
throughout the region. All Northerners working in the local government in 
the province districts, including the police, wild life warders, prison 
warders, clerks, accountants or book-keepers, drivers, etc. Those working 
in the post office in Sudan; bank and Unity Bank, judiciary and the army 
were not affected. But all Southerners in the Northern Sudan, working in 
banks, post offices and judiciary were transferred to the Southern Sudan. 
All Southern medical doctors, assistant medical doctors, nurses and 
dressers, plus engineers working in the Northern Sudan were transferred 
to the South. In addition, 12,000 members of the armed forces, with 6,000 
Southerners were stationed in the Southern Sudan. 53 
The establishment of regional government precipitated the creation of 
sixteen regional ministries, over seventy directorates or departments. A 
regional assembly, with 160 members of assembly and employees within the 
assembly, (RDC) Regional Development Corporation, and other departments, 
were created. The Equatoria Trading Corporation, which was established in 
the early days, before political independence and was affected by the 
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Civil War, was also reactivated. 
The Auditor General office in the Southern Sudan was attached to the 
region of government, with all Southerners work elsewhere in the north 
transferred to the southern region. Other departments were not affected 
by "Southernization", although Southerners were transferred to the 
region, including custom duties, national projects, communications, 
transport and civil aviation, including Sudan Airways, Sudan Railways and 
river steamers, mechanized agricultural economics, bridges, colleges and 
university. The Islamic institutions which were established in the 
southern region during the civil war were not affected. 
The regional government which took over the administration of the 
Southern Sudan (lately), in 1972, was faced with a number of problems 
including finance or funds for resettlement of over a million returnees, 
their accommodation, employment and feeding was on the top of the 
regional governments agenda. The region which had over ministers and 
directors, started with one car or a bus, transporting the ministers and 
directors in turn. In addition, there was not enough housing for the 
ministers, directors and other regional employees. Further offices for 
various regional ministries and their directorates was one of the major 
problems. Another problem to be solved was office equipment, including 
filing cabinets, desks, cupboards, chairs, telephones etc. 
With peace achieved, the reactivation of productive schemes, 
restructuring of economic infrastructure, reconstruction of roads and 
bridges, have to be undertaken. In addition to this, reconstruction of 
schools, abandoned government offices and houses which were destroyed 
during the war. Also, provision of feeding, books and housing for both 
students and teachers, were among the problems the new regional 
government was facing. 
Furthermore, the resettlement of a million returnees, which involved the 
supply of essential commodities, blankets, shelter, clothes, shoes, beds 
and bedding, agricultural tools or equipment, cooking utensils, etc., was 
equally one of the pressing problems for the regional government. For 
example, the regional government was required to resettle half a million 
people in the rural areas on fertile land, in order for it to be 
cultivated. Eighty villages were set up throughout the Southern region. 
In the urban centres, population increased tremendously, especially in 
Juba, Wau and Malakal, the headquarters of the three provinces. 54 In 
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1953/56 a census of the population of Juba alone was recorded at 10,600, 
and in 1973 it rose to 56,723, recording a growth of 10.4% per annum for 
the 1956-1973 period. A study and survey by both town planners of the 
Regional Ministry of Housing and public utilities and MEFITO APA 
consulting engineers, estimated the Juba population in 1977 as 77,453 in 
Juba, while a similar increase was noted in Wau and Malakal. 55 But the 
actual population in each urban centre was not known because of the poor 
statistical documentation in the Southern Sudan. What is certain is that 
populations in various urban centres throughout the Southern Sudan 
increased beyond their normal capacities in terms of housing, food and 
other facilities or services. For example, the regional government - the 
main employer in the region - employed in 1972-3 more than a hundred 
thousand [100,0001 persons in various institutions, with six thousand ex- 
Anya-nya employed in the national army and another six thousand in the 
police and prisons institutions, twenty thousand labourers employed in 
the reconstruction of building of roads, bridges and houses, and a 
thousand in the wildlife and tourism section. This is in addition to more 
than ten thousand civil servants and those employed by both regional and 
central government and working within the southern regi6n. 56 
All the above-mentioned changes in the Southern Sudan marked a new 
dimension not only in the political sphere but in the penetration of 
capitalism (including merchant capital) in this area. 
As noted elsewhere: - 
"The establishment of a regional self-government in the Southern 
Sudan under the control of bureaucratic petty bourgeois 
elements in 1972, marked a new beginning in the penetration of 
capitalism in the area. That is to say, a new entity was 
brought into being representing definite class interest. It 
involves the disarticulation of various pre-capitalist modes of 
production and their rearticulation on the capitalist lines. It 
also involves the disarticulation of various pre-capitalist 
systems of tribal governments and their re-articulation on the 
capitalist pattern of government. "57 
(Deng Dongrin Akuany in Political Modernization in a Developing 
Society, the Southern Sudan Experience from 1972 to 1982. ) 
The establishment of an autonomous regional government in the Southern 
Sudan was followed with the expansion of bureaucratic sections within the 
regional government, which brought millions of Southerners, (who had been 
alienated during the Colonial rule and which continued under the neo- 
colonial regimes after political independence), under a neo- colonial 
orientated regional government, this time controlled by Southern Sudanese 
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or bureaucratic petty bourgeois or bourgeoisie. 
The establishment of a neo-colonial regional government with expanded 
bureaucratic sections, equally meant the expansion of government 
investment in various developmental projects, which were in the interest 
of merchant and industrial capital throughout the region. It equally 
meant the expansion of commercial institutions or markets to meet the 
demands for millions of new consumers made possible by the peace 
agreement. In other words, it meant the creation of several commercial or 
market centres for more than five million consumers or buyers and 
settlers who were integrated for the first time into a capitalist 
orientated economy. 
The expansion of a capitalist economy in the south Sudan was marked by a 
tremendous transfer of capitalist commodities into the heart of Southern 
Sudan, i. e. from the regional capital Juba down to the villages which 
probably had not seen, nor tasted before, salt, sugar, tea, onions, bread 
and other foreign imported goods. The demand for all kinds of goods and 
services rose high above what the regional government was able to meet. 
To solve the economic problem, the regional government made several 
appeals to both central government, foreign governments and international 
organizations, for financial assistance. In addition, the regional 
government appealed to the Jallaba's Chamber of Commerce to help in the 
relief and rehabilitation programme in the Southern region. The response 
to the above mentioned appeals was extremely generous both within and 
outside the Sudan. In consequence, the regional government, which had 
started with only two cars and one office was able to receive several 
cars, food stuffs, blankets, medical supplies, clothes, beds, bedding, 
cooking utensils, agricultural equipment, etc. Both the central and 
regional governments set up a special funds commission and a 'Board of 
Trustees for Relief Funds' to receive and control all the assistance 
coming from outside the country as well as from within. The Board of 
Trustees for Relief Funds, was composed of seven members under Mr. Mamoun 
Beheri as full- time President of the Board in the rank of a minister, 
and Mr. Peter Gatkuoth Gual as Director General. The functions of the 
Board of Trustees for Relief Funds, included the supervision of a special 
fund established to meet expenses of repatriation, resettlement, relief 
and rehabilitation of Southern Sudanese refugees or returnees. 
The Commission for Repatriation of Southern Refugees which was set up to 
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implement policies on relief and rehabilitation and resettlement agreed 
upon by central and regional government, was composed of seven members 
with Mr. Clement Mboro as its Chairman. The members include, Messrs. El 
Tayeb al Mardi, Wilson Ariamba, Job Adier, Hussein Jok Elisapana Mula and 
El Tayeb El Haris. The above mentioned board and the commission, also 
appealed for financial assistance, medical and food supplies on behalf of 
the Sudan Government to both foreign governments and non-governmental 
institutions. As a result of these appeals the commission received 
several million dollars, thousands of bags of sugar, wheat flour, 
varieties of beans, thousands of sacks of sorghum, thousands of tins of 
cooking oil, milk powder, butter, sardines, jams, thousands of bags of 
rice, cartons of washing powder and soap, household equipment and 
utensils, mosquito nets, shoes of all kinds, clothes, cars, including 
lorries, buses, land rovers, bicycles, Singer sewing machines, etc. All 
the above mentioned items were supposed to be taken and distributed to 
all repatriated refugees in the Southern Sudan, through the regional 
government agencies. But this study found that there was gross 
mismanagement or corrupt practises by most members of the Board of 
Trustees for Relief Funds, most of whom were retired civil servants and 
former politicians from both south and north Sudan and who had private 
businesses and shops to which a considerable amount of goods or 
commodities were diverted. The majority of those members with private 
businesses, shops and financial institutions were exclusively Northern 
Sudanese who actually controlled the finance and administration of the 
special funds, who became millionaires soon after the dissolution of the 
special fund commission, and which included the President of the Board of 
Trustees for Relief Funds, El Tayel of Mardi and even junior officials of 
the commission such as Mr. Sid Ahmed, managed to buy a quite expensive 
private house, a car with automatic gears and doors and a trading 
business in Khartoum city. 58 
This study equally found that half of all food stuffs, cars and many 
other items, did not reach Southern Sudan let alone the displaced 
population of the South. For example, in Nimule, Yei and Parajok in 
Equatoria, several returnees (repatriated refugees), died of hunger, lack 
of medical care and proper shelter. The quarter or so of the other half 
disappeared between the Northern merchants and the members of members of 
the Southern Sudan bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie - those who were 
involved in the transporting and distribution of the said items. What 
reached the displaced poor in the Southern Sudan was less than one 
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quarter, as the majority of the needy people did not receive anything or 
hear about receiving anything either. 
Perhaps this was the origin of corruption in the Southern Sudan, which 
later on spread throughout the regional government institutions. The 
corruption in question actually involved two groups. One group was 
composed of thieves who wanted to be rich and stole when the opportunity 
arose and took according to his 'ability and capacity to hide the item. 
The other group was composed of people whom I would like to describe as 
'political thieves' and others as 'political merchants'. A political 
thief or a political merchant will be used to refer to a person, or 
persons, who commit theft or are involved in black market activities as a 
means to achieve a political end. For example, certain prominent members 
of the Special Funds Commission for the Southern Sudan were opposed to 
the idea of creating a separate autonomous government for the southern 
region. To fight against such a system within their means was to prevent 
anything going to the south if possible, in order to block any progress 
in favour of such a system. This group was well organized and supported, 
under cover, by the sectarian Arab and Islamic political parties. As a 
result of this group, several thousand sacks of wheat flour donated to 
the southern region, with Juba, Wau and Malakal printed on them, were 
found being sold in the markets in Northern Sudan. Several Landrover 
cars, including ambulances with the names of hospitals from Southern 
Sudan on them, were found in Abu Amid Dongola Gadarif, Shandies and 
Khartoum, being used by members of northern or central government 
officials without any interference or questioning by the police. Also 
thousands of medical boxes with the names of southern hospitals marked on 
them, were being distributed in the north, while those to whom they were 
intended, were ignored and the central government could not stop it. 
Here, the political thief serves his own interests as well as that of his 
political constituency. That is to say when he steals for himself he also 
steals for his political group and thereby prevents the progress of the 
southern people. While the political merchant does almost the same thing, 
he differs only in terms of reinvestment. For the political merchants buy 
the goods, maybe at higher prices, but then destroys the goods or hoards 
them in order to make the consumers suffer and as a result of such 
suffering, the people would rise against the system of government in 
power. 59 
Both political thieves and anti-regional government of the south were 
found to be dominant among the civil servants within the central 
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government, especially among the supporters of the Islamic Front and 
Sectarian parties. 60 These two groups played a major part against the 
interests of the Southern Sudan until the Special Fund Commission was 
shut down and those foreign governments and non-governmental 
organizations who had sent aid, were told by the regional government to 
change the route of sending help to the South and to send, through 
Mombasa and Kenya instead of Port Sudan or Khartoum which was accepted. 
However, some other non-governmental organizations such as ACCROSS, 
ACCORD, NCA, World Vision, OXFAM, Red Cross, etc. brought relief directly 
to the Southern Sudan. Several stations with airports attached were 
established throughout various villages which were inaccessible by land. 
The first health centres and dispensaries replaced and even medical 
doctors were found in the villages serving the areas which had never has 
such opportunities before. 
The major problem was the reconstruction of economic infrastructure 
throughout the region, i. e. economic development and social change. And 
it is in relative economic development where the role of the merchant 
capital was most vital. The regional government had a duty to develop not 
only the economy of the Southern Sudan but to maintain justice, security, 
order and equality. But the regional government had insufficient money 
for development; money to pay salaries and wages, money to reconstruct 
and feed students in various boarding schools and colleges, money to buy 
medical supplies, money to bring spare parts, money to buy school books, 
etc. Workers, teachers, doctors, police, etc. could go for up to four or 
five months without salaries and wages, the answer always being the same, 
that there was no liquidity in the state bank, "the Sudan Bank". 
In addition, there was the problem of black markets, soaring prices and 
the low standard of living in the region. The Jallaba class was found to 
be dominant in markets whether white or black. The regional government 
contacted collectively and individually members of the Jallaba class to 
stamp out the black markets, stop hoarding goods, etc. The Jallaba 
reaction was positive and many promises made to such a request. On the 
other hand, the regional government found it very difficult to supply the 
schools, training institutes, hospitals, prisons and police cadets with 
food supplies, clothes, etc. and had to contact the members of the 
Jallaba class who were controlling all the commercial activities 
throughout the southern region to supply the above mentioned institutes 
with all the necessary requirements laid down in the budget of each 
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institution. It was decided by the regional authorities that the state 
contracts should be advertiled, i. e. to take bids from those merchants 
who would be ready to supply the schools, prisons and various boarding 
schools with their requirements, such as meat, bread, beans, cooking oil, 
sugar and other necessary items as required, on credit and to be paid at 
a future time. The next step was to form selection committees in order to 
supervise and select those who satisfied the requirements laid down by 
the state, and who would be contractors for a year or two depending on 
the terms of the bids. The following contracts were allocated: - 
1. Contracts involving 18 prisons, 
2. Contracts involving seven secondary schools including technical and 
teacher's training institutes, 
3. Contracts involving 18 hospitals, 
4. Contracts involving police and prison officer training camps, 
5. Contracts to reconstruct those hospitals, schools and houses 
destroyed during the war and also devastated houses and dispensaries 
and to provide the hospitals with food stuffs, beds and bedding, etc. 
6. Contracts to transport students to the schools and back to their 
villages, transport of returnees and their belongings to their 
villages, transport of essential commodities and those things 
required in the villages and all districts. 
7. Contracts to supply the regional government with various stationery, 
files, typewriters, paper, filing cabinets, office equipment and hire 
purchase cars. 
The award of these contracts to ten Arab merchants, marked a new 
dimension in the process of exploitation, expropriation and under- 
development of the Southern Sudan. It also marked the 
institutionalization of corruption in the history of regional government. 
The selection of contractors for the contracts had involved millions of 
Sudanese pounds and was influenced by bribery and corruption. 
Several million Sudanese pounds were used by the Arab merchants 
interested, though it is not easy to know the amount of money involved 
for the purpose of bribing top political leaders, directors and members 
of various committees and even messengers. The methods used for bribing 
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by those involved were very complicated, but it first became clear and 
common to knowledge to those Southern Sudaner, people nearer political and 
economic power. The author had all the advantages of witnessing 
personally some of the methods used by the Jallabas for making, or 
attempting to make, those in authority corrupt. The author had worked as 
a civil servant in the Department of Economic and Political Affairs, in 
the High Executive Council, (i. e. the Southern Region Council of 
Ministers) for nearly seven years and was responsible for receiving 
various 'complaints' on corruption and injustice committed by various 
political leaders and senior administrative, police, prisons and game 
park officials and members of the public at large, on behalf of the 
president of HEC. 61 
It was from this experience, plus knowledge of the personalities involved 
as well as concrete evidence brought against those concerned, although 
only a very small minority were punished, and those who were brought 
before the law and freed on the grounds of lack of evidence, that the 
author was convinced of the existence of corruption, especially when 
those involved were able to buy houses, cars, have houses built or buy 
companies etc. without the need of a loan and in such a short space of 
time. The examples of those who became very rich include both southerners 
and the Jallabas, e. g. Amin Akasha, Kier Awad, Albeno M Morgan. 
There were other cases of corruption which the Jallaba was behind. These 
corruption cases include the distortion and corruption of bills by the 
contractors and the regional authorities concerned. Other examples 
consisted of various so-called "gifts" in kind and in cash as well, such 
as iron beds and chairs, sponge mattresses, TV and video sets, grinding 
mills, fridges, several sacks of sugar, wheat flour, etc. The outcome of 
this was more corruption, exploitation and distortion of almost all the 
bills of the Arab contractors. The allocated budgets for schools, food, 
transport, medical supplies and other supplies were at one time exhausted 
six months before the end of the academic year. There were problems in 
all the schools with strikes, demonstrations and attacks by students on 
those held responsible, the regional authorities and also their 
headmasters. Both the school authorities and the Jallabas were accused 
not only of mismanagement and corruption but also distortion of bills. 
The examination of claims presented to the regional government proved 
that there was corruption, especially by the Arab traders. For example, 
most of the bills contained items such as chickens, milk, cheese, eggs 
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and certain deserts which were not being supplied to the students as such 
items were not available, even in the local market. 
Another area of corruption was the world programme which was able to 
provide cooking oil, sardines, cheese, toilet soap, milk-powder, fish, 
etc. to all the schools in Southern Sudan, through various schools' 
committees and yet the items were found in the local market, both black 
and white markets. 
The emergence of such cases or corruption in the Southern Sudan became a 
political issue between the ruling bureaucratic bourgeois: elite and 
those outside political power and the public at large. 
Black markets hoarding of essential commodities, resultant high prices in 
the markets, combined with shortages of various goods in the market, 
shortages of drugs or medical supplies and the failure of the central 
government to release salaries time and its failure to provide 
development funds to the regional government created a new feeling of 
distrust, if not a feeling of anti-Northern Sudanese, by the masses whose 
suffering was moving from bad to worse. 
The regional government reacted by suspending payment, pending 
investigation into the whole affair, and the question of pay was deferred 
to a future date. The Jallabas could not wait until the investigation was 
completed but took the case directly to the head of state, a Northerner 
himself, and falsely reported to him that they were being cheated 
unjustly be a government under the control of separatist, anti-Arabs, 
anti-Islam or anti-Northerner elements. The president, instead of seeking 
clarification from the regional authorities, decided and instructed by 
the Central Minister of Finance and National Planning, to deduct ten 
million Sudanese pounds from the amount which the regional government was 
supposed to receive as its entitlement. The consequences of such a 
decision were grave indeed. It affected not only the development budget, 
but salaries and wages, for a period of six months. The regional 
government was forced to lay-off several thousand labourers, the first 
from the roads and bridges which were under reconstruction. The students 
were saved only by the World Food Programme which was able to provide 
enough food items during this period. The regional government reacted by 
cancelling all the contracts which were associated with corruption and 
committees were set up by each school or institution, composed of both 
teachers and students, to be responsible for purchasing all basic food 
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requirements for all the schools, etc. Furthermore, the regional 
government brought all the facts concerning the corruption to the 
President of the Republic and the State President, whose reaction was to 
dismiss the Minister of Finance for having misled him in this regard. 
All these incidents marked a breakdown of a trust or respect in relations 
between the regional government on one hand and the Jallaba in the 
Southern and Central Government on the other. It equally marked the 
breakdown of respect, trust and honour which seemed to have been 
maintained between 1972 to 1975. During this period both Southerners and 
Northerners were living under the amnesty laws which forbids revenge or 
punishment of crimes committed during the Civil War. And therefore, for 
nearly three years they were living in some kind of relative peace, but 
were now back to square one. 
The crisis between the members of Jallaba within the Southern region and 
the southern masses interested in commercial activities reached a hot 
point from 1977 onwards and brought into the crisis both central and 
regional government. The central government was defending the merchants 
from the Northern Sudan, while the regional government was defending the 
interests not only of the southern citizens, but its own interests 
especially when the northern merchants were failing to respect laws laid 
down by the southern region authorities. These crises may be summarized 
under the following headings: - 
1. The process of transfer of material resources from Southern Sudan by 
the Jallaba and its consequences; 
2. The marginalization of the rural population in the Southern Sudan by 
the Jallaba; 
3. The trade licenses and the quota trade system; 
4. The black markets, hoarding and the high prices; 
5. The border trade crisis; 
6. Transport and the Jallaba monopoly in the Southern Sudan. 
4.7 The Process of Transfer of Material Resources from Southern Sudan by 
the Jallaba and its Consequences 
The history of transfer of various material resources out of Southern 
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Sudan goes back to early centuries when Arab long-distance traders and, 
slave raiders penetrated the Southern Region and took slaves, ivory, 
gold, livestock and took them to Northern Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria 
and the Arabian peninsular. 62 Such processes have been documented and 
Ushari, Ahmed Mahmud has this to say about it: 
"The Jallaba (single Jallabi) were probably the first foreigners 
to penetrate the Southern Sudan from the north. They entered 
Dar Fatit in Western Bahr el Ghazal .... (through) Dar Fur 
and Kordofan several years ... (ago). The big Khartoum 
merchants came into the scene and landed their boats at Meshra 
el Rek in the early 1850's" 
and that, 
"The Jallaba were predominantly Sudanese Arabic speaking 
Moslems. Some ... were Greek, Tunisian and Syrian ... when 
the Khartoum merchants established their settlements in the 
south their numbers increased dramatically ... i. e. Jallabas 
poured themselves into the negro country annually by the 
thousands ... "63 
Those Jallaba who came on donkeys acquired slaves either by raids or 
through exchange of various foreign goods such as gold etc. for slaves. 
This process continued to the Mahade or the Khalifa's state. 
The British re-conquest of the Sudan, which was followed by the 
establishment of a colonial state in 1898, stopped slavery as an open 
market trade and sent those still interested to operate secretly. Then 
the British introduced a new kind of exploitation and appropriation which 
was equally committed to the transfer of material, while using human 
beings as cheap labour in order to exploit agricultural resources. The 
exploitation and expropriation, plus the transfer of Southern Sudan 
resources by both the British Colonial State and the Arab merchants 
continued from 1898 until 1930 when the British Colonial Authorities 
decided to expel all the Arabs and Arabized Sudanese from the southern 
provinces following the establishment of the southern policy. For 17 
years, i. e. from 1930 to 1947, all Arab merchants were forcefully sent 
out of the Southern Sudan and never allowed to return, until 1947. The 
Greek, Tunisian, Syrian, Lebanese, American and the British merchants 
took over all the trade and commercial operations for seventeen years, 
with a few Southern Sudanese shopkeepers. 
1947 marked a new development in the expropriation and the exploitation 
of Southern Sudanese resources. It marked a new penetration of thousands 
of Arab merchants who spread all over the Southern urban and rural areas 
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and began the economic and political destruction which has continued to 
this day. As a result of which the period between 1947 and 1972 resulted 
for the Southern Sudanese people in the loss of nearly a million lives 
f 
and property worth billions. 
Of course, the seventeen year Civil War, which actually started in Torit 
in 1955 and continued up to 1972, affected the Sudanese people in general 
and the Southern Sudanese in particular. For the Jallaba, it was not 
safe to trade freely again in the rural areas but limited agricultural 
products continued to be shifted to the north which included coffee, 
rice, maize, timber, skins and hides, gold, tusks, rhino horns, etc. 
Furthermore, the desertion of most towns in the south by people seeking 
refuge in the neighbouring countries, (i. e. Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia and 
Kenya), was also a big blow to the Arab merchants. The transfer of 
resources was therefore affected because exploitation was only in the 
towns, whereby commercial activities were limited to the number of 
consumers therein. 
It is important to state here that the Arab and Arabized traders or 
merchants, could not invest in industrial establishments in the Southern 
Sudan. Nor could they invest in real estate such as buildings etc. so 
whatever profits were and continue to be accumulated in the Southern 
Sudan were all transferred and invested in the areas from where the 
merchants in question came from. 
The establishment of a regional government after the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, marked a new dimension in the expansion of commercial or 
merchant capital in the Southern Sudan. The creation of a new regional 
government, in turn created more consumers and more markets for the 
merchant capital in the Southern Sudan to operate in. Table 4.2 shows 
the first Regional Government Special Development Budget for the fiscal 
year 1972/1973. The budget in question was approved for implementation 
and the aggregate amount of funds approved in these special development 
budgets was Ls. 38,362, though the actual expenditure was very much below 
expectation, as shown. 
The special budget was specifically made to serve several objectives 
which included relief rehabilitation or resettlement of the returnees and 
the revitali n renovation and re-construction projects destroyed 
during the W . 
59 urthermore, the above budget indicated several 
million Sudanese pounds spent especially in the areas of food supplies, 
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transport, medical care, housing or accommodation and clothing which were 
dominated by the Arab merchants, and which they had to received a great 
amount of cash from the southern people who were totally integrated into 
the capitalist economy. 60 F. B. Mahmond had pointed out that: 
... in the period 1976 ... the Southern regional government 
received an average of Ls. 32 million annually of the country's 
budget ... the money allocated to the South ... 
is not used 
for production but is spent mainly on the state apparatus in 
the form of salaries and buildings ... Ls. 4 million were 
spent on building houses for the regional government 
officials. "61 
TABLE 4.2: SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Budget Actual Actual Expenditure 
Year Allocation Expenditure as % of Allocation 
(Ls, 000) (Ls, 000) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
1972/73 1,400 560 40.0 
1973/74 7,300 730 10.0 
1974/75 7,100 1,150 16.2 
1975/76 7,200 1,630 22.7 
1976/77 15,300 3,610 23.6 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 38,300 7,680 20.1 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs, pro below in table 4.48ceedings of the Conference on 
Development in the Southern Region of the 
Sudan 5th and 8th April, 1983, (Juba, 1984), 
p. 17. 
In addition, there was another amount received and continued to be 
received by the regional government in Juba which was the salaries and 
wages for those personnel or employees of both regional and central 
government which continued to rise as shown by Table 4.3 below: - 
As indicated by this table, the amount of money transferred by the 
Central Government had progressively increased from approximately 4.7 
million Sudanese pounds to 13.6 million Sudanese pounds, while the amount 
meant for development might have resulted in the reproduction of wealth, 
the amount for salaries which is clearly shown above, was spent by 
individuals in purchasing essential commodities such as clothes, medical 
supplies, shoes, bedding, cooking utensils, radios, TV sets, school 
uniforms, tables, chairs and fridges (which continue to be monopolized by 
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TABLE 4.3: PERSONNEL BUDGET AND THE ACTUAL AMOUNT RECEIVED 
FROM THE SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGET (Ls. MILLION) 
-------- ------------------ 
Salaries 
--------------------- 
Development 
------- 
Total 
Years for the Budget Actually Amount 
employees Received Received 
-------- 
1972/73 
------------------ 
4.1 
--------------------- 
0.560 
------- 
4.660 
1973/74 5.2 0.730 5.930 
1974/75 6.8 1.150 7.950 
1975/76 8.0 1.630 9.630 
1976/77 10.0 3.610 13.610 
-------- 
Total 
------------------ 
34.1 
--------------------- 
7.680 
------- 
41.780 
-------- 
Source: 
--------------------------------------- 
Tabulated by author from: The Six Year 
------- 
Plan 
for Economic and Social Development of 
1977/78 - 1982/83 -Juba 
the Arab merchants). That meant millions of Sudanese pounds are received 
annually by the Arab merchants and instead of investing them in the 
Southern Sudan, most of the money received was transferred directly to 
the Northern Sudan where the whole amount was invested in various 
productive projects. The Arab merchants in most cases failed to pay 
various taxes to the regional government authorities worth thousands of 
Sudanese pounds. The failure of Arab merchants to reinvest most of their 
profits accumulated in the Southern Sudan, plus their failure to pay more 
than ten types of taxes to the regional government, has added to the 
crisis already faced by the regional government, due to the failure of 
central government to honour its commitment to speed up economic and 
social development in the south after the establishment of self- 
government in 1972. It is important to strongly stress here that the 
major single cause of shortfall in the five year economic plan, was the 
lack of financial resources, or liquidity, and the role of the Jallaba 
who deprived the regional government of funds by failing to pay taxes, 
worth millions of Sudanese pounds, to it, as well as taxes on all goods 
coming into and out of the region. They were involved in the smuggling of 
coffee, wood or timber, tea leaves, hides and skins, elephant tusks (or 
ivory), rhinoceros horn, etc. both inside the Southern Sudan and outside 
its borders. Fatima B. Mahmoud had documented that, 
"The regional disparities referred to ... were apparent even in 
capital accumulation", 
and that, 
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"A striking fact resulting from the survey (hers) was that with 
one exception, who started business in 197567none of the 
capitalists in the South was a Southerner. " 
Of course the Arab merchants had the monopoly of trade in 1972-1975, but 
because there were no Southerners involved in commercial activities who 
could be called a capitalist in accordance with Fatima's definition of a 
capitalist in Sudanese Society. As mentioned previously in this chapter, 
there were a handful of Southern Sudanese who could qualify as 
capitalists, although Mahmoud singled out the most recent one who was not 
a Dinka nor a relative of a Dinka governor. The only Southern Sudanese, a 
pharmacist in Juba, was Dr. Philip Tongun from the Bara tribe who was not 
a relative, of the regional governor. Furthermore, there are merchants 
such as Abdel Fadil Agot, a Dinka who started in the 1940's, his trade or 
business with the sale of 100 head of cattle and who was later joined by 
his relative, Lual Ayen, who was himself a merchant. In addition, there 
was Dr. Gama Hassan who established his business before the Addis Ababa 
Agreement. Dr. Cama had established a freight business for import and 
export and the transporting of goods to the Southern region, Arthur Agany 
and the Ryan family. In addition there was another Bara who had built 
half of the shops in Malakal, Juba, plus a dozen houses in Malakal. with 
Mr Nicadimo. In Wau, Mr. Aweet Aweet was a millionaire by 1975. Of 
course the Southern capitalists or merchants, because of their limited 
number, and their contacts, were insignificant compared to the thousands 
of Northern merchants who amounted to nearly 70,000 during the 
independence period. 
68 
Fatima B. Mahmoud asserted that, 
"The South (Sudan)... was a source of commercial capital 
accumulation since before Turco-Egyptian rule and especially 
during and after the British rule. Some of the leading old 
commercial capitalists ... in Khartoum and Port Sudan had 
accumulated their starting capital in the south but eventually 
transferred all of it to Khartoum and Port Sudan. None of the 
case ... transferred any of their capital from Khartoum or 
Port Sudan back to the south. " 
She went on to state that, 
"the commercial capitalists who accumulated *capital the West 
and the South were all from the North (Arabs) ... 
Here the author personally witnessed, in 1980 and 1981-2 how Northern 
merchants were carrying millions of pounds in cash in briefcases without 
resorting to the use of banks. An attempt by the regional government to 
stop the Arab merchants was met without success. The author witnessed the 
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role of the regional army leaders and national security who had 
intervened to prevent the Arab merchants from smuggling all their 
profits. Instead of travelling by civilian aircraft, which would involve 
some form of police search, those taking millions out of the South 
decided to go to the army with their money and from there a military plan 
was implemented whereby the money would be transported in boxes by a 
military officer as no one would dare search him and in that way all the 
money would be taken to the north where it would be reinvested. In this 
way and in many others, the national army and the national security 
ceased to be national in their activities and operation but became 
regional and basically Arab or northern in every sense of the word. 
Similarly, the same applies to the only two banks in the Southern region 
at the time, namely the State Bank, which had only one branch in the 
Southern region in Juba. The other bank was the Unity Bank which was the 
nationalized Barclays Bank which had been converted to a state commercial 
bank. The latter was giving business loans to Northerners only on the 
grounds that Southerners had no guarantees nor insurance. A Southern 
Sudanese Branch Manager of the Unity Bank of Malakal, was dismissed by 
his Arab seniors because he had given loans to Southern Sudanese 
businessmen and commercial farmers in Renk, on the grounds that he had 
given loans to Southerners without prior approval from Khartoum. The 
dismissed manager, Mr. Haris Morgan, told the author that he was under 
instructions to only give loans to Northern Sudanese, especially the 
Jallaba, without referring to Khartoum, a practise he considered unjust 
to Southerners. To him it was a bad law which he was happy to break. 
Finally, the transfer of material resources from Southern Sudan to 
Northern Sudan increased tremendously after the first Civil War following 
the establishment of the regional government. Table 4.4 and other tables 
below will give some evidence of the extent of exploitation and 
appropriation of resources in the Southern Sudan by Jallaba, with the 
apparent help and assistance of central government representatives in the 
Southern region, such as the army, judiciary officials and the national 
security. For example, thousands of tons of coffee, ivory, dried fish, 
simsim, groundnuts, rice, beans, maize, tobacco leaves, millet and 
sorghum were (and to some extent continue) being smuggled out of the 
Southern region with the help of the army commanders of Southern command, 
who use army trucks and transport planes, which are not subjected to any 
army search by regional police. Table 4.4, shows also the price structure 
of certain essential commodities produced in the Southern region. The 
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table indicates how profits were made by the Jallaba from the sale of 
locally produced agricultural goods and that profits were accumulated 
over a period of time and later transferred to the north for 
reinvestment. 
Table 4.5 shows how imported essential commodities were and continue to 
be sold cheaply in the Northern Sudan, while the same goods are sold at 
inflated prices in the Southern region. Commodities such as sugar, 
sorghum, rice, wheat flour, double zero. 
TABLE 4,4: THE PRICE STRUCTURE OF CERTAIN ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES 
PRODUCED IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN IN 1982 
- ----------------------- -------------- 
Producer's 
-------------- 
Jallaba's 
--------- 
Name of Commodity sale price prices same Profit 
at harvest commodity 
- --- - ----------------------- -------------- 
Ls 
---------- - 
Ls 
-------- 
Ls 
1 sack of dura 10 70 60 
1 sack of maize 20 90 70 
1 sack of millet 15 80 65 
1 sack of cassava 25 100 75 
1 sack of green beans 30 120 90 
1 sack of simsim 40 150 110 
1 sack of groundnuts 10 50 40 
1 sack of white beans 30 120 90 
1 bag of coffee 150 750 600 
1 bag of rice 30 130 100 
1 bag of yams 25 75 50 
1 kilo of sweet potatoes 1 4 3 
1 kilo of tobacco 50 120 70 
1 dozen pineapples 6 12 6 
1 dozen mangoes 3 7 4 
1 
- 
dozen oranges 
------------------------ 
6 
------------- 
12 
--------------- 
6 
-------- 
Source: Prepared by the author based on interviews with consumers and 
black market traders. Based on the ý*perience of the situation 
by the author who used 0g sometimes'r'buy from producers but 
mostly directly from the Jallaba, who buys from producers at a 
lower price. 
Cooking onions were sold at five times less than they were sold in the 
North. 
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TABLE 4.5 THE PRICES OF CERTAIN IMPORTED ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES 
IN JUBA AND KHARTOUM (1987) 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Prices in Prices in 
Name of Commodity Khartoum Juba Profit 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Ls Ls Ls 
" 50 kilo sugar bag 25 1500 1475 
50 kilo bag rice 50 800 750 
50 kilo bag of wheat flour 30 600 570 
50 kilo bag of double zero 50 
Tin of cooking oil 100 400 300 
Tea leaves 10 100 90 
Bag of cement 50 400 350 
Sack of sorghum 40 300 260 
Bag of salt 5 100 95 
Sack of beans (Haddas) 4 250 210 
Bread 1 10 9 
Biscuits 10 80 70 
Sweets 5 65 60 
Egypt fuel 
----------------------------- 
60 
------------- 
360 
---------------- 
240 
--------- 
Source: Prepared by the author based on actual prices paid in Juba and 
Khartoum, on the same commodities in 1987. 
The following list of commodities shows those commodities used as a means 
of exploiting the Southerners by the Jallaba: - 
(a) 
- Jute 
- Sunflower 
- Soya 
- Castor 
- Oil palm 
- Lulu 
- Sugar 
- Bananas 
- Meat 
- Cattle 
- Goats 
- Sheep 
- Honey 
- Cigarettes 
- Vegetables 
- Chickens 
- Eggs 
- Dried milk powder 
184 
- Salad 
- Perfume 
- Soap 
- Cream 
(b) Essential household requirements 
- Beds 
- Mattresses and pillows 
- Bed sheets 
- Dining tables, coffee tables 
- Chairs 
- Wardrobes 
- Desks 
- Cupboards 
- Cooking utensils 
- Plates and dishes, teacups & spoons 
- Kettle 
- Refrigerators 
(c) Essential family requirements 
- Men's clothes 
- Women's clothes 
- Girls dresses 
- Boys clothes 
- Men's shoes 
- Women's shoes 
- Exercise books for children 
- Books 
- Radios 
- TV and video sets 
(d) Essential Services 
- Grinding mills 
- Bakeries 
- Bars and soft drinks shops 
- Night Clubs 
- Restaurants 
- Hotels 
- Tea shops 
- Shops 
- Retail shops 
- Cinemas 
(e) Transport Services Urban and rural service 
- Taxi 
- Lorries 
- River transport 
- Planes 
- Pick up cars or rented cars or others 
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(f) Houses for rent and sale in: - 
- First class residential area 
- Second class residential area 
- Third class residential area 
- Fourth class residential area 
(g) Building materials 
- Cement 
- Corrugated iron 
- Timber 
- Bricks 
- Nails 
- Paint 
- Iron ore 
- Glass 
- Building contractors for both Government and private 
houses, house loans etc. 
(h) Contractors for the Regional Government in the following 
Institutions. 
1. Contractors for supplying food stuffs to: - 
- University of Juba students 
-5 Teacher training institutes 
-5 Institutes of education 
- 27 Senior secondary schools 
-2 Commercial senior secondary schools 
-2 Technical schools 
- 25 Intermediate schools 
- 20 Primary schools 
-4 Medical assistant schools 
-3 Nursing training centres 
- 40 Hospitals 
- 40 Prisons 
-1 Police officers' college 
-6 Police training centres 
-6 Prison warders training centres 
-3 Wild Life scouts training centres 
-1 Institute of accounting and business studies 
-1 Multi training centre (MTC) 
-4 Mayo vocational training centres 
-2 Midwives training centres 
-1 Leprosy Institute 
2. Contractors supplying shoes, clothes, etc to Regional Government 
institutions 
- 40 Prisons for prisoners 
- 2,500 Prison warders, including officers 
- 6,000 Police officers and soldiers 
- 1,500 Wild life scouts 
- 2,000 Nurses, dressers and cleaners 
- 1,000 Town conservation workers 
- 1,200 Veterinary workers 
- 400 Technical school students 
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3. Contractors supplying Regional Government Officials and Students 
with Travelling Warrants 
- 12,000 Students a year 
- 5,000 Regional civil servants 
- Transport of food stuff, clothes, shoes and others 
to their respective places. 
4. Contractors Supplying the Regional Hospitals 
- With drugs, bandages, and others worth millions of Sudanese pounds. 
The above contracts by the regional government were worth over 10 million 
Sudanese pounds annually. In 1982, the regional government was forced to 
pay 20 million Sudanese pounds to school contractors alone, otherwise the 
schools would have suffered from the lack of food supplies and others. 
Table 4.6 shows the distribution of private pharmacies throughout the 
Southern Sudan and those who own them. 
TABLE 4.6: THE NUMBER OF PHARMACIES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN AND OWNERS. 1987 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Region Jallabas Southerners Total 
Equatoria Region 617 
Bahr el Ghazal Region 336 
Upper Nile Region 437 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 13 7 20 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Prepared by the author based on research conducted in 1987. 
Finally, it is true to say here that over 80% of profits and income 
produced in the Southern Sudan has been and remains in the hands of Arab 
Jallabas and a few Southern Sudanese political, economic and military 
elites, plus a few police and prison officers who have access to the 
centres of political and economic power in the Northern Sudan. 
4.8 The Marainalization of the Rural Population in the Southern Sudan 
by the Jallaba 
The marginalization of the Sudanese masses by the bourgeois class is not 
limited to the urban population but also to the rural people. Most of the 
Sudanese population comes from the rural areas. It provides the entire 
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labour force to the agricultural sector which usually receives 30 per 
cent of the national development budget. It equally provides industry 
with considerably more than half of its labour force. Table 4.7 shows the 
population and labour force in the Sudan from 1956-83. The table also 
indicates that the rural population continues to be more than that of the 
urban area. 
TABLE 4.7: POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE IN THE SUDAN 1956-83 (. 000) 
------- 
Year/ 
-------- ------------ 
Population 
--------- ------------------- 
Labour Force 
------ 
Period 
------- -------- 
Total 
------------ 
Rural 
--------- 
Urban 
----------- 
Total 
-------- 
Rural 
------ 
Urban 
1956 10,263 9,526 737 3,213 2,982 231 
1973 14,819 12,083 2,736 4,363 3,557 805 
1983 
------- 
21,593 
-------- 
17,232 
------------ 
4,361 
--------- 
6,165 
----------- 
4,920 
-------- 
1,245 
------ 
Source: Population census and ILO, 1986. 
(a) The agricultural sector at the beginning of the ten-year plan 
contributed 57% of its gross domestic product which was estimated to be 
Ls. 357.2 million for the nation as a whole, and employed 86% of the total 
labour force. The amount invested during this time was Ls. 285 out of 
which Ls. 85.1, equivalent to 29.9% was ear-marked for agriculture. The 
Southern region received only Ls. 2,570,000 out of the amount allocated. 
Although there is a virtual absence of reliable statistical date on the 
structure of private sector production and investment intentions in 
agriculture during the period covered by the ten-year plan, the role of 
the private sector in agricultural development has always been enormous 
in the rain-fed and irrigated schemes. 
The majority of the rural population is illiterate, backward and receives 
the lowest rate of national income. The rural population especially in 
the least developed areas are the most marginalized members of the 
Sudanese society. For example, the marginalization of the indigenous 
people of Nuba Mountains after the Habila mechanized schemes were 
distributed and production took place. The same marginalization took 
place in Gadarif, where most of the Beja tribesmen remain marginalized 
both economically and politically after the Arab immigrants had been 
given the majority of the schemes by the state official of the mechanized 
department. Similarly, in the case of Southern and Northern Funj and 
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Ingesna, especially in Damazin, Kezan, Roserios, Abu Naama, etc. where 
various local and international capitalists have invested several 
millions of USA dollars in mechanized farming, which displaced the local 
population and reduced them to landlessness and cheap labour. That is to 
say, the Arab merchants and foreign investors accumulated great profits, 
while the indigenous population became poorer and had to sell their 
labour cheaply to the new landlord, who had no mercy on them. 70 
The marginalization of Southern Sudan in general and the Southern 
Sudanese in various mechanized schemes in particular, by the Arab and 
Arabized Northerners, is as old as the age of modern Sudan. Since we have 
already discussed the historical background of under-development of the 
Southern Sudan, we will limit this discussion very briefly on 
marginalization of Southern Sudanese engaged in the production of coffee, 
tea, timbers, fruits, dura, with special reference to the situation in 
Renk mechanized agricultural schemes. 
The process of marginalization in the Southern Sudan as stated earlier, 
remains a nation-wide crisis between members of the Jallaba class, and 
the marginalized people and the regional government. 
The marginalization in Western Equatoria, was equally applied to the Renk 
Schemes where several thousand Dinkas were displaced from their lands by 
force and made weak and poor. The local population in Renk are Dinkas of 
the Upper Nile region, who keep cattle as their main occupation, but they 
also cultivate during the rainy season to provide for their own needs. 71 
The land problem in Renk district came into being after the Central 
Government had created mechanized agricultural schemes in four of the 
largest villages in the district. The expansion of the said schemes in 
the area, has led to the encroachment of schemes on land traditionally 
held communally by the local population for the cultivation of their own 
food products. Many villages in the district were affected whereby the 
best lands were taken and distributed to the northern Sudanes migrant 
merchants. Most villages were surrounded on all sides by schemes and the 
land allocated to them was unsuitable for cultivation or grazing. 72 
The early opposition to any injustice in Renk was expressed through a 
petition signed by six Dinka chiefs, representing the various Dinka clans 
in the Renk district and who had been authorized to act on behalf of the 
tribe. 
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Gaihak Ngok Dau 
Dein Dongolai 
Dein Shoal 
Nuri Mahi 
Yausif Abdalla 
The complaint signed by the above, was submitted to the House of 
Representatives in Khartoum by the MP elected for Malakal and Renk in a 
motion to Parliament at 10.00 am on 11th June, 1957. Abdel Nabi Abdel 
Gadir (MP), representative of Malakal and Renk constituency made a motion 
which goes as follows: - 
"Mr Speaker, Sir, 
May I be allowed to put before the House the enclosed petition 
by Jalhak Nyok, Dein Donglay, Ajeng Dein, Dein Shoal, Noul 
Mahi and Yousif Abdalla on behalf of the Dinka tribe of Renk 
district. 
.... This petition summarizes and relates to private 
agricultural schemes ... which covered the whole area of that 
locality. These lands belong to the tribe and date back to 
the time of their ancestors. These schemes ... deprived the 
people from their rain cultivated lands and their grazing 
areas. 73 
The above quoted passage briefly indicated what suffering was created by 
the mechanized schemes introduced to Renk during post-independence period 
and this continued to marginalize the Southern tribesmen in the area 
until 1972, when the self-rule for Southern Sudan was established. 
It was only in 1978 that the issues surrounding the mechanized schemes in 
Renk came directly to the notice of the regional government. Several 
petitions and complaints were sent to the president of HEC about the 
suffering of the local people at the hands of the Arab merchants and it 
was through these complaints that the author learnt of the crisis in Renk 
district. The said petitions were analysed by the author and then they 
were forwarded to the president of the HEC on 21st July 1978.74 The 
petitions quoted all events which had taken place since the establishment 
of the rain-fed mechanized schemes in Renk since 1964, which were marked 
by repressive, and exploitative polices imposed by the authorities on the 
local tribes in the area. The authority responsible for the mechanized 
schemes in Renk was 'the Mechanized Farming Corporation' which was 
created in 1968 by the Sudan Government to replace the mechanized 
agricultural department in the central ministry of Agriculture. The MFC 
took Renk under its control and started to survey again and then made 
allocations of schemes to individuals and co-operatives which were 
interested and could meet the conditions laid down. Those schemes which 
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were distributed in early 1964 were not touched and instead some of those 
who had already undertaken schemes were given more. Table 4.8 indicates 
the early distribution of the schemes of which representatives of the 
Dinka tribesmen claimed had denied them their right to land for 
cultivation and homes. 75 
The establishment of a corporation exclusively controlled by the Arab 
orientated elements naturally ignored the Dinkas complaint and instead 
endorsed all the policies laid down and the process of under-development 
and marginalization were strengthened. 
TABLE 4.8: NO. OF SCHEMES DISTRIBUTED IN RENK IN 1964 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
No of No of Schemes No of No of No of Total 
Area feddans Distributed Private Co-op public No of 
already (size of each Schemes Schemes Schools Schools 
planned scheme is 200) 1 
---------------- 
-- fca _tl ------------------------------------- 
Goz 
Roum 50,000 25 21 22 25 
Akon 70,000 35 33 2- 35 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Mechanized Farming Corporation, Renk, 1972 and quoted by Paul 
Wani Gore in a paper delivered in Sudan Research Workshop at a 
seminar held between 3-5 July, 1984 in The Hague. 
As clearly indicated by the above table, 21 out of 25 schemes went to 
private individuals who were mostly Arab and Arabized Northern merchants. 
But the above distribution could not be implemented in 1964 due to the 
first civil war, which also prevented the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan 
from granting loans to any farmers. 76 
The implementation of Renk mechanized projects actually began during 
1969/70 when 209,000 feddgps were allocated to schemes, whereby 68.2% was 
given to individuals, 14.1% to co-operatives and 9.3%'remained with the 
public section. The remainder 8.5% was reserved for forest. Akon and Goz 
Rouen schemes were expanded enormously, and by 1971/72 the number of 
schemes reached 243,000 and ten years later in 1981/82, the number of 
schemes had reached half a million feddons (i. e. 500,000). 
In 1974 the new regional government in Juba was faced with food 
shortages, especially sorghum or dura to feed the poor returnees or 
labourers who could only afford grain and not bread. The influx of the 
returnees after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement made shortages chronic. 
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The only solution was thought to be the increase of production levels in 
Renk, the only area where mechanized dura schemes were established in the 
Southern Sudan, though this was not sufficient to meet the regional needs 
in terms of food requirements. 77 
The regional government sent a team of surveyors to find out any areas 
suitable for cultivation. It was found out that the British Colonial 
Government had already located those areas in the 1950s and they include 
Um Dilwar, Kolong, Shamadic Aboyot, Jong and Mehnt, which were found at 
that time to offer 38,500 feddons of cultivable land. The regional 
authorities therefore surveyed and distributed 448 schemes of 1,500 
feddons each, to individuals. 90.8% of these schemes, mostly from Um 
Dilwar in the North and Atham in the south were distributed to private 
persons, with only 9.2% to co-operatives. As in other schemes, the 
majority of those allocated to private persons went to the merchants, 
ministers, directors and any other constitutional holders interested in 
such schemes. These 448 schemes distributed by the regional government 
were owned and controlled by them, while those which were surveyed and 
distributed between 1969 to 1972, were under the control of the 
Mechanized Farming Corporation which has been mentioned previously. Both 
the Mechanized Farming Corporation authorities and the Jallabas who 
already operated schemes did not like the schemes implemented by the 
regional government but were unable to stop them and had to either 
complain to Khartoum or resort to sabotage in the hope that if they were 
seen to produce insufficient amounts of food products this may discourage 
others from investing in the mechanized schemes. 
Another area of disagreement between the regional government on the one 
hand and the Mechanized Farming Corporation and the Arab traders on the 
other, was the collection of various taxes by the regional government: - 
1. Direct and indirect taxes, i. e. income and pall taxes which the 
Jallabas have either paid to the Blue Nile province or never paid at 
all; 
2. Business profit taxes; 
3. Local and land rates; 
4. Excise duty on alcoholic beverages and spirits being sold by the 
Arab merchants; 
5. Taxes on essential commodities, e. g. sugar, wheat flour, etc; 
6. Royalties on forest products; 
7. Property taxes; 
192 
8. Royalties on leaf tobacco, coffee, tea, and cigarettes, etc; 
9. Taxes and rates on central local government projects in the Renk 
area, including 5% of nett profits of factories, co- operative 
societies, agricultural enterprises, etc; 
10. Taxes on agricultural projects and their shipment to other provinces 
or regions; 
11. Development taxes; 
12. Regional or provincial trade licenses; 
13. Royalties on all sorghum, and any agricultural products moved out of 
the region and the province borders. 
The above taxes were worth millions of Sudanese pounds accrued to the 
Regional Government, local councils and the province. When in 1976 the 
Regional Government took great interest in Renk, it sent Mr. Andrea 
Acijok Yak, as an inspector of local government. Mr. Yak was chosen 
because he had been an inspector for local government at Juba town for 
three years and in that time he managed to discover malpractice in the 
Southern regional capital whereby all the rate collectors were bribed by 
the Arab merchants not to ask them to pay outstanding arrears of taxes 
mentioned above. Most Northern traders had paid these for 15 years and 
it amounted to millions of Sudanese pounds. It was cheaper for the Arabs 
to bribe the rate collectors, even if this meant the whole staff of the 
regional Ministry of Finance, than to pay their arrears in full. Some of 
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the Northern traders feared that they may loose their licen$es if these 
matters were brought to the attention of the police and the regional 
government, so for over two years since the inception of the regional 
government, the Northern traders were involved in various forms of 
bribery. But with the transfer of Mr. Yak in 1975-6 to Juba Council, the 
issue regarding unpaid taxes and rents, came to light. Almost all the 
Arab traders in Juba were found to have either not paid all or most of 
their taxes as outlined above. The regional government knew that to 
collect the over ten million pounds in arrears would not be without some 
form of resistance. At first, the Northern traders said that there were 
no arrears and that taxes, rents and rates had been paid to the former 
administration, prior to the regional government taking over. The records 
left by the previous administration showed that the traders had been 
failing to pay regardless of various correspondence sent to them by the 
local government during the pre-Addis Ababa Agreement. Yet the traders 
insisted that they were being victimized by Southerners and they 
threatened to close all their shops and return to Northern Sudan. The 
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traders also sent petitions to the First Vice President, President of the 
Republic and to the Chamber of Commerce in Khartoum complaining that they 
were being politically victimized. 
The reaction from the Regional Government was to take the matter to the 
courts in Juba. The courts asked the *merchants to produce evidence that 
they had paid their taxes and those who failed to produce their receipts 
would be submitted to court. The result was incredible in that not a 
single registered Northern merchant trader in Juba was found to have paid 
all this taxes. It was from these findings that the regional government 
decided to set up a committee which would be responsible for such matters 
throughout all Southern Sudanese urban centres. By the end of 1975, it 
was found that a similar situation existed in all urban centres and the 
administrators and the courts were ordered to recover all the arrears 
due. This marked one of the greatest crises in the Southern Sudan since 
the war. It was found that thousands of Northern traders or retail 
traders had poured into all the urban centres, most of them involved in 
trade without licenses. Furthermore it was discovered that most of the 
new arrivals engaged in trade were former soldiers who had been fighting 
against the Anya-nya during the 17 year Civil War. They were rough, rude 
and corrupt. For example, in Rumbek over 60 retail traders were found in 
Suk al Shamish in the open markets where shade is made by erecting a few 
sacks or tents which have to be removed after 5.30pm when all the shops 
closed and brought back the following day. Most of the people working 
there did not have licenses nor pay taxes or rates. It was organized 
looting, corruption and all kinds of crimes. These retailers were also 
found at a number of different areas, or villages, selling all kinds of 
goods at black market prices to innocent villagers who were not used to 
such kinds of contact before. The retail traders were found to use the 
barter system, i. e. exchanging for example two metres of cotton cloth for 
a tin of grain or simsim, a piece of soap for a kilo of groundnuts, etc. 
It really was cheating on a grand scale. 
Similar conditions were found in Renk, Malut, Rebek and other surrounding 
villages. All commercial activities, including agricultural production, 
were controlled by the Arab merchants. For example, in 1975/76 before Mr. 
Yak went there, the Arabs controlled the Mechanized Farming Corporation 
and had allotted 254 schemes whereby indigenous people were given 22.8% 
of the schemes, i. e. 58, while the Jallabas were given 64.6% of the 
schemes. 78 The Dinkas who were allotted the 58 schemes mentioned were 
either forced to sell to the Arabs (though illegally), or have their 
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schemes confiscated by the MFC authority for failure to pay various taxes 
and land royalties. The Dinkas not only lost their lands, but their 
cattle too which resulted in absolute marginalization. The Dinkas were 
asked to apply for schemes and had to pay ten Sudanese pounds (Ls10), 
plus Ls. 100 if their application was successful. On top of this, 10pt per 
feddan was imposed, this was later raised to Ls. 1 per feddan in the 
1980's. 
In addition, the owner of a scheme had to raise an initial capital of 
Ls. 500 or they had to get a loan from the bank or merchants to meet the 
initial capital. It was the failure of the land tax which amounted to 
Ls. 1,500 i. e. Ls. 1 per feddan which prompted the MFC to confiscate all 
the lands from those Dinka farms who failed to pay their land taxes. 
The Dinkas lost their cattle because they had to sell most of them in 
order to pay both the co-operative membership fees and land taxes as 
well. 79 Paul Wani Gore had observed the processes of marginalization of 
the Dinkas in Renk when he wrote the following: - 
"Although the sale of schemes is illegal, since it is leased by 
the government to individuals for 25 years, many Dinka who 
owned schemes sold to the Jallaba. Many of them could not 
continue paying the annual land tax ... without selling their 
cattle. With a cost of between Ls. 300 - Ls. 400 per year for a 
lease of a scheme to the Jallaba a Dinka with 500 feddons had 
to find an extra Ls. 100 - Ls. 200 per year to pay the land tax 
of Ls. 500. Many Dinka lost their cattle in the process of 
struggling to maintain their schemes in their ownership. "80 
This passage clearly shows the situation which was found in Renk by Mr. 
Yak in 1978 when he took over as inspector of local government. Mr. Yak 
found similar discrepancies with taxes as mentioned previously, and when 
he attempted to convince the Arab traders to pay all the areas of various 
taxes, royalties or land rates, without resorting to the courts, he was 
met with strong resistance. The first thing that shocked him was the 
monopoly by the Arab merchants of everything in the district, i. e. from 
commercial operations, political organs, judiciary, army, agricultural 
farms, etc. The only area not dominated was local government and the 
police. Mr. Yak, armed with administrative power, called the police, the 
resident magistrate, the army officers, prison warders and the officials 
of various state agencies, including health and wild life, the Sudan Bank 
and the Mechanized Farming Corporation to attend a meeting where he 
explained his policies as directed by the regional government. The main 
issues on the agenda included various taxes and arrears which had not 
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been paid for a considerable time. Mr. Yak issued orders to all traders 
and agricultural traders to pay their taxes and arrears promptly. Those 
that failed to pay would be seriously punished, i. e. their shops would be 
closed. After several weeks of waiting for the Jallaba to pay, the 
inspector of local government ordered the closure of 30 shops out of 35 
though the remaining five shops closed as well in solidarity with the 
other merchants. This marked the beginning of a serious crisis between 
the regional government and the inspector of local government on one 
side and the merchants and their supporters, on the other. The Jallabas, 
instead of paying their arrears and taxes, sent a delegation to the 
President of the Republic complaining that anti-Arab, or anti-Northerner 
elements had been brought to Renk district in order to victimize them and 
confiscate their wealth, property and their shops and that schemes had 
already been confiscated. The President of the Republic instructed his 
First Vice President to intervene in any way to prevent the victimization 
of the Northern traders in the Southern Sudan, especially in Renk and 
Malut areas. The First Vice President of the Republic flew directly to 
Renk in a military helicopter, without any reference to the Second Vice 
President of the Republic or the President of HEC in Southern Sudan, or 
to the Commissioner of Upper Nile province under which Renk district 
falls, picked up the inspector of local government, a junior regional 
government employee, and took him to Khartoum more than seven hundred 
(700) miles away. The masses from Renk opposed this un-constitutional 
action by the First Vice President, as did the regional government, 
including the Commissioner of Upper Nile province. The local population 
wrote two petitions, one to the Vice President of the Republic and the 
President of HEC and the other to the President of the Republic outlining 
what had happened. 
The regional government protested to the President about the actions of 
his First Vice President which developed into a crisis which developed 
into another civil war. The regional government issued decrees upgrading 
the Renk office to a Group I Super Scheme, with sufficient power 
delegated to them. In addition, a regional committee was formed to 
investigate, study and enforce some regulations to be followed by all 
traders. The committee, after completing their investigation, ordered the 
people of the area not to take the law into their own hands. The second 
command was that no trader or farmer was permitted to transport their 
grain to any province or region without permission from the said 
committee. 
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Although Mr. Yak was forced out of Renk, he was able to recover more than 
five million Sudanese pounds from the merchants and over 600 schemes out 
of 1,500 feddons were confiscated and redistributed to Southern Sudanese 
people who were able to pay land taxes and application fees. Therefore, a 
minimum control over schemes and transport or transfer of dura produced 
in Renk was introduced. But the war between the Southern Sudanese and the 
regional government against the Northern Sudanese, bank authorities and 
the central government precipitated the National Assembly in 1980 to pass 
a Bill annexing Renk, Bentiu, Malut, Afrote, Nahar and other agricultural 
areas at Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile regions. This worsened 
the political conflicts between the Northern Sudan and Southern region, 
which had started to grow again. 
It is important to mention here that the differences between the Jallaba 
class, especially those in Renk and the regional government of the Dinkas 
of Kerk, had played a great contribution towards the current political 
crisis facing the country. For the Jallaba who remain committed to make 
profit, even illegally, blamed others when caught committing crimes and 
brought before the law. The terms anti-Arabs, anti-Islam, anti-Northern 
and anti-national unity are the most popular paradigms among the Arab 
merchants and their supporters, and they are used as scapegoats to 
explain various corrupt and illegal practices, which include the black 
market, inflated prices, hoarding, and smuggling of a number of local 
products in order to avoid paying various taxes. Bribery, blackmail and 
threat of death are among the means used for maintaining the status quo 
for the political and economic hegemony of the Jallaba dominant ruling 
classes. 
The agricultural bank in Renk remains another means for marginalizing the 
indigenous tribesmen of Renk district. The main function of the bank, as 
stated in its policy, is to assist farmers financially to cover 
production cost. It gives two kinds of loans to farmers, (a) long-term 
loans, repayable in 3 to 4 years and (b) seasonal or short-term loans, 
repayable in 18 months. The conditions of receiving this type of (a) 
loan was that: 81 
(i) the farmer must, of course, own a scheme, 
(ii) the farmer must own assets such as a house to be mortgaged, or have 
documentation indicating that he would be able financially to pay 
back the loans in the stipulated time, 
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(iii) at least 85% of the scheme should have been cleared, 
(iv) an engineer must certify the conditions of the assets and their 
cost. A representative of the bank visited the scheme to ascertain 
its condition. The loan itself is 70% of the total cost of the assets 
that have been mortgaged. 
Seasonal loans are given at the beginning of the cultivation season for 
(a) purchase of oil, gasoline and spare parts, 
(b) weeding as Ls. per feddan as assessed by an agricultural expert, 
(c) harvest, according to the assessed productivity per feddan, 
(d) empty sacks at Ls. 1.50 per sack in 1984, and 
(e) for collecting the produce and transport. 
Other conditions include, 
(a) That the applicant be Sudanese, certified by nationality card; 
(b) That the applicant must present an endorsed financial capability 
certificate of savings (so many thousands), from any commercial bank; 
(c) Citizenship certificate specifying from which province he/she is; 
(d) Specification of type of scheme applied for, co-operative, crop- 
sharing (company) or a private scheme; 
(e) Previous occupation. 
it is clear from these requirements, that the indigenous citizen of Renk, 
or anywhere in the Sudan, was a victim of the state machinery in 
organized and legalized theft. The state makes laws or conditions which 
favour the rich and the powerful politicians, army, police and prison 
officers, senior state officials and their relatives. The laws or 
conditions laid down by the state controlled MFC eliminates the peasants 
or the illiterate small farmers and the local co-operatives from 
receiving both land and loans. Furthermore, one condition from the bank 
which stamps out the possibility of any loans being given to the local 
population is that small farmers should not be given loans of any type 
(i. e. long or short-term loans), because they are not settled in one 
permanent place and could not fulfil many if not all of the requirements 
mentioned above. The same applied to the local co-operatives which the 
bank authorities considered as unstable, poorly organized and poorly 
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managed making them unviable recipients of bank loans. 82 
The bank also had refused to give loans to all the schemes distributed by 
the regional development scheme committee on the grounds that "their 
schemes do not fulfil the strict conditions of allocations or those of 
the MFC. "83 So all the small farmers in the area, whether they are 
recipients of the MFC land distribution or regional government's 
distribution list were unable to receive any loans. All attempts by their 
trade union to complain to the President of the Republic and the 
regional government could not produce any fruitful outcome. Table 4.9 
shows the amount of loans offered to the large farmers in Renk in the 
1982/83 season. It is important to point out that over 90% of the larger 
farmers remain Arab merchants, composed of former ministers and current 
ministers, army, police and prison officers and also former and current 
senior government officials. These loans are compared with those of 
previous years. 
TABLE 4.9: SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM LOANS GIVEN TO FARMERS IN RENK 1982/83 
--------------------------- 
Loans due at 
beginning of the 
Type year 
of --------------------- 
Loan original cost 
and interest 
--------------------------- 
Ls. Ls. 
------------------------------- 
Loans due Total loans 
during season due during 
the year 
------------------------------- 
original/cost original/cost 
------------------------------- 
Ls. Ls. Ls. Ls. 
Short-term 547564 10538 1476426 162687 2023990 173225 
Medium 726508 25551 38350 70405 764858 95957 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 1274072 36089 155776 233092 278884 269181 
Source: Agricultural Bank of the Sudan, Renk, 1983 - quoted 
by Paul Wani, Sudan Research Workshop, Institute of 
Social Studies, the Hague, Netherlands, 1984. 
According to the leaders of the farmers trade union, who were interviewed 
by the author, none of their members has ever received any loan from the 
agricultural bank of Renk in spite of their complaints to various 
authorities, both central and regional governments until now. Mr. Enoch 
Marial Rong, the Secretary General of Southern Sudanese based farmers 
union told the authority that he and all indigenous citizens who were 
allocated large schemes, i. e. 5,100 feddan or more, were denied loans 
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from the Agricultural Bank because the Arab controlled MFC, said the 
schemes were not surveyed by them and that if the Southern farmers want 
to get loans they have to give half of the 1,500 feddans allotted to 
them. Mr. Rong confirmed that he was among the farmers who had accepted 
that condition and gave up 750 feddons but that he had not been given any 
loan up to the time of our interview. He further pointed out that the 
newly elected government in Khartoum had failed to solve their problems 
especially in the re-distribution of agricultural schemes and bank 
loans. 84 
This injustice was confirmed by the representative of Renk territorial 
seat in the constituent assembly when the author interviewed him in 
Khartoum on October 10th 1987. Mr. El Rafayi Ahmed Dugshim, a member of 
the Umma Party, the ruling party, was not an indigenous citizen of Renk 
but one of the five rich Northern merchants and had his permanent homes 
in Khartoum and Kosti and nothing concrete in Renk. Because he controls 
Northern Sudan in the Renk area, he was able to blackmail the indigenous 
citizens who have been reduced to destitutes and labourers on Arab farms. 
One member of the executive of the local farmers union, who himself had 
to join the National Islamic Front, with a hope of winning against the 
Umma and DUP whose members continue to control the agricultural 
production and trade in the Renk area. Mr. Renk Kadur Baidit, who was 
third in the results, told the author how his family's land was bought 
and they were forced out by the Arab merchants, and reduced to labouring 
jobs, which were not well paid, to meet their daily expenses. So in Renk, 
the bulk of labourers continue to be Dinkas who are indigenous to the 
area, followed by seasonal labourers from the Hilluk tribes and the 
smallest group, the Western Sudanese, sometimes known as Fellata. Paul 
Wani pointed out that as more schemes were established, more labour was 
required as a result of which many people came to Renk in 1981 to work on 
the schemes. 85 
At the time of the new civil war which began in 1983, a great number of 
indigenous Dinkas have been made landless, poor and destitute in the Renk 
area, while at the same time, several new Southern Sudanese merchants and 
the old Arab merchants, have become very rich. Most of the peasants 
became reserved labour and this has led to bitter feelings among the 
Dinkas in Renk, Malut and other areas where agricultural production was 
taken over by the Arabs by using the mechanized authorities. This 
resulted in Dinkas responding by attacking Arab settlements in Maban, 
Goz, Rom and Um Delmunt areas killing ten Arab merchants in 1983. 
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Similarly, 13 Arab farmers or commercial farmers were killed in Amath 
Rice Scheme where the local population had been cheated of land. 
4.9. The Trade Licences and Quota System 
One of the main causes of conflict was the demand for equal participation 
in commercial activities by those in Southern Sudan who did not only have 
profound interests, but had the capital to invest in commercial 
establishments. For example, the Dinkas especially those of Atout 
section, had started a long distance trade in livestock, mainly cattle, 
and some of them were able to accumulate several thousand Sudanese pounds 
early in the 1960's but were not able to obtain trade licenses. The exact 
date of the origin of the long-distance livestock trade popularly 
described as 'Bariya' is not known. What is well known is that following 
political independence in 1956, there arose a demand for meat in the 
urban areas throughout the Southern Sudan. To satisfy such demands those 
tribes with cattle as their assets had the responsibility to supply not 
only meat, but milk as well although it was not quite sufficient. It was 
apparent that none of the districts or provinces in the Southern Sudan 
had a sufficient number of cattle. Equatoria province and Western Bahr el 
Ghazal were and unfortunately remain the only areas without sufficient 
numbers of livestock and even fish for various natural reasons beyond the 
power of the people of these two regions. 
It was probably the enormous demand for meat in Equatoria that prompted 
the long distance Dinka cattle traders to travel first from Yirol on foot 
with cattle to Maridi, Yambio, Tumbara and down to remote villages in the 
area. The same long distance cattle traders were also supplying the towns 
of Yei, Juba, Yirol, Rumbek, Tonj, Raga and Wau. They had to walk from 
Yirol to Awial, Gorgial and down the country, more than 700 miles on 
foot, looking for livestock, especially cattle, and then take it to 
Equatoria and other areas, also on foot. They were not able to engage in 
the butchery section of the trade due to the fact that they were not 
granted licenses by the local government inspectors who were Northern 
Sudanese. In consequence, the butchers were all Northern Sudanese during 
the post-independence period. Those members of the long distance cattle 
trade who wanted to diversify their commercial activities into the 
setting up of retails shops in various urban centres were not granted 
licenses. Those who insisted on diversifying, had to move into remote 
rural areas and could expand due to the types of goods and limited 
knowledge of trade in these villages but they had to die a natural death 
201 
during the 17th civil war. 
Things changed greatly with the establishment of the regional government 
under the central Southern Sudanese national group. In 1975, almost the 
whole cattle trade throughout the Southern Sudan was completely 
controlled by Southern Sudanese. Licenses were issued for all those 
involved in commercial operations in any field. 
The establishment of commercial, industrial, agricultural, housing and 
hire purchase car loans for commercial purposes by the regional 
government in 1976, were fundamental in the emergence of the Southern 
Sudanese merchant capitalist class, capable of running the entire local 
commercial operations in the southern region if given the chance. The 
emergence of a Southern Sudanese merchant class, whatever its size, was 
affecting the Arab Jallabas who had been enjoying an absolute monopoly in 
both the commercial and industrial field, since political independence 
thirty-three years ago. It equally marked the collapse of the hegemony of 
the Arab merchant capitalist over the Southern Sudanese petty capitalist 
traders. 
The issuing of more trade licenses to Southerners was to result in the 
creation of more local merchant capitalists in the Southern region, and 
the creation of a quota system of trade and the distribution of those 
goods mostly to Southern traders in order to circulate them to the 
consumers. 
The reaction of the Northern merchants to the distribution of licenses to 
the Southerners was negative. They went directly to the President of the 
Republic and claimed that they were being discriminated against by anti- 
national unity and anti-Arab elements among Southerners in the regional 
government. They pointed out that licenses had been given to people who 
had no capital or technical know-how or experience in the trade. 86 
The President vigorously intervened on behalf of the merchants but 
without much success. This added to the conflicts already in existence 
between the regional government and the central government over the 
failure of central government to annually release sufficient development 
funds. 
The consequences of the failure by Central Government to meet its 
financial obligations towards the Southern Region resulted in the failure 
of regional government to effect social and economic changes. There was 
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failure of Central Government and regional government to pay monthly 
salaries in time, and in some cases the delay was six months, forcing 
more than two thirds of regional government employees (especially low 
paid workers), to resort to the Northern merchants for essential 
commodities. They were always ready to provide these services, essential 
commodities, clothes, etc. on credit, charging black market prices on all 
items. These loans were used by the Jallabas as a new basis for 
exploitation by forcing the customer to authorize the merchant in 
question to receive his monthly salary directly from the pay-sheet and to 
give the balance (if any), back to the customer concerned. Most customers 
were forced to live in chains under the tyrannical authority of the 
Jallaba or merchants. For, in most cases, especially among the low income 
groups, their customers were not able to see their salaries for quite a 
long time, and some never recovered it at all. In spite of all attempts 
to free themselves from the Arab merchants and their loans. 
The regional government's strategy for solving the problems created by 
the Jallaba class in the Southern Sudan included giving large numbers of 
commercial licenses to many Southerners as explained previously, and the 
use of the "quota" system of trade, as a means of breaking down the 
monopoly and the hegemony the Arab sectarian merchants had not only over 
the commercial establishments and markets in the Southern Sudan, but 
throughout the whole country. 
The "quota" system of trade refers here to a process through which the 
state controls the distribution and prices of various essential 
commodities, in a given market. It therefore involves the division of 
specific commodities, say 100,000 bags of sugar produced by Guneid sugar 
factory which had to be shared or divided into five parts, each part 
containing 20,000 bags of sugar which would be distributed to various 
regions, with each region receiving only a part or a "quota" as explained 
above? Therefore a "quota" system of trade is a process by which a state 
allocates an equal portion out of the whole quantity produced, to each 
region. Here the state directly intervenes not only in controlling the 
distribution of various limited commodities, but in controlling the 
prices which will be paid for the goods. The system was first applied in 
the Southern Region in 1976 with approval from Central Government. The 
principle behind the notion "quota" as explained by both regional and 
central government was and (and still is), to destroy the black markets, 
stop the hoarding of goods and to control prices of essential commodities 
which are always in great demand. The most important commodities which 
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fall within the "quota" system include sugar, wheat flour, both wholemeal 
and double zero, sorghum, cooking oil, rice, petrol, and diesel. Cement 
for building purposes was also distributed to various regions in terms of 
"quotas". 
The system of "quota" was adopted by central government in 1977 when the 
President of the Republic publicly condemned the merchants for supporting 
the defunct sectarian political forces. The merchants were accused of 
sabotage, not only of open markets but also of the national economy. Of 
course, the hoarding of goods, the black markets, the shortages of 
commodities and uncontrolled high prices were always a sign of a weak 
government and the governments had to deal with them more harshly in 
order to stop them. 
The formation of co-operative societies throughout the country was 
precipitated by the above problems. After their formation, the state took 
over the distribution of all essential commodities throughout the 
country. The country was then divided into regions or zones and each 
region was (and still is) given a "quota" of the existing quantity of 
that particular commodity. The "quotas" for Western, Eastern, Northern, 
Central and Khartoum regions were given to the commissioners of the 
provinces before regionalization was adopted in the Northern Sudan. While 
the quota for the Southern region was divided into very small parts, in 
order to supply, provincial, district and regional headquarters. Even all 
these arrangements failed to stamp out black marketing, shortages of 
various essential commodities, high prices etc. The three main reason for 
the failure of the regional government and the masses at large to control 
the corruption within commercial activities have been found by this study 
to be; 
Firstly, the Northern Sudanese finding it very difficult to maintain its 
monopoly over the commercial activities in most of the Southern 
Sudanese towns and villages, organized themselves not as a trade 
union but as a racial and an ethnic political group. Their first task 
was to mobilize all Northern Sudanese within their localities, as 
strong supporters and this continues to include officers and soldiers 
from the national army stationed in various urban centres throughout 
the Southern Sudan, and all Northern Sudanese working in the national 
banks, (i. e. branches of Sudan Bank and Unity Bank, whose leaders 
have always been Northern Sudanese), Northern Sudanese in the post 
office, among the Northern judges in the Southern towns. The most 
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important group was the national security with branches in various 
towns in the Southern Sudan which was like all the so-called national 
institutions and was not only dominated but also led by the Arab and 
Arabized national group. All were organized in the name of Islam, 
Arabism, national unity and their common interest which they said 
should protect all throughout the Southern Sudan by all means. The 
members of the Jallaba class went around preaching in their Islamic 
mosques saying that the Northern Sudanese are being mistreated by the 
regional authorities, including the police, local court and various 
groups who are anti-Arab, Islam and national unity. This created a 
general feeling of distrust and the old south-north conflict surfaced 
again. Those from the army, judiciary, banks and national security, 
who were convinced who were convinced of this not only misinformed 
the Central Government and Northern politicians about insecurity and 
anti-national unity build-up or activities in the Southern Sudan, but 
actively supported the corrupt merchants without finding concrete 
evidence in support of the claims in question. For example, there are 
several cases in each urban or rural centre where Northern traders 
had been caught in various illegal activities and when caught and 
arrested by the local police, who had sufficient evidence against the 
accused, all the national merchants would close their shops, 
restaurant and tea shops within every commercial or administrative 
centre. The judges, and especially the members of national security, ' 
would assume supreme power, even over the regional government, 
including the president of the HEC. 87 The national security in the 
Southern region were not answerable to the president of the HEC who 
was the chairman of the security (both national and regional) 
committee, with the director of national security branch office in 
Juba, the commanding officer for the entire national army in the 
Southern Sudan and others as members. Yet both officers by-pass the 
president of HEC and communicate directly with the President or First 
Vice President of the Republic, was the overall chairman of national 
security in the contrary, at least in theory. 88 Furthermore, the 
army/used its position and its planes to transport various goods on 
behalf of the Arab merchants, which would directly go into the black 
markets. The role of military corporation, a commercial enterprise 
running various army co-operative shops throughout the country, 
became extremely important in the scenario of crime. While normal 
markets were facing acute shortages of various goods, the black 
markets were able to supply all goods and this forced everyone, 
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including members of the regional government, to accept the black 
market as a powerful force that must be fought at all cost. 
Secondly, the petty bourgeoisie class in the Southern Sudan which had 
emerged during this time, was also involved in the black market, 
trying to accumulate and make as much profit as quickly as possible, 
and in turn became allies in a small way to the Northern traders. 
Together they began a new dimension in the process of exploitation 
and expropriation of the Southern Sudanese masses. 
Thirdly, the merchants who became the most pressing enemies of the may 
Regime in the Sudan had support from the banned sectarian political 
parties who were opposed not only to Nimiere's rule but to the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. They pumped smuggled goods through Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Zaire, etc. to corrupt and defeat government policies, especially 
consumer markets. As we shall see in the next sub-section, the 
struggle between the merchant class, which favours the existence of 
black markets, hoarding and inflated high prices, not only against 
the regional government but central government as well and the 
majority of Sudanese people, continued to have enormous power. 89 This 
brings us to another important issue between the regional government 
and Southern Sudanese against central government and the Arab 
traders. 
4.10 The Black Markets, Hoarding and High Prices 
The shortages of essential commodities and the high prices in Juba, then 
the capital of the Southern region of the Sudan, was one of the major 
crises which faced the newly established regional government right from 
the time of its birth. After ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement on 
3rd march 1973, several hundred thousand Southern Sudanese refugees 
poured into the region from the neighbouring countries and from the bush 
seeking rehabilitation, shelter, clothing, food, medical care, education, 
work and security. The interim transitional government which was 
established in April 1972 was busy managing the situation. Several relief 
stations were set up to receive the returnees in each province, district, 
etc. These thousands of returnees had to be given temporary 
accommodation, food, clothes, medical care, transport to various villages 
or towns. The provision of all these services cost millions of Sudanese 
pounds. With little money given to these returnees, they went to markets 
with limited goods on sale and because of the sheer numbers involved, in 
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some areas all the available commodities in the local markets were 
finished. As the shortage of goods in the market place was so acute, the 
merchants were influenced by the market mechanisms to raise their prices 
according to the law of supply and demand; i. e. if the demand is high 
while the supply is low, the price will rise, or if the demand is low and 
supply is high, then the price falls. So it was apparently natural that 
prices had to increase throughout the Southern region following the 
tremendous increase of the population in most of the urban centres at 
that time. The extent of the increase in prices and the disappearance of 
almost all goods from the markets or shops was one of grave concern not 
only to the new regional authorities, but to the communities in those 
towns at large. Roughly, this was the background to the emergence of 
black markets, hoarding of various goods and money, and the 
uncontrollable high prices, which have come to characterize the 
commercial activities not only in the Southern Sudan but in the whole 
country hitherto. The situation in the Southern Sudan was exacerbated by 
two related issues, firstly the political relationship between the 
returnees and other Southerners on one side and the Arab merchants who 
had the monopoly of trade throughout the Southern Sudan on the other. For 
Southerners there was still hope that things would improve as they placed 
their trust in the government which had brought peace to the area. While 
the merchants who remain supporters of the sectarian political parties 
had been deposed by the government of Nimieri were against the peace 
which brought power to their enemies in the Sudan. In such a situation 
there was bound to be not only mistrust, but apparent dislike between 
both groups. Secondly, the merchants were engaged in capital accumulation 
by any means. It was therefore assumed natural by the merchants to 
increase prices whenever and wherever demand exceeded supply. Although 
this statement may appear simplistic vet it shows and explains the actual 
behaviour of the Jallabas in the Southern Sudan before the Addis Ababa 
Agreement and during Abboud's period as well as during civilian rule. 
An attempt by the regional government to convince members of the Jallaba 
class to stop black marketeering, hoarding of goods and raising of prices 
without state permission and bribery were fruitless, and instead 
continued more openly than before. When those involved were arrested the 
entire merchant community decided to show support for the criminal by 
closing down all their shops in protest. If their members were not 
released then they would march to the army nearby, which was (and still 
is) dominated by the Arab national group and would claim that they were 
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being accused by anti-Northern Sudanese or separatist elements in the 
government. In some cases, the senior military commanders would contact 
the leaders of national security, also under the control of Arab 
elements, and both groups would then contact the regional authorities 
concerned in order to find a solution. In Juba in 1980, when the regional 
army commander, Major General Idris El Banna took his gun and led his 
army to the police station and freed five Northern traders who were 
arrested by the local police because they were involved in a crime and 
had evidence against them. These Jallaba were taken from their cells at 
gun point and put on a military 'plane and sent to Khartoum, regardless 
of the stand of the regional government. But in most cases, the Jallaba 
would go on strike and send a delegation to the President of the 
Republic, dictator Field Marshal Nimiere who would always take the law 
into his hands and order the regional authorities to cancel any charges 
against those Northern traders arrested. As a result the regional 
government was forced to authorize the Regional Development Corporation 
(RDC) and the Equatoria Trading Corporation to take over the shipment of 
all essential commodities from the Northern Sudan and their distribution 
directly through co-operatives societies, where possible, which the 
regional government had been encouraging at that time. Although this 
arrangement was not very successful, it was far better than the Arab 
monopoly in the market. On top of that the regional government was able 
to give various loans for those Southern Sudanese who were interested in 
commercial operations. Hire purchase lorries were also given to several 
Southerners in order to break the Arab monopoly in the Southern Sudan. 
The bringing into business of RDC and ETC and the co-operative societies 
brings us to the next topic, the "quota" system of distribution of 
essential commodities which had continued throughout the Sudan as a 
whole. 
The fact that the black markets, hoarding and high prices were 
destructive not only in the Southern Sudan but in the whole country, made 
the Central Government and public in the other regions condemn and reject 
the activities of black marketeers. It was from such experience that the 
quota system of distribution of essential commodities was adopted and 
applied throughout the country. Nimiere then president, condemned both 
the black marketeers and hoarders and those who were arrested in the 
north were punished while at the same time refusing to punish those 
criminals in the south. 90 Table 4.10 below shows the existing black 
market prices in the Sudan, published on 30th June 1989 in Khartoum. 
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It is quite clear from Table 4.10 and also from various statements by the 
government in power against the Jallaba, that their activities were and 
remain detrimental to the Sudanese community. The new military rulers in 
the Sudan have recently issued a decree to prevent the merchants from 
hoarding or selling goods at black market prices because such practices 
were destructive to the economy of the region. 
TABLE 4.10: BLACK MARKET PRICES AS ON 30TH JUNE 198991 
-------------------- 
Type of Goods 
--------------- 
------------------ 
Official Prices 
------------------ 
---------------- 
Black Market 
---------------- 
------ 
Prices 
------ ----- 
Ls. Ls. 
Ox meat 20.00 30.40 pt 
Lamb 24.00 40.00 pt 
Gallon of petrol 10.00 30.50 pt 
Milk powder 
from Ls. 8 to 22.05 32.00 pt 
Tin of tomato paste 2.25 3.75 pt 
Local cigarettes 8.25 15.00 pt 
Washing soap 1.00 3.00 pt 
Kilo of sugar 1.50 8.00 
Bread 0.15 0.50 pt 
Mango 
-------------------- 
0.10 
------------------- 
0.30 
--------------- 
pt 
------- 
Source: Prepared and translated by the author from the Arabic text - 
"Journal at Dastua" published in London. 
4.11 The Border Trade Crisis 
The Addis Ababa Agreement, "Appendix B. Draft Ordinance" on items of 
'revenue and grants in aid' for the Southern region states in no. 10 that 
the regional government will issue trade licenses without specification 
whether it will include both foreign and internal trade operations. In 
1975, Central Government consent to the regional government request to 
manage foreign trade along the borders with neighbouring east and central 
African countries, which include Kenya, Uganda, Zaire and the Central 
African Republic. The Central Government made a resolution, no. 1950, 
establishing powers and rights for the regional authorities in Juba to 
issued licenses as provided for, under the Southern Region Self-Rule Act 
of 1972.92 
This resolution, no. 1950, marked the first official participation of the 
Southern Sudanese in the state organized foreign trade. For more than 
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thirty years, foreign trade both imports and exports have been 
exclusively controlled by the Arab merchants throughout the country. The 
absence of statistical data on what has been exported from the Southern 
Sudan has made it very difficult to make estimates of cattle, sheep, 
goats, ivory, rhino horns, hides and skins, tons of groundnuts, dura, 
simsim, oil seed, timber, dried fish and meat, coffee, iron ore and gold 
which have been subjected to the (Arab) Jallaba exploitation and 
smuggling. Table 4.11 shows the total livestock population in the Sudan 
1980/81. The total livestock for the Southern Sudan at that time is 
given as 7 million cattle out of a total of 25.6 million cattle for the 
whole country, 3.6 million sheep out of a national total of 18.1 million 
sheep and 2.4 million goats out of 13.3 for the whole country. That 
number for the southern region is definitely not the correct one, for the 
livestock owners in the south have a policy of not telling the government 
or any stranger, the correct number of herds their family may have. It is 
not possible to also know how many cattle, sheep and goats might have 
been exported int he Southern Sudan. 
TABLE 4.11: LIVESTOCK POPULATION IN SUDAN 1980/1981 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Area cattle sheep goats Total 
per million per million per million 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Southern Sudan 7.0 3.6 2.4 13 
Whole of Sudan 25.6 18.1 13.3 57 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Department of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture 
current agricultural statistics 1980/1981. 
Similarly, Southern Sudan has been contributing to any export on 
agricultural products already mentioned above. Table 4.12 shows the 
estimated production of main arable crops in the Sudan (in , 000 metric 
tons). But because of the lack of statistical data on Southern Sudan's 
share in export, it becomes difficult to show exactly. Equally difficult, 
if not impossible, is the assessment of imports into South Sudan by 
Jallaba who control this sector as well. 
The table shows that the South still lags behind in terms of development 
of the agricultural sector. The production of crops in the Southern Sudan 
is shown to be less compared to other regions in the West, Central, East 
and Northern Sudan. 
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Table 4.13 shows the percentage shares of the principle exports and total 
exports (1975-85). 
In 1975, the organization and the management of foreign trade in the 
Southern Sudan was given to the regional government. The Department of 
Foreign Trade in the Regional Ministry of Commerce and Supply was given 
the task of issuing licenses and in the first year 20 such licenses were 
issued to the Arab merchants and two to Southerners. Central Government 
allocated three million USA dollars for Foreign Trade in the region which 
was less than 2 percent of the total national foreign currency allocation 
for this sector which amounted to 20 million USA dollars in 1975. The 
regional government set up purchase officers in Kenya and Zaire to 
monitor imports and exports in the Southern Sudan. The purchase officers 
were also responsible for clearing various goods coming into Southern 
Sudan, including cars, etc. 
TABLE 4.12 ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAIN ARABLE CROPS (IN , 000 METRIC 
TONS) SUDAN 
-------- 
Crop of 
- 
---------- 
Region 
---------- 
----------- 
1980/81 
----------- 
----------- 
1981/82 
----------- 
---------- 
1983/84 
---------- 
----------- 
1984/85 
--------- ------- 
Cotton : South 50 90 110 
-- 
30 
Sudan 286 474 629 649 
Dura : South 262 323 210 134 
Sudan 2,068 3,272 1,806 1,100 
Millet : South 14 18 11 11 
Sudan 491 509 314 168 
Groundnut : South 55 60 45 40 
Sudan 172 838 413 386 
Simsim : South 29 27 20 20 
-------- 
North 
----------- 
221 
---------- 
242 
----------- 
206 
---------- 
133 
----------- 
Source: Prepared by the author from existing information from the 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Annual Report, 1984/5. 
The regional government in 1978 decided to direct imports and exports to 
neighbouring countries, especially Kenya and Uganda. Mombasa became the 
chief avenue through which the Southern Sudan was to have commercial 
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activities with the outside world. The regional government started to 
construct roads and bridges linking the region with Uganda, Kenya, Zaire 
and Central African Republic. There was a plan to extend the railway line 
from Wau to Juba, then the regional capital and from there to Uganda. 
By 1978, the purchase offices in Nairobi and Mombasa were fully occupied 
with the import of various goods to the Southern Sudan which included 
Styers cars from Australia, lorries (cars) from Britain; Polo, Passat and 
Fiat cars from European countries. In addition half of the petrol and 
diesel for the Southern region was imported through Kenya. 
With millions, if not billions, of USA dollars being expected to be 
gained through trade, several rich Sudanese merchants from the Northern 
Sudan on one side and a few Southern Sudanese businessmen who had 
benefitted from some kind of business loans from the regional government 
on the other, competed for licen, &s and it was here that accusations of 
bribery, corruption and cheating as well as abusive names were used. The 
first complaint came from the Southern Sudanese businessmen, who accused 
the regional authorities of having been unfair in the issuing of licenses 
especially as over 90% of the first licenses were given to Arab Jallabas. 
The regional government reacted by giving more licences for both internal 
and external trade to Southerners. This time the Northern Sudanese or 
Jallaba seriously took up the issue with regional government. When they 
failed to get a satisfactory response, they then took their complaint to 
the President of the Republic. They complained that the way in which 
licenses were issued was wrong and corrupt, though they did not have any 
concrete evidence to back this up. Though this is not to say that there 
were no irregularities. There were irregularities such as bribing the 
authorities responsible for issuing the licenses. The complaints were 
made by those who failed to get licenses. The Southerners who failed to 
get licenses accused the Arabs of having bribed the weak Southern 
Sudanese with large amounts of money and later to have blackmailed them 
into issuing licenses only to the members of the Jallaba class, leaving 
those Southern Sudanese who wanted licenses without any. 
As for the Arab national group who received most of the licenses said it 
was because justice was done whereas other groups within the Arab 
national group, who were in the majority, condemned it as racist and 
corrupt. The problem was made worse by the fact that the number of people 
given licenses were not known exactly. According to records available at 
the Department of Foreign Trade in the Region of Commerce and Supply, 
LA 
CO 
1 
U) 
H 
O 
X 
0 
O 
w 
U 
z 
PG 
P+ 
w 0 
cn 
PG 
P. 4 
Lri 
00 
rn 
00 
rn 
1-4 
M 
00 
CY% 
. -4 
N 
co 
0' 
00 
o. 
O 
O 
C' 
2 
ON 
00 
rn 
rn ' 
In 
r- rn 
r. 
u 
0 
wI 
op t 1+1zN000' 
-t. -4 -4 
000CM NCN 1- 
OýýNNIz C'1M00' 
OO C' r- r- -00NM 
Co O%. 4COONNM0000 
_ 112 1: \i C\ONO\ 
tf1N-4r, 00%DMN. -i 
c% CD 00 
O, 0 NOl000jcz-' 
. -I -4 -4 -I -4 -f 
O vl NrNO CO 't 
NýONc%%ONululO 
r: ri 
vi m. -iN OOtei in %0 
"D 
ce c 4l' NNM 12 
. -4 
t -4 c> rý CD C, 1 0 
Km - .4 
NNCS(: Lr) 1t 
S 
-4 c> 
S 
SS SN%Drý%D 
tr% C% 0 00 
OO+C; v1c N14_Z z 
KM N 
000.4 000%or- Inu'º 
212 
0 
0 
O 
0 
0 
0 
.I 
o 
0 
O 
0 
0 
0 
., 
0 
0 
0 
0 
O 
0 
0 
0 
%00 N1-Li10 
-1 N -4 . '+ 
to 
Co 
rn . - a ca v N x umE to M .W 
'° ý a ö. ýs c o 
ý 
ý 
m 0 
j 
C) C) 
tu W oo 4) 
0M ,4 d '4 R1 0 4.1 0 
213 
only twenty licenses were issued and sixteen of these went to the 
Northern traders, three went to Southerners, while the remaining one was 
reserved by the regional government to be given to a contractor to inform 
on behalf of the regional government, on credit, to be paid at a later 
date. 93 The report by the Nairobi based purchase office did show that 
more than sixty people were carrying licenses issued in Juba and that 
most of these were Northern Sudanese who were not taking their imported 
goods to Juba or Southern Sudan, but that all kinds of goods were taken 
through Juba to Northern Sudanese towns where they were hoarded and sold 
on the black markets. 94 
Yet this study found out through interviewing those involved, that the 
actual crisis was not corruption as such, but it was because a sizable 
number of northern traders who had complained to the President of the 
Republic that Southerners were using the border trade to smuggle arms to 
be used against the Central Government, if not the Northern Sudanese. 
Here the President did not try to verify this but issued instructions to 
the northern controlled army and national security to detain any Southern 
Sudanese in any position whether a constitutional position or not. The 
arrest of the Minister of Wild Life and the Commissioner of Jonglei 
province, without proper evidence or a warrant of arrest from a competent 
judge and a lifting of their impunity which was granted to all 
constitutional holders, was the first indication of a break down in 
relations between the Central Government authorities. The arrest of the 
above mentioned constitutional holders was found out to be a blunder 
after three months of interrogation in the military headquarters in Juba. 
It was found out that there was no evidence to link both these people 
with armed resistance at the Ethiopian border and they were released 
without punishment but the damage had already been done. Some Southern 
leaders have wrongly been detained and kept for nearly three months 
without trial. 
The final part about the border trade came in 1982, when the President of 
the Republic suddenly issued a decree, no. 34, cancelling the Central 
Government resolution no. 1953, already previously mentioned. 
The Director of the Central Ministry of Commerce and Supply, responsible 
for foreign trade, Sayed Omer Ali Omer, stated that he had recommended 
the cancellation of resolution no. 1953, conferring powers and rights for 
the regional government in Juba to issue trade licenses, as provided for 
under the Southern Regional Self-Rule Act of 1972.95 Sayed Omer said his 
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decision was made because the regional government had misused its powers 
he went on to say, 
"The Central Ministry was angered by the regional government's 
action of surpassing the half million Sudanese pounds annual 
ceiling imposed for the border trade. "96 
As found by the author, the director quoted above, was not even sure of 
what the real ceiling was, (which according to the Director of the 
Department of Foreign Trade in the Regional Ministry of Commerce and 
Supply, Mr. Aligo A Wani, said was three million USA dollars). According 
to Sayed Omer, the Central Government was angered by the chaos and crimes 
which were seen in the market. He stated that traders from the Northern 
Sudan, who were issued with more licenses, flooded the market with goods 
which affected the locally made products, and that local manufacturers 
products in the Northern Sudan depended on the markets in Southern Sudan. 
The Northern merchants who were affected by the border trade called upon 
Central Government to protect their local industries. 97 
In an interview, Sayed Omer confirmed to the author that the issuing of 
foreign trade licenses were taken from the regional government before the 
division of the Southern Sudan and had not been returned to any regional 
government. Instead, it was his ministry in Khartoum which had the power. 
He also stated that those traders given licenses were told what goods to 
import and what not to. Those items which were encouraged included food 
items, agricultural machinery, pesticides, fertilizers, pharmaceutical 
and other items as specified. 98 
The border trade began to die gradually following the division of the 
Southern Sudan into three regions, the imposition of Sharia Islamic laws 
and the civil war in 1983 and 1984 respectively. The last two continue 
damaging the border trade between the southern region and the 
neighbouring countries. Firstly, the Islamic laws affected many licenses 
issued to bring alcohol to the region as imposed by the customs officers 
in the Southern Sudan. Secondly, the Central Government suspended any 
cash in hard currency which was given to the Equatoria region which was 
still maintaining trade with neighbouring countries. During the time of 
the interview, i. e. December 15th, 1987, the author confirmed that 
Kapoeta, Kenya Road, Nimule - Uganda Road and the Arua - Yei Road were 
badly affected by the civil war and trade had come to a standstill. 
Consequently clearance and freight offices which were established, were 
closed down. 
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4.12 Transport Crisis and the Jallaba 
It is often stated that there cannot be a proper trade unless there is 
sufficient means of circulating goods, which means transport facilities. 
In order to take various commodities to consumers, there must be 
transport. To facilitate their commercial activities, the Arab merchants 
purchased vehicles and steamers on the river. This was followed by the 
establishment of widespread trading networks with fleets of trucks and 
lorries, private cars, lorries and pick-ups, buses and trucks which were 
being used in transporting various goods or commodities. 
The Arab merchants were able to acquire more cars and trucks than the 
colonial state in the 1940's. In 1939 there were 2,099 registered trucks 
and lorries in the country, in 1945,2,718 and in 1956 the number rose to 
10,798. In each year the number of private cars or trucks were reported 
to be highest. Attempts have been made to study this section of the 
economy and Tim Niblock was one of the scholars who has taken interest. 
Table 4.14 shows the situation in 1956, whereby the private ownership of 
1-1 
cars and trucks was three times more than the state. 
TABLE 4.14: VEHICLE OWNERSHIP, 1956 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Type of Vehicle Private Government Total 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lorry 6,247 2,131 8,378 
Box car truck 1,633 787 2,420 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 7,880 2,918 10,798 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Quoted from, Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, "The Sudanese Bourgeoisie, 
Vanguard of Development? ", Khartoum University Press, Sudan, 
1984. 
The most striking fact about Table 4.14 is that of all the private cars 
registered, not a single one belonged to a Southern Sudanese. It is 
equally true to say that less than one quarter of government cars were in 
the Southern Sudan administrative centres or towns. For example, when the 
regional government was established in 1972, it could not find a single 
car in working condition in the entire Eastern Equatoria province, with 
eight district headquarters. As a result, the cabinet which composed of 
12 ministers and 12 senior directors, had only one mini-bus and one 
office. The mini-bus in question was not big enough to transport all the 
ministers and their directors at one time and they had to be transported 
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in shifts, with the directors taken to their ministries first and then 
followed by the ministers. A few weeks later over 50 cars were brought to 
Juba, the regional capital. 
The real transport issue came into being when the regional government in 
Juba was supposed to transport nearly half a million returnees to their 
respective provinces, districts and villages. This involved paying more 
than seven million Sudanese pounds to the contractors who were all Arab 
Northerners and who were again involved in corruption, by forcing the 
regional government to pay more than it should. Lorries were used in 
transporting students to their schools and labourers on the roads were 
using the same contractors, whereby millions had to be paid. 
An attempt by the regional government to control the corruption involved 
in the transporting of regional government employees and students, ended 
up in a crisis. The regional government claimed that there was corruption 
in the bills presented for payment. The Arab contractors claimed that 
there was no corruption and that the bills should be paid promptly and if 
not, they would take the matter up with Central Government. The regional 
government had not choice but to pay in full, for the Jallaba were able 
to get their money from Central Government before when the regional 
government had refused to pay on the grounds that the amount on the bills 
was inflated, when the Central Ministry of Finance and Economic planning 
had arbitrarily awarded more than ten million Sudanese pounds to the 
merchants and had deducted this amount from the regional development 
budget under Central Government control. This was without any reference 
or consultation taking place with the regional government on one side and 
Central Government and the Arab merchants on the other. 
The second area of conflict between the regional government and the 
merchants plus the Central Government was the transporting of essential 
commodities and various equipment and materials for the development of 
the Southern Region. The regional government had argued that essential 
commodities and urban building materials for the region should be given 
special priority, in transporting them to Juba. But the Arab merchants 
argued that priority should be given to them because their business would 
be affected if they were further delayed and they wanted to avoid 
bankruptcy and losses which would take place as a result of such long 
delays. The Department of River Transport, which controlled at the 
steamers, especially Government ones, had to give priority to the 
regional government to transport urgent development materials as 
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requested but the Jallabas went under ground to block their way by 
bribing the engineers, workers and drivers of the steamers, such that 
their departure may be delayed indefinitely until the senior officials of 
the regional government could not wait any longer and then left. At an 
attempt by the regional authorities to stay until the steamer in question 
was to go towards Juba, the Jallaba would bribe the crew into delaying 
the steamer on its way for more than the normal period of time which the 
steamer should have spent on its way between Kosfi and Juba which was 
supposed to be seven days, and at the worst, ten days. The matter was 
always quite different when for example, in 1978 the Regional Minister of 
Commerce and Supplies, Mr. Ezekiel M Kodi decided to travel on the same 
steamer which was carrying essential commodities and building materials. 
It took the steamer more than a month instead of ten days, the delay 
being attributed to technical difficulties. The same experience happened 
to the Commissioner of Lakes, Mr. Martin Marial Takpiny who was 
humiliated by the Jallaba when he was kept on the steamer between Malakal 
and Shambe for more than two weeks instead of the usual two days and even 
then all his consignment did not reach Shambe, some was stolen without 
accountability. 
An attempt by the regional government to establish a separate regional 
transport corporation was rejected by the Central Government on the 
grounds that the request was unconstitutional. When the regional 
government insisted that it must buy a private steamer for services in 
the Southern region, it was allowed to do so. A steamer was bought and 
given the name of 'Jonglei'. The steamer Jonglei had to be operated by a 
driver and engineers from the Arab elements while Southerners were sent 
for training in river transport and also as pilots and drivers. But the 
Jonglei did not last long enough to be operated by the Southerners under 
training. It was set on fire by one of the Northern engineers, claiming 
that he was cooking and then an accident took place which burnt the 
steamer to ashes. The crisis and struggle took a different turn. The 
regional government decided to use lorries to transport various goods to 
Juba by road, through Western Bahr El Ghazel "raga" and from there it 
would be easy to get them to Juba in cars, etc. Of course such an 
arrangement was a temporary one and could not offer a lasting solution to 
the problems known in the Southern Sudan. 
it is also important to mention that, the regional government attempted 
to set up a special regional airline, known as a feeder airline, to 
operate mainly in the Southern Sudan. The whole project was destroyed by 
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one Captain Omer, a Northern Sudanese sent to advise on the project. 
Finally, the problem of transport was a great bottle-neck for both 
economic development in the southern region and also in bringing into the 
region various essential commodities which were scarce throughout. The 
situation was quickly controlled when hire purchase lorries were brought 
in numbers and distributed to all those southern merchants who had an 
interest in the field. As a result, internal transport between provinces 
and districts was easily managed by southerners and most Arabs were 
forced to leave the transport market within the southern region to 
southern traders until the new civil war began in 1984, which stopped 
everything, i. e. commercial transport sector, for most roads were 
landmined by the Sudan People's Liberation Army. For example, by the end 
of 1983, the situation was as follows: - In Juba there were modern buses 
carrying passengers between Juba and Yai down to Kaya border station, 
Juba Nimule, Juba Maridi down to Yambio, Juba - Tomt down to Kapoeta and 
Kenya border town, Juba Bor and Juba Parajok. All the buses were owned by 
Southern Sudanese merchants and traders. In addition there were nearly a 
thousand lorries in the Southern Sudan. Of course, there is a lack of 
statistics on the number of cars brought to Southern Sudan from 1972 and 
until the time of writing. But that fact of the matter is that there is 
evidence to confirm that the number of cars in the Southern Sudan 
increased more than ten times the normal number expected to be there 
following the Uganda crisis in 1978 when the government of Idi Amin was 
overthrown. Nearly ten thousand different types of cars were brought to 
the Southern Sudan and half of that number remained there while the other 
half was taken to other parts of the Sudan, especially Northern regions, 
by the Jallaba. As we shall see in the next sub-section, threequarters of 
transport was under the control of the Southern Sudanese before the 
division of the Southern region into three administrative separate 
regions in 1983. 
Finally Table 4.15 shows the road building plan in the Sudan in the 
1970's. Over 13 road projects were earmarked for the Northern, Western 
and Eastern Sudan with both Gezira and Khartoum regions taking the lions 
share. Table 4.16 shows the number of roads started but not completed, 
while table 4.17 shows the number of licensed private motor vehicles in 
the country. 
All the completed and asphalted roads are in the Northern Sudan. All the 
planned but yet uncompleted roads are also' in the Northern Sudan, except 
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for the Rabak-Renk road which joins Rabak in the North to Renk in the 
northern most part of the south. Renk is a mechanized agricultural area 
dominated by settlers from the north, though some southerners also own 
mechanized farms. 
TABLE 4.16 UNCOMPLETED ROAD PROJECTS 
-------------------- ------------ 
Length 
-------------- 
Total 
--------------- 
Foreign 
Project in cost currency 
-------------------- 
Km 
------------- 
(Ls, 000) 
------------- 
(Ls, 000) 
--------------- 
Raba-Renk 160 15,000 10,000 
Kadugli-Talodi 100 10,000 6,000 
Kassala-Sabdenat 30 3,000 1,500 
Gedarfa-Gelabat 135 15,000 10,000 
Kosti-Um Ruaba 170 15,000 1,000 
Um Ruaba-El Obeid 170 - - 
Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1983, 
p. 141. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. There are several terms describing Arab traders in the less developed 
regions and all reflect the exploitative, and oppressive character of 
the traders and they include, Jallaba, Guang-guang, Arab Chol etc. 
These terms are used rather abusively. 
2. Hassan, Yusuf F. The Arabs and the Sudan: From the Seventh to Early 
Sixteenth Century. Edinburgh University Press, 1967. Ibid. 
3. Mahmud Ushari Ahmed, Arabic in the Southern Sudan: History and Spread 
of a Pidgin Creole. Pal Advertising, London, 1983. 
4. See Joseph Lago pamphlet addressed to Anya-nya Forces, January, 1972, 
p. 2. 
5. This is a general view held by Arab Settlers once stated by Saddiq al 
Mahdi and Gen. Surah el Dahab. 
6. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Southern 
Sudan in August, 1955. pp. 24-27. 
7. Oduho, Joseph and Deng, William. The Southern Sudan. pp. 38-40. 
8. See Joseph Oduho and William Deng. ibid. 
9. See Joseph Oduho and William Deng. ibid. P. 39. 
10. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1955 Disturbances, 
op. cit. 
11. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1955 Disturbances, 
op. cit. 
12. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1955 Disturbances, 
op. cit. 
13. Joseph Oduho and William Deng, ibid. p. 28 
14. Sudan: Human Rights Violations in the Context of Civil War, by 
Amnesty International,. 1 Easton Street, London, December 1989. p. 9. 
15. By the end of 1966, all the shops were burnt in Majok (13), Aluak- 
Luak (20), Akot (22), Pacong (16) and many other villages as well. 
Their owners were either killed or fled to the towns or outside 
Sudan, or in the bush. The author was in Majok at the time of the 
burning. 
16. Joseph Oduho and William Deng, ibid, p. 29. 
17. See Joseph Lago, ibid. 
18. See Fatima B. Mahmoud, ibid. 
19. See Joseph Garang ibid, p. 84. 
20. Joseph Oduho and William Deng, ibid. p. 29. 
21. See Joseph Oduho and William Deng, ibid. 
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22. The author witnessed the massacre of teachers in Yirol and some 
traders in May 1965. 
23. The Author was in Wau on 13 August 1965, when shooting started at 
8.30 in the evening which continued until 10 a. m. next day. 3 cousins 
of the author were killed in the party - Nasrel Din Nyayuom, Arok 
Akec, and Daud Caggai Wut and many others wounded. 
24. See Joseph Oduho and William Deng, ibid. 
25. See Joseph Oduho and William Deng, ibid. 
26. Interview with Andrew Acijok, former Assistant Commissioner for Renk 
District, 1978-9 who was expelled by First Vice President of the 
Republic, Major Abu-al Geshim Mohammed Ibrahim because he had 
redistributed the schemes after the Arab landowners failed to pay 
land tax, which they had not paid for nearly 15 years. Interview made 
in Juba on 10th November 1980, when Author was dealing with the 
complainant's. Address to President of H. E. C., Juba. 
27. Interview with ten long distance cattle traders known as "Ba, iya" who 
were affected in Yirol when they came to claim compensation or loan 
from the Regional Government -3 of the cattle traders are relatives 
of the author. All interviewed in Khartoum in 1987. 
28. In 1972, Khier Awad, an Arab merchant was elected to represent Yirol 
in the Constituent Assembly in Khartoum. Khier Awad was reported to 
have intimidated the voters using Northern Military officers, police 
and administrators in order to get himself elected. He also used 
bribery in some cases, including giving bags of sugar, wheat flour, 
cooking oil etc. to local Anya-nya officers. 
29.22 Arab merchants were declared as elected unopposed to the Khartoum 
Constituent Assembly in 1968, when Southern Front and other Southern 
parties boycotted general elections - because they were afraid of 
being murdered in the South. William Deng Nhial, President of Sudan 
African National Union was murdered with 3 colleagues near Rumbek 
after he and his party won ten seats in the Assembly. 
30. This point is quoted in 29 above, by author. 
31. The author discovered that in Khartoum all domestic servants are 
either Southerners or people from Nuba Mountains, Funj and Ingesna, 
or from Darfur Region. Similarly most manual labourers including 
casual ones come from the areas mentioned above. 
32. This thesis maintains that the Jallaba are looked upon as racist and 
practice discrimination in employment, being able to recruit shop 
assistants only from their own home regions. 
33. The Author discovered that most Arab merchants keep their Arab wives 
and children in the North when operating in the South. And while in 
the South they marry or take as concubines Southern Sudanese girls. 
Children born to such girls were then taken back to the North to be 
Arabized. 
34. The Author confirmed this point when he examined those resident in 
Hay Jallaba" in Yirol, Rumbek, Wau and Tonj and found that each house 
had a high fence around it, where those small children which have not 
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yet been sent to the north play. The Arab children in Southern Sudan 
were found not to play in the public playground with Southern 
Sudanese children. 
35. The Author witnessed the problems mentioned therein and have personal 
experience as well. 
36. See Joseph Garang, ibid, p. 85. 
37. The Author's interviews with executive committees of the Union of 
Northern and Southern Funj, General Union of Nuba Mountains, Darfur 
Development Front, Sudan National Party, Beja Congress and Youth 
Union of Abba Island revealed that they are facing similar conditions 
to Southern Sudanese. 
38. See Joseph Oduho and William Deng, ibid. 26. 
39. Joseph Lago ibid. 
40. There are evidence that in the Wau incident quoted, Muslims both 
Southerners and Northerners who attended the wedding party were 
killed or wounded. 
41. The Author had witnessed this in all the Southern Towns he visited, 
with the exception of Juba town, Wau and Malakal, after Regional 
Governments established their H. Q. s therein. This led to an influx of 
non-Muslim people attracted to the new way of living in the town, 
while others came to look for jobs or join the police, wildlife and 
prisons forces. 
42. In Yirol, the author found that almost all children of school age 
were found to have joined the Catholic church school and were 
converted to the Christian faith, while the parents apparently 
accepted the change for their children. 
43. This study found that most of Southern Sudanese returnees from 
Egyptian adopted non-Islamic names and their daughters married non- 
Muslims. 
44. The author discovered that several people whose parents were 
originally Muslims in most of the Dinka areas studied, e. g. Rumbek 
and Yirol, were not Muslims but Christians. There were other extreme 
cases where some parents had sent their children to grow up in the 
Cattle Camps, where they could not even speak Arahbic or live in teh 
town, let alone the Islamic South. 
45 This study found that the Egyptians failed to uphold the Islamic 
schools in the south as well. 
46. This is based on the author's observation and experience as some of 
the author's relatives fall within the group cited. 
47. In 1966 almost all Southern Sudanese primary, intermediate and senior 
secondary schools were transferred to Northern Sudan, their teachers 
fled to the bush or killed by the army or police or transferred to 
the North to learn Arabic. Also senior administrators, police 
officers and prison warders were transferred to Northern Sudan. 
48. The peace villages were first established in 1964 in order to settle 
Southerners and Westerners there, but the settlers were used as cheap 
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labour and looked upon as a market. 
49. Awad, Mohammed Hashim. "The Southern Sudan: Planning for National 
Integration in Sudan: Notes and Records, Vol. IV, Khartoum 1974, p. 
88. 
50. Awad, Mohammed Hashin, op. cit. pp. 88-9. 
51. Awad, Mohammed Hashin, Ibid. p. 94. 
51. It is common knowledge in Sudan that the Jallaba are members and 
sometimes leaders of three sectarian political parties (ie. Umma, DUP 
and NIF). The majority belong to DUP, while the majority of 
capitalist farmers come from the Ansar. The NIF controls the banks 
and financial enterprises. The power of these three parties was 
demonstrated during Nimiere's rule, especially from 1972-1976, 
hoarding of essential commodities (ie. foodstuffs, petrol and 
building materials) were bought by rich merchants and either hoarded, 
destroyed or smuggled out of Sudan, in orer to pressurize the people 
to rise against Nimiere. 
52. Awad, Mohammed Hashin, ibid. p. 94. 
53. See Mohd. Hashan Awad, ibid. p. 89. 
54. Quoted by Yongo-Bure, B. ibid. 
55. This report by MEFITO APA has been quoted by Yongo-Bure, ibid. 
56. Deng Dongrin Akuany. "Political Modernization in a Developing 
Society, the Southern Sudan Experience from 1972 to 1982". 
Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Dept. of Politics, University of Leeds, 1985. 
57. Deng Dongrin Akuany. Op. cit. 
58. In 1972, the President of the Republic established a Commission known 
as 'Special Funds' for Resettlement and Rehabilitation of the 
Returnees after the Addis Ababa Accord was implemented. The people 
appointed to run it were former Northern and Southern politicians who 
were accused of mismanagement of the funds. Sid Ahmed, unclassified 
clerk was found to have become very rich. 
59. During Nimiere's rule, specially between 1981-85 several merchants 
were caught in Khartoum and Juba and found guilty of hoarding 
essential commodities, e. g. sugar, wheat flour, cooking oil etc. 
because they were asked to do so by their sectarian parties 
underground. Some destroyed their goods and were covered by the 
parties opposed to the Government. It was during this time that black 
markets became dominant. 
60. The anti-Southern Region system of Government during Nimiere's rule 
included supporters of sectarian parties among civil servants and 
merchants who supported the division of Southern Sudan into three 
regions in 1983. 
61. Mahmoud, F. B. ibid. 
62. Mahmud, Ushari Ahmed. Arabic in the Southern Sudan: History and 
Spread of a Pidgin Creole. ibid. p. 29. 
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63. Mahmud, Ushari Ahmed. ibid. p. 29-30. 
64. Yongo-Bure, B. The First Decade of Development in the Southern Sudan. 
Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum. 1985, 
p. 11. 
65. Mahmoud, F. B. ibid. 
65. "Seasonal Labour Migration to the Renk Mechanized Scheme and its 
Effect on the Subsistence Economy", Sudan Research Workshop, July 3-5 
1984, Iss. The Hague. 
67. Mahmoud, F. B. ibid. 
68. Mahmoud, F. B. ibid. 
69. Mahmoud, F. B. ibid. 
70. This study confirmed that foreign investment in Agricultural 
production in Southern and Northern Func, Gadarif and Nuba Mountains 
did not benefit the local population instead it created land and food 
problems for them. 
71. Abdel Nabi Abdel Gader (MP) representative of Malakal and Renk 
Constituent Assembly, See Appendix 
72. See Abdel Nabi Abdel Gader, op. cit. 
73. See Abdel Nabi Abdel Gader, ibid. 
74. Gore, Paul Wani 1984, ibid. pp. 18-20. 
75. Gore, Paul Wani, op. cit. p. 23. 
76. Gore, Paul Wani, ibid. p. 25. 
77. Gore, Paul Wani, ibid. 
78. Gore, Paul Wani, ibid. 
79. Gore, Paul Wani, ibid. 
80. Gore, Paul Wani, ibid. 
81. Madut, Abelgak Them, "Regional Distribution of Public Agricultural 
Credit in Sudan". Unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of Khartoum. 
Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, 1986. pp. 13-14. 
82. Madut, Abelgak Them op. cit. 
83. Also the Author interviewed Mr. Marial Rong, Secretary General of the 
Farmers Union in Renk and Kadok area in Khartoum in September 1987, 
when he accused the Department of Agriculture and Mechanized Bank of 
racism, practised against Southern Sudanese in Renk. 
84. Interview with Mamal Rong in Khartoum, ibid. 
85. Interview with Renk Kadur Baidit, Chairman of Renk Farmers Union, 
Khartoum, 10/1/88. 
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86. On 18 July 1981, Brig. Andrew Mabur, Vice President of the High 
Executive Council, Juba, while on an official visit to Khartoum 
(accompanied by the author) was summoned by the First Vice President, 
Gen. Ower El Tayeb and was shown written complaints against him 
because of the issuing of trade licenses to Southern Sudanese who had 
no capital or financial capability for running such trading 
activities. Three documents were produced, signed by the 
representatives of the Northern merchants in Juba, Wau and Malakal. 
87. Although in theory the President of the H. E. C. was the Chairman of 
Security in Southern Region, it was noted by the Author several 
times, that the First Commanding Officer of Southern Command was 
deciding matters of security without reference to the President of 
the H. E. C. and directly contacted the President of the Republic. For 
example, in 1980, the Military Commandeered the regional monthly 
quarter's supply of petrol and diesel in the name of national 
security, regardles of protestations by the President of the H. E. C. 
88. As in 87, H. E. C. President, op. cit. 
89. The problem of black marketeering was (and still remains) insolluble. 
The Northern traders found it easy to make profits through the 
monopoly of the black market. 
91. Quoted by Dasfeeur, a weekly Arabic journal of the Baath Party. Pan 
Arab publishing Company Ltd., London, 22/7/90- 
92. Resolution no. 1953, which delegated certain powers with regard to 
foreign trade to the regional authorities, functioned for seven 
years, but it was cancelled by the President of the Republic because 
of complaints from Northern traders in the South, who claimed that 
Southerners should not be given licenses. 
93. Interview with Mr. Omer Ali Omer in Khartoum in 1987 - at the time he 
was pensioned off. Mr. Omer told the author that the cancellation of 
Resolution 1953 was for political reasons. 
94. Mr. Omer told the author that the reasons given were dictated to him 
by higher authorities which was the term given to the First Vice 
President who was a very good friend of the Jallabas in the south. 
95. Interview with Omer, ibid. 
96. Interview with Omer, Ibid. 
97. On Resolution no. 1953, ibid. 
98. On Resolution No. 1953. ibid. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNDER-DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTHERN 
SUDAN 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter Studies the role of sectarian political parties in the 
under-development of Sudan, and in particular Southern Sudan. It also 
investigates and analyses the problems which led to the collapse of 
Western Liberal Democracy in the Sudan. It also argues that the dominance 
of feudally orientated sectarian political leaders within the ruling 
class has led to the emergence of weak non-democratically organized 
political parties, whose policies are incapable fo resolving various 
problems created by socio-economic and political change. 
It will also be argued that the dominant sectarian political parties are 
to blame for corrupting state institutions and the recurrent political 
violence in the country. 
The weakness of political parties in the less developed regions, 
especially Southern Sudan, is attributed to the policies of the dominant 
ruling national grouping. 
5.2 The Origins and Development of Political Parties in the 
Sudan 
There is no general consensus about the origin of the political 
organization in the Sudan. Some say the first nationalist organization 
formed was The Sudanese Union Society, 
' 
while others say, the White Flag 
League was the first. 
The existing historical records have shown that the two political 
organizations were separate and had different objectives. While the 
Sudanese Union Society (formed in 1920) was demanding that the British 
colonial authorities should leave the Sudan and Egypt and that Sudan and 
Egypt were to be united, the White Flag League (established in 1923) was 
demanding that all the colonial powers, including the British and 
Egyptians should leave the Sudan for the Sudanese. To be precise, Ali 
Anbdel Latif, the leader of the White Flag League was Quoted many times 
as demanding self-determination for the Sudanese people and yet, some 
scholars continued to do injustice to the White Flag League leaders by 
falsely describing them as Egyptian based elements. 
2 
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The fact that no Egyptians nor members of the Arab orientated sectarian 
national groupings had ever taken part in the 1924 uprising was clear 
evidence to show that the Egyptian intention was just a conspiracy 
against the movement, so much so that it was destroyed. Indeed, both the 
Arab settlers and the Egyptian colonial authorities, like the British had 
a strong reason to make sure that the White Flag League was eliminated by 
all means. 
Furthermore, the events which followed on from 1924 were characterized by 
massacres and mass disbandment plus detention of indigenous black 
Africans not only in the Sudan Defence force but in all colonial state 
institutions and departments. The oppression, experienced (which 
continues to the present day) by the Black Bloc before and after 
independence, which is reflected in the current Sudanese crises may 
partly explain why very little has been written on the White Flag League, 
not only by foreign scholars, but by Sudanese also. 
3 
Since the aim of this chapter is not to trace the historical origins of 
the White Flag League, it suffices to state here that the White Flag 
League was the first genuine nationalist political organization, formed 
by the indigenous Sudanese national groups though it was supported by 
some Arab settlers and the Arabized riverain tribes. 
The first political organizations to be recognized and financed by both 
the British and Egyptian colonial authorities were the two Arab Islamic 
sects: the Ansar (under the leadership of the Mahdi family) and 
Khatmiyya, (under the leadership of the Mirghani family. The support of 
the British was shown by the knighthoods, wealth and property given to 
the leaders of these sects. According to Islam these sects should be seen 
as the political parties of Allah. 
4 
The British became patrons of the 
Islamic religious sects and therefore used them as the instruments 
through which the colonial regime could propagate its policies of 
exploitation, domination and appropriation of Sudanese national 
resources. 
The sectarian leaders, as allies and agents of the colonial domination 
and exploitation in the Sudan were allowed to establish newspapers, 
journals and various associations (such as the Graduates Congress and the 
Trade Unions), as appendages to the Sectarian families who became not 
only patrons but the actual leaders of those organizations. 
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It was therefore quite natural that the first two political parties the 
Umma and Ashiqqa recognized by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial regime in the 
Sudan were controlled by the same Islamic religious families, i. e. the 
three dominant families - Mahdi, Mirghani and Hindi. The first two 
political parties mentioned above were, actually, the offsprings of the 
Graduates Congress and the Sudanese Union Society. The other political 
parties which were established before independence included the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Republican Brotherhood. The Sudan Communist Party and the 
Black Bloc were, at first denied registration as political parties by the 
British colonial authorities in Sudan. 
As for Southern Sudan, The Southern Liberal Party was established only in 
the 1950s but weakened by the lack of a financial base independent of the 
British colonial authorities which refused to give any of the financial 
assistance to the southern political parties such as was granted to the 
Arab orientated sectarian political parties. 5 
The development of political parties in the Sudan reached the highest 
stage when in 1953, the following political parties and the trade unions 
were established: 
Political Parties 
1. Umma Party 
2. National Union Party 
3. Liberal Unionist Party 
4. The Nile Valley Party 
S. The Socialist Republican Party 
6. The Muslim Brotherhood Party 
7. The Communist Party 
8. The Southern Liberal Party 
9. The People's Democratic Party 
Trade Unions 
The Sudan Railway Workers 
The Agricultural Labourers 
The Farmers 
The Professional including 
teachers 
The Students Unions etc. 
By the time of independence in 1956 other political parties emerged which 
included the People's Democratic Party, established by Ahmed Abdel Rahman 
of the Khatimiya sect, the Unity Party from the Southern Sudanese pro- 
Unity Group by those of Philimon Majok, Santino Deng Teng etc. The 
development of political parties and their activities were stopped in 
1958 when a Military Junta took over and all the political parties were 
legally banned until 1964 when the Military regime was overthrown by 
popular uprising in October. 6 
231 
The October uprising which overthrew the Military Government, brought 
into being a civilian caretaker government which organized the elections 
of 1965. In those elections, ten political parties participated in it, 
which included National Unionist Party, Umma Party, Sudan African 
National Union (SAND), Muslim Brothers, Nuba Mountains General Union, 
Beja Congress, the Southern Liberal Party, the Communist Party and the 
Independents. 
It is to be noted that several political parties mentioned above emerged 
in 1964- 5 for example, in the Southern Sudan SANU and the Southern Front 
were established specifically to replace the Liberals and those of Unity 
Parties which were accused of failure to stand against the Arab National 
groupings which had been able to outwit them. 
In the Western Sudan, two movements were formed. One of them, the General 
Union of Nuba Mountains, managed to contest elections as an independent 
party and got ten seats in the parliament in the 1965 elections. 
The Darfur Development Front was unable to take part in the elections as 
an independent political party but as a part of Arab orientation and 
sectarian parties until the last elections of 1986. 
In the Eastern Sudan, the Beja Congress emerged as a challenging and 
competent political party which won ten territorial seats against the 
dominant Khatmiyya controlled political party. In the 1966 elections, 
some political parties refused to participate in the elections because of 
insecurity in Southern Sudan, included the Southern Front, People's 
Democratic Party and some of the independent members. As a result, 21 
Arab traders were appointed by the state in order to fill those empty 
seats illegally. 
The military take-over by General Nimiere in 1969 halted the activities 
and the development of political parties for nearly 16 years. The May 
Revolution as its leaders called it, banned all political parties on 25th 
May, 1969 and after nearly four years of direct military dictatorship the 
military leaders established a single political party and a permanent 
constitution which were introduced in the Sudan for the first time. The 
Sudan Socialist Union was established early in 1972 as the only ruling 
party in the country. The military and the civilian leaders who organized 
the one party state invited all the Sudanese, including those from the 
banned political parties to join the party and so many former politicians 
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joined. For example, the leaders of Umma Party's Democratic National 
Unionist Party, Muslim Brothers, and some members of the Communist party. 
The Southern Sudanese political parties and people at large were among 
the first to support the formation of the Sudan Socialist Union because 
of the Addis Ababa'Agreement which was reached between the Military 
Government in Khartoum on the one side and the Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement with the Southern political parties on the other. This 
Agreement, which brought a peaceful solution to the 'Southern Sudan 
Problem' and a self-government to the Southern Sudan provinces, was 
opposed by the Arab Sectarian political parties who had accused the 
Military leaders of a sell-out of Arab interests. And as such, the Arab 
sectarian political parties violently opposed the May Regime until the 
military leaders agreed to dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1977. 
The 1977 Agreement between the leaders of the Sudan Socialist Union led 
by the President of the party and the President of the Republic and the 
leaders of various Arab sectarian political parties which was known as 
the 'National Reconciliation' was made on the grounds that the Government 
in power would dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement while the opposition 
parties agreed not only to stop their anti government activities but to 
join the party and the government, in order to realise or achieve the 
main objectives of both groups. Members of the Arab Sectarian Parties 
joined the Sudan Socialist Union. where some of them were either 
appointed or elected to constitutional positions, ie. as Minister or 
Members of Political office or secretaries of various Sudan Socialist 
Union Committees. Although the National Reconciliation was dishonoured 
many times by both sides. the regime was able to remain in power for 
nearly eight years, with the support of some political parties and also 
some individuals who were benefiting from the system. 
The collapse of the Sudan Socialist Union and the May Regime in 1985, 
following the dismantling of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the regional 
autonomy for the South came as a result of a popular uprising and the 
continuous opposition against the regime by the sectarian political 
parties and other oppressed political groups or organizations. It is 
important to note here that the successful overthrow of the one party 
state which had ruled the Sudan for nearly a decade was followed by the 
emergence of several new political parties and movements in addition to 
the old ones. The total number of political parties which had applied for 
registration in order to contest the 1986 general elections were nearly 
50 including the old and the new political parties, as follows: 
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Umma Party, under the Ansar Islamic sect, was split into three 
competitive factions, with separate leadership, ie. Saddiq al Mahdi 
was the leader of one of the factions, Ahmed al Mahdi, Saddiq's 
uncle, led another, while the third was led by Weli el Din of Hadi 
al Mahdi, Saddiq's cousin. These three leaders came from the same 
family of the Mahdi. The fourth political faction of the Ansar was 
organized by the family of Khalifa Abdallahi of Ta'ashi under the 
7 
leadership of Abdal Salam Khalifa. 
The National Unionist Party, the second largest political party, was 
divided into three before the 1986 general elections. The Mirghani 
family established a wing known as the Democratic Unionist Party 
with Mohammed Osman al Mirghani as the leader and his cousin, Ahmed 
al Mirghani as the Patron. Also Sharif Zein Abdin al Hindi as the 
deputy leader and secretary general. The second wing was under 
Ahmed Zein Abdin and All Mohammed and the third wing was under Hag 
Maowei and Zarouk. The DUP emerged after elections as the most 
powerful of the three factions with 62 MPs. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was another large political party, which split 
into more than two factions. Out of this party was formed the 
National Islamic Front led by Dr. Hassan al Turobi, and the Muslim 
Brothers led by Abdel Magid. In addition, several new Islamic 
orientated political parties emerged which included the Islamic 
National Party, led by el Baghir Omer Assad; The National Islamic 
Party, led by Mustafa Abdel Grader, and the Socialist Islamic 
Party, led by Nasir el Seed a close relative of the founder of the 
Party, the late Babiker Karrar. 
The Sudan Communist Party whose leaders were executed by the Military 
Government under General Nimiere in 1971, with its Youth Wing 
remained united, under its new leader, Ibrahim Nugud. Several 
political parties claiming to be progressive or socialist emerged 
in 1985, included the Progressive Socialist, the Democratic 
Socialists, the Sudanese Socialist Party, the Alliance of 
Nationalist Forces, the Socialist Organization, the Democratic 
Alliance, the Sudanese People's Socialist Front. Other non- 
progressive parties included the Conference Party, the National 
Coalition Party, the Liberal-Nationalists Alliance, the Pro-Libyan 
Revolutionary Committees, the Arab Socialist Ba'athist Party was 
also fragmented into two, ie. the pro-Iraq wing led by Dadr el Din 
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Nasirist Arab Socialist Party led by Taha Mirghani and Asha Hassan, 
the Workers and Farmers Parties. 
All these political parties continue to be led by the Arab National group 
from Northern Sudan. 
The African National group had the following political parties and 
movement and they include both the old and the new. 
The Southern Sudan Political Association, consisting of members of the 
Southern Front and Sudan African National Union (SANU) under the 
leadership of Samuel Aru with Peter Gatkmoth as his Deputy. The other 
wing of SANU, was led by Andrew Wei and his three deputies, Dr. Wol 
Wol, Ezboni Mundri and Samuel Lupai. The People's Progressive Party 
(PPP), (led by James Aliab Surur), Sudan African People's Congress 
(SAPCO) (led by Morris Laweya), the Education Southerners Alliance, 
which became Sudan African Congress (CAC), the Federal Party led by 
Gabriel Yual. The other wing of the Federal Party was led by Jesuha 
Dei Wal. The Unity Party, led by Daniel Gatwich and Francis Gai. The 
Peace Party under the leadership of Ramandan Shoul. The Sudan 
National Party, (led by Rev. Philip Abbas Gabaush), Zengrab (The 
Arab-Negro) Party. The Union of Nuba Mountains (led by Prof. Almin 
Amoda and Mohd Zain Shadad), the Darfur Development Front, Beja 
Congress, the Sudanese National Progressive Party, The Sudanese 
people's Liberation Party led by Osman Ibraham Taweel, the Union of 
Southern and Northern Funj. The Sudan Green Party, the Sudan Rural 
Solidarity and Sudan National Action Labour Party (SNLAP). 
It is to be noted that most of the above-mentioned parties did not 
participate or take part in the 1986 elections for several reasons which 
included the lack of finance, lack of popular support, the lack of 
organization and experience, low educational background of the Party 
leaders and the failure of the leaders to produce party manifestoes. 
Nevertheless, nearly 28 parties took part in the 1988 General Elections 
but only 12 political parties managed to win any constituency seats. The 
numbers of seats won ranged from one to 100 by the Umma Party. 
These Parties may be divided into three groups, the first of which 
consisted of parties based on sectarian Arab oriental despotic and 
bourgeois ideological background. 
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It is equally important to mention here that the emergence of Trade 
Unions in the Sudan were influenced by the Communist Party which 
mobilized most of the working classes in the Northern Sudan including 
Qricultural labourers as well as intelligentsia which became the basis 
of the opposition against the sectarian feudalist, oriental, despotic and 
bourgeois ruling parties. 
It should be noted that the sectarian ruling parties have not been 
democratic in their approach in dealing with opposition. For the ruling 
political parties, those who opposed their policies were either racist or' 
anti-Islam or Arab. The consequences of such an approach was the 
establishment of a Union of non,: -Arab political parties in the Sudan 
consisting of all southern Sudanese political parties (ie. ASSPA, PPP, 
SAPCO, SAC, SANU, Federal Party, Unity Party etc. ), the Southern National 
Party, GUN, and the Union of Southern and Northern Funj. The Unions of 
Sudanese African parties were accused of being racist by the leaders of 
Islamic and Arab oriental political parties who have continued to 
prescribe that all Sudanese should be Arabized and Islamized, which in 
itself is a racist decision in all senses of the word. 
It was surprising that the Beja Congress was not seen to be a member of 
both Sudan Rural Solidarity and the Union of Sudan African parties. 
Similarly the Darfur Development Front could not join the Union of Sudan 
African Parties because of Arab influence or presence in the Darfur 
Development Front. Another reason was that Darfur citizens were engaged 
in a kind or regional civil war (which is still going on) between Arab 
and African tribes, which the Sudan Government under Saddiq al Mahdi had 
described as armed robbery. 8 
R 
There is therefore a general belief that the dominant sectarian ruling 
political parties are blamed for the armed struggles in Kordofan and 
Darfur where the Umma party and DUP Party have been involved in arming 
some Arab tribesmen known as militias and which use their armaments 
against the unarmed tribes, looting, robbing and killing with impunity, 
since the state under the control of these two parties in coalition 
failed to dissolve the militias. Furthermore, they were warned not to 
join the Southern Sudanese Parties because those parties were meant 
exclusively for Southern Sudan. Only the Black Bloc attempted to organize 
cooperative societies similar to those formed to oppose the British and 
Arab orientated leaders. Although the cooperative societies were formed, 
most of them did not get Grants in Aid like other cooperatives organized 
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by the Arab elements. So from 1938 until 1956, no Africans were allowed 
to organize political parties by the British Colonial Authorities in 
Northern Sudan. The leaders and supporters of the Black Bloc were advised 
to join the sectarian political parties if they wished to participate in 
Sudanese politics. The British made sure that the African majority were 
suppressed. 
5.3 The Political Parties and Liberal Democracy in Crisis in the Sudan 
In this study, it has been argued that the dominant Arab sectarian 
national group, has been using Liberal democratic institutions to serve 
its interests since Sudan achieved its political independence 33 years 
ago. And by so doing, the institutions of liberal democracy were misused 
and subsequently failed to resolve the problems facing the country. The 
failure of democratic institutions in the Sudan should not be blamed on 
liberal democracy (which has its own weaknesses), but on the weakness of 
the dominant sectarian Arab, Semi-feudalist ruling political parties. 
The following questions may help to understand why liberal democracy in 
the Sudan has been in crisis and has failed. The questions may be put as 
follows: 
--- Can sectarian political organizations be democratic? 
--- Can oriental despotic societies be democratic? 
--- Was there (or is there) democracy in Islam? 
--- Where the Khalifas, who took over (ie. Abu Babiker, Osman, Ali, Omer 
and others) democratically elected? 
--- Was 'Majales al Shurah' the prophet's advisory council democratically 
elected? 
--- Can democracy be applied in societies which are dominantly sectarian 
and feudally organized? 
To answer these questions, we have to examine very briefly similar 
societies which include almost all the Arab countries, and non-Arab 
Islamic countries. For example, Saudi Arabia, under the control of the 
Saudi family, Kuwait under the rule of the al Sabah family, Oman, under 
the control of Zaid's family, Qatar, under the control of Gabush's 
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family, Jordan under the control of the Hashamites, Morocco under the 
control of Hassan's family, and Northern Yemen, under specific family 
domination. All these families who govern these countries can be found to 
have no democratic institutions and therefore could be said to be ruled 
by autocratic dictators, or oriental despotic leaders. 
The other Arab countries which are not being governed by specific 
families, including Egypt,, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Southern Yemen and Mauritania but they are equally controlled by 
autocratic regimes which are also headed by dictators. 
The Sudan falls within both categories, whereby under the liberal 
democracy, the sectarian dominant families usually control the use of the 
political and economic institutions to serve their egoistic or personal 
interests while under the military dictatorship, both the sectarian and 
the military forces became the main beneficiaries of the system and with 
the majority of the population at the disadvantage. 
The Sudanese case is marked by the existence of various contradictions, 
which include feudal oriental despotism, merchant and industrial 
capitalism and Islamism. Arabism and liberal democracy. That is to say. 
the Sudanese case is characterized by the alliance of various despotic 
oriental Islamic families. led by the Mahdi, Mirghani, the Hindiyya and 
others who wear different masks at various times, including liberal 
democracy, oriental despotism, Islamic autocratic dictatorship or 
fundamentalist Islamic masks, and sometimes even radical progressive 
masks are seen to be emerging. 
9 
The above contradictions become clearer when we examine the structures 
and the organization of Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party, and 
National Islamic Front, 'just to mention a few. We find that three 
dominant political parties had adopted Islamic and Arab political aspects 
and imposed them on the non-Arab majority which in turn creates socio- 
political conflicts. As for Umma and Democratic Unionist Parties, their 
leaders had to inherit their political and economic positions through the 
family inheritance. For example, in the Umma parry its leadership has 
never left the Mahdi Family, in 1950s the first President was Siddiq al 
Mahdi while his vice was first cousin and the patron of the party was 
Sayyed Abdel Rahman al Mahdi and all the leaders were selected by the 
leaders of one dominant religious family only. 
17 
This was true of the 
Democratic Unionist Party where only two specific families were 
239 
... _-, 11 
responsible for the running not only of the party but of state affairs. 
For example, in 1986 when political parties were allowed to operate the 
Mighani family in alliance with Hindi family automatically assumed party 
leadership without any elections. It is to be noted that Osman Mirghani, 
the Khalifa of the Khatimiya. Islamic religious sect became the head of 
the party and his cousin, Ahmed al Mirghani became his deputy and the 
President of State Supreme Council. The third important position the 
Secretary General of the party was inherited by the brother of late 
Sharif al Hindi, Zein Abdin al Hindi, the current leader of the Yusufiya 
Hindiyya Islamic religious sect. The other members of the executive of 
DUP as we were told by those interviewed were appointed by top leaders 
mentioned above from within their related families based on traditional 
linkages or feudal and sectarian relationship. That is to say, the top 
leadership of the dominant Umma and DUP parties assumed to inherit their 
political and economic positions through the blessing of the prophet 
Mohammed who is also taken to be their cousin. 
10 
Similarly the Muslim Brotherhood from which the National Islamic Front 
was its offspring and which emerged as the third most powerful and rich 
political parties in the Sudan was led by members of Islamic religious 
sects already mentioned, families who for some reason based on political 
strategy have decided to form a political party drawing its main support 
from the intellectual and merchants from the Arab national group. When we 
examined the policies of the sectarian Islamic Arab based political 
parties, we found that there were no ideological differences nor any 
differences in their economic and social policies. It is to be noted that 
these three parties (ie. Umma, DUP and NIF) support the Arabization and 
Islamization of Sudanese political and socio-economic life, by calling 
upon all Muslims to accept an Islamic constitution and for the non-Arab 
Sudanese to accept Islamic and Arab cultures, or face Islamic Holy War. 
It is their similar ideological background of dominant political parties 
that has made it easy for these to form a weak coalition government 
whenever a liberal parliamentary system has been revived through a 
general election. And it is equally because of their class composition 
and orientation, that the leaders of all sectarian dominant bourgeois 
ruling parties in the Sudan have been failing to solve the problems of 
social change, particularly the problem of regional inequalities. On the 
contrary the dominant ruling sectarian parties simultaneously take two 
contradictory roads, ie. on the one hand they continue to consolidate the 
feudal, oriental despotic policies and structures or institutions in 
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various rural areas or villages wherever they have influence on the 
masses. While on the other, they take the road of capitalist development 
in various urban centres where capitalist forces have already penetrated 
and which consequently has led the gap to widen continually between the 
more developed areas and the backward areas. It is not surprising 
therefore to see that the experiment with liberal democracy in the Sudan 
led to the emergence of corrupt institutions not expressing the interests 
of the Sudanese masses but that of dominant sectarian ruling families. In 
addition, the dominant ruling political parties which benefited from 
political independence in the form of state power, high posts in state 
government contracts, monopoly over the police, judiciary, army and 
economic establishments, adopt the policy of clientilism, whereby they 
become political and economic patrons to any political and economic 
organization formed by any national groupings within the Sudan. As a 
result, a bitter struggle ensued between the Sudanese people on the one 
hand, and the dominant Arab sectarian ruling parties on the other. But 
the dominant ruling parties were able to divide the oppressed and the 
exploited masses through notions of religious and ethnic differences, 
which had been consolidated and used efficiently by the British Colonial 
Authorities in the Sudan before independence. 
In this study the evidence shows that the dominant sectarian Arab 
oriented ruling political parties are to blame not only for the current 
crisis, but for all the crises from 1955 to the present time. The 
Commission of Enquiry covering the 1955 crisis has documented several 
causes for the disturbances which precipitated the political uprising 
mentioned above and were responsible for the civil war which dominated 
Sudanese politics for 17 years. For example, the dominant sectarian Arab 
ruling parties were for unequal recruitment of Southern Sudanese during 
the Sudanization of the State Apparatus. They were equally for non- 
participation of Southern Sudanese Political leadership during the 1953 
Cairo Conference which was attended by the members of the Arab political 
parties only. They were also to blame for unjust distribution of 
territorial seats by giving the Southern Sudan less seats in the 
constituent Assembly in 1954-1956. The dominant sectarian ruling 
political parties were to blame for their repressive, exploitive and 
oppressive policies against non-Arab national groupings since 
independence and which has led to the exacerbation of the conflict in 
point. 
It is therefore the dominant sectarian ruling political parties who 
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initiated or imposed Arabization and Islamization on the African majority 
which is to blame for that. They are also to blame for uneven development 
and under-development of some areas in the Sudan, including the Southern 
Region. Furthermore the dominant sectarian Arab ruling political parties 
are to blame for the division of the Sudanese people into Muslims versus 
non-Muslims, Arabs versus Africans, Southerners versus Northerners or 
Nubians Fur, or Awalad al Bled versus others, or al Asharaf versus non 
Asharaf etc. 11 
It is to be noted that the dominant sectarian feudal orientated political 
"r 
parties are the main agents-of international financial and commercial 
capital. The members of the said political parties are members of the so- 
called national capitalist or merchant capital and some are also members 
of the 2omprador group. 
There is sufficient evidence to show that the dominant ruling parties are 
to blame for the corruption that has continued to exist in various state 
departments and state corporations. For example, the sectarian dominant 
Arab ruling political parties have been seen to be involved in the 
mismanagement or embezzlement of state material resources with impunity. 
Similar corruptions were quite evident in various state projects and 
corporations in distribution of state controlled agricultural schemes, 
bank loans, contracts, scholarships, appointments to state super scales, 
promotions to leadership posts etc. 12 In addition, the dominant political 
parties have been able to corrupt various liberal democratic 
institutions, such as rigging the general elections in some voting 
stations in 1986, and in the use of Parliamentary members and 
institutions, not for national interests but for the sectarian family 
interests. They have also been able to corrupt the judicial and the 
police institutions. 
The consequences of all these failures has been the breakdown of the law, 
characterized by the emergence of various violent gangsters engaged in 
armed robberies within the urban centres which were once peaceful and 
secure towns, the breakdown of state power and credibility characterized 
by the failure of the state to impose law and order, to protect state and 
public property and various financial institutions from the corrupt 
political leaders. 
It is important to point out at this juncture that the dominant sectarian 
Arab ruling political parties have been able to corrupt other political 
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parties from the backward areas, and made them dependent on themselves. 
They have also been responsible for political instability in the country, 
because of disagreements and political struggles within all the coalition 
governments which they themselves have always found. These struggles and 
competition among political parties in the Sudan usually take the racial, 
class, ethnic, religious, tribal or regional lines. In most cases the 
struggles become bitter and violent. To the people of the national 
groupings from whom the rulers come, the problem appears in its true 
light as a class struggle. But to the people of the national groupings in 
the backward areas who are excluded from power, the problem appears as 
one of the struggle between their people on the one hand and the whole 
national grouping in power on the other. 
The consequence of these conflicts was the emergence of more tension 
expressed through racist alliances rather than class alliances between 
the members of the less developed areas and the dominant ruling parties 
and members of their national grouping. The dominant national grouping 
which tends to reply with repression, attempts to justify its policies by 
appealing to the national sentiments of the masses of their national 
grouping, seeking to rally them against the opposing national grouping as 
"separatists" or "imperialist stooges" or "foreign agents". The outcome 
of the struggle was that the issue of social progress was lost sight of, 
and consequently the oppressed and the exploited masses in the whole 
country are not only effectively divided but are locked in a state of 
violence directly against each other, and the dominant sectarian 
bourgeois political parties are safe and strong, while the masses remain 
weak and poor. Here the struggle for social progress is replaced with 
struggle between the contending national groupings, ie. the Arabs and the 
Africans and this in turn created permanent political instability. 
In the following sub-section an attempt will be made to examine the role 
of clientelism, family dominance and oriental despotism in the collapse 
of liberal democracy in the Sudan, especially with regard to the recent 
events which led to a fourth military coup on 30th June. 1989. 
5.4 Clientelism, Dependence and the Southern Sudan Experience 
The origin of the political parties in Southern Sudan is traced to the 
Black Bloc, which arose in 1938. Several Southern Sudanese who took part 
in the founding of the Black Bloc, later founded the first southern 
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political parties. These included Buth Dhieu, Edward Odok Dedigo, Lual 
Deng Kak from upper Nile, Abdallah Adam (or Mangok Mabok), Khamis Mursal 
and Stanislaus Paysama from Bahr el Ghazal, James Tumbara, Benjamin 
Lowki, Korokongwas Hassan and Siricio Iro from Equatoria. It should be 
noted that these people founded the Liberal Party after the British 
colonial authorities had refused to register the Black Bloc as a 
political party on the grounds that it was a racist organization and 
anti-Arab. The formation of the Liberal Party by Southern Sudanese marked 
the division of the indigenous Sudanese into a fragmented, small regional 
grouping. The British policy of isolating Southern Sudan was achieved. 
Both Arab Settlers and British colonial administrators together with the 
Egyptians were against any united front shown by African National groups 
in Sudan. As can be seen from the composition of the Black Bloc, Muslims 
and Christians alike were members, united by anti-colonialism or any 
foreign domination, repression and exploitation. Table 5.3 shows the 
members of the Executive Committee in 1940. According to Dr. Muhammed 
Adam Adham, the founding Chairman of the Black Bloc and the Black 
Cooperative Society who later became the President of the People's 
Democratic Party (which only lasted a short time) Muslims and Christians 
from Southern and Northern Funj, Beja Tribes, people of the Nuba 
Mountains, Fur, Masalit, Zakawa and ex-slaves together worked to 
establish an indigenous political party. 13 
By the end of 1953 the Black Bloc was broken up and members from the 
Western, Khartoum, Eastern and central Sudan were forced to join the Arab 
controlled political parties as appendages, subordinates or weak and 
dependent individuals. The Southern Sudanese who were members of Black 
Bloc were themselves divided into small political groups or parties and 
others joined the sectarian Arab orientated political parties. Abdalla 
Adam (or Mangok Mabok), Akec Khamis Rizgalla, Mica Bol Ciengan and 
Muhammed Adam became members of NUP (these came from Bahr el Gihazal 
Province -a new region). Similarly, Abdel Nabi Abd-al Gader, Simon 
Makuac, James Gatluak Kuny, Nyado Okiech, Bullen Alier Bior and Hassan 
Morgan from Upper Nile province joined the NUP. The politicians, like 
James Tumbara, Redento Ondzi Komar and Korokongwa Hassan from Equatoria 
joined the NUP after feeling that the Black Bloc was not going to receive 
any legal recognition from either the British colonial authorities or the 
post-independent regime-14 
It should be noted that an attempt to reorganize the African National 
group throughout the country under a new political organization, known as 
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Sudanese People's Party was blocked, again by the British. On 18th 
September, 1948 in Omdurman, a new political party was established but 
the colonial authorities refused to register it. Again in 1951 the 
constitution of the party with all democratic objectives was 
presented to the colonial regime, which refused to recognize the new 
party outright. Although this party declared its support for liberal 
democracy and total independence for a Sudanese State, the British 
Colonial authorities and the pro-independent Arab oriented Umma party and 
others, could not accept or support the formation of the Sudanese 
TABLE 5.3: LEADERS OF THE BLACK BLOC. 1938-1953 
--------------------------- 
Name 
-------------- 
Region 
-------------------- 
Position 
--------------------------- 
Dr. M. A. Adham 
-------------- 
Khartoum 
-------------------- 
Chairman 
Ibrahim Alallah it Gen. Secretary 
Abdalla Adam B. G. P. Treasurer 
Buth Dhieu U. N. P. Member 
Edward Odok U. N. P. to 
Siricio Iro Wani Equatoria 
Benjamin Lwoki #I it 
Dr. Z. Al Tain Khartoum it 
Yagub Rahal A. Kadugli Kordofan it 
Abu Bakr Badowi Darfur of 
Muhammed Osman Kassala 
Cyir Rihan B. G. it 
Khamus Murgal It it 
James Tumbara Equatoria it 
Akec Khams Rizqalla B. G. to 
Hassan Morgan B. G. of 
Indris Rafi Khartoum to 
Mohd. Hussian Rihan of 
Stanislaus Abdalla Paysama B. G. P. it 
Abd-Al Nabi Al Gader U. N. P. of 
Idris Rafi Khartoum of 
Hassan Kabsouri of to 
Deng King U. N. P. it 
Kabsan Ajok Khartoum to 
Idris Abu Bakheit B. G. P. of 
Salim Ahmed Khartoum of 
Mossan Khiralla 
---------------------------- 
of 
-------------- 
of 
------------------- 
Source: Prepared from files of Dr. M. A. Adham in Khartoum, 
15/6/87 
People's Party. 15 The leaders of the Sudanese People's Party and those of 
the Black Bloc from Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern and Central Sudan 
were told to join one of the two sectarian Arab orientated political 
parties, namely the Umma and National Unionist parties. 16 The other 
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option was to set up social clubs which were to be non-political. It was 
here that various groups set up tribal cooperative societies. 17 It was 
therefore natural that no parties independent of the sectarian Arab 
parties were again formed by the African National group from so-called 
Northern Sudan until 1965. 
As for the Southern Sudan, those who had rejected or refused to joined 
the sectarian Arab oriented political parties were free to form their own 
political parties on a regional basis. 
It should be noted that the main weakness of the African leaders and 
their political parties was their failure to raise sufficient funds from 
within their local communities in order to finance both the party 
programmes and incidental expenses. The failure of the African national 
group to give financial support to the families of full-time politicians 
who had no material resources meant that they had to struggle on their 
own to meet their elementary needs. 
The British and Egyptian leaders who had given financial support to the 
sectarian Arab families who in turn sponsored the dominant ruling 
parties, had refused to extend similar support to the African national 
groups as represented by the Black Bloc, Sudanese People's Party and 
later the Southern Sudanese political parties, liberal and federal. But 
instead, they advised them to join one of the Arab sectarian political 
parties, ask for financial assistance from them, on the basis of 
alliances, or else they would go without funds. The British and Egyptian 
authorities had hoped that most leaders of the black Bloc would easily 
succumb to the new Arab masters, when they were denied financial 
assistance. Indeed, for several years, most of the leaders of the Black 
Bloc from Khartoum, Kordofan, Darfur, Southern and Northern Funj and 
Eastern Sudan, agreed, supported and joined either NUP or Umma party and 
remained subordinate until 1965, when a new group emerged to continue the 
struggle for self-determination and equal participation in national 
politics. 18 
The Southern Sudanese politicians who were members of the Black Bloc 
established two weak political parties in 1954 - Liberal and Federal 
Parties - which were dependent on both Christian missionaries and the 
dominant sectarian Arab ruling parties on the basis of future cooperation 
etc. The establishment of these parties marked the collapse of the united 
front shown by the African national group in Sudan, and the emergence of 
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very weak, dependent political organizations. For example, the Liberal 
and Federal parties in Southern Sudan were too weak to stop both British 
and Arab political parties from rushing to declare the country 
independent in 1956. The Arab leaders were able to subordinate all the 
African majority in the North by isolating the leaders, accusing them of 
being racist. In addition, economic and political war was declared 
against the African leaders who continued to struggle for equality and 
justice for all Africans. First of all, members of the African National 
Group in the North and the South were denied any credit facilities or 
loans unless they were supporters of the Arab dominant ruling parties. 19 
No member of the African national group was allotted any agricultural 
schemes, with the exception of Philimon Majok, Buth Dhien, Santino Deng 
and Abdel Nabi Al Gader who resigned from their parties to form the Unity 
Party, because their colleagues in the Liberal and Federal Parties were 
standing firm on Federalism as the only system good enough for the Sudan, 
which the Arab national group did not want. Apart from the Schemes and 
other financial awards given to these leaders, they were appointed as 
members of various coalition governments set up by the Umma and the 
(DUP), NUP. Philip Majok was appointed a member of the State Supreme 
Council, a body which represented the Head of State. While Santino Deng 
Teng and Buth Dhieu were appointed Ministers of Wildlife and Public Works 
respectively. 
It is important to note that all Southern Sudanese who were appointed as 
either members of the State Supreme Council or as Ministers in the 
Central Government by the dominant sectarian Arab ruling political 
parties were among those who had succumbed in return for financial 
grants, awards or ministerial positions, against the wishes of the 
Southern Sudanese masses who complained that the Arab national group was 
responsible for the backwardness, under-development and regional 
inequality of Southern Sudan. 20 
This practice continued in Sudan under both military and civilian 
regimes from the post-independence period until the present. It is not of 
course surprising to see the military officers in power and the civilian 
politicians at different times applying similar policies towards Southern 
Sudan. This is possible because the military officers and politicians in 
question come from the same social, political and economic background. 21 
Several personal interviews with some prominent political leaders from 
the Union of Southern and Northern Funj, Nuba Mountains parties, Darfur 
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Development Front, Beja Congress, the old members of the Black Bloc and 
several Southern Sudanese political parties, have indicated that the 
dominant sectarian Arab ruling political parties have always been 
responsible for the break up or internal divisions within their political 
organizations and parties, using 'divide' and 'rule' tactics. 22 This was 
true in Southern Sudan in 1965-1967 when the Liberal and Federal parties 
disintegrated and disappeared, leading to the establishment of unity and 
peace parties which were weak and dependent on the sectarian Arab 
political parties which could not send any member to parliament in the 
general elections of 1965 and 1968 because the Southerners rejected them. 
The return to Liberal Democracy after the overthrow of the military 
regime of Gen. Ibrahim Abbud was followed by the emergence of two 
powerful political parties in Southern Sudan which were quite independent 
of the sectarian dominant Arab ruling political parties. They were the 
Southern Front, composed of intellectuals, who managed to create 
financial resources of their own. (For example the leader of the Southern 
Front was an advocate with a private legal office, while its secretary 
was a journalist who managed to establish a popular daily newspaper, 
which was able to bring in a reasonable or sufficient income for its 
owner). 
The second was the Sudan African National Union (SANU) which emerged in 
1965 and was composed of both new Any-nya leaders and old members of the 
Liberal and Federal parties. Most of the members of SANU were retired 
civil servants and local government officials, who had no reliable 
material resources of their own. It was this weakness which made SANU 
dependent in a way, on the Umma Party. It should be recalled that the 
SANU leadership was divided by external forces during the 1968 general 
elections. This division characterized by the walk-out of the so-called 
'Big six' marked the beginning of the weakness of the party. The 'Big 
Six' which were opposed to the party's participation in the 1968 General 
Election was led by Ambrose Wol Wol Dhal, Lugi Adowk, Alfred Wol, Andrew 
Wei, Samuel Lupai and Elia Duong. The overall leaders of the party, Mr. 
William Deng Nhial was murdered by the sectarian based military group 
near Rumbek Town after his successful re-election in 1968 and his wing 
won 10 territorial seats in the elections when his opponent could not win 
a single seat. 23 
This situation was repeated in 1986 when the Transitional Military 
leaders allowed the formation of new political parties, while the old 
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parties were free to revive their organizations and resume their 
activities. In the Southern Sudan, over ten political parties were formed 
which included SANU, Southern Sudan political Association (SSPA), Federal 
Party, Unity Party, Peace Party, People's Progressive Party (PPP), Sudan 
African People's Congress (SAPCO), Sudan African Congress (SAC), Sudan 
Liberation Party, the Sudan National Action Labour Party and the People's 
Liberation Party. And only five parties managed to win at least one seat 
during the elections. Some of the parties, including the Peace Party, 
Sudan Liberation Party, the Sudan Labour Party and several other wings, 
were almost one man political organizations. 24 
It is important to point out that these five political parties were 
fragmented or divided into various factions, hostile to each other. For 
example, SSPA, PPP, SAPCO, Federal Party, SAC and the Labour Party were 
divided into two factions or more, whereby each faction had to struggle 
to outwit the other faction(s) by appeasing the 'king makers' or the 
dominant sectarian bourgeoisie and feudalist ruling parties, in order to 
appoint whoever they thought won the contest. 25 All the processes of 
contacts and operations involved a great deal of corruption, dishonesty, 
blackmailing or other illegal practices. The 'king makers' as they are 
generally known use all the means within their power to keep almost all 
members of the African national group weak and dependent if not to 
neutralize them to the point of inactivity. The dominant ruling parties 
had to break all the democratic laws and practices by using state 
resources, such as funds, employment or property reward to opponents, who 
resisted domination, exploitation and oppression of all kinds. In some 
cases, the opponents were blackmailed, threats of arrest on false 
charges, or death threats or organized state terror were applied. In 1987 
the number of Southern Sudanese political parties rose to 16 some of 
which did not have any constitution or manifestoes, party premises or 
offices. More than seven of these political parties were only factions 
called 'X's' wing or 'Y's' wing. Again patron-clientilism and dependence 
was fully used. So Southern Sudanese politicians were classified as "good 
guys" and "bad guys". The good guys are those who easily succumb and 
agree to accept unconditionally and carry out the policies or ideas 
passed over to them by the oppressor and the exploiter. 26 Over 98% of 
the Southern Sudanese who have been appointed to Ministerial or 
constitutional positions have always been made from among the "good 
guys". This policy was first used by Ismial al Azhari of NUP, the first 
Prime Minister of Sudan, during the post-independence period, when he 
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appointed Bullen Alier de Bior from Upper Nile and a member of NUP, as a 
Minister after he agreed to join NUP as a client. 27 The second Prime 
Minister from the Umma Party, Abdalla Bey Khalil, used the same tactic 
when he appointed Buth Dhien and Santino Deng Teng as ministers after 
they had supported the Umma Party's programme in 1957 and condemned 
instead the general demand for a federal system of government by Southern 
Sudanese masses. Similarly, Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub and Saddig al Mahdi, 
both from the Umma Party and Prime Ministers from 1965-1969 applied the 
same policy of 'divide' and 'rule' on the Southern Sudanese politicians 
whereby the so-called "good guys" became dominant, in spite of the fact 
that there were very popular Southern Sudanese leaders from SANU and the 
Southern Front which was reflected in the election results of 1965 and 
1968 when most of the "good guys" were defeated. 28 Those who won 
elections from the "good guys" did so through the support of the military 
commanders who had threatened not only the voters but the other 
contending candidates, forcing them to withdraw from elections so that 
the "good guys" could pass as unopposed members. It was because of such 
threats and state organized terrorism in Southern Sudan that led to the 
boycott by the Southern Front of the 1968 elections. And the outcome of 
that was that 25 Arab Sectarian merchants in Equatoria were nominated and 
declared as unopposed members of parliament by the dominant sectarian 
Arab ruling parties who were controlling the elections. 29 
It was therefore not surprising that Saddiq of Mahdi, the leader of the 
Umma Party and then the Prime Minister, Mohammed Osman Mirghani, the 
leader of the democratic Unionist Party and Dr. Turabi the leader of the 
National Islamic Front adopted similar policies towards Southern Sudan in 
the 1986-89 period of civilian rule. What is more apparent and surprising 
is that the dominant sectarian ruling parties continued to use the same 
policies when they are in fact detrimental to national unity, socio- 
economic and political development of the country. Equally apparent is 
the failure of the dominant Arab ruling parties to realize where they had 
gone wrong and to correct the situation. Instead, the sectarian Arab 
national group has insisted on continuing with policies based on unequal 
distribution of economic and political resources and crowned that with a 
policy of Arabization and Islamization of all non-Arab national groups. 
While most Sudanese Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and African majority 
alike, call for unity in diversity, the three sectarian Arab parties 
advocate the imposition of Arabism or Islamism and the Shariah Islamiya 
not only non-Muslims and non-Arabs but on those who have clearly stated 
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that they do not accept and would violently fight against its 
imposition. 30 
These cultural and racial practices have been pursued and justified by 
the three sectarian Arab oriental ruling political parties to protect the 
Arab and Islamic hegemony in Sudan which has been established since 
independence. Although there exists major differences among the above- 
mentioned parties, which are reflected in their various party 
constitutions and manifestoes, they all share a common ideology and agree 
on what to do with current political crises. This will be made more clear 
by comparing the Umma Party's views as outlined by its leaders Saddiq al 
Mahdi, entitled, "Five Ways to Islamize and Arabize Southern Sudan" in 
"Mustaabal el Sudan wa El Araaba fi el Sudan", in the Democratic Unionist 
Party's policy document on Southern Sudan and also in the National 
Islamic Front policy statement on the South as documented by the "Sudan 
Charter"; 
For the Umma Party, Southern Sudan will be inevitably islamized and 
arabized through the following ways: 
A. Through differences among the Southern leaders particularly those 
from the pastoral and agricultural tribes and through mutual 
relations; 
B. Through Islamic scholars (Fukaha) and Northern Traders who go to 
settle in the interior of the South and mix with southerners in a 
friendly way; 
C. Through establishment of economic projects to be financed by the 
North or by the Arabs through the North. This will make Southerners 
develop tangible interests towards the north and the Arab world; 
D. Through settling a large number of southerners in the north so as to 
adapt themselves to the northern environment; 
E. Through introduction of a new consciousness which rejects the idea 
that the Northerners are the number one enemy of the southerners but 
stresses that both the southerners and Northerners are victims of 
imperialism and invasion of "white civilization". This same 
consciousness is now being shared by many African thinkers who are 
anti-imperialist and also by black Americans who have been forced by 
oppression to seek justice in Islam. 31 
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Sayed Saddiq al Mahdi went on say: 
"If there is freedom for propagation of religion, and bitterness 
between the north and the south is removed, these five ways 
which I have suggested will be enough to make Islam spread in 
the southern Sudan. Hence, the movement for the propagation of 
Islam is now required to help in any way to make these 
suggestions become reality and to fight against any behaviour 
of actions aimed at obstructing this process. "32 
Although the above quoted passages are regarded as unofficial views of 
the Umma Party, they are in practice the basis of the official policy of 
the party. In 1987 the Umma Party produced the Sudan Charter which was 
summarized as follows: 33 
"1. Sudan is Arab African and its Arabness extends culturally and 
linguistically. Its Africanness includes everybody by 
citizenship. The race character of Arabism and Africanism are 
denied to be important aspects. 
2. Arabic is the language of communication among all the people 
of Sudan and as Sudan it is an official language of the 
country. 
3. The other non-Arab languages are considered as part of the 
national heritage and to be shelved in the museum. 
4. And that the learning of European and other foreign languages 
are to be encouraged for opening to human civilization. 
5. The learning of African languages that have status in Africa, 
like Bantu (sic) Swahili and Hausa to be encouraged. 
6. Islam to be the state religion and Islamic laws to be the 
basis of legislation. " 
The Umma Party document concluded by stating that: 
".... Arabism has cultural and linguistic contents and 
therefore.... national identification of the Sudan is Arab for 
Arabic is the mother tongue or as an acquired language for the 
majority of the people. "34 
The Democratic Unionist Party does not differ ideologically from the Umma 
Party, nor does it do so with Muslim brothers or National Islamic Front. 
But in principle, each party claims that its approach to solving the 
Sudanese problems does differ from other sectarian Arab orientated 
dominant political parties. In practice, they are all united and 
committed to the same programme of Arabization, Islamization and the 
assimilation of non-Arab national groupings by all means into the Sudan. 
As we shall see, the DUP like the Umma, does not care to consider whether 
or not the African majority though Muslim, does accept being called 
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Arabs, let along being subjected to transformation from an African to an 
Arab personality and attendant racial images. 
The major weakness of the Umma Party has been its failure to recognize 
economic factors as equally important when finding solution to what the 
party terms the South-North conflict. Instead, it is falsely assumed that 
mere processes of Arabization, Islamization and assimilation would lead 
to the solution of the Sudanese problems of inequalities, backwardness 
and under-development. 35 
The DUP policy document on the south outlined in a party memorandum which 
was leaked, circulated and subsequently published and publicly discussed 
among various national groups was summarized in four related headings as 
follows: 36 
"1. In the administrative field: 
we support the continuation of the policy which keeps the South 
divided into three economically fragile regions that will 
continue to depend on the central government and Islamic relief 
organizations for their economic and financial needs. In this 
respect, we would like to correct the wrong impression of many 
people who attribute the division of the south into three 
regions in 1983 to the personal initiative of the deposed 
president alone. Despite our many disagreements with him over a 
wide range of his policies, some of which proved to be very 
tragic, it is important to stress that the leadership of the 
party fully supported all measures that he undertook in order 
to divide the south into three regions. This policy of divide 
and rule is at this crucial moment the ideal policy and the 
right step towards the realization of the establishment of an 
Islamic and Arab State throughout the Sudan. 
2. In the political field: 
The party leadership is fully aware of the separatist tendencies 
among the people of Equatoria Region, who deeply hate Islam and 
Arabism. Like the natives of the Nuba Mountains, they have been 
far removed from direct contacts with Arabic influences, a 
factor which in their specific case prompted their first mutiny 
in 1955 in Torit, which escalated into a full- scale racist and 
separatist movement led by Joseph Lago up to 1972. 
In spite of all this we in the Democratic Unionist party decided 
to control the political parties which currently based in the 
Equatoria region, ie. the PPP (Peoples Progressive Party), led 
by Eliaba James Surur, and SAPCO (Sudan African People's 
Congress) led by Morris Lawiya. Although these parties are 
associated with Umma Party, our support for them is based on 
our objective of keeping the south divided into three regions 
and by our desire to establish a base in Equatoria from which 
we can counteract the ferocious assault upon Islam by Christian 
missions currently established in Uganda, Kenya and Zaire, this 
is in addition to the need of making a strong stand against the 
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dangers posed by the communist regime in Ethiopia. This is the 
background to a lunch held by Sayed Mohd. Osman el Mirghani at 
his home to which he invited the leaders and MPs of the 
People's Progressive Party and also to the support which our 
party has given to Dr. Pacifico Labk's (of SAPCO) membership of 
the Supreme Council of State as representative of the whole 
south. 
On the security side, the coalition government of which we 
constitute a main partner has initiated a policy of arming 
tribal militias in the Equatoria Region, this is in addition to 
our arrangement of the Nuer, who have a more advanced militia 
of their own, Anya-nya Two, or the friendly forces, as they are 
known in Upper Nile Region. These forces have proven their 
military value to the government forces, particularly when they 
recently overwhelmed the forces of Garang and overran their 
camp at Bokteng. Generally our militia policy aims at creating 
a security belt against aggression from the forces of atheism 
and Christian colonialism under the leadership of John Garang, 
the deserter who does not bother to conceal his hatred of 
Arabism and Islam. 
3. In the economic field: 
Our use of Arab money for the advancement of Islam and Arab 
culture in the south has not been in vain. The building of 
Islamic centres, Khalawi schools and modern hospitals in the 
south in general and Equatoria in particular, is part of a 
well-conceived plan that has been long supported by our Party. 
It has been our long term objective to train Muslim Cadres 
through whom we can ensure control over the most important 
political and economic institutions so that we can reach a 
point when the whole area of Equatoria may be converted into an 
Arab and Muslim land from which the light of Islam can spread 
into the jungles of Africa south of the Sahara. 
4. Arabic language: 
It is our top priority to speed up the spread of Arabic language 
throughout the south and in the Nuba Mountains. In this era of 
modern national identities the importance of language as a 
means of consolidating the Arab and Islamic culture is obvious. 
At this stage our objective of spreading the Arabic language in 
the south and in the Nuba mountains where Paganism predominates 
will be aided by the expansion of audio-visual means to 
incorporate these areas. We regard the spread of Arabic in 
these areas as part of Jihad (Holy War) for the sake of Allah 
and Arab nationalism. " 
The DUP document went on to stress that the party will have a similar 
policy for Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Southern and Northern Funj, which 
the party suspects to have the same tendency which southern nationalists 
have shown. In addition to that, the document concludes that: 
it.... we must not accept the.... idealism of the Umma Party and 
other Muslim groups who currently call for the re-unification 
of the Southern provinces.... we therefore fear that the re- 
unification of the Southern regions will strengthen the 
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political solidarity of the southerners and lead to their 
eventual secession. This could be followed by the secession of 
the other areas, such as the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and 
Southern Funj Districts of the Blue Nile. 
The continued division of the Southern regions into three will 
provide a chance for the minority ethnic groups in the south, 
who have suffered from the oppression and domination of the 
larger tribal groups a chance to be incorporated within the 
Muslim fold, providing a chance (for us) to address the 
international community according to the principles outlined in 
the Quran..... "37 
These passages are quite sufficient evidence to support what we have 
described above as Arab settler colonialism or internal colonialism which 
the world in general and Africa in particular failed to see or to accept 
whenever some members of the African national group could find the chance 
of telling them what they have been experiencing hitherto. 
It should be noted that the dominant sectarian Arab ruling parties 
represented by the Umma Party and DUP and later joined by the National 
Islamic Front as the third largest political party in the constituent 
assembly were themselves undemocratic in their various activities and 
relations with their semi-slave subjects, and the Sudanese masses at 
large. The human rights records of various elected parliamentary civilian 
governments were never different from the military ones. For example 
emergency laws were found to be used by both civilian and military 
governments of General Abbud and also under Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub and 
Sadiq al Mahdi between 1965-1969 and from 1986-1969. Similarly, General 
Nimiere, Sahar al Dahab and Omer Bashir still did not differ in the use 
of emergency laws. In each case, the abuses of human rights, social and 
legal injustices have been high. The main reasons for the weakness of 
liberal democracy in Sudan could therefore be reduced to two. 
-- the first contradiction is that the very dominant ruling parties who 
were supposed to protect liberal democracy were responsible for its 
collapse or downfall. This was because the main ideology of the 
dominant ruling parties was oriental despotism and combined with 
strong elements of feudalism, which are all antithesis and 
contradictory to the principles of liberal democracy. 38 
-- The second important weakness or contradiction is the absence of 
strong checks and balances in the institutions under the said liberal 
democratic regimes which could protect the system and the people. 39 
It was therefore understandable therefore, that the absence of a strong 
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parliament and judiciary in Sudan led to the consolidation of various 
feudal patron-clientele and oriental despotic features of the Arab 
sectarian based communities. 
In brief, both Umma Party and DUP have been using their own undemocratic 
programmes full of injustices and illegal practices. For example, 
according to the transitional constitution made by the military regime of 
Sahar al Dahab, the Southern three regions were dissolved and merged into 
one region to be ruled by a single regional president of H. E. C. Because 
such a decision was opposed by DUP, Umma and the National Islamic Front, 
this part of the constitution was not implemented, regardless of the 
demand by the interim president of the High Executive Council that his 
government should move to Juba at once. Similarly, the elected coalition 
government of Umma Party and DUP failed to implement the same thing 
without using parliamentary ways and means. Instead, the government 
violated the constitution approved by the constituent assembly and 
instituted the Southern council, which was constitutionally illegal. 40 
The Southern council which was composed of nearly 25 ministers and 
advisers headed by a president had no function, since there were no 
ministries nor departments which they could supervise. As for the three 
Southern regions, there were appointed one Governor with five ministers 
in each region which were independent of the Southern Council. In 
practice, both the Southern Council and the regional governors were 
answerable to the central government under the control of the Arab 
sectarian ruling parties. In addition, the Southern Council's president 
and his ministers without ministries were given offices, state cars, 
state houses, huge ministerial salaries and VIP status. Because the 
Southern Council was illegally instituted, it had no approved budget but 
the state had to raise funds through various illegal means. 41 
The other most important constitutional aspect which the elected 
government did not consider nor bring to parliament for discussion was 
the legal situation in Southern Sudan. 
Following the abolition of the existing laws by General Nimiere and their 
replacement with Shariah law, the Southern Sudan found itself without any 
laws when the three regional Assemblies and regional governments refused 
to implement Shariah laws within their respective regions, regardless of 
the demands by the president to implement them. So for six years Southern 
Sudan has been without laws. The constitution which allowed the formation 
of a Southern High Executive Council and a regional parliament was not 
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implemented in full. And so the state of law and order collapsed in the 
Southern regions. The Governors, regional ministers and the provincial 
commissioners became corrupt and no law existed to try them with. The 
Islamic laws which were adopted in Northern Sudan were not applied in the 
south. Criminals could not be tried and nothing could be done to try the 
cases or set free those who were detained and held indefinitely in the 
prisons throughout the Southern regions. In June, 1987, Juba prison was 
broken down by the untried prisoners and most of them, including those 
who might have committed serious crimes like murder or theft, escaped. 
For political reasons which were to serve the interests of the dominant 
ruling parties, the said authorities became blind and did not care to 
punish law breakers in the south. In 1986-89, corruption in the three 
southern regions reached its highest level, with almost every governor, 
minister, commissioner director etc. being involved in some kind of 
corruption and embezzlement of public funds. And yet the Prime Minister 
(Umma Party) and the state president of the supreme council (DUP) who had 
appointed the above mentioned governors, ministers, commissioners and 
others from among their selected stooges, within various political wings, 
and did nothing to correct the situation in spite of popular calls from 
the people of Southern Sudan to bring them to justice. Where actions were 
taken to dismiss those publicly found to have embezzled funds, including 
salaries of regional government employees, no cases were opened by the 
central government prosecutor against them. Instead, they were allowed to 
go free on the grounds that they remained loyal to national unity as 
prescribed by the dominant sectarian Arab ruling parties. 42 It was under 
such practices that corruption, favouritism, nepotism, embezzlement of 
public funds, illegal distribution of various essential commodities 
including sugar, rice, and double zero or wheat flour and other crimes 
like black marketeering etc. became the normal or common practice in the 
whole country. 43 
The National Islamic Front in its policies and actions was no different 
from those of the Umma Party and DUP described above. In their political 
programme of action documented the "Sudan Charter", the NIF supports all 
Islamization, Arabization, assimilation and other unjust practices. 
Although the Sudan Charter contains some rational and reasonable 
proposals for solving Sudan's problems, the practical activities and 
decisions made and implemented by the leaders of the Islamic National 
Front were (and still are) not different from those made the Umma Party 
and DUP, already discussed above. The National Islamic Front or Muslim 
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Brothers' main differences with other Arab Islamic parties stem from 
their organization and structures under which they operate. 
The National Islamic Front, which is composed of the best educated 
members of Arab National groups, was also one of the richest political 
organizations in Sudan with more than 30 banks or commercial banks, with 
dozens of branches throughout the country, with the exception of Bahr el 
Gihazal and Upper Nile regions in the south. In addition, the NIF is the 
most organized and active Islamic religious party in the country. It has 
established the first Islamic Missionary organization in the world, known 
as Dawa al Isßamiyya (and whose objectives include the winning of 
converts from non-Arab nationalities in Africa, to Arabism and Islamism). 
Armed with billions of USA dollars contributed to it by the rich Arab 
states and its control of the judiciary, the police, the army, and 
government of the day, the NIF was able to mobilize all Muslim 
intellectuals and control commercial enterprises throughout the country, 
building several hundred mosques and Islamic centres where the processes 
of Arabization, Islamization and assimilation were commonly carried out. 
To further their control over the poor and urban destitute people, the 
NIF managed to control, the relief agencies both government and private, 
carried out by the Dawaa al Islamiyya. Here the Muslim brothers carry 
with the left hand, swords, guns, daggers etc. while in the right food, 
cloth, money etc., the Quran and the Shariah Islamiyya, both to be given 
to whoever accepts the package. 
The main success of the NIF stems from two items: 
1. using relief facilities to win over the poor with short-term 
benefits; 
2. using its ability to mobilize and penetrate the poor. 
In this connection the Muslim brothers converted the Muslim five prayers 
a day into five political and religious meetings a day and the Friday 
general Muslim worship day into an Islamic general conference or congress 
every week to discuss, propose, and plan all the future political and 
socio-economic programmes for the Arab Islamic state in Sudan where the 
African Majority was to be reduced to slavery. 44 
For NIF Southern Sudan was war zone I where Arab and Islamic power must 
be used in order to defeat the forces of evil and western imperialism. 44 
To achieve it the policy of divide and rule should be used to the 
259 
maximum. And it was here that the National Islamic Front came out with a 
policy of accommodation of corrupted southerners who should be used to 
destroy those non-corrupt southerners. The NIF had to agree to establish 
a federal system against its own will and to accommodate even those 
southern priests who have been excommunicated from their own churches 
because of immorality and accommodated them provided that they accepted 
the terms laid down by the NIF. As a result, the NIF mobilized the 
southern Muslims in order to fight other non-Muslim southerners -a 
project which continues until now unsuccessfully. Yet the Islamic Front 
in its coalition government with Umma Party and DUP in 1988, appointed a 
Southern Sudanese driver as a regional minister of education, simply 
because he was a die-hard supporter of the NIF who had elevated him to 
the highest position which he could possibly dream to reach in his 
lifetime, given his educational background and local, political and 
economic resources. 45 
If space would allow, the evidence could continue indefinitely, but since 
this is beyond the scope of this present work, it suffices to say that 
the dominant sectarian Arab political parties which have been controlling 
the political and socio-economic powers in Sudan have been responsible 
for the emergence of corrupt Southern Sudanese political leaders. And 
because the whole system of government in Sudan has been based on 
nepotism, feudalism, sectarianism, oriental despotism and capitalism, it 
was natural that the Sudanese problems already defined have continued to 
grow daily. This has made any peaceful solution very difficult to attain. 
Finally, in general political parties in Sudan are fragmented into 
factions. The most affected political parties are those from the under- 
developed areas, which are too divided and weak to face the Arab dominant 
political parties. And because of such divisions and weaknesses, the 
parties from the Southern and Northern Funj, Nuba Mountains, Darfur, 
Eastern and Southern Sudan have become dependent on the ruling parties. 
That is why the Islamic ruling parties have apparently transformed Sudan 
into a nation of shopkeepers or merchants who are constantly involved in 
raiding public funds (ie embezzlement) and public property with impunity, 
and using public wealth as if they were the state and the people of Sudan 
their commodities, and this takes us to the slave-raid mentality. It was 
found that there was no limit in the use of public property and funds. 
Almost all civil servants, police, prison warders and army officers and 
men are busily engaged in one way or another in various trades, both 
black and white markets through the day and night and the state's work 
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apparently came to stand still. In Khartoum it was found out that 
individuals and groups own either taxis or pick-up cars for hire, or 
lorries on hire and/or retail tea and coffee shops being personally 
operated (such as drivers or sellers by members etc. The explanation 
given by those interviewed vary from person to person but the common 
answer was that a government salary does not meet the expenses or family 
needs, such as house rent, food for the family, transport for children to 
and from school, plus their medical care, clothes. In short, state 
salaries do not meet the basic necessities of life for the state 
employees, whatever the scale, including the highest paid state employee, 
let alone the lowest and in order to supplement, it is necessary (so goes 
the claim) to use any means to raise extra income. When we investigated 
the prices of commodities in the market, meals in schools, clothes, meat, 
cooking oil, sacks of grain or wheat flour, it was found that prices have 
increased in the white market by more than 500%, while on the black 
market (which is the most prevalent) prices have increased more than 
1000%. The explanation given by the black marketeers is that the goods 
are sold from the black markets and sold in the same market just to gain 
a paister ('geriesh'). 
The consequences of this situation for state employees is that anything 
that can be sold, be it state or private property, is used to make money. 
Here the most affected area is law and order, for there is nobody left in 
the country who can enforce law and order genuinely, for the Joint Stock 
Company has corrupted and would always corrupt everybody in order to 
survive in the midst of crime. 
Another consequence is that no one could be involved in carrying out a 
genuine function of state (which might even solve the problems facing the 
national in general). Out of all the confusion the interests of the 
merchants, shopkeepers and their supporters would tremendously increase, 
and thereby more people would be brought under the system using various 
ways until all are integrated into the system of corruption and this 
system creates political instability first, and because the system can 
only survive through the crises mentioned. Secondly, because the 
oppressed, the exploited, the destitute are weak and could not liberate 
themselves unless an alliance is made between the progressive workers 
intelligentsia, peasants etc. in order to defeat the dominant sectarian 
Arab ruling national group. 
As explained it was not surprising to find that in Sudan the bourgeois 
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sectarian ruling classes were in full control of the following: 
1. religious organizations; 
2. media, which in modern society means radio, TV, newspapers and all 
forms of advertising; 
3. educational system; 
4. legal system and the courts; 
5. control of jobs and coopting many potentially dissident workers into 
top positions to pressure and condition people into a pro-business 
frame of mind; 
6. family, the institution that transmits the need for 'discipline' and 
'respect' in order to get ahead in the working world; 
7. the state corporations, national research council, national 
population council, national health commission, election commission 
and many others; 
8. the national, specialized and private banks. 
It is the control of the above institutions and sectors by one national 
group that led to the emergence of inequalities or imbalances. As a 
consequence, those who control the economic and financial institutions, 
as well as the political institutions control the advancement of all 
Sudanese people, economically, socially and publicly. For example, in 
Khartoum the author found that almost all Southern political parties (16 
in number) were dependent on the Arab parties, Umma Party, DUP, and the 
National Islamic Front, which are the richest parties in the country. The 
SSPA with 8 MPs was dependent on the Umma Party, which gave the party 3 
cars, and to pay the rest of the building being used as the main party 
headquarters. The executive of the party composed of 40 members, was 
supposed to manage the affairs of the party including raising of funds 
from the supporters with the exception of the 8 MPs, the rest of the 
members of the executive including the president, vice president, 
secretary and treasurer were unemployed and depending on private sources. 
These private sources mostly came from the rich northern political 
leaders, who had to bargain with the poor southern politicians. In other 
words, any financial assistance received by Southern politicians was 
linked to political promises or bargains, ie. to support the policies put 
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forward by the financiers, otherwise, the financial support would cease. 
5.5 The Military and its Intervention in Sudanese Politics 
The origin of modern Sudanese Military institution is traced to the 
Anglo-Egyptian rule which lasted for 60 years. The functions of the 
military varied during the colonial period and the neo-colonial era. 
Ahmed Al-Awad Muhammed had documented that 
"The primary function of the Sudan Defence Force which determined 
its distribution, strength and organization was the maintenance 
of internal security. "45 
The British colonial authorities in the Sudan before and after the 1924 
uprising in Khartoum and elsewhere in the country, divided the country 
into five military zones, namely East, North, Central, West and the 
South, demarcated on the basis of internal security. 47 Troops were placed 
so as to deal expeditiously with local resistance, such as Dinka, Aliab, 
Atuot and many others. They were made up of Sudanese soldiers, while 
British and Arab Officers were in command. The same was true of the later 
uprisings of 1927-36 in Western and Southern Sudan. Equatoria Corps were 
used to suppress any resistance throughout the South, while Western Arab 
Corps were used against any local uprising in the Nuba Mountains and 
Darfur areas. 48 The common examples in this latter case include the Jebel 
Julud and Temein operations of 1926 and operations against Mek Kabango of 
Jebel el Liri in the same year, all in Nuba Mountains; Nong Nuer 
operations and Luo Nuer operations both in 1927-8, where locally 
recruited soldiers of the Sudan defence force were used to massacre their 
own people under the orders of colonial officers. 49 But where the 
indigenous members of the army refused to accept orders from their 
colonial superiors, a serious confrontation would arise, like the one of 
1924, when some Sudanese soldiers refused to shoot other Sudanese until 
the British soldiers were brought to fight. And afterwards, the Sudanese 
in the army before 1924 were disbanded and a new loyal group was created 
from among allies and collaborators who were absolutely trusted by the 
colonial masters. 50 Table 5.4 shows the total number of the Sudanese 
units within the Egyptians in 1924. 
The Black soldiers or returnees, who were slaves, took the greater part 
in the reconquest of Sudan. Because of their historical link with the 
Egyptians former masters, their nationalism as free Sudanese was always 
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TABLE 5.4: SUDANESE UNITS OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN 1920 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
officers 
Unit Station Men British Sudanese 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mounted Infantry 
Company Shendi, Shambat 570 
Maxim Gun battery El Obied, Bara, Medani 820 
9th Sudanese Bat. Port Sudan, Omdurman 892 
10th Talodi, Delling, Kadugti , 
Dalamy 881 
11th " Omdurman 901 
12th " Malakal, Akobo, Nasir, 
Pibor 789 
13th Wau, Awiel, Loryok 759 
14th Medani, Singa, Roseris, 
Kurmuk 802 
Eastern Arab Corps Kassak, Gedarif, 
Gallabat, Abu Julab 870 
Western " El Kashio, Nyala, Keb 
Kabia, zalingi, Geneina 805 
Equatoria Corps Mongola, Loka, Oktos, 
Tumbra, Tali, Torit, 
Yambio 831 
Other Units 334 
- - ------------- 
TOTAL 
------------- 
------- 
------- 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
--- ------- -------------- 
9,254 106 233 
-------------------------- 
Source: A. H. Muhammed, Sudan Defence Force:: Origin and Role 1925-1955 
Occasional Paper No. 18, Institute of African and Asian 
Studies 
denied them for political reasons by both the British Colonial 
authorities, who feared them because of their superior stand in the army. 
The Arab elements who sold them to the Egyptians after bloody raids, were 
also afraid now that these black soldiers would chase them out of the 
country and they had to work hard for their elimination, most of which 
was achieved between 1920-1930. It is important to note what role the 
Egyptians themselves had to play when they failed to take over, after 
they had deceived the black soldiers into joining. By the end of 1927, of 
all six Sudanese battalions more than 4000 men and officers shown in the 
above table were completely eliminated from the army and replaced by 
military police. The main reason for getting rid of the black soldiers 
was that they were responsible for the 1924 popular uprising in which 
several hundred people died on both sides. 51 
The establishment of a new Sudan Force after the elimination of the black 
soldiers was marked by uneven recruitment of both officers and men from 
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Southern and Western Sudan. It marked the emergence of regional 
inequality in the development of military and police forces. The creation 
of four Arab military corps in Central, Eastern, Northern and Western 
Sudan composed entirely of Arab officers and black soldiers was crucial 
in the underdevelopment of those regions in terms of the uneven 
representation in the Sudanese army. 
In Southern Sudan the situation was far worse as the British were hostile 
to some tribes and this influenced their intake both to military college 
and into the army generally. Muhammed asserted that: 
"Colonial powers developed an ethnic imbalance when recruiting to 
fashion what they believed to be politically reliable 
organizations. They recruited and enlisted personnel from 
tribal groups of remote areas.... Consequently one tribe or 
group of tribes formed the major strength of the unit. "52 
The consequences of such a policy was that those tribes considered as 
enemies of the colonial regime were not allowed to join the Sudan Defence 
Forces. So in Eastern Sudan, Bari Amio which actually belonged to Eritrea 
(Ethiopia) were recruited, while the indigenous Beja tribesmen were 
prevented from joining and the military corps established in their area 
was given an Arab name because the Arabs were British agents against the 
Beja tribes for the simple reason that the Beja were resisting 
Arabization, assimilation and colonialism. Therefore the British had to 
strengthen the Arabs against their long-time enemies. 
In the central Sudan, the Fung and the Ingesna tribes were deprived of 
entry into the army because of the resistance of Anglo-Egyptian colonial 
forces and were therefore considered to be enemies. So the Arab tribes 
were selected and recruited in Central Region and employed to oppress the 
non-Arab tribes. 
In Western Sudan, the Arab tribes, such as Bani Helba, Habania, the 
Rezaigqat, Ta'aiyyaha and others were recruited in great numbers, while 
African tribes were represented by a small number of soldiers none of 
whom were officers. 
The Northern region Arab military corps was equally composed of Arab and 
Arabized elements from those families which were collaborators with the 
British Colonial regime. The recruitment was mostly limited to one Arab 
tribe known as Shaigiyya which had been used by various foreign invaders 
(in particular the Turco-Egyptian colonial forces and the Anglo-Egyptian 
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forces). A few from other tribes, especially friendly families, were 
recruited. 
53 
The same policy was equally applied in Southern Sudan where the Nilotic 
tribes were mostly affected. Muhammed pointed out that: 
".... the major tribes in this area were Dinka and the Nuer who 
were a constant and major threat to the Britý4h. Therefore, 
the British recruited from minority tribes. " 
It is quite clear from the above quoted passage as well as the others 
already referred to that the consequences of the 1924 mutiny was 
responsible for the disbandment of all ex-slave soldiers and other black 
soldiers who were in the force. 
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Furthermore, other ex-slaves of Sudanese origin who were hostile to the 
British authorities and took part in the events of 1924 were eliminated 
from the army. This is no different from the situation mentioned above 
because Sudan was a British colony and the military police and civil 
sectors of the colonial administration were geared towards the serving of 
the colonial interests and those Sudanese collaborators or allies. 
Secondly, like other ex-colonies, Sudan had a neo-colonial state which is 
just as weak. 
We will argue in the following section that the Sudan army is unique and 
has certain features that differentiate it in a way from other neo- 
colonial armies. The main point of difference will be shown by the 
colonial and imperialist mentality of the military leadership which is 
mainly composed of the members of the Arab settler group who, like the 
other Arab national groupings within the civilian sector, advocate and 
impose repressive exploitative and dominative polices. The processes of 
repression, exploitation, suppression and domination are carried out by 
the military always following its usurpation of political power by force. 
And in all military regimes in the Sudan, the African National has been 
under-represented because of uneven recruitment of both officers and men 
to the army. 
This unjust and uneven recruitment had affected most of the black 
Africans in the country. The Black Africans in Western and Eastern Sudan, 
plus Southern and Northern areas were recruited as soldiers only, while 
their officers were recruited from among the Arab settlers. This unjust 
system was equally inherited and subsequently adopted by the neo-colonial 
state after independence. Here we can conclude that the uneven 
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recruitment or imbalance representation of indigenous Africans in the 
Sudan National Army, Police, Prisons and other state Departments which 
were created by the British colonial regime, has continued throughout the 
subsequent neo-colonial regimes. It is therefore important to stress here 
that although over 70% of soldiers in the National army are members of 
African National groups, specially Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Southern 
Sudan, yet 90% of the officers in both the national army and the police 
are members of the Arab national group. And that the above mentioned 
imbalance continued to prevail under both military and elected 
parliamentary regimes. 
It is therefore clear that the military in Sudan is not autonomous nor 
independent of political parties, which are in fact responsible for 
recruitment of officer cadets. It is common knowledge that the intake to 
the military college is usually done in various houses, mosques, shops or 
in social gatherings where each dominant Arab sectarian party is given a- 
quota to fill with names of its supporters. Those who have no link or 
relation with the current leaders of the government of the day - military 
or civilian - will not send anyone into military college, unless 
corruption is used involving bribery costing thousands of Sudanese pounds 
to those in key positions. 56 
As regards the class nature of the military, it is to be noted that there 
are no fundamental differences between those bureaucrats and civil 
servants in general terms who also depend on the system of government as 
well. 
This argument is based on the experience of the Sudanese case, whereby 
all the military interventions were engineered or organized by the 
civilian leaders who had some family or religious or class affiliation 
with army officers. In other words, military intervention in Sudanese 
politics were all instigated or planned by prominent leaders of the 
dominant ruling parties who were afraid of socio-economic and political 
change being demanded by the working classes and the leaders of the 
African national group. The well-known successful military takeovers with 
Umma party support include the Gen. Ibrahim Abboud's coup ddktat'of 1958. 
The Prime Minister felt that the status quo was in danger and the 
military officers affiliated to the party were asked to save the 
community. Gen. Nimiere's coup d'etat was the second to be supported by 
the Umma party, though by another Prime Minister whose power was removed 
following a family agreement between Imma al Hadi al Mahdi and his 
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brother's son. Saddiq al Mahdi to share political power between them and 
therefore the Prime Minister in question was prepared to hand political 
power over to his son-in-law and his cousin rather than leave it with the 
Mahdi family. 
Similarly Mahgoub who saw that two different coups were imminent (one 
under the communist party and the other under supporters of the Black 
Bloc), thought it wise to give power to those who would maintain the 
status-quo - the pan-Arabist officers under Col. Nimiere in alliance with 
Umma and DUP affiliated officers. 
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The third military take-over was made by Lt. Gen. Sahar al Dahab, who 
declared his government to be transitional, to retain power until free 
and democratic elections could take place. The transitional period was 
just a year. It should be noted that the military intervention of 1985 
was a palace coup made by the Defence Minister. He was not only conscious 
of the status quo but was a member of the Muslim Brothers whose entire 
leadership (ie. 200 including the president) was detained by the then 
state president, Nimiere, following a disagreement over the application 
of Sharia Law in 1985.58 Furthermore, Gen. Sahar al Dahab who became the 
President of the TMC told his supporters that he had assumed power 
because a group of radical junior army officers were about to take the 
country over by force. 
The fourth military takeover in the Sudan, on 30th June. 1989, when Brig. 
Hassan Bashir took power, supported by only 300 officers and soldiers out 
of nearly 60.000 officers and soldiers. The coup d' etat in question was 
engineered by the National Islamic Front, whose leaders resigned in March 
1989 following an agreement between DUP and Umma parties to form a 
government of national unity which would include all small parties, plus 
the communist party, and the Union of Sudan African parties and various 
political wings which had been created since 1986. It is to be noted that 
the agreement in question was apparently imposed on the Umma party's 
leader, who was then the Prime minister of the three party coalition 
government by another group of army officers, affiliated to both DUP and 
Umma Party and other progressive groups who had supported peace 
initiatives agreed between DUP, and SPLA/SPLM, which was meant to end the 
civil war in Sudan after certain conditions were implemented by the State 
and which included the abolition of the Sharia Laws. These Laws had been 
decreed by Gen. Nimiere in 1983 and endorsed by Gen. Sahar al Dahab in 
1985. with Southern Regions being exempted by the latter. 
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Again, there is sufficient evidence to show that the June 30th Coup was 
organized by the National Islamic Front supported by the Prime Minister, 
the leader of the Umma Party, who after the coup sent a written letter of 
support, but asked the coup leaders to allow him to go free, since his 
views did not contradict theirs. So the arrest of the Prime Minister and 
of the leader of the National Islamic Front, Dr. Turabi was considered by 
observers as a cover up or camouflage. The appointment of well known NIF 
members as Ministers, Ambassadors, Senior Military and police officers, 
Under-secretaries of various important ministries and departments, 
Chairman of state corporations and various people's committees, the 
release from detention of well known corrupted members of NIF, and Dr. 
Turabi, leader of NIF and the order to apply the Shariah Islamic Laws on 
all Sudanese are enough evidence to show that the June coup was made by 
the National Islamic Front. 
However, a survey by the author of the socio-economic and political 
background of each of these four military interventions in Sudanese 
politics, has indicated that all leaders of the coups can still be seen 
to be members of various sectarian Arab oriented political parties or 
religious families who came to power because they felt that the political 
economic and military hegemony of the ruling families and/or national 
groupings was being threatened. Furthermore, the policies and the 
activities carried out by each military regime remains the same, and all 
confirm out statement that the military institutions in Sudan could never 
be autonomous or independent of the state and sectarian dominant ruling 
parties. Of course, there are individual officers and intellectuals who 
hold differing views and ideologies from the majority of the army 
officers. 59 
A brief examination of various policies, political programmes, 
composition of various cabinets or governments of the said military 
regimes has confirmed our arguments. 67 Furthermore, the study of Military 
takeovers has confirmed that all military regimes which have held power 
in Sudan were found to support and impose policies advocated by sectarian 
Arab political parties, and this includes Islamization, Arabization, 
oppression, exploitation and expropriation of various material resources, 
which in the end reinforces regional disparities and uneven development 
in Sudan, with African national groups as the most affected peoples of 
the Sudan. 
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It will be seen that the experience of Southern Sudan, the role of the 
military regimes in the current crises was not different from that of 
sectarian Arab Islamic ruling parties. 
5.6 The Military and the Underdevelopment of Southern Sudan 
Uneven development and regional disparities were not limited to the field 
of economic, educational or political development alone, but also 
involved the military and the police. The uneven recruitment of soldiers 
and officers in the south goes back to British colonial rule, and was 
later continued by the neo-colonial state and its military institutions. 
The Equatoria Military Corps, which was established in 1925 in Southern 
Sudan was the first organized military unit in that area. The force of 
831, has remained without a single local officer for nearly three 
decades. Although there were Southern Sudanese officers, the British 
refused to transfer them to the South on the grounds that the officers in 
question were Arabized and Islamized as well as assimilated into Arab 
culture. For example, officers like Abdalla Adam, Attah Mohd both from 
Rumbek, Hassan Kabsaun al Ajack, Mohd Khamis from Geogrial, just to 
mention a few, were not allowed to enter Southern Sudan until 1947, when 
the Southern policy was reversed. 61 
The first Southern Sudanese to be recruited as officers into the Sudan 
Defence Force, took place in 1953 before Sudanization of the state 
apparatus was carried out. So by the time Sudanization was complete in 
1954, there were nine junior officers from Southern Sudan in the Sudan 
Defence Force and these were stationed in Southern provinces. At this 
time, there were 24 Northern (Arab) Sudanese officers, most of them in 
higher positions as senior commanding officers of those garrisons in the 
three Southern provinces of Bahr el Ghazal Equatoria and Upper Nile. The 
names of Southern Sudanese officers were as follows: 
There were 24 Northern (Arab) Sudanese, and the commanders of all 
military garrisons through Sudan after Sudanization in 1955 were taken 
from among them only. This was reflected in the number of Southern 
Sudanese soldiers who formed the minority within the Sudan Defence Force, 
ie. 1770 out of nearly 10,000 soldiers. 62 
Southern Sudanese were equally under-represented in the police force, 
both officers and men. All the Southern officers were of junior rank and 
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the commandant was an Arab from the North. There were four junior police 
TABLE 5.5: DISTRIBUTION OF SOUTHERN SUDANESE OFFICERS IN 1955 
WITHIN EQUATORIA MILITARY CORPS, NAMES AND RANKS 
---- 
No. 
---- 
--------------------- 
Name 
--------------------- 
------------------ 
Rank 
------------------ 
--------------------- 
Province 
--------------------- 
1 Ali Gatala. 2nd Lt. Equatoria 
2 Mobi Allah " 
3 Mandari Orizaki 
4 Renaldo Loleya 
5 Taffeng Ladongi 
6 Albino Tombe 
7 Samuel Abu-John 
8 Machid 
9 
----- 
Nyang Dhieu 
-------------------- ------------------ 
Bahr el Ghazal 
--------------------- 
Sources: prepared from the Report of the Commission of Enquiry of 1955, 
Torit Disturbances 
officers - Gabriel Tulba Kalam Sakit from the Zande, Elia Lupe Baraba and 
Placido Laboke from Baria speaking tribes (These were the highest ranking 
Southern Sudanese in the Police force), and Gordon Mortat, a Dinka from 
Rumbek. In the same way, the majority of policemen and officers in Sudan 
were from Arabized national groups from Northern Sudan. But before 1955 
Southern Sudanese policemen were the majority in the South. They were 
disbanded and replaced by officers from the north, after the 1955 popular 
uprising against Arab domination in the South. 
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After the events of 1955, almost all the members of Equatoria Military 
Corps were either executed, dismissed, jailed or became fugitives in the 
bush. By the time Independence came in 1956, the number of Southerners, 
both officers and men in the Sudan Defence Force were reduced to almost 
zero. specially amongst officers. After Independence, very few 
Southerners were recruited into the army, police or prisons as officers 
or men. The same was true for local government and other central 
government departments. This was the beginning of underdevelopment and 
unequal representation in central government or state apparatus in 
Southern Sudan. The Arab dominant rulers decided not only to oppress, 
exploit and dominate the Southern Sudanese but also to murder them in 
order to make them afraid. The only sure way of doing this was to use 
trusted military and police forces to crush and destroy any resistance 
against Arab settlers who thus became the only group able to enter the 
civil service, police, prisons, army or commercial enterprise after 
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independence. 64 While the numbers of Arab officers increased in the Sudan 
Defence Force, the numbers of Africans, whether they were from Western, 
Khartoum or Southern Sudan continued to decrease until 1958 when a 
military coup took place, led by Major General Ibrahim Abboud. 
In a similar way, the military, police and prisons, the judges and the 
administrators of Southern Sudan were used to suppress the popular demand 
from local people for equal economic, social and political development 
which had been denied them. The struggle by the oppressed people from the 
Eastern and Western areas, Southern and Northern Funj was suppressed 
using the same methods. 65 The period between 1955 and 1958 was marked by 
struggle and resistance against Arab domination and exploitation. As a 
result, the neo- colonial regime adopted all the policies and strategies 
used by the British Colonial regime against National Liberation 
suprressing all movements under the leadership of the White Flag League 
mentioned earlier. The logical steps taken by the Neo-colonial 
authorities after the 1955 disturbances in the South can be summarized as 
follows: 66 
-- The whole Equatoria Military corps was totally disbanded and its 
members were either executed, imprisoned or dismissed. 
-- The transfer to Northern Provinces of all the Southern Sudanese in 
the army who did not take part in the mutiny. At the same time, those 
few Southern Sudanese junior local government administrators, police 
and prison officers and others were also transferred to Northern 
Sudan. 67 
-- The transfer of Arab administrators, police and army officers, judges 
etc. to the Southern Provinces to implement repressive, oppressive 
and unjust policies in the area. 
-- The introduction of new recruiting policies in the Sudan in general 
and Southern Sudan in particular. In Northern, Eastern, Central, 
Darfur and Kordofan regions, the recruitment of officers was 
dominated by the sectarian parties who had inherited the state 
machinery and its economic resources. 
The two dominant political parties, Umma and National Unionist Party 
(NUP), comprising various members of several Islamic religious sects as 
allies, distributed positions and places in the various armed services 
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and civil administration among themselves. The few positions that were 
left vacant were allocated to their stooges, collaborators or agents in 
the following manner: 
-- The first group to be given posts were the Muslims from the trusted 
elements among Fur, Zakawa, Bornu, Massalit and Nubians who were used 
in the name of the Islamic faith against the South during the first 
civil war more successfully by the Aboudd Military Regime rather than 
the civil regimes that followed its fall in 1964.68 
-- The second group which benefited in the South consisted of those 
trusted families and Muslim families which were politically active. 
Typical examples include the Muslim families like the Kersaid Amodo 
family, Abdalla Adam and many others in Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and 
Upper Nile. The examples of non-Muslim friendly families from the 
South included those from small and insignificant tribes which had no 
record of violent confrontation between themselves and the Anglo- 
Egyptian forces, such as Madi (Joseph Lago), Lugawara (Wilton Majit), 
Jur (Franco Wel) and others who were expected to be used against 
fellow Southerners. 
There were Dinkas, Nuer, Shilluk, Baria, Zande, Moro and others who were 
recruited as officers during the post-independent era on the basis 
mentioned above, but all the same the number of Southern Sudanese 
Officers in the army, police and prisons were quite few, and could not 
represent Southern tribes in these forces. For the Southern Sudanese 
political leaders demanded that one third of these should be from the 
south after independence. 
At this juncture, it can be freely said that the uneven or unbalanced 
representation of non-Arab national groupings in the national army, 
police, prisons and other state department was created by the British and 
continued by subsequent neo-colonial regimes which had been ruling Sudan 
from 1956 hitherto. For example, the number of southerners to be admitted 
to military college had never exceeded three. The first southerners 
accepted by the military college were Franco Wel, Alfred Magot and George 
Husien. The first two left the army but Alfred Magot joined Anya-nya I 
where he were fought until the Peace Agreement was signed in 1972, and he 
was absorbed as a Brigadier into the National Army and retired in 1981 
with the rank of Major General. Franco Wel went to Beirut University and 
became a secondary school teacher. It was George Husien who remained 
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until his retirement under Nimiere in 1969 with the rank of Colonel. 
The second group consisted of only two, while three who had passed all 
the requirements were dropped by the Commander in Chief personally for 
reasons known only to himself. But according to the general view held by 
Southern Sudanese citizens, the main reason (including the three dropped 
candidates), was political. Those who were finally taken by the military 
college amounted to 150, with two Southern Sudanese, while more than 140 
were selected from Arab and Arabized national groups. 69 The lucky two 
southerners were Wilson Lupai and Barathulomiyo Rassas. 70 The latter had 
to change his religion and names from Roman Catholic to Islam, taking the 
new name of Gismalla Abdalla Rossas. The reasons for changing his 
religion, according to retired Major Rassas were personal, but others 
said he was influenced by the military authorities so as to make it easy 
for him to enter the college and to succeed in life. Those who dropped 
out were Arthur Agany, Nathaniel Jada and Peter Tonguon, all from rather 
more powerful tribes which were unfriendly to both colonial and neo- 
colonial states. 
The third group to be taken into the army between 1955 and 1958 consisted 
of three selected southerners as usual, out of the ten who applied. Those 
taken include Fabian Agamlong, Paul Hassan and Alison Mongai. Later, Abel 
Chol was also taken on in a different intake. 
All this demonstrates quite clearly the pervasive character of inequality 
and underdevelopment in Southern Sudan. Inequality and imbalance in the 
representation of Southern Sudan in the army could also be seen in terms 
of the numbers of southern Sudanese in the Officer Corps holding any rank 
or position of authority. This study has found that the only Southern 
Sudanese who attained the rank of General before the Addis Ababa 
Agreement was an Arabized person of Dinka origin whose parents can be 
traced to the Sudanese returnees after they were freed during the time of 
reconquest and it was this Dinka who became the only Southern Sudanese in 
the military government, as a governor of Bahr el Ghazal province. The 
Addis Ababa Agreement marked a turning point in terms of representation 
of Southern citizens in the National Army. For the first time since 
independence, a great number of both officers and men were absorbed in 
both the national army and local police and prisons. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 
below show clearly the evidence of imbalances in the recruitment of 
police and army officers from 1950 to 1965: 
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TABLE 5.6: ADMISSIONS TO THE SUDAN POLICE COLLEGE 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Year* No. of Northerners No. of Southerners TOTAL 
1950 10 3 13 
1951 14 4 18 
1953 13 7 20 
1957 27 3 30 
1960 29 NIL 29 
1961 36 1 37 
1963 26 1 27 
1964 35 2 37 
--------- 
TOTAL 
--------- 
----------------- 
190 
----------------- 
------------------ 
21 
------------------ 
------------ 
211 
------------ 
* There was no intake in 1952,1954,1955,1956,1958 or 1959. 
Source: A. Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint (1970), London. 
TABLE 5.7: OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE SUDAN ARMY 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Date No. of Northerners No. of Southerners TOTAL 
7.7.54 19 1 20 
1.8.55 45 3 18 
1.4.56 35 3 38 
1.7.57 40 3 43 
1.5.58 58 2 60 
1.5.59 56 1 57 
1.5.60 58 2 60 
1.1.6 64 NIL 64 
1.1.63 56 1 57 
1.1.64 71 NIL 71 
1.1.65 67 4 71 
---------- 
Total 
---------- 
------------------ 
569 
------------------ 
------------------ 
20 
------------------ 
------------- 
589 
------------- 
Source: Albino, O. B.: The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint. (London, 1970) 
Although it was not possible to obtain concrete written documents on the 
numbers of officers absorbed into the army and police and other 
departments in 1972, the actual total number of officers in the army, 
police, and prisons was found to be five times the total number shown by 
the above tables. For example, the numbers of southerners absorbed into 
the army were as follows: 200 officers and 6000 soldiers. Among the 
officers was major General Joseph Lago the leader of SSLM and Commander 
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in Chief of Anya-nya forces. Next to the Major General were four 
colonels, which included Alfred Magot, Paul Awal, Samuel Abu John and 
Emmanuel Abu. The Lt. Colonels who form a third of the hierarchy were 
seven in number and their names were: Andrew Makur Thou, Kuol Amuom, 
Samuel Gai Tut, Sataturino Ariah, Peter Carilo, James Loro and Peter 
Mobil. The remaining 188 consisted of majors, captains, first lieutenants 
and second lieutenants. 72 
As for the Police Force, there were 3116 policemen including officers 
which were absorbed in addition to the 2,000 police already in the 
national police which transferred to the Region following the 
implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. Over 2,000 men and 
officers were absorbed in both the prison service and wild life service 
in Southern Region. 
It is therefore quite clear that only after the implementation of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement that great numbers of Southern Sudanese were taken 
into the national army in terms of officers and men. It was also after 
this Agreement that the leader of the Anya-nya forces and the leader of 
the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement were promoted to the rank of major 
general. The first high position to be held by a Southern Sudanese in the 
army since Independence. 73 The most striking was the acceptance into the 
military college of 69 Southern Sudanese in the first of its kind in 
history. The 69 men consisted of former Anya-nya officers who were 
demoted or rejected by the joint military commission responsible for the 
absorption of Anya-nya forces into the Sudanese Army in 1972. These were 
taken in as Battalion Sergeants, Battalion Quarter Master Sergeants, 
Company Quarter Master Sergeants and Sergeants. To have over 70 officers 
from the Southern Sudan graduating from the college at one time was 
considered as one of the achievements of the Peace Accord which ended the 
Civil War in the Sudan. It was equally important that the people of 
Southern Sudan should have such a good representation in the national 
army. 
Unfortunately, the celebrations did not last long, for Southern Sudanese 
were soon shocked by the high rate of dismissals of Southern Sudanese 
Officers from the army without sufficient reason. 74 More alarming was the 
very low admission rate to the military college, reducing to one or zero 
the numbers between 1975 and 1980. Since this issue will be discussed at 
length in Chapter 8 under sub-section 8.2 and 8.3, it is enough to say 
here that the existence of over 300 Southern Sudanese officers and about 
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10,000 men in the national army was considered by the sectarian 
opposition groups and Arab oriented areas to be a potential threat to 
their policies of Islamization and Arabization. Furthermore, the 
opposition groups within the army and among the banned political parties 
saw that their future plans to overthrow Nimiere through the army would 
be weakened. The Southern Sudanese would be used against them in case of 
attempted coups. Others from the Arab orientated national groups also 
stated that the entire Addis Ababa Agreement was a sell out of Arab and 
Islamic interests in the Sudan and therefore the system and the regime 
which had created must be destroyed and those responsible should be 
charged with treason. 
75 
These considerations led to the formation of a so-called National Front 
by Northern Arab orientated political parties including the Sudan 
Communist Party as an ally, to dismantle not only Nimiere's regime. but 
all institutions and personnel created by such a regime. The first 
targets included the vulnerable Southern Sudanese section of the National 
Army, the System of regional government and the economy of the region, 
which would have to be destroyed at all costs. 
The participation of Southern Sudanese in the crushing of the sectarian 
rebellion in Gezira Abba (1973), the crushing of the sectarian coup of 
Hassan Husien (1975), the crushing of the Libyan sponsored mercenaries' 
invasion under the leadership of Mohammed Nur Saad in 1976 and other less 
significant rebellions of the sectarian supporters could be cited as 
strong evidence to back these claims by anti-government elements. Just as 
alarming and frightening was the transfer of three or more military 
companies composed of ex-Anya-nya forces together with their officers to 
Khartoum in order to guard the State Palace and various State 
Departments. It was alarming to hear the rumour that led to the mass 
arrest of Southern Sudanese politicians in 1975 and to see the ex-Anya 
nya soldiers and officers organizing a new rebellion to fight for 
separation etc. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. An interview with Dr. Mohammed Adam Adham, one of the founders of the Black Bloc in 1938 has revealed that the White Flag League was more 
organized and committed to the policy of total independence for now 
and was more than a mere social club. 
2. No comprehensive study of the White Flag League has ever been carried 
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out in Sudan, until now. Yet some Academics describe it as an 
Egyptian Agent etc. 
3. In 1985, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Juba organized the 
first to examine the role of Southern Sudanese in the struggle for 
independence, but none of the papers presented to the Conference 
concentrated on the 1924 uprising, specially in regard to what 
happened to members of Sudanese Battalions which were disbanded after 
1925. 
4. The Sectarian political leaders claim to be also divine leaders and 
that their parties are the parties of Allah and so Allah's laws 
(Sharia) should be adopted when they were in power. 
5. The Southern political parties which emerged in 1952-3 were weak 
financially and the British Colonial regime which gave financial 
support to the Arab Sectarian political parties, so they became 
dependent on the sectarian parties for financial support. This 
continued until 1988 when the author was conducting research. He 
found that with the exception of the Sudan African Congress the rest 
of the Southern political parties were dependent on northern parties, 
even in hiring party premises or transport for party leaders. 
6. The October Uprising of 1964 was the first political grouping to be 
recognized Southern political parties as equal partners. The Southern 
Sudan was represented for the first time by people who were never 
stooges to rich Arab political parties. 
7.1986 general elections saw the division of Umma party into more than 
five wings but Saddiq's wing got the majority of members elected to 
the Constituent Assembly. It was the time that the Mahdi family and 
the Abdallah El Ta'ashi (Khalif a) were reconciled and Abdel Salam El 
Khalif became the cabinet minister who demanded that all the property 
of the Mahdist state, like Omdurman prison, be given back to them. 
8. There has been civil war in Darfur between the Arab and African 
tribes since 1985, but the Sudan Government refused to acknowledge 
it, describing it as armed robbery. Although the fighting forces had 
appealed to Saddiq's Government to intervene the please were to no 
avail. 
9. The Sudanese Sectarian political parties have been using various 
policies against the masses in order to maintain their political and 
economic hegemony, so they tried liberal democracy, when that 
promoted their interests, and shifted to military rule or autocratic 
civil dictatorship whatever best served their interests 4. e. g. 
Abboud, Nimiere, Surah, El Dahab and the current military regime of 
Hassan Omer. 
10. The author discovered that the leadership of Umma and DUP parties is 
not elected by the members but by decision of the families who 
patronize these parties, e. g. Mahdi family, Mirghani family, and 
Hindi family selects one member of the family as a leader of the 
party and merely informs the Party Conference who the leader was, and 
he, together with his family selects the executive of the party. The 
party has no finance of its own and no treasurer, because the Patron 
provides the cash for on-going day-by-day activities. 
11. This is a general view held by non-sectarian political leaders in 
Sudan and has been expressed in press conferences, seminars, 
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political rallies, books etc. by Bana_Malual, Abel Alier Mansour, 
John Garang, Aliab James Surur, Samuel Aru Isaiah. Peter Gatkuoth, 
Philip Abbass Gabush, Ahmed el Dariesh etc. 
12. It is common knowledge in Sudan that those who misappropriate public 
funds from the dominant ruling parties are not punished. Late Sharif 
Zien Abdeen El Hindi -a Minister of Finance during NUP Government 
and i various Umma-NUP coalition Governments in the 60s, is cited to 
have transferred Millions ofSudanese pounds of Government money into 
hard currency in accounts under his own name, later removing them 
after gaining interest. The author witnessed how the Prime Minister 
instructed the Minister of Finance to compensate his family of a 
certain plot of land used by the state - 36 Sudanese Million Pounds 
without any approval from the Constituent Assembly. Also, 3 Southern 
Sudanese Governemnt officials were accused in 1987 of 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE NEO-COLONIAL ISLAMIC STATE AND THE POLITICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN 
THE SUDAN: THE CASE OF REGIONAL INEQUALITIES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines and analyses the role of settler neo-colonial state 
in the process of under-development and regional inequalities in the 
Sudan. It will be argued that the concept of 'relative autonomy' of the 
State, does not work in the Sudanese case because the state (apparatus 
or) institutions are controlled by the sectarian families which use them 
as if they were their own private enterprises. It will also be argued 
that the neo-colonial state weakness, in failing to solve the problems of 
social injustice, has led to a considerable decrease of state 
creditability and which in turn has led to the break down of national 
security. 
In the light of the above mentioned arguments, the state is to blame for 
the recurrent civil wars in the country. 
6.2 Class Structure and the Class Nature of the State 
There is no general agreement on the class nature of the state in Sudan, 
or of the very existence of classes themselves. While members of the 
dominant ruling class deny the existence of classes, they argue that the 
social basis of the state in Sudan is Arab and Islamic, which means that 
the class structure and class nature of the State reflects the class 
background of the dominant Arab oriented ruling class. 1 
The Arab dominant ruling class in Sudan maintains that there are no 
classes in Sudan because it is against Islamic principles. The dominant 
ruling class and its supporters claim that (which is never put into 
practice), all Muslims are equal in the Islamic faith, both rich and 
poor, rulers and ruled, for all Muslims share their wealth with all 
members of the Umma Islamivva, including the poor. The Sudanese 
experience clearly shows that the Arab claim remains only lip-service. 
Similarly, the dominant Arab ruling class claims that if all non-Arab 
Sudanese tribesmen, especially in Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains had 
accepted Islamization, Arabization and the application of "Shariah 
islamiya" (or Holy Laws) there would not have been any political crisis, 
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as Sudan has witnessed so far. 
2 
While the existence of class conflict is denied (for the same reasons 
used against the class concept), people from the less developed or 
backward regions are blamed for their poor socio-economic conditions and 
poor level of participation in political activity in the country, simply 
because of their resistance to social change, or rejecting Islamic faith 
and Arab culture which are assumed to be civilizing factors in those 
developed regions. Similarly, because Sudanese political and economic 
power has been under the control of a minority of Arab settlers, they 
have declared Sudan an Arab country and that since the majority of 
Sudanese are Muslims, they are falsely considered as Arabs, because 
Arabism refers not merely to race but also to culture. So those Sudanese 
who are Muslims and speak Arabic have also adopted Arab culture and are 
described as Arabs. As an Islamic and Arab country, the state identifies 
with general Arab policies which include opposition to the state of 
Israel and is also against the Islamic state of Iran. In both cases the 
Sudanese state has sent troops to fight alongside Arab armies in 
Palestine and Iraq. 
3 
Finally, the ruling dominant class has advanced and continued to claim 
that Sudan is divided politically into north and south. This means that 
Northern region includes the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan, 
Central, Eastern and Northern regions, while Southern Sudan comprises 
Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile regions (ie. the 3 old 
provinces). In addition, the Sudanese are racially and religiously 
divided between Arabs and Muslims on the one hand and Christians, 
4 
Africans, animists etc. on the other. 
This policy totally rejects these assumptions, because they deny the 
existence of various social classes in Sudan, including comprador, 
national capitalist, the petty bourgeoisie, a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, 
intelligentsia, the working classes, capitalist farmers, peasants, 
agricultural labourers and the urban and rural destitutes. In short, 
there are in Sudan, the oppressors and the oppressed, the exploiters and 
the exploited, 'the haves' and 'the have nots', just the same as other 
capitalist countries. 
5 
This study has discovered that the present bourgeois class has for the 
past 32 years used state institutions to serve its class interests as 
well as to use state power to repress/suppress all demands for social 
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change and social justice. Similarly, it is argued that during the last 
33 years of independence, political rights, justice, obligations and 
duties whether under military or civilian governments, were closely tied 
with property, rights, Arabism and religious sects. All these point to a 
class structure in which the bourgeois ruling class is predominantly 
composed of Arab settlers and the Arabized riverain tribes. Volls has 
asserted the Arab dimension of the state and he wrote: 
".... Most of the political leaders who articulated Sudanese 
nationalist sentiments in the twentieth century considered 
themselves to be Arabs. The common Arab heritage was one of the 
elements frequently cited by the proponents of the unity of the 
Nile valley. These Arab Sudanese political leaders also 
dominated politics at independence. They brought the Sudan not 
only into the United Nations but also into the Arab League. 
Within that framework the Sudan is an Arab country, although in 
strict ethnic- historical terms the majority of the Sudanese 
are not Arabs.... When Sudanese Arab leaders stress the 
Arabness of the Sudan too vigorously they arouse the fears of 
many non-Arab Sudanese. "6 
And Volls went on to say, 
"At times the issue of Sudanese Arabness is directly involved in 
internal political conflicts ..... "7 
Joseph Garang adds: 
".... the movement for independence was led by the national 
groupings in the more advanced areas of the colony and within 
them, by intellectuals representing the interests of national 
capital or the petty-bourgeois in town and country. Having 
thrown out the colonial power it was they who got the benefit 
of independence in the form of state power, high posts in the 
state, government contracts etc. 
"Because of its class composition and orientation, the new 
leadership invariably fails to solve the problems of social 
change, particularly the problem of uneven development of the 
country.... "8 
Gerang has further argued that the bourgeois ruling class which took over 
after independence and which took the capitalist road of development 
could be held responsible for the current widening gap between the most 
developed and less developed regions of Sudan. 
6.3 The Concept of Relative Autonomy of the State 
The concept"of relative autonomy was formulated and developed by Hamza 
Alavi, in an article entitled "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: 
"Pakistan and Bangladesh". The role of post-colonial, state, Alavi 
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maintained,. should be seen in the light of interests of three specific 
propertied exploiting classes as identified as follows: 
. the indigenous bourgeoisie the Metropolitan neo-colonial 
bourgeoisie and the landed classes. " 
Alavi's study was able to show some aspects which are crucial in the 
governing of the politico-economic activities, or classes within the 
under-developed societies. His emphasis was on the basic characteristics 
of the relationship therein and which was the main foundation of his 
theoretical framework. Alavi maintained that the economic and political 
interests of the three propertied classes, "were no longer "contradicting"_ 
but rather "competing" with one another. He went on to say that "The 
state mediates these competing interests and does not side with any group 
or those classes involved, in order to give favour to one particular 
class, while oppressing others. By such impartial activities, in managing 
the public affairs of the contending classes. " The state, according to 
Alavi, "acquires a relatively autonomous role and is not simply the 
instrument of anyone of the three classes. "10 For Alavi, his theoretical 
perspective or analysis is not limited or restricted to the particular 
conditions of Pakistan and Bangladesh but can be applied to all the newly 
independent under-developed countries, Sudan included. 
Poulantzas is one of the leading writers who support the viability of the 
concept of the relative' autonomy of the state, not only in the post- 
colonial societies alone, but in the advanced western capitalist 
societies as well. These writers do not regard the social origins and 
business connections of state personnel as particularly significant. They 
argue that the role of the state is ultimately determined by the 
infrastructure. As a result, the state will automatically represent the 
interests of capital. Poulantzas strongly advocates the above mentioned 
position. He argues that the capitalist state best serves the interests 
of the capitalist class only when members of this class do not 
participate directly in the state apparatus that is to say when the 
ruling class is not politically the governing class. Poulantzas argues 
that the ruling class was not directly governing, but rather its 
interests are served through the medium of the state. As such the state 
is relatively autonomous from the ruling class. And that to some degree, 
it'is free from its direct control, since the state is shaped by the 
infrastructure, it is considered to represent the interests of capital. 
11 
Poulantzas further argues that the relative autonomy of the state is 
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essential if it is to represent capital effectively. The state requires a 
certain amount of freedom and independence in order to serve the ruling 
class interests. Poulantzas pointed out that if the state was staffed by 
members of the bourgeois class, it might lose this freedom of action. As 
a group, the bourgeois class is not free of internal divisions and 
conflicts of interest. To represent its common interests, the state must 
have the freedom to act on behalf of the class as a whole. If the 
internal wrangling and disagreement continues or dominates the views of 
the class, it might fail to present a united front in conflicts with the 
proletariat. The relative autonomy of the state allows it to rise above 
sectional interests within the bourgeoisie and to represent that class as 
a whole. It provides the state with sufficient flexibility to deal with 
any threats from the subject class to ruling class dominance. To this 
end, the state must have the freedom to make concessions to the subject 
class which might be opposed by the bourgeoisie. Such concessions serve 
to defuse radical working-class protest and contain demands within the 
framework of a capitalist economy. 
The supporters of the concept of the relative autonomy of the state have 
maintained that it enables the state to promote the myth that it 
represents society as a whole. The state presents itself as a 
representative of the people, of public interests and national unity. 
Thus in its ideological role the state disguises the fact that 
essentially it represents, the ruling class interests. 12 
Our disagreement with the Alavi analysis is based on our beliefs that the 
real issue which must be investigated and taken into consideration is not 
the contradictions between those governing propertied classes among 
themselves. Rather they are between all of the three propertied classes 
combined on one side, and the working classes, the peasants and the poor 
in general on the other. The gist of the argument was missed by Alavi as 
far as we are concerned. For the point in question is not whether or not 
the state acquires a relatively autonomous position in relations between 
those propertied classes, but to ascertain the economic role of the post- 
colonial state and whether or not it serves the interests of bourgeois 
classes, or it serves the interests of the masses of the working people, 
peasants and other poor members of the public or its mediates between 
them as a neutral party? 
As for Poulantzas and other Marxist writers, the matter is quite 
straightforward. The state, though considered relatively autonomous, is 
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generally believed by most Marxists as a tool in the hands of the 
dominant bourgeois class(es) which usually controls economic and 
political power in all capitalist societies. 
The Sudanese state has been serving the interests of dominant ruling 
classes from the time of independence until now. The state in Sudan was 
inherited by bourgeois classes from the British colonial authorities 
under the Sudanization of the state apparatus scheme. Out of more than a 
thousand senior and junior officials, only five or six junior clerks and 
administrators were from Southern Sudan, the rest were taken either from 
Arab settlers or Arabized Northerners. As a result, all departments of 
state were largely staffed by members of the ruling class, and 
consequently the interests of merchant capital (Jallaba's capital) and 
the sectarian leaders became predominant. The Sudanese parliamentary 
institutions, the main government departments, including the army, police 
and prisons, are manned and controlled by the merchant and finance 
capital. The merchant class (which includes finance capital) is not an 
outsider (or Lobbist) in the political system but is part and parcel of 
it, being built into the foundation of the contemporary Sudanese state. 
Almost all MPs are engaged in business and financial activities of some 
kind. Political parties are financed and run by merchants or industrial 
capitalists who have emerged in great number under the military rule of 
Field Marshall Jaafer Mohd. Nimiere. The business and financial 
connections of the ministers, top civil servants, top military, police 
and prison officers and members of government advisory bodies are quite 
clear. 13 As can be seen from such connections the activities of the state 
systematically favour the interests of merchant (Jallaba) and finance 
capital. Furthermore, the Sudanese state has been concerned with 
particular rich families, very few in number and who have been corrupting 
most of the state civil servants in order to maintain and perpetuate that 
exploitation. The Sudanese state has accepted and the leaders of the five 
Arab Islamic sects, (the Khatmiyya, Ansar, Hindiyya, Tijaniyya and Gada 
Henj) as not only the royal families, but as natural political and 
economic leaders, and also as the sole representatives of the Islamic 
faith and the Arab people. In brief, state power has always been in the 
hands of the most economically powerful faction of the Sudanese 
capitalist class (dominated by the Arab national grouping) and the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie (dominated by the Arab settlers). 
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6.4 The Neo-colonial State in Sudan 
The state in Sudan has never been 'relatively autonomous'. As a result, 
the state has no credibility and no legal legitimacy as far as people of 
Southern Sudan are concerned. 14 This erosion is characterized by the 
existence of anarchy, insecurity and violence everywhere in the country 
including the national capital, Khartoum, and other cities and regions 
which never knew violence. Armed robbery, armed tribal militia, party 
militias, armed gangs have become the order of the day, in the East, 
Darfur, Kordofan, Central and Southern Sudan, the Northern region being 
the only exception. 15 The fact is that most of the members of the 
dominant bourgeois ruling class in the Sudan since independence 
originally came from that region, which is already mentioned in chapters 
three and four, albeit briefly. Of course, Richard Lobban (and many other 
scholars both Sudanese and foreign nationals) have observed similar 
conditions which are expressed in the following way: 
"with independence at hand, there was a rapid transformation of 
the Sudanese ruling class as a result of the evacuation of the 
colonial masters.... the new ruling class was built upon 
traditional alliances further cemented by religious sectarian 
ties, and by dominant mercantile interests. "16 
Lobban went on to assert that: 
"Although there is a multi-ethnic component in the bourgeois 
class, it is composed primarily of those riverain Arab groups 
that have long been close to the centres of power (both 
political and economic power). "» 
The closeness of the riverain Arab groups to the centres of power was a 
result of centuries of collaboration with various colonial forces, 
starting with the Turco-Egyptian invaders down to the Anglo-Egyptian rule 
which later built a bourgeois class which was characterized by the 
existence of a mixture of feudalism, sectarian, oriental despotism and 
bourgeois exploiters, looters and oppressors. 18 The bourgeois class in 
question while adopting Islamism and Arabism as a part of its oriental 
despotic character, also applied both Westminster parliamentary democracy 
and capitalist forms of economic planning. The bourgeoisie insists that 
Islamic "Shariah" laws and Arabism should be the basis on which all 
Sudanese nationals must identify themselves, ie. all Sudanese should 
consider themselves as Arabs and speak Arabic. In this, the bourgeois 
class failed to take note of other cases where the use of religion and 
race or ethnicity as a unifying factor has led to more not less class 
conflict and disintegration. For example, Islamic unity without economic 
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and real political emancipation could not save Pakistan and Bangladesh 
from war, followed by final disintegration. Arabization, Islamization and 
Assimilation alone, without equal distribution of political and economic 
resources could not save the Arab bourgeois ruling classes from being 
destroyed by the poor African national groupings in Zanzibar in 1969. It 
was equally true that it could not prevent the systematic annihilation of 
Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Iran by fellow Muslims, in spite of their 
religious heritage. Other examples, include the Berbers', political 
struggles in Morocco, Libya and Algeria, the fate of Africans in 
Mauritania dominated by immigrant Arab settlers and the recent crisis 
between African Muslims of Senegal and the Arabs of Mauritania which led 
to the death of nearly 300 people. 19 
The origins of the above crises were based on economic inequalities and 
political domination not on racial differences as it might have appeared. 
In each case economic inequality, perpetuated by public domination, was 
responsible for all the crises. For example in Pakistan, it was said, 
.... what started as a movement for economic autonomy with the 
framework of a united (Islamic state of) Pakistan has been 
irrevocably transformed by the wholesale slaughter of East 
Pakistan civilians into a movement that sooner or later will 
produce an independent East Pakistan - "Bangla Desh". 
20 
Here the political domination of East Pakistan by Western Pakistan since 
independence in 1947, was followed soon by the economic exploitation 
oppression and expropriation of East Pakistan by the west and 
consequences of the failure of the Central Government to solve regional 
disparity or uneven development was the break up of Pakistan. 
As for the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964, it was described by most scholars 
(including Mazrin and Tidy (1984), Lofchie (1965) and others) as true 
revolution. 15 Mazrin and Tidy made the following statement: 
"The Zanzibar uprising was a revolution, primarily arising out of 
popular discontent and the challenge of armed civilians rather 
than from any professional army... the revolution on the 'Isle 
of Cloves' seems an almost inevitable result of racial.... 
divisions.... economic and political inequalities.... "21 
Here again political domination and economic exploitation were the basis 
of the conflict. Racial factors only came, due to the fact that dominant 
bourgeois ruling class happened to be controlled by people oý" Arab race. 
But otherwise the first elections did show or indicate that people voted 
not on the racial basis but on political programmes of various parties 
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and the Arab controlled political party got the majority in the 
parliament which led to the Arab elements to form a government. 22 It was 
the distribution of political resources (ie. positions) and the 
allocation of economic resources which exacerbated the existing 
differences and therefore sparked off a revolution. 23 
As for the Kurds they are victims of settler colonialism whereby 
Iranians, Turks and Arabs have divided the Kurds country among themselves 
merely to exploit rich lands and oil resources, while annihilating the 
indigenous people of the land, in order to pave the way for smooth 
exploitation and transfer of various material resources without regard to 
human rights nor justice or self-determination. 24 
The above cited examples are enough evidence that economic and political 
domination is not only central to various political (class) struggles in 
the third world in general and Africa in particular. Therefore we reject 
the use of various paradigms such as tribalism, ethnicity, religion and 
race as the basis of political violence in Africa including the Sudan. 
6.5 The effects of the Economic and Political Policies of the Neo- 
Colonial States in the Sudan: The Case of other'Less Developed 
Regions 
This study has found that the neo-colonial state's policies of unequal 
distribution of economic and political resources have affected Southern 
and Northern Funj and Ingesna, Southern Kordofan (ie. Nuba Mountains), 
Darfur and most of the Beja Villages in Eastern region, equally. All 
these regions are the most backward areas in the so-called Northern 
Sudan. Most of the local population in these areas are oppressed. The 
author agrees with those writers who had divided the Sudan into four 
regions on the basis of their respective socio-economic (and political) 
developments, which goes as follows: 25 
Region A- Kassala, Northern and Khartoum Provinces 
Region B- Blue Nile Province 
Region C- Kordofan and Darfur provinces 
Region D- Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr al Ghazal provinces 
Each region, according to those writers, was given a criterion which 
would explain its composition in terms of population and economy. For 
example Blue Nile province, now the central region was considered to be 
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different from most other provinces because it has nearly all the 
irrigated land of Sudan. Western regions of Darfur and Kordofan were 
treated as one because they were considered to be relying on rainfed 
cultivation, animals, gum Arabic and have much in common. The three 
Southern regions (that is, five provinces) were treated differently, due 
to what was considered to be their common cultural, economic and 
historical background, which was very different from other regions, which 
was not true either, though assumed by most scholars to be so. Table 6.1 
shows the basic statistical features of the four regions in question. 
Here region (A), Northern, Kassala and Khartoum provinces have 22% of the 
total area of the country, had LS. 33 per capita income, which is 20% 
higher than that of the country as a whole. Region (B) Blue Nile province 
with a population of 20.2% and an area of only 5% had the highest per 
capita among the four regions and has got LS42. which is three times more 
than that of the whole country. As for Region (C), Kordofan and Darfur 
(ie. Western Sudan) with the largest proportion of population (ie. 20.1%) 
and area (35%) as well, got only LS27, as per capita income, which in 
actual fact, was lower than that of the country as a whole, which stood 
at that time at 27.4% but which has tremendously decreased due to the 
recurrent political and economic crises. Region (D), Upper Nile, 
Equatoria and Bahr Ghazal Provinces (ie. Southern Region) came out at the 
bottom of the ladder, with population of 27.1% or more and an area of 
25.8% and had only 8.14 per capita income, the lowest in the whole 
country. 26 
According to the existing data, C and D regions were the most 
underdeveloped regions in Sudan. In this section, we will further 
elaborate on A, B and C regions in order to show that not all the members 
of Kassala, Blue and Khartoum provinces were enjoying those high per 
capita incomes. For example, in the Blue Nile, with the exception of the 
minority merchants and senior government officials, in the urban areas, 
who are themselves migrants, the majority of the indigenous people were 
forced to live on the High Hills without educational, health and other 
services. The author was told by one of the leading members of the 
Southern and Northern Funj that over 98% of the population in Damazin do 
not receive electricity or water, despite the fact that both pass by most 
villages. One member of Southern and Northern Funj dramatized the 
injustice in Sudan, when he described how the waterpipes and electricity 
and wireless pass above his house, and he could hear the water and 
electricity running but there was no way of getting them. There is no 
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health service in the hills since most of the tribesmen were forced out 
of their local lands to give way to foreign investment in agriculture 
such as the Arab, Japanese and American companies (which have invested 
there). In spite of these companies, the problem of employment has been a 
big issue for people without education and who are condemned to work as 
agricultural labourers on their own farms, now controlled by a Jallaba or 
Japanese, American or Arab who is the new landlord. The same applies to 
most of Beja tribesmen in Kassala whose per capita income as the lowest 
in that province for they are also victims of unequal distribution of 
economic and political resources. For example, in Kassaknand Port Sudan, 
90% of agriculture schemes were found to be owned by the Arab settlers 
who are merchants and local government administrators in the area. 27 
The situation in the Nuba Mountains is not different from that of 
Southern and Northern Funj where several agricultural schemes were set up, 
by the state/private foreign and local capitalist but not to the benefit 
of the indigenous population, but to the migrants and their foreign 
allies or partners. For example, the Habila Agricultural Scheme which in 
theory was to provide various job opportunities and sources of income for 
those who were to receive allocations of land for mechanized farms but 
unfortunately were not able to receive any land for several reasons, 
firstly the local population did not have enough money to pay the state 
agents for the rent of the land which was nearly LS500 Sudanese to pay in 
advance. As a consequence of that, the local people lost their land and 
were forced either to work as labourers who were to be underpaid or 
migrate to Port Sudan, Khartoum or Wed Medani in search of work. This 
situation in the above areas have either remained the same or has become 
worse. The poor have become poorer, and the rich have become richer. So 
can such people like the Beja tribesmen in Kassala, Port Sudan and 
Gadarif, the Funj and Ignessna people in Danazin, Gessan, Kurmuk and 
others, or Fur, Masaht or Bornu, who are marginalized or considered as 
part of the same society with a high per capita income or a part of the 
ruling class in those regions. The answers to these questions are simple 
and straightforward. In brief they are not members of the ruling class 
and they do not fall within such high per capita income which the 
minority dominant ruling class enjoys. 
Finally, the underdevelopment of Southern and Northern Funj, Southern 
KO40f61% and Darfur cannot be denied, besides both academics and policy 
makers have of late agreed about it, for example Ibrahim Kersany, 
Mohammed on the Nuba Mountains, Abdel Rahma Abaker on uneven development 
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in Western Sudan, Bashir Omer and many others have contributed to this 
debate and came out with similar conclusion that these areas are 
backward, underdeveloped because of the state policies, which tend to 
favour particular regions and particular national groups as the main 
beneficiaries to both political and economic development. 
As a result the people of the Southern and Northern Funj area, people 
from Nuba Mountains and people from Darfur, plus people from Beja Hills 
have come to distance themselves from the dominant ruling classes and 
instead join hands with other oppressed, the exploited or dominated 
people of Southern Sudan in order to make a social revolution for socio- 
economic and political change. 28 
The real weakness of the Sudanese state is its inability to solve uneven 
development underdevelopment or regional inequality not only in Southern 
Sudan but in the so-called northern regions. The policy makers and 
executors, tend to follow the same trend of investment based on uneven 
allocation of development resources for nearly 30 years. Agricultural and 
industrial projects continued to be concentrated in the so-called 
triangle area which includes Gezira or Blue Nile, Kassala, Northern and 
Khartoum province: Table 6.2 below has again demonstrated the process of 
underdevelopment of some regions in the Sudan through unequal allocations 
of not just the projects but the failure to release the amount of cash or 
the funds meant for the implementation of the project(s) in Western 
Sudan, for example, the Five-year plan and Ten-year plans which were 
designed to solve the problem of regional disparities but instead the 
already developed regions were given more funds than the less developed 
as shown by existing research studies. For example Kassala and Blue Nile 
in the Five Year plan were given the highest land to put under production 
(ie. Blue, 10,024 and Kassala 874 
E 
while Southern Darfur and Kordofan got 
the least and with Southern Sudan receiving second lowest - ie. 450 
thousand feddans, but all the same no funds were ever released for the 
implementation of the said projects. 
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TABLE 6.2: DISTRIBUTION OF 'NEW LANDS' PROPOSED BY THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
COMPARED WITH THE PROPOSAL OF THE AMENDED FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 
BY PROVINCE 
5-year plan Amended 5-year 
Province proposal - plan proposal 
Thousand feddans Thousand feddans 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Kassala 900 874 
Blue Nile 550 1,028 
South Kordofan 500 410 
South Darfur 400 411 
Upper Nile 450 559 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 2,800 2,981 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Sudan Govnt. 1970, P. 52. and Sudan Govnt. 1976 
As a result, all the projects in Southern Region have been buried in the 
books until now. For it is therefore not enough to propose a development 
project which would not be implemented or executed. As we shall see, in 
the case of Southern Sudan, the failure of the State to fulfil its 
commitment is to blame on the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which executes 
policies laid down by the dominant ruling bourgeois class. During this 
period the 5-year Plan, The Agricultural Sector and specially irrigation 
received 25% of the development allocations in the public sector and 
accounted for 24.2% of the actual development expenditure. Kursany has 
described how the State Capitalist policies in Agriculture in the same 
region, have affected the local populations when he wrote the following: 
"Since land is owned by the State, many of the local population 
had been driven away from their fertile land (which is 
allocated instead for the private capitalists) and either 
compensated by less fertile land, or simply forced to migrate - 
after being deprived of their principal means of production 
(viz. land) to the nearby towns as wage labourers. 
"The implementation of the King Faisal Scheme in the Blue Nile 
Province is found to result in the loss of 57,000 Feddans of 
Bildot land and the removal of a town with 6,000 population. 
The number of families which were affected by the construction 
of capitalist schemes in Habila were 850 and the number of 
persons affected ranged between 5,950 - 6,600 which is not 
insignificant as far as Habila area..... The total area 
affected is 25,000 feddans. "29 
Kursany went on to assert that: 
it.... on Habila Schemes the rate of labour displacement was... 
39% which is considered high by conventional standards.... This 
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process has created a serious social problem since the local 
population saw themselves being "kicked out" from "their" 
traditional land and were only able for "readmission" as casual 
labourers selling their labour power to the private 
capitalists. "30 
These long passages are self-explanatory. Therefore it suffices here to 
say, that the state policies were damaging to most, while beneficial to 
some, depending on whether or not the group is within or outside the 
ruling class. And so the absence of development in one area in a 
capitalist orientated state can be explained in terms of who, and from 
which region the ruling class comes? For there is always uneven 
development or regional inequalities in all the capitalist states even in 
the advanced western capitalist countries like Britain, USA, Canada, 
Australia etc. The differences in this connection is a question of 
degree. For example the backwardness of Darfur region in the Sudan is not 
same with backwardness of Scotland or Wales as compared with England. 
The role of state in the eradication of poverty is incontestable, due to 
the fact that in the third world countries, the state is the only 
institution in the country which controls more money than any capitalist 
individual, given the fact that all national capitalists in the third 
world are weak and incapable of being independent from both state 
influence and foreign capital's control. 31 As such it is the neo-colonial 
state which acts as an agent of Imperialism and capitalist development. 
But unfortunately capitalist development reinforces regional disparities 
or inequalities inherited from the defunct colonial state and which in 
turn poses a new problem of political violence and the crisis of national 
integration. 
Bashir Omer M. Fadlalla was one of the Sudanese academics concerned with 
uneven development, which he described as "unbalanced development and 
regional disparity in the Sudan". Like most writers or academics, among 
the Arabs and Arabized national group, in Sudan, he left out Southern 
Sudan from his studies for reasons best known to him. His studies cover 
the'six regions usually known as Darfur and Kordofan (regions in the 
west) central, Eastern, Khartoum and the Northern regions. 
Fadella observed that, 
".... Resource allocation, particularly financial resources was 
haphazardly conducted .... 
"32 
He went on to assert that, 
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.... continued heavy government investment, in the "Golden 
Triangle" of the Gezira area in the Central Region was seen by 
many as exasperating a situation of already worsening regional 
inequalities. "33 
And, he continued: 
"A readily available symbol of inequality and perhaps the most 
revealing.... is that of regional income per capita for the 
Northern Regions and although the figures are estimates, they 
help to highlight the pattern of regional income disparities 
over a period of fifteen years. Khartoum and the Central region 
are comfortably at the top of the income scale with Darfur 
trailing laboriously at the very back. "34 
In addition to the above quoted statements Fadlalla used an ILO study on 
the Sudan which offered an estimated assessment of regional inequalities 
in form of a Table: 
TABLE 6.3: ESTIMATED REGIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA (LS) (AVERAGE INCOME OF 
HOUSEHOLD). 
--------------- 
Region 
--------- 
---------------- 
1967/68 
------------ 
--------------------- 
1982/83 
------------------ 
Increase % 
------ 
1. Northern 
---- 
124 
--------------------- 
160 
------------------ 
29 
2. Eastern 180 240 44 
3. Central 183 300 63 
4. Kordofan 153 196 28 
5. Darfur 98 111 13 
6. Khartoum 
--------------- 
236 
---------------- 
524 
--- 
112 
7. Ave 
--------------- 
162.33 
---------------- 
------------------ 
255.00 
--------------------- 
------------------ 
49 
------------------ 
Source: ILO., Growth Employment and Equity. 
Here, Southern Sudan was omitted by Fadlalla's Study but he pointed out 
that there was evidence to show that Southern Sudan was poorer than 
Darfur which was the poorest cited in his work. 
For Fadlalla, under-development and regional inequality was created by 
bad policies, in agricultural development, health, education, transport, 
communications and industrial establishments which have been concentrated 
around the "Golden Triangle" area. 35 Table 6.4 clearly shows the unequal 
distribution of industrial establishments in Sudan. 
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TABLE 6.4: DEGREE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION IN SUDAN (1980) 
------------------------------------------------- 
Region % 
Khartoum 6.54 
Eastern 0.72 
Central 0.66 
Northern 0.35 
Kordofan 0.17 
Darfur 0.06 
Southern 
--------------------------- 
0.02 
------------------------- 
Source: Economic Surveys, by Fadlalla, 1980/81 
Fadlalla strongly pointed out that, 
".... there is nothing more revealing as a measure of economic 
disparities than the degree of industrial concentration. "36 
Khartoum, according to Fadlalla was the most favoured region, which was 
found out to possess the following: - 
1.44% of manufacturing industrial establishments 
2.62% of the industrial labour force 
3.65% of the total industrial wages 
4.48% of the total invested industrial capital 
5.66% of the total industrial production and to generate 
6.62% of the total industrial value added. 
As shown by the above, it is therefore reasonable to state here that the 
existence of wide ranging regional disparities have had negative effects 
on the process of economic, social and political development not only in 
Southern Sudan but also in most of the so-called 'Northern Regions', 
(which include Kordofan and Darfur in Western Sudan, Central, Eastern, 
Northern and Khartoum regions). 
6.6 The Process of Political Exploitation and Domination in 
the Southern Sudan under the Neo-Colonial State 
The process of political exploitation and domination in Southern Sudan, 
which was used by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial state, was adopted by the 
post-colonial state in 1954 when the first Sudanese Government took over. 
While Southern Sudan was not represented on all commissions made to 
prepare Sudan for political independence, it was under-represented in the 
first Sudanese Parliament of January 1954,13 out of 97 seats, in the 
first Sudanese Council of Ministers of 1954, ie. 3 junior ministers out 
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of 40 ministers, in the army, police and in the administrative posts 
after the Sudanization of all senior state posts. The under 
representation mentioned above has continued until this day and its 
consequence have been the recurrent civil wars which started with the 
1955 uprising in Torit and spread to other parts of Southern Sudan. 37 
This injustice was reinforced at the time of independence when political 
and economic power went to the national bourgeoisie from the most 
developed areas in the Arab controlled regions who had accumulated 
considerable wealth and political influence during the colonial phase. 
The neo-colonial state during the first period of independence became 
known to Southerners as 'Arab Settler Colonial State, ' to some western 
Sudanese, as an 'internal colonial state' and to the Arab orientated 
ruling group as 'national state' comprised of the following 
institutions. 38 
(1) Constituent Assembly to replace the British Colonial legislative 
council. 
(2) The Supreme Council of State, to replace the Governor General, 
(3) The Council of Ministers. 
This latter was composed of five members to replace the Governor General 
and the chairmanship of the council was to be rotated among the five 
members each for a period of a month. This arrangement was dropped in 
1965, when the provisional constitution was amended through an agreement 
between the Mahdi family controlled Umma Party on one side and the Hindi, 
the Abdel Rahman and the Mirghani families controlled National Unionist 
Party (later DUP) on the other, to share the state power. It was agreed 
that the Umma which had the majority should take the position of the 
premiership to be appointed by the Imam of Ansar, the Patron of the Umma 
Party, while the chairmanship of the Supreme Council was made permanent 
and given to NUP leader Ismail Azhari representing Mirghani family and 
Hindi family was given Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was also given to NUP. In 1986 this arrangement was to serve the 
sectarian families, for the Umma Party under Saddiq al Mahdi the Acting 
Imam of Ansar with majority in the constituent assemblies, took the 
position of Prime Minister, the Mirghani's son took over the Chairmanship 
of the Supreme Council of State, the Hindi's son was given the position 
of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the Abdel 
Rahman's family was given the Ministry of the Interior. At this time, the 
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Mahdis decided to control both Finance and Economic Planning, Commerce 
and Foreign Trade, the Attorney General, etc. 
The third political institution was the Cabinet or the Council of 
Ministers replacing the Colonial State Administrative Council which was 
headed by a Prime Minister to be assisted by ministers, State Ministers 
and the Under Secretaries who were responsible for the Management of 
various Ministerial departments and State corporations etc. The Council 
of Minsters was composed of over 60 ministers and state ministers. The 
Constituent Assembly was (is) the highest political organ and its members 
were publicly elected and were responsible for the making of laws which 
the state would enforce or use for the Management of the national 
affairs. Not only so, but they were responsible for supervision, checking 
and guidance of the country towards a particular political and socio- 
economic development. The constituent assembly was the first place from 
where domination and oppression of various national groupings was planned 
organized and legalized. After having examined how members of the 
constituent assembly were elected, it was found that every member of the 
constituent assembly was a member of a political party. Those without a 
political party were found to be very few. For example the list of the 
1953,1954 and 1958 members of the constituent assembly has shown 
sectarian political parties were dominant with nearly 80% seats in the 
assembly. 
In theory and in practice the political party that gets the majority 
would form the Cabinet, which governs the Constituent Assembly which in 
theory elects the five members of the State Council, from among the 
members of the Constituent Assembly. The elections of these five members 
are also dominated by parties which hold the majority in the Assembly. 
The parties which dominated (and still do) the Assembly at the time of 
independence include the National Unionist Party, under the control of 
Khalimiyo and Hindiya sects, and Umma Party under the Ansar of the 
Mahdist family. The 1954 elections gave the NUP a clear majority and its 
leader was the first Prime Minister of the independent Sudan in 1956. 
These two parties were politically and financially developed by both the 
British and the Egyptians for their own colonial use. And so these 
parties with their wealth and political power controlled and continued to 
control the constitution, the state and its apparatus and all state 
policies. These dominant political parties had to see to it that their 
supporters or candidates had to pass in the elections in order to 
dominate the Assembly, the State and its apparatus. Furthermore, the 
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dominant ruling class had to determine the regional representation in the 
Assembly. To do so, they had to allocate less seats to those regions 
which they lack influence such as Southern Sudan. 
The criteria for allotment of territorial seats was not clear and the 
authorities responsible have no guiding law for such matters. What 
matters it seemed was the ruling clique had accepted it. It is in the 
Constituent Assembly and Council of Ministers where dominant bourgeoisie 
ruling classes use their majority properly ie. to serve their interests. 
It was because of these interests that led various political parties and 
individuals to struggle to become a minister in one of the outstanding 
ministries such as finance and economic planning, Internal and Foreign 
Affairs, Trade and Commerce, Agriculture, Health, Energy and Power 
Industry, Lands, Housing and Attorney General's position etc. for 
definite personal or group interests. Thus in the Sudan, the Constituent 
Assembly, Council of State, Council of Ministers and State apparatus and 
Corporations were (and still are) staffed with members of the dominant 
bourgeoisie sectarian parties and the same goes to the members of civil 
service, judiciary, the police, the Army, prisons and members of the 
diplomatic corps and corporations. 
The political domination, oppression and exploitation of Southern Sudan 
is carried out under these institutions and departments, where Southern 
Sudan is under-represented and in most cases not represented at all. For 
example, in 1987, the author found that out of 331 members of the 
Assembly Southern Sudan, which was supposed to receive one third of the 
seats in the Assembly was allotted less than that in order to reduce 
their number such that their members always remained a minority in the 
Assembly and in the Council of State and in the Council of State and 
Council of Ministers such that their political influence should be less. 
Again as was made clear above, the ideas of those who dominate the 
Constituent Assembly, Council of State, Council of Ministers and the 
State Apparatus were considered as the national ideas. Their culture, 
language, ideology and religion are considered to be national and are 
legalized. The Council of State became identified with the Arab dominant 
ruling class. 
Attempts are still aimed at transforming Sudan from an African country, 
with an African majority to an Arab Islamic nation state, Arabizing and 
assimilating the African majority. So it is safe to say that the entire 
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period of 33 years of political independence in Sudan which were 
characterized by violence, struggles between Arab National groups and 
African National Groupings was overtaken by the policies mentioned above. 
It is equally important to point out that the sectarian military regime 
of General Nimiere was able to impose Arab cultures and Islamic Laws on 
the Sudanese people in 1983 while secular laws were abolished. The 
implementation of these cruel laws marked a return to Islamic ancient 
oriental despotic system of rule, which characterized most systems of 
rule in the Arabian Peninsular today. It marked the legalization of 
dictatorship of a few families using archaic cruel laws considered as 
divine or holy by the Arab ruling national grouping. But who have the 
most affected victims of those repressive laws? This study found that 
over 400 Sudanese poor had their hands and limbs cut off since 1983, and 
more than 200 were from Southern Sudan alone, while over 98% of the 
remaining victims were from the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Beja, and 
Southern and Northern Funj and Ingesna areas. Three quarters of those 
affected were not Muslims but Christians and others, and the number of 
the Arab and Arabized elements affected were those from the most 
impoverished families without influence over the ruling sectarian 
families. 
It was found also that the crimes committed by these victims were petty 
thefts, such as pickpocketing, or stealing small things worth, say, 50- 
100 Sudanese pounds or a bit more. This study also found that the 
Government which had imposed the repressive September laws was composed 
of several corrupt thieves, who were involved in embezzlement of several 
millions if not billions of Sudanese pounds with impunity, until the fall 
of the regime on 6th April 1985, when several ministers, generals and 
senior government officials including the first Vice President of the 
Republic, Omer Mohd al Tayeb, were convicted and given jail sentences and 
heavy fines only. This study found that although the convicted ministers 
and generals were found to have stolen several millions of Sudanese 
pounds, none of them had received punishment involving cutting off of 
hands and limbs instead they were released by the succeeding regimes in 
Khartoum. 39 
Apart from the elimination of Southern Sudanese leaders by the state 
repressive authorities through the influence of the dominant ruling 
sectarian families during both the military and civilian rule, the state 
power had and continued to be used violently against Southern people by 
arresting and murdering those singled out as resisting the state. 1955 
305 
was the beginning of the violent oppression in Southern Sudan, when over 
twenty southern members of constituent assembly were arrested and jailed 
without trial because they had opposed linguistic treatment of southern 
workers in Anzara Scheme. 40 
The abolition of Sunday as a holy resting day in the south and its 
replacement by the Islamic holy resting day 'Friday' marked the beginning 
of religious persecution which ended in the expulsion of all foreign 
missionaries from the South. All attempts, by foreigners and nationals, 
politicians and students, to force the military regime to change its 
repressive policies, was met with further strong state repression and 
suppression. In 1962, there were nearly 5000 Southern Sudanese political 
prisoners, and nearly 30,000 southerners died. 
The overthrow of the military regime in 1964 by a popular uprising in the 
name of democracy, justice and human rights did not bring any significant 
change in terms of all these rights in the country. The caretaker 
civilian government attempted to narrow the political differences between 
northern and southern leaders, was unsuccessful. The failure of Mr. 
Clement Mboro (then the minister of the Interior) to return from his tour 
of the south on a Sunday resulted in the massacre of over 10,000 Southern 
Sudanese. 41 In August 1965, another 700 people, including civil servants, 
politicians and several young men and girls were massacred during a 
wedding party in Wau. Several massacres followed in Juba, Malakal, Bor, 
Yiral and several rural areas, involving 6-7,000 more innocent people. In 
Bor alone, 36 chiefs who came to receive Saddiq al Mahdi, then the Prime 
Minister, were murdered by the army, after he had left the town. 42 Then 
he visited the graves of Northerners killed by the resistance movement 
Anya-nya I Forces and wept over one of the graves. This made the soldiers 
wilder and they went outside the law and shot unarmed civilians. So for 
Southerners, the army, police, prison officers are there to serve the 
interests of the Arabs and Arabized national groupings, and it was 
surprising to see some great Southern leaders murdered. For example, in 
Bohr el Ghazal Province (as it was known) more than 80 politicians were 
-murdered among which were William Deng Nhial (one of the leaders of 
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement), William Nhial, Duad Caggai Wut, Thon 
Ater, Chor Malek, John Majak and other members of the former Constituent 
Assembly in Khartoum. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement which had provided the Region with a separate 
Parliament, separate police, prisons and public service, was a target of 
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the sectarian forces. In addition, the 6000 ex-members of Anya-nya Forces 
and which were absorbed into the national army was another target for 
destruction. The Southern Command stationed in Southern Region was 
subjected to arbitrary policies of the sectarian forces which eventually 
led to the abolition of the Addis Accord. Before the abolition of this 
Agreement, the state was once again used by sectarian families to 
terrorize both Southern leaders and the masses at large. For example, 
when the issues concerning oil, borders, Jonglei Canal, Abeyi Hafrat el 
Nahas mines, and the transfer of the 6000 ex-Anya-nya I to Northern 
Sudan, the failure of the Central Government to release sufficient funds 
to the South and the division of the Southern Region into three separate 
regions, the central government applied repressive means to suppress 
southerners, ie. mass arrests and detention of their leaders, without 
legal procedures being taken. That is, violating all the constitutional 
provisions laid down in order to maintain order, justice, equality and 
human rights. An other example was the mass illegal dismissal of Southern 
Sudanese Officers by the sectarian forces using the state power to 
inflict injustice on other Sudanese between 1980 to 1984. Also the most 
striking example of the misuse of State power in Southern Sudan has been 
the absence of any legal base either arresting or trying of any criminals 
in the South since 1983 when the judges from the south and three southern 
governors refused to implement Nimiere's Islamic laws. This study found 
that no law to cover crimes committed in the Southern Region has been 
enacted since 1983. The Transitional Military Government which took over 
the after the fall of Gen. Nimiere and the elected Government of Saddiq 
al Mahdi both failed to create laws acceptable to Southern Sudanese 
leaders or the mass of people at large. The Transitional Military 
Government, which abolished Nimiere's Constitution and established its 
own Transitional Constitution failed to implement sub-section 2, section 
16, which states: - 
"To establish the system of regional self-rule on the basis of 
the United Sudan, in accordance with Regional Self Government 
Act for the Southern Provinces of 1972 or any amendments made 
by one third of the members of the Transitional Military 
Council and the Council of Ministers jointly, and submitted for 
a referendum according to the Act of 1972 for the self-rule in 
the South, when etc....... 143 
Although the Transitional Military High Executive Council for the 
Southern Region was appointed, the central authorities refused to allow 
the President of the Transitional High Executive Council and his members 
to move to Juba or anywhere in Southern Sudan, instead, they allocated 
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them offices in Khartoum. At the same time, three Governors and Regional 
Ministers were appointed and sent to govern the three regions, while the 
members of MTHEC remained redundant for a full year. It was found that 
both the Transitional Military Council and the Council of Ministers were 
influenced by the sectarian Arab based parties, specially the NIF which 
did not like to implement the above-quoted section of the Transitional 
Constitution because it contradicted their own interests. Furthermore, it 
was found that the Central Government, during the Military Transitional 
rule and during Saddiq al Mahdi's rule failed to enact non-Islamic laws 
acceptable to the south and as a result, prisons in Southern Sudan became 
full, with people who could not be tried because there were no laws to 
try them with. In 1987, several prisons were destroyed by untried 
prisoners who fled into the bush. Their reasons for the revolt were that 
they were illegally imprisoned without trial. The Central Government 
preferred to spend millions of Sudanese pounds on bribing Southern 
Sudanese politicians to solving the problems of lawlessness in the South. 
For example, the Central Government created the Military Transitional 
High Executive in 1985, based in Khartoum, while three regional 
governments were set up in the three Southern Regions, each with more 
than ten regional ministers and advisers. Both the Military Transitional 
High Executive Council and the three regional governments had nearly 50 
ministers, each receiving various financial benefits ranging from houses, 
cars, fuel, free drivers, security etc. The three southern governors and 
their ministers and support staff and the budget for Southern Sudan was 
not increased for the betterment of the regions, but for accommodating 
certain Southern Sudanese politicians who were only interested in their 
salaries and other financial benefits - not for the welfare of their 
people. 44 
During the time of field work and data collection, it was found that the 
elected government of Saddiq al Mahdi had failed to implement (or even to 
accept) the section of the Transitional Constitution that his government 
had inherited from the Military. Saddiq had in fact replaced the HEC with 
something called the Council for the South, consisting of 20 ministers, a 
president and his vice-president. However no work was given to them, 
since three Governors and Regional Ministers had been appointed to the 
region to execute their administrative functions. In addition, there were 
32 advisers with the rank of regional ministers, with all ministerial 
entitlements, on various specialities, including political and economic 
affairs. Like the members of the Council of the South, the advisers had 
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nothing to do and no one to advise, and their appointment was therefore a 
mere political accommodation to gain the support of poor southern 
politicians. 
This study found that the leading three sectarian families who had 
inherited both the state and economic power had continued not just to 
control but had managed to create a bureaucratic feudalism within state 
institutions, enabling those particular families to hold permanent 
control over certain state departments or ministries. For example the 
Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning, and Commerce and Foreign 
trade, were controlled by the Khalimiya and Hindiya religious sects 
because the post independent governments were controlled by the National 
Unionist Party. Similarly, the University of Khartoum, the Ministry of 
Education, Foreign Affairs just to mention a few have been under the 
control of particular religious sects, or families. 
45 The Sudanese case 
resembles what is prevailing in the Arab world, specially Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Bahrain, Northern Yemen, United Arab Emirates, ie. 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qutar and the economy is controlled by specific 
sectarian royal families. It is to be noted, in each case, state 
institutions or departments are run as if they were private family 
corporations or companies. 
46 It is equally important to note that in each 
those families who control the institutions in question claim to be 
representatives of the prophet of Islam on earth. 
47 
The political exploitation and domination of Southern Sudan, under the 
neo-colonial state is made more clear when we examine the composition of 
the Sudanese state, such as the (Parliament) Constituent Assembly under 
civilian rule, Supreme Council of State, Council of Ministers, State 
Corporations and Departments. In examining the composition of the 
Constituent Assembly membership, Southern Sudan with one third of the 
country's population was the least represented in 1986. In examining the 
leadership of the Constituent Assembly which consisted of a Speaker, two 
Deputy speakers, Controller and Deputy Leader of the House and his 
Deputy, 20 Chairmen of Specialized Committees and the entire secretariat 
of the Constituent Assembly, the study found that there were only two 
Southern Sudanese as Chairmen of two specialized committees. 
In the State Supreme Council which was composed of a President, one 
Deputy President and three Members there was only one Southern Sudanese. 
While in the Secretariat of the Council of State there was only one 
Southern Sudanese employed as an office manager to the Southern 
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representative on the State Council out of over 100 officials. 
In examining the composition of the Council of ministers composed of 
nearly 40 Ministers, and State Ministers representing Southern Sudan. In 
the Secretariat General of Council of Ministers composed of over 150 
officials, there was no Southern Sudanese employed. Similarly, Southern 
Sudan was under-represented in various state corporations or 
institutions, including the military Officer corps, the police and 
prisons, judiciary, Foreign Affairs, Universities, Gezira Board and 
others. 
This study examines the structures and composition of selected central 
ministries in order to find how many Southerners have attained the 
position of Under Secretaries, the highest position in the hierarchy of 
civil servant, or how many have attained positions of deputy under- 
secretaries, director, deputy director and assistant director in the 
following ministries, Finance and Economic Planning, Foreign Affairs, 
Education and Guidance, Trade and Commerce, Interior, Defence, Industry, 
Energy and Mining, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Transport, Roads 
and Communications, Local Government and Public Services. 
Each ministry is administered by a Permanent Under-secretary and several 
deputies, Directors and their deputies and Assistant Directors. This 
forms the Super Scale section of a ministry. This groups also forms the 
political leadership of the ministry, under the overall leadership of a 
minister. 
The second category in the set-up is composed of Senior Inspectors, 
Inspectors and Assistant Inspectors. The lower sections consist of 
clerks, book-keepers, drivers, messengers, security men, etc. It was 
found that no Southerner has ever reached the position of under- 
secretary, deputy under-secretary, or director of any central ministry. 
There has never been a Southern Sudanese who has ever attained the 
position of Chief Justice, Police Inspector, General or Major General in 
the national police or prison service. 
It was found that there were only two Southern Sudanese Deputy Directors 
but were only given a limited authority. One of these, Mr. Isaac Bior 
Deng, was the former Director of Planning in the Regional Ministry of 
Finance and Economy, Juba. The other was Mr. Peter Urat, who was the 
former Director of Taxation in the Regional Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning. In the Ministry of Justice, only one senior Judge in 
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the High Court of Appeal was appointed - Mr. Wilson Aramba, while the 
rest of the Southern Judges were junior and those who could have been 
promoted were dismissed by the central government. 
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (employing over 500 staff) there were 
three Junior Ambassadors and two Roaming Ambassadors, including the 
retired Lt. Gen. Joseph Lago, former leader of The Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement and later President of HEC and Mr. Philip Ubang. The 
other three ambassadors were Dr. Acal Deng, Mr. Lawrance Modi, former 
Governor of Equatoria Region and Mr. Rathaya Acal de Dut, who was 
recently dismissed by the current military Junta. There are also about 
six junior secretaries in foreign embassies, and inside the ministry 
itself. 
There were no southerners in leadership positions in the following 
ministries, Interior, Commerce and Trade, Agriculture, Energy and Mining, 
Industry, Transport, Roads and Communication, with the exception of Sudan 
TV Service, where there is a Southerner in group five super scale as 
Assistant Director. 
Similarly this study found that there has never been a Southerner 
employed as senior or junior member of the secretariat general of the 
Supreme Council of State and council of ministers since Independence in 
1956. 
Also, state power is also used in Kasha (ie. arbitrary arrest, detention, 
and deportation of unwanted citizens) used by the British Colonial State 
in Sudan after the 1924 popular uprising, was adopted by the neo-colonial 
state after independence and continued to be used by successive regimes 
both civilian and military. In 1987, the author witnessed Kasha being 
used against Sudanese classified by the police as Junubeen and Garbeen 
(ie. Southerners or Westerners) who were distinguished by the colour of 
their skin. The police throughout the national capital, (ie. in Omdurman, 
Khartoum) in the markets and on the streets were found to be raiding, 
arresting, beating and kicking any black Sudanese present in any area 
where Kasha was in progress. This affected old men and women, young men 
and women, boys and girls, including the author, and a member of the 
Constituent Assembly (MP) from Nuba Mountains Territorial Seat. The 
criteria used by the police in the Kasha was quite apparent, for those 
who were victims, including the Member of Parliament, were southerners, 
Westerners and those from Southern and Northern Funj, who were also 
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identified as 'The Fifth Column'. Furthermore, the composition of those 
detained in almost all police cells throughout the national capital was 
sufficient evidence to show that Kasha was a racist institution, 
established by those who control the neo-colonial state to get rid of 
those unwanted Sudanese in various northern towns, including Khartoum, 
Wed Medani, Port Sudan and others. 48 
A committee, composed of members of the Constituent Assembly under the 
chairmanship of Major General Andrew Makur (MP of the Graduate Seat Bahr 
Ghazal Region) was set up in 1987 by the Union of Sudan African Parties 
to conduct an investigation on the state sponsored brutalities, ie. Kasha 
in general and racial abuses of the above-named Member of the Constituent 
Assembly. The Committee failed to achieve anything because the Minister 
of the Interior refused to cooperate and influenced the police and 
courts, not to cooperate with the Committee. The Prime Minister, Mr. 
Saddig al Mahdi denied all the charges against the injustice committed by 
the police and courts specially in Khartoum. 
The Committee Chairman in a report to the Union of Sudanese African 
political parties and also in an open letter to the Minister of the 
Interior documented and enumerated the processes under which the state 
participates in oppressing, suppressing and murdering Sudanese citizens. 
The use of Kasha, 'The Fifth Column' or 'rebels' and other terms to 
justify the massacres, murders, detentions or mass arrests of 
southerners, westerns and other African nationalities were strongly 
stated. 
Finally, the use of state political and economic power in favour of the 
dominant sectarian ruling political parties is not a secret but rather 
known throughout the country. Similarly, the violation of various state 
regulations and laws in relation to the manner and method of recruitment 
of state employees using favouritism, corruption and nepotism with 
impunity has therefore led to the weakness of state institutions and 
inefficiency in the country. For example, Umma party, DUP, NIF and others 
are often openly accused of nepotism, corruption abuse of state power and 
institutions by processional organizations, trade unions, the SPLA and 
most Sudanese intelligentsia or scholars. 49 
The following tables show the state institutions under the control of 
these national groupings. 
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TABLE 6.5: SENIOR STATE CIVIL SERVANTS BY PLACE OF BIRTH UNDER NIMIERE, 
1981 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Region Number Percentage 
Khartoum Region 65 50.4 
The Central Region 27 21.0 
Northern Region 19 15.0 
Kordofan 10 8.0 
Darfur Region 4 3.0 
Eastern Region (Kassala) 3 2.0 
3 Southern Sudan Regions -- 
Others (Egypt) 1 0.6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: 50 The Civil Service Commission Report, 1982, Khartoum 
TABLE 6.6: MEMBERS OF 3 MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF 1958,1969, AND 
1985 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Arabized Southern 
Regions Regions 
-------------------------------------------------------------- : 
The Aboud Military Region 16 16 - 
2. The May Military Region 18 18 - 
3. The 1985 Transitional 18 15 3 
Military Regime 
------------------------------------- 
TOTALS 52 49 3 
------------------------------------ 
Source: 51 Prepared by the Author in Khartoum in 1987. 
TABLE 6.7: THE STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN SUDAN 
1. - The Supreme Council of State 
2. - The Council of Ministers 
3. - Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
4. - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
5. -"" Power and Energy 
6. -" Local Government 
7. -" Defence 
8. -" Interior 
9. -"" Education 
10. -" Commerce, Trade and Supplies 
11. - It Agriculture 
12. -" Public Service 
13. -" Transport and Communications 
14. - It Industry and Mining 
15. -" Public Works and Utilities 
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16 - " Information and Culture . 
17. - " Animal Resources and Tourism 
18 - " Youth and Sports . 
19. - " Labour and Social Insurance 
20. - " Cooperative and Rural development 
21. - " Religious Affairs and Endowment 
22. - " Justice 
23. - " Attorney General 
24 - " Auditor General . 
25. - " Ministry of Health 
26 - " Ministry of Social Affairs . 
27. - " " Ministry of Irrigation 
28 - " Foreign Trade . 
29. - " Refugees and Relief 
30. - " Zaka and Social Welfare 
31. - " Peace 
TABLE 6.8: IMPORTANT NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHERE SOUTH SUDAN NOT 
REPRESENTED 
1. - National Council for Research 
2. - Department of Housing 
3. - Department of Land Distribution 
4. - Ministry of Culture and Information: 
a. Antiquities b. Information c. Supreme Council for Arts 
5. - National T. V. and Radio Corporation 
6. - Sudan News Agency 
7. - Ministry of Cooperation: 
a. Commerce and Supplies b. Commerce 
8. - Ministry of Finance and Economy: 
a. Finance 
b. Taxation 
c. Statistics 
d. General Investment Secretariat 
e. Customs and Excise Duty f. Stores and Equipment 
g. Institute of Accounts Studies 
h. Planning 
TABLE 6.9: NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHERE SOUTH SUDAN NOT REPRESENTED 
9. - Republican Palace 
The General Administrative and Secretariat of the Supreme 
Council of State -4 under-secretaries 
10. - General Secretariat and Administrative for the Council of 
Ministers 
11. - National Council and Administration of Training 
12. - Police 
13. - Prisons 
14. - Army 
15. - Wild Life 
16. - Meteorological 
17. - Fire Brigade Administration 
18. - National Central Archives 
19. - Public Corporations for Labour, Culture and Recruitment 
Ministry of Education and Guidance. Imbalance in Education between North 
and South Sudan, where South Sudan is marginalised. 
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Table 6.9. a: High Education in the North 11 
1. - Khartoum University 
2. - Gezira University 
3. - Polytechnics College, Khartoum 
4. - Atbara Institute of Education 
5. - High Nursing College 
6. - Omdurman Islamic University 
7. - Abu Naama Agricultural College 
8. - College of Hygiene 
9. - Institute of Physical Education 
10. - Mechanical Engineering College, Atbara- 
11. - Ahfad University College 
12. - College of Arabic Studies 
13. - High School of Commerce. Khartoum 
14. - Holy Koran Institutes 
15. - National Handicrafts School 
16. - Khartoum Institute for Arabic Language 
17. - Khartoum Industrial and Vocational Schools 
18. - 10 Institutes of Teachers 
19. - Institute for Marine Sciences 
20. - Institute of Tropical Medicine 
21. - National Population Council 
22. - Information Training Institute 
23. - Institute of Accounting and Banking 
24. - Shambat Agricultural Institute 
Table 6.9. b: National Corporations 
1. - Sudan Airways 
2. - Sudan Railways 
3. - Sudan River Transport 
4. - Agricultural Corporation 
a. - Western Savanna Development Corporation 
b. - South Darfur and Savanna belt Development 
c. - Jebel Marra Rural Development 
d. - Northern Region Agricultural Corporation 
e. - Agricultural Research Corporation 
f. - The Blue Nile Agricultural Corporation 
g. - New Half Agricultural Corporation 
h. - Nuba Mountains Rural Development 
i. - El Suki Agricultural Corporation 
J. - Tokar Delta Agricultural Corporation 
5. - Gezira Board 
6. - Irrigation 
7. - Rural Water Development 
8. - Earth Moving Corporation 
9. - Rahad Agricultural Corporation 
10. - Livestock of Meat Marketing Corporation 
11. - Stock Route Company 
12. - Jonglei Development Commission 
13. - Sugar Corporation 
14. - Sugar Research Centre 
15. - Sudanese Mining Corporation 
16. - National Electricity Corporation. 
F 
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6.7 The Process of Economic Exploitation and Domination in the Southern 
Sudan under the Neo-colonial State 
-Southern Sudan is one-of. the less developed Regions in Sudan. The 
Southern Sudan has been transformed into an exporter of raw materials to 
the industrial establishments in Northern Sudan. The important products 
include timber, coffee, tea, groundnuts, sesame, gold, iron-ore, jute, 
lulu oil, oil seeds etc. Similarly Southern Sudan is an exporter of cheap 
labour for Northern Sudanese agricultural schemes, industries, domestic 
servants etc. 
At independence, Southern Sudan was one of the regions left without major 
economic and socio-political development. The only important economic 
investment by the British Colonial Government was the Zande Scheme. This 
had 50,000 tenants who cultivated cotton (to be used in the textile 
centre at Anzara, where an agro-complex was established). The second 
scheme was a tobacco plantation on the East Bank in Equatoria, where a 
cigarette factory was established in Kapoeta. The third project was 
Kenaf, at the Tonj Oil Mill in Yiroi. Then there was a rice scheme in 
Awiel, and Sawmills in Bahr el Ghazal Province and Equatoria, with 
production so insignificant that it could not be considered as real 
profit-making projects. The Yirol oil mill was a local cooperative 
society intended to introduce the natives to capitalist production and 
which the British had thought would influence people so that they would 
produce over and above the subsistence level. It was assumed that the 
natives would be required to produce oilseeds (sesame, groundnuts etc. ) 
at a reasonable price to encourage petty commodity production in 
agriculture. But unfortunately, no social or economic change took place, 
for several reasons. 
1. The local people were not enlightened or educated enough to 
understand the pros and cons of such an innovation. So the project 
was imposed on the indigenous people through their chiefs who did not 
understand it either. In fact, the cooperative society and the oil 
mill was under the management of foreigners, with no local people 
committed to its management, so the project appeared foreign. 
2. The authorities were not able to connect the financial benefits which 
would accrue to the project with the concept of wealth that the 
people could understand. Yirol and Rumbek areas were rich in terms of 
cattle ownership and wealth was measured according to the number of 
316 
cows (plus sheep and goats) possessed. At that time, any future 
development should have begun with the modernization of the herds 
through cross-breeding etc. and the increase in milk production, meat 
production as well as-agricultural production. These things are still 
important to the local people. 
It is clear from the literature on the British economic programme in the 
South that it was responsible for the early backwardness or regional 
inequalities. 
The main question largely answered by all concerned rightly or wrongly, 
has been why did all the regimes which had ruled Sudan fail- to readjust 
the situation in 33 year's? The majority of academics and political 
leaders in Sudan, including leaders of the dominant ruling class have 
publicly admitted that the present underdevelopment and backwardness in 
Sudan is the fault of the state and the leaders of various dominant 
political parties, which have continued to control or dominate national 
political and economic power. But some leading policy and decision makers 
in the North have claimed that people from the South are lazy, primitive 
and refuse to accept modern economic and socio-political change. They 
claim that Southern cultures (some even went further and denied their 
existence) are backward cultures. This school of thought (if they can be 
at all labelled as such) claimed that Southern cultures reject modern 
education. Modern economic and political structures and principles. They 
propose that if there is to be any real socio-economic change, 
southerners will have to be transformed into Muslims, Arabs etc. 
otherwise they will resist ideas of modern development and 
civilization. Some argued that Islam was a religion of civilization, 
trade, economic and political modernization, and Arabic should be a 
factor in any development. Some well-educated and well placed people from 
the North went on to describe Southerners as 'people of the jungle, 
pagans and wild, like the animals in their jungles. ' 
it is equally argued that the Northern Regions were relatively developed 
owing to Arab-Islamic settlement in the area which has brought in Islamic 
and Arab civilization. It is assumed that the entire people of the 
Northern Sudan (which is usually used to include Darfur, Kordofan, 
Central, East and Northern Regions) are considered homogeneous because 
they are Muslims and accept Arabization. They are all Arabs and equal 
members of the dominant ruling national groupings. The arguments are 
advanced to support claims that all Muslims are equal brothers, and share 
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all the wealth of the Islamic community. The sectarian groups have been 
able to establish religious cells throughout the urban and rural areas. 
In these centres, poor people are gathered and indoctrinated using 
Koranic verses. In addition, the media, ie. the press, T. V. radio and 
newspapers are used to mislead them in a similar manner to the media in 
the Arabian Peninsular, where feudalist families have been controlling 
millions of people hitherto. 
While visiting and studying those areas labelled as developed, the author 
found something different. In Darfur, for example, it was found that the 
Arab tribes had declared war against African tribes in an open letter 
signed by over 25 leaders of various Arab tribes in Darfur and even 
Kordofan. Prominent tribes involved in this racial struggle for economic 
and political power of the region, include, on the Arab side, Haboniyya, 
Rezigat, Masirriya, Hansiniyya etc., while on the African side, we found 
the Fur, Zagkawaa Bornu in Darfur, Nuba in Kordofan, Ingesna and Funj in 
Southern and Northern Funj. Similar conditions were found between the 
Beja tribes and the Arab settlers. The Hadandowa tribesmen are the most 
oppressed tribes in Eastern Sudan, because of their resistance to 
Arabization. Bani Amir and Bishariyyan tribes are being used by the Arab 
based Gorot in Khartoum to oppress the Hadandowa. The outcome of such 
tension has led to violent confrontation between Hadandowa and Bani Amir 
and Bashirayyin tribes specially in 1987 in Port Sudan when over 300 
people were killed. 
The state failed to invest in any new project for nearly two decades with 
the exception of one or two areas, under military rule such as Abboud, a 
canning factory was constructed in Bahr, to produce food for the army 
fighting in the south during the first civil war. The USSR gave it to the 
north in Khartoum. The second was the Renk Mechanized Scheme and was 
distributed to Northern merchants and officers and a few tribal chiefs in 
the area. The southern elite were denied access to such schemes, and 
while there were attempts to exploit both agriculture and industry, none 
of the schemes got underway, and the development budget was given to 
those Southerners of the system whom they trusted, to steal with 
impunity, being the 'Good Guys' as they are called. 
The central government had promised to develop the southern regions, 
following the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. As a result several projects 
were initiated, and feasibility studies were conducted on most of the 
projects if not all. They include the following: ' 
318 
1. Maht and Mongalla Sugar Project 
2. Mougalla Weaving Mill and Nzara cotton complex 
3. Tonj Jute and Kenaf Project 
4. White Nile Brewery in Wau (beer) 
5. Juba Town Electricity power supply project 
6. Awiel and Jonglei Rice Schemes 
7. Wau fruit and vegetable canning factory 
8. Jebel Lado Ahab and Ajak Dura Schemes 
9. Mongalla Agro-industrial complex 
10. Regional medical laboratories in Juba. 
Nos. 7,8 and were implemented. Awiel rice started in 1979 its 
production. Wau fruit and canning was in operation in 1978 but at a lower 
capacity and could not provide the southern three senior secondary 
schools (ie. Rumbek, Juba and Malakal) with necessary canned foods 
requirement, let alone the whole country. 
Table 6.10 shows the budget allocation of special development budgets for 
the southern region for a period of five years beginning with 18 months 
transitional period of 1972/73 to 1977. It is clear from the table, that 
the central government failed to release the actual promised special 
development budgets which the Southern Region was desperately in need of, 
in order to rehabilitate the war-destroyed economic infrastructure of the 
region on one side and the settling of problems created by the returnees 
(or refugees). Because of these issues the failure of Central Government 
Table 6.10: Special Development Budgets 
----------- ------------------ 
Budget 
---------------- 
Actual 
----------- 
Actual % 
Year Estimate Expenditure of Estimate 
(LS) 
----------------- 
(LS) 
- ------------ 
1972/73 
- 
1,400,000 
-------------- 
560,000 
----------- 
40 
1973/74 7,300,000 730,000 10 
1974/75 7,100,000 1,150,000 16.2 
1975/76 7,200,000 1,630,000 22.7 
1976/77 15,300,000 
--- - 
3,610,000 23.6 
------------ 
TOTAL 
------------ 
---------- ---- 
38,300,000 
------------------ 
--------------- 
7,680,000 
--------------- 
----------- 
20.1 
----------- 
Source: Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Proceedings 
of the Conference on Development in the Southern Region of the 
Sudan held in Tuba, 5-8 April, 1983 (Juba, 1984), p. 17 
to release 38 million Sudanese pounds to regional government was a great 
problem. The 20% of the special budget released was insufficient. As a 
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consequence, over 32,000 labourers employed by the Regional Government 
among the returned refugees were dismissed. In addition, some departments 
(teachers), road workers and those in the district had to go for more 
than half a year without receiving their salaries. While other regions or 
provinces were receiving more than five times more than the southern 
region. For example, the proportional distribution of functional 
government expenditure during the five-year plan as shown in Table 6.11 
as a percentage share of each sector, does indicate that the central 
government intentionally gave less to the south and therefore directed 
the funds to the already developed areas. More than 400 Million Sudanese 
pounds were spent or transferred to the northern regions (ie. Central, 
Northern and Khartoum) during the five-year plan and yet, the Southern 
Region was given less than one third of the amounts allocated. The 
central government expenditure from 1974-73 to 1984-85 shows that LS6530 
million was spent on general administration and defence along, and LS 456 
million was the total development expenditure. 52 
Table 6.11: Proportional Distribution of Functional Government 
Expenditure, 1971/72 to 1976/77 ($) 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Economic Social Loan Security Local Miscell 
Fiscal Year 
---- 
Services 
-- -------- 
Services 
------ 
Repayment Forces Govern -aneous 
----------- 
1971/72 
-- 
13.8 
--- 
14.2 
---------- 
9.6 
--------- 
31.1 
------- 
12.1 
-------- 
19.3 
1972/73 13.7 13.6 9.4 26.6 9.1 27.6 
1973/74 12.9 8.9 10.0 21.0 20.0 26.5 
1974/75 10.8 7.1 10.5 15.9 18.2 37.5 
1975/76 11.5 7.9 12.4 15.0 19.7 33.4 
1976/76 
--------- 
10.0 
------------ 
7.3 
--- 
10.5 19.1 20.8 32.2 
------ 
Average 
--------------- 
12.1 
------------ 
------ 
9.8 
--------- 
---------- 
10.4 
---------- 
--------- 
21.6 
--------- 
-------- 
16.7 
-------- 
------- 
29.4 
------- 
Source: Government of Sudan, Economic Survey, 1977/78, p. 98. 
It is important to stress here that the period between 1972 and 1983 was 
a period of testing the honesty and commitment of the Military leaders to 
the Addis Ababa Agreement and its success. The suffering of the returnees 
or displaced people (with low incomes) in Southern Region was a great 
test for both Regional and Central Government. Furthermore, the most 
affected people were road workers who had very low wages, but were 
responsible for the maintenance of the destroyed roads which kept them 
moving from station to station in most cases on foot, since the regional 
government did not have enough vehicles or fuel, (where they had the old 
O P. 4 
w 
In 
LA 
O4 
W 
rn 
cn 
OW' 
C7 
PQ 
H 
P3 
N 
H 
CW9 
P4 
w 41 
00 H 
O 
y 
1J f-1 
tu P» ýc+ 
a4 a 
w Co 
O +ý 
0 
U" 
.H cn ra 
JD 4 
OO 
WU 
wH 
O Co 
41 
0 
8ýE N 
41 
up 
Ow 
(D v 
H 
oc 
44 ý4 
0 Aj K0 H 
a1 
º-1 a) 
cc Ig 
00 
N 4) 
H 
u 
0 c+ 
a 
320 
O cm N tr1 O 
%0 N -4 O 
.1 
00 C4 
r Oý 
00 M r+ ý 
ww 
ý! 1 Ný 
cq 00 -e %0 1 
LM 
-4 
rn -4 
%D . -4 in o 1, NN . -+ 
N 1, c'ß'1 
ww 
rl -4 
-"L sr- 
%0 -4 
00 LM 't tlý 1- CM "--- 
.tO v1 
www 
%D 0n 
v1 N 
%D 00 CV) %D 
O t- M . -4 
ww 
r-I ý' : ri rl 
rl 
M 
co 
O' 
oI 
0 
O' 
M 
0 
0 
w 
0 
0 
M 
cn 
N 
w 
N 
c 
Co w 0 
b 
Co w 
, -4 0 P-4 Co W Co 
c1 
Co 44 
N 
tu 
0 0 
bd G) Co . -I ti 
r4 H «- Co 
' f4 s. Z '-4 W 'd 
N 
aC 
.Jv 
4-S 
Co 
t+ 
vN 
to 
Co w :i :i P. 4 r-4 
° Öl tu ä z w PQ 
.0 
ir 
a. ' 
Co 
0 
o00 u00 
Ha 
Co w 
0 oß 
o in 
M Oý 
Co 
Zi w 
.Co 
LJ 41 
N 
w Co 
C) 
f"1 w 
c9 aý 
0 
º7 aý 
Co 
10 Ai 
C c! 2 
cu 
w o 
Cv 
a- 
.w xä 
.u Uq 
C) 
U 
w 
0 
U) 
321 
colonial cars), there was no benzine or petrol because of shortages. For 
example, the headquarters of the regional government (HEC) began with 
only two cars, one saloon car and a minibus to transport both ministers 
and regional directors. 53 
The failure of all the above mentioned development projects in the 
Southern Region was due to: - 
1. the lack of central government funds to meet financial obligations 
towards the implementation of projects in question and this is 
illustrated by Table 6.13. 
2. The failure of central government to discipline those responsible 
officials for the said projects, after their failure to execute the 
programme as laid down. 
It is important to point out here that in spite of the fact that the 
above projects were not put into operation, the managers of the projects 
in question managed without any exceptional case to use up or embezzle 
all funds without being either discovered by the central government 
authorities who were responsible for the running of all the 'national' 
projects. Also, all managers of the initiated projects were not only 
central government appointees but were all Northern Sudanese who 
apparently did not recognize not only the Addis Ababa Agreement which 
brought peace but the whole system of government under Nimiere. It is 
here that the importance of bureaucratic bourgeoisie was recognized. For 
example, it was clear from central government employees working in the 
South and who were all Northerners in the National Sudan Bank (branches 
in Juba, Wau, Malakal) the National Army, the General Petroleum 
Departments (branches in the South), the Post Office and Telegrams, 
Regional or provincial Judges, River transport, Sugar Corporation and all 
the staff of various projects already mentioned, that all officials 
considered themselves above the regional government, let alone directors 
of the regional ministries. All central government departments in 
Southern Sudan under the leadership of officials from Northern Sudan were 
not ready to accept any instructions from any authority from the regional 
government, even the president of the HEC, was rejected on the pretext 
that they were from the central government or more superior institutions 
and a better qualified one. Similar behaviour was expressed by central 
ministers who on many occasions, ridiculed some regional ministers with 
connections with central government for example regional ministries of 
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Finance, Information, Agriculture, Education, Administration, Police and 
Prisons, Commerce and Trade, Energy and Power etc. which at one time 
received some foreign currency through the central government and the 
respective ministers refused to release the funds to reach the Southern 
Region. Specific examples include the central ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning which refused several times, to release funds for 
Southern region, donated by foreign governments specifically to the 
Regional Government on the grounds that it is the central Government 
which has the power to set priorities for development. 40 Another example 
was in 1982, when the President of HEC visited Mongalla, Agro-Industrial 
complex he found out from the Time-keeper, (a Southerner) and the 
workers, who informed him that the manager had been away for three years. 
And that the time-keeper was assigned to act as a manager, personnel 
officer and accountant. The workers found at the site included ten 
labourers, three watchmen, and a driver. In examining the project's 
files, it was found that Public funds were being embezzled by the manager 
in collaboration with a time-keeper, the Sudan Bank Accountant, where 
money was being kept. It was found that the time-keeper used to withdraw 
ten thousand Sudanese pounds a month, and he would give 300 Sudanese 
pounds to the ten labourers, 75 pounds to the driver, 135 pounds to the 
three Watchmen and kept 150 pounds for himself. The balance, 9,340 pounds 
was distributed as follows: The Manager, 7,000 pounds, the Bank 
Accountant 500 pounds, the Time-keeper 1500, for him to keep silent, 
while 340 pounds was given to the workers including the driver as 
overtime allowance. In this way, the funds of the projects were misused 
throughout Southern Sudan without any accountability being given. 
Major General Abdalla Rasas, the President of the HEC became very angry 
about the corruption on the projects, whether the project was rice, dura 
or agro-industrial complex or sugar project in Maht. As a head of the 
Regional Government, the president issued directives to the Legal Affairs 
Department to contact the regional judiciary in order to order the arrest 
of the Manager of the Agro-industrial complex in Mongalla. The Regional 
legal authorities sent a telex to Khartoum High Court to direct the local 
magistrate to arrest the said manager and send him back to Juba to answer 
certain charges of embezzelement of public funds. No reply was accorded 
to the order, and later on the president was told to mind his business, 
because the issue in question was outside his jurisdiction as the 
president of the HEC and that the matter was of Central Government and 
the matter will be handled by the responsible ministry and that the 
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matter should be closed as far as the regional government was concerned. 
The importance of this case, is that many similar cases were discovered 
but the regional government was told to stop interfering in what was not 
its business, so all the projects under the central government in the 
south died because of sheer mismanagement, and corrupt practices of 
Central Government appointed managers, who seemingly acted with 
permission from central authorities in order to underdevelop the southern 
region. 
The same was true of transport, roads and construction of bridges in the 
south, where the respective ministries refused to implement the projects. 
For example, Shambe Port and Road was one of the projects under the 
Central Ministry of Communications, Roads and Construction, which could 
not be executed because the money was drawn and spent on other projects 
in the north and with impunity. 54 The same was true of all Sugar projects 
whereby similar projects were set up in the North and executed using the 
funds allotted to projects in the Southern Sudan. These counter projects 
include, Rahad and Khashun al Girba Agricultural projects, Kenana Hazer, 
Assalaya, sugar scheme, and other sugar projects in Northern Sudan. 
Table 6.13: Planned and Realized Investment 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Annual Plan Actual Annual % of 2 to 1 
Year Alloc. (Ls. M) Allocation 
(1) (2) (3) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1977/78 32.5 6.1 18.9 
1978/79 39.5 7.8 19.8 
1979/80 41.6 10.3 24.8 
1980/81 38.1 12.8 33.6 
1981/82 36.6 13.4 36.6 
1982/83 43.0 8.1 18.9 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Regional Ministry of Finance and Economy Planning, Proceedings of 
the Conference on Development in the Southern Region of the 
Sudan, 5-8 April, 1983. (Juba 1984, p. 19) 
The lack of development was both in the agricultural and industrial 
sectors in the south, although some projects have been initiated. The 
role of state in both agricultural and industrial production is quite 
dominant for it is the state which controls all mechanized schemes, 
financial institutions, like the Development Bank, Agricultural Bank, 
Trade Bank and Foreign Trade Bank. 
324 
Therefore the state can develop. -, and under-develop any region by 
releasing cash or not providing the development projects with cash to 
execute or implement various projects. The South is one of the regions 
suffering from such policies, based on unequal distribution of 
development funds, even when such investment would help the whole 
country, to generate more wealth which would raise the rate of standard 
of living not only in the South but in other regions of the Sudan as 
well. 
A British economic survey team reported in 1952, that: 
"given the money, the technical know-how and experts the Southern 
Sudan could easily become one of the richest countries in 
Africa. "55 
Indeed the region has tremendous potentialities: 56 
Animals - very rich in animals 
7 million head of cattle (or 6,912,000) 
3 million sheep (or 3,141,000) and 
goats (or 2,211,000) 
as estimated in 1983 by a study conducted by the Regional Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, Table 6.14 shows the estimated population 
of livestock in the Southern Sudan, distributed according to provinces. 
Table 6.14: Livestock in Southern Sudan, 1979/80 
-----------------------------------------=----------------------- 
Province Cattle Sheep Goats 
Bahr el Ghazal 1,460 730 81 
East Equatoria 952 993 72 
Jonglei 1,670 89 579 
Lakes 856 61 42 
Upper Nile 1,700 1,170 376 
West Equatoria 274 138 2 
-----------=---------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 6,912 3,181 2,252 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Proceedings of 
the Conference on Development in the Southern Region of the 
Sudan, 5-8th April, 1983 (Juba, 1983), p. 125 
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The above population of livestock represent 40%, 16% and 28% respectively 
of the national animal wealth. The Southern Sudan has more than half of 
the country's fisheries resources, which are estimated to cover about 2 
million hectares and a yield per hectare in the Bahr el Jebel, Bahr 
Ghazal and Sabot is estimated to be between 100 and 110 kilogrammes 
compared with a yield of 30 to 40 kilogrammes per hectare at Jebel Aulia. 
The Agricultural sector of Southern Sudan is rich, and President Nimiere 
once made a statement in Yirol that Southern Sudan is so beautiful that 
even if you plant, stones they would grow: all kinds of food crops or 
cash crops can be grown there such as sesame, cotton, sugar, coffee, 
groundnuts, fish, timber, tobacco, rice, potatoes, beans, cassava, maize, 
sorghum, jute, fruit etc. The industrial sector is equally very rich in 
gold reserves, cement, copper, iron-ore, hides, ivory, uranium, oil, 
wildlife and tourism. We have wonderful scenery with lots of wild 
animals, some of which are not found anywhere in some parts of Africa. 
Table 6.15 shows the distribution of wealth in some small African 
countries which are classified internationally as relatively developed, 
while Southern Sudan, with more than they have is the poorest region in 
the whole of African. So what is lacking is money and funds, all of which 
are controlled by the Arab settlers who control the state and who do not 
like to see the South being developed, for fear that it will eventually 
separate from the Arab controlled regions. 57 For example, between 400,000 
and 500,000 barrels a day of crude oil were supposed to be exported from 
the oil of Bentiu area (Unity, Hegliy), by 1985. But it could not be 
exploited due to unjust policies of the neo-colonial state which 
arbitrarily decided to build a refinery outside the south in Central 
Region to add to the industries and agricultural schemes, of which 80% 
are located in the region. 
For nearly two decades, the neo-colonial state has failed to solve the 
real problem, of uneven development, backwardness, hunger, illiteracy, 
and disease. From the time of independence, first on the agenda of any 
Sudanese Government's policy statement was to see how to Arabize, 
Islamize, assimilate, oppress, dominate, exploit the African people of 
Sudan, who are indigenous and whose indigenous background never 
threatened the presence of Arabs, nor any non-African in Sudan. 
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Table 6.15: DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES IN AFRICA 
Area in 
Country sq. miles Population Economy 
---------------- 
Southern Sudan 
------------ 
254,000 
---------------- 
Over 
-------------------------- 
Cotton, Sugar, Rice, 
Region 4,000,000 Sesame, Coffee, 
Groundnuts, cattle 
fish, timber, hides, 
tobacco, copper, gold, 
uranium, oil etc. 
Botswana 220,000 629,000 Diamonds, Cattle 
manganese 
Burundi 10,747 3,425,000 Coffee and cotton 
Central African 238,000 1,518,000 Cotton, Groundnuts, 
Republic coffee, diamonds 
Dahomy 44,913 2,640,000 Palm oil, cotton, 
Groundnuts 
Gabon 102,317 485,000 Embers and minerals 
Gambia 4,000 360,000 Groundnuts 
Guinea Coast 96,865 3,890,000 Coffee, bananas, 
(Conakry) diamonds, iron, 
aluminium 
Ruanda 10,169 3,500,000 Coffee, iron ore 
Senegal 77,814 3,980,000 Phosphates, groundnuts 
Togo 21,895 2,000,000 Coffee, cocoa, 
phosphates, palm oil 
----------------- ------------ --------------- 
cotton 
-------------------------- 
Source: Kessinga (1972) African Independent, a Study of Political 
Development. Research Report 6, Charles Scribers Sons, Inc., New 
York. 
For the Sudanese Africans, as documented in books. newspapers, public 
rallies, political manifestos etc., the real problem was unequal 
distribution of political and economic power which continued to be 
reinforced by all the regimes which have ruled Sudan, whether or not this 
has been military or civilian. 
The ruling bourgeoisie, Arab, Islamic national groupings do not want to 
invest what could be termed 'our money' in the development of Southern 
Sudan. Whatever reasons given by both academics and policy and decision 
makers in Northern Sudan, about the backwardness of Southern Sudan, will 
not be complete nor acceptable if it does not include the failure of the 
central government not only to invest but not to allow any foreign 
capitalist to invest in Southern Sudan. Again this was exactly what the 
British Colonial regime did when it prevented all British Companies which 
wanted to invest in various sectors of the economy, the prominent ones 
being cotton, coffee, tea, gold, papyrus etc. and aquatic plants. 
58 The 
neo-colonialists followed British policies, specially on economic 
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development, exploitation and oppression. The neo-colonial state decided 
to neglect the South and all projects initiated, like Zande Scheme, 
Anzara textile mill, Yirol oil mill, saw mills in Equatoria and Bahr el 
Ghazal, etc. were left to die. Like health and education which we shall 
discuss in the next section, agricultural and industrial development was 
ignored. Attempts to revive the jute factory failed due to the failure of 
the neo-colonial state to release funds earmarked for the said projects. 
The state corporations which gave credit facilities not only cooperative 
societies like the one of Yirol, but to individuals, failed to give none 
to any southerners. Those given loans were Northerners and no Southerner 
received a loan. Table 6.16 shows the distribution of credit from the 
Agricultural Bank of the Sudan to various regions throughout the country 
from 1959 to 1984. During the first decade of independence, most of the 
loans went to Northern Merchants if not all, for from 1955-1972 
southerners were denied all services in the south by the state itself. 59 
Table 6.16: Regional Distribution of Credit from A. B. S. to the Southern 
Region as from 1959 to 1984 (in , 000) (Percentage) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Region Population1 Total Loans Total Loans 
('000) 1959-79 1980-84 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Central 2 29 47 38 
North-East 16 40 33 
South-West 55 13 29 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Population is based on the 1983 population census which put the total 
population of Sudan at 22 million. 
2 Central Region includes Khartoum city and its suburbs. 
Source: Agricultural Bank of the Sudan. 
As shown by this table, the management of A. B. S. was not interested in 
national development either for the south or Darfur and Kordofan and that 
was why they have to receive less, in spite of the fact that both south 
and west have the highest populations. The criterion for allocation of 
loans is as corrupt and unjust as the criterion used for distribution of 
all economic and political resources in the country. 60 What is more 
visible and incontestable is the element of discrimination in allocations 
of development funds, distribution of state loans to merchants, farmers 
and cooperative societies, public and private investment all of which are 
328 
concentrated in two selected areas. 
Another evidence of the state's involvement in underdevelopment is seen 
in the six-year plan of 1977/78 - 1982/83, whereby Southern Sudan with 
over 30% of the country's population and a vast agricultural 
potentiality, was allocated about 5% of the national investment 
resources. It is important to stress here that the above mentioned plan 
was the first in which Southern Sudan was really involved. For example 
the ten-year plan initiated five projects but the allocation of funds was 
comparatively low, 3% of the total proposed public sector investment for 
agriculture and even then no funds were released until during the six 
year plan. From these facts about the uneven development in Southern 
Sudan, it is safe to state from this juncture that, the state or central 
government in Sudan is to blame for most of the current crisis of 
backwardness, or regional disparities in the Sudan. 
A classic example of the state's continuous policies of under- 
development and transfer of raw materials from southern Sudan to the 
Northern regions of Gezira and Khartoum was the issue of the exploitation 
of oil in Southern Sudan, which the state has attempted to hide from the 
Southern people and the world at large that the oil discovered in 1980 
was from South-Western Sudan at Magled as the Centre, instead of Bentiu 
in Upper Nile, Southern Sudan. To avoid the truth being known, both the 
central government and the foreign company engaged in the exploration and 
exploitation of the oil decided not to inform the Southern Regional 
Government. Another way of keeping the area of the oil a secret was that 
the state and the companies' decision to train oil technicians, engineers 
and personnel only from the Northern Sudan, several southerners applied 
for both scholarships and work with the oil company, Chevron but neither 
of them were easy. Even those Southerners who managed to be employed were 
summarily dismissed and their position filled. For more than five years 
since Chevron started exploration, both Southern Sudan leaders and 
academics have been denied access to materials related to the oil 
exploration in the South and an attempt to know the facts about the oil 
was met by strong threats from the then President of the Republic, 
followed by complete confession that several oil wells dug by Chevron, an 
American Oil Company, and that one or two of these wells were from Bentiu 
area, nicknamed Unity of Heglig in Bentiu while Jabra and others near 
Muglad in Kordofan region. There are three main reasons for the central 
government's cover-up of the existence of oil in Southern Sudan in large 
commercial quantities. 
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1. For years the ruling class in the north has educated their 
supporters, telling them that Southern Sudan was a useless region 
and its survival depends on the goodwill of the Northern people who 
love southerners. It was therefore too much for them to admit this 
reality without loss of face or honour from both southerners and 
Northerners who were misinformed about the location of the oil. 61 
2. Development in the South could not progress because the ruling 
elements in the north believes that if Southern Sudan was given an 
equal chance to develop, it may separate at the end of the day and 
for the last 32 years they have told their supporters that unless 
Southern Sudanese accept Arabization and Islamization, it will be 
improper to make any serious economic investment. 62 So it was nearly 
impossible for the south to receive its fair share of national 
investment. The Table shows the inequalities created by such a wrong 
assumption. 
3. The third reason is that Southern Sudan be kept dependent on the 
North to ensure Northern control and exploitation of the rich economy 
potentialities of the South. To accept that Southern Sudan was rich 
would then disarm the ruling class and take away their reasons for 
not developing the South using what they claim to be our money from 
the Blue Nile or Central Region. 
As a result of these assumption (or beliefs whether or not they are well- 
founded), the Northern politicians made use of state machinery in 1980, 
to do what they could not have done physically alone, and that was to 
annexe Bentiu oil-fields, Renk and Malut agricultural lands already 
flooded with Arab settlers looking for wealth and a long disputed area of 
Hufrat el Nahas. This time the National Assembly was used to cut off the 
richest areas from the south and declare them parts of Northern Sudan by 
the right of political power. There was not consideration of the views of 
Southern Sudanese people whose hopes of survival, let along development, 
have been affected severely. It was only after the President saw the 
emergence of another round of political violence taking shape that he 
intervened to save the country from a major confrontation again, and 
issued a presidential decree cancelling the National Assembly's decision 
to annexe oil rich areas of Southern Sudan. Nothing was more 
irresponsible and unjust than this act of the Northern leaders who 
thought that they did it to harm Nimiere's support in the south. However, 
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they missed the harm they were doing to the Sudanese State and nation, 
for the trust gained after the 17-year war between southern nationalists 
and those from the Arab national groupings. 
But soon Nimiere came up with a new strategy to oppress or divide and 
rule the people of the South. The new strategy includes division of 
Southern leaders through blackmailing them with political and financial 
benefit. Here the question of who to rule the Southern Region or who to 
be second vice-president of state was on the agenda in Khartoum. And so 
the hungry politicians were neutralized and rushed to the kingmakers to 
plead their allegiance to the president for life and who would do 
anything in return for a political post. After Nimiere has received 
assurance, be set out to execute the following political programmes which 
were thought to weaken Southern Sudan, to enable the exploitation, 
domination and expropriation to be carried on. The first step was to 
create a new region (to be known as Unity Region) which would comprise 
Bentiu, Renk, Molut, Rabak, Kosh Maglet, Hufrat al Nahas etc. and to be 
directly ruled by the President of the Republic and because he was 
trusted by southerners, his strategy would go through. However, Nimiere 
was shocked to see the South rejecting Nimiere blackmails. In a show of 
force, Nimiere threatened to break what he called the Dinka Power base 
and he dissolved and dismissed Abel's government and handed power to 
military officers who would act on orders issued by a field marshal and 
commander in chief of the armed forces. And for the Southern politicians 
the ball was thrown onto the pitch and whoever wanted to win must accept 
his conditions. Any attempt by Alier to return to the good books of 
Nimiere could not work, because Nimiere demanded absolute submission, 
which Nimiere hoped he would get from several influential southern 
elements who would be ready to give in, in return for positions of state. 
1 The 2nd strategy was the division of the south into two or three regions 
to try to destroy Dinka power and domination in the region. The third 
strategy was to build the refinery to produce 300-500 million barrels of 
crude oil from Bentiu province. The fourth strategy was how to impose 
Islamic Sharia laws with impunity in the South which he had been opposed 
and an enemy of Islam and Arab people for years. All this could not be 
implemented without a weak south and this could be achieved through 
creating and supporting tribalism and power struggle among the southern 
Sudanese politicians, which was done successfully. But Nimiere under- 
rated southern strength and jumped to a false conclusion and through 
blind ambition went on to decree everything he wanted apparently with 
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impunity. Nimiere divided the Southern by decree, regardless of the 
constitution which stipulates that such matters would be solved through 
popular plebiscite with two thirds of the people of the South in support 
of that or vice versa. Before long, Islamic laws were also decreed and 
imposed on all Sudanese regardless of religious background. Similarly, 
the oil issue was resolved by force, and it was decreed that a refinery 
would be built in the 'Golden Triangle' area. But the international 
multi-nationals intervened by proposing that the quickest way to exploit 
and accumulate wealth from oil would be to build a pipeline from the 
oilwells in Bentiu and tap it through to the Red Sea port of Port Sudan, 
where it could be sold to foreign companies. Here it was finally agreed 
by the neo-colonial state to have a multinational company build the 
pipeline in question in order to carry the crude oil out from the South, 
which would make Southern Sudan poorer and the 'Golden Triangle' richer. 
The above mentioned scenario is a case in which the state had 
demonstrated its support for the bourgeois classes without regard to 
national interest, which the state was supposed to safeguard. The state 
agreed to endorse the policies and programmes of the bourgeoisie ruling 
coalition parties based on uneven development and underdevelopment of 
Southern Sudan. There is sufficient evidence to show how the South 
underwent the present backward condition, in spite of riches. The main 
indicators of backwardness of Southern Sudan are visible and they include 
the widening gap in the average standard of living between the region and 
other regions, using the per capita income indicator, which is 
incontestable. There is no dispute about the existence of regional 
inequality because the oppressors and exploiters themselves admit that 
Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Darfur region, Southern and Northern 
Funj, plus some areas in Eastern Region have been cheated or neglected. 
The Southern case was only exacerbated by the repressive policies of the 
various regimes against the oppressed and the exploited people of the 
South. The income disparity is largely the result of systematic 
subordination of the interests of Southern Sudan to those of the Arab 
based regions, for example, 'Golden Triangle', Central, Khartoum, 
Northern and Gadarif regions where Arab settlers have displaced the 
indigenous people by force. The entire foreign exchange fund earned by 
exporting various goods are shown in Table 4.13. However, prominent among 
them include cattle hides, sheep skins, goat skins, crocodile skins, 
python skins, monitor skins, to neighbouring countries. Southern exports 
include dried fish and meat to Zaire and also elephant Tusks. Of course 
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if it ends then the South will dominate the export market replacing 
cotton from the Blue Nile area. On top of that other important minerals 
such as uranium, gold, copper and iron-ore which have a high 
international standing. Table 6.19 is made up of basic needs indicator 
for each region is presented in the last column, based on life 
expectancy, central government transfers, primary enrolment rates and 
sugar supplies, giving the five items equal weight. Results are not 
surprising and show that the Khartoum region is best off with a composite 
indicator value twice the national level, closely followed by Northern 
Region, Central and Eastern Regions are close to the national average, 
while Kordofan and Darfur fall one quarter short yet. Southern Sudan is 
far behind and is less than 60% of the national level. 63 
Summary - Economic underdevelopment 
1. Pre-independence period ) 
) The main economic sectors underdeveloped 
2. Post-independence period) 
(1) Agricultural (2) Industry (3) Industry 
(4) Distribution of mechanized schemes 
(5) it it National corporations 
to Projects 
to it State cooperative projects 
(6) Sufficient funds released for development 
(7) Investment increase 
(8) Problems of oil exploitation 
(9) Problems of re-distribution of wealth - projects 
(10) Distribution of financial institutions - 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan branches throughout 
the country 
(11) Distribution of services: 
Health Education Post Offices T. V. /Radio 
(12) Electricity Services 
(13) Transport Communications, Road construction 
(14) Employment in state departments. Equal opportunities for all 
(15) Labour forces form the basis of segregation 
(16) Private Investment 
(17) Distribution of foreign trade licenses 
(18) Distribution of foreign exchange, ie. dollars. 
(19) Tables to be taken 
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TABLE 6.17: THE NATURE, NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL 
ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE SUDAN, 1983/1987 
--------------------- 
Kind of No. of 
---------------- 
Establishments 
------------------------ 
No. of Establishments 
------ 
Establishment in North Sudan 
-------------------------------------- 
in South Sudan 
----------------------- 
Total 
------ 
Textile 77 0 77 
Shoes 39 0 39 
Tanneries and Skin 
Preparation 9 0 9 
Wood Products 26 4 30 
Paper and Binding 69 0 69 
Chemical Industries 111 0 111 
Building Materials 63 3 66 
Electrical Equipment 117 0 117 
Mining and 
Petroleum 9 0 9 
Food Processing 312 - 
- -- --- 
312 
---------------------- 
Total for the Sudan 
---------------------- 
---------------- 
832 
---------------- 
------- - - -------- 
7 
----------------------- 
------ 
839 
------ 
Source: Compiled from the Economic Survey 1979/80 Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy, Khartoum and the Regional 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Report, 1982, 
Juba. 
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TABLE 6.18: PERCENTAGE, DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL BANK LOANS BY PROVINCE 
DURING THE PERIOD 1974-1977 AND THE NUMBER OF POPULATION 
INHABITING THOSE PROVINCES IN 1973 
----------------- -------------- 
Population 
--------- -------- -------- -------- --------- 
Province No. 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Average 
(ooo's) 
--- ----- -------- -------- -------- -- ----------------- 
Khartoum 
------ - 
1150 37 39 87 
------ 
88 
--------- 
63 
Kassala 1572 20 - 4 - 6 
Blue Nile 3804 - 29 9 7 11 
Bahr el Ghazal+ 1388 - - - - - 
Equatoria 758 - - - - - 
Upper Nile 799 - - - - - 
Northern 964 - 32 - 5 8 
Darfur 2181 10 - - - 4 
Red Sea* - 12 - - - 3 
White Nile* 
------------------ 
- 
-------------- 
14 
-------- 
- 
-------- 
- 
-------- 
- 
-------- 
3 
--- 
Total 
------------------ 
12616 
-------------- 
100 
-------- 
100 
-------- 
100 
-------- 
100 
-------- 
------ 
100 
--------- 
Source: Economic Survey, 1977/78, pp. 187 and 189. 
* Red Sea Province is included in Kassala and White Nile in Blue Nile. 
+ The population shown in Bahr ei Ghazal was not correct for it has more 
than two million people. 
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6.8 The Role of State in the Unequal Distribution of Education 
Resources and its Consequences 
In this section, it will be argued that the British colonial state was 
responsible for the origins of educational imbalances and regional 
inequalities, especially in the distribution of various schools, ie. 
primary, intermediate and secondary schools. Similarly, there has also 
been unequal distribution of higher education institutions, such as 
universities and colleges, which could award degrees etc. where some 
regions receive more than others without any reasons based on justice and 
equity. 
Southern Sudan was opened to missionary societies to establish modern 
education and to convert the indigenous tribesmen to Christianity. The 
first missionary societies to have entered Southern Sudan were three 
namely, the Italian Roman Catholic Verona Fathers, the Anglican 
Missionary Society and the American United Mission. Several missionaries 
came later and scattered all over the south and established both churches 
and primary schools. The Catholics went to great lengths to establish 
both academic and technical training in order to produce book-keepers, 
clerks, technicians etc. Right from the start, the British Colonial 
authorities adopted the use of English and local languages, not Arabic in 
schools. Arabic and English were used in the Northern Sudan. 
The type of schools provided in the South were village or bush, 
elementary, intermediate and trade schools. They varied in size and 
educational standard and the better ones aimed at teaching the first two 
years' syllabus of the elementary school course. The medium of 
instruction was the vernacular. The elementary schools provided a four- 
year course. English then became the medium of instruction when the 
language policy was agreed upon. Although other academic subjects were 
taught (eg. English, maths, geography, history) much of the teaching was 
devoted to the teaching of Christianity. The intermediate education was 
the highest level given at that time, and until the 50s. The course of 
study for boys at intermediate schools was for six years and the medium 
of instruction was English for all subjects except religion, which was 
taught in the vernacular. 
It was from these schools where the first catechists, craftsmen, 
teachers, clerks, book-keepers, technicians, pastors or priests, 
police, prison and army etc. were produced later. 
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The Governor General, after the 1st World War, appointed a committee to 
look into the development in Southern Sudan, with special reference to 
education and yet nothing much was done by the Government until the 
1950s. This was done after various complaints, to the administration. A 
report by the Inspector of Opari District, East Equatoria to the Director 
of Intelligence in Khartoum in 1918 noted: 
.... not further progress in the administration or commerce in 
the South could be made until the natives were educated. The 
administration required a class of native clerks who would read 
and write their own language, dp the office work of their 
chiefs and develop their country on intelligent and progressive 
lines. Sons of chiefs and certain boys should be educated for 
the purpose of ultimately filling the position of Mamurs and 
native officers. -64 
The outcome of this report was that the colonial state took some kind of 
interest in education in Southern Sudan with encouragement of native 
languages as part of the school curriculum, but the role of missionary 
societies in the development was paramount. For example, two primary 
schools were established by the Verona Fathers in Upper Nile at Delwek 
and Lul in 1901, in Bahr Ghazal province at Wau at Kayjok in 1905 and in 
Equatoria Province in 1913, the American Presbyterian mission built a 
school at Doleb Hill in 1902, the Sudan United Mission opened a school at 
Roma and Pacala and at Malut in 1913. The Church Missionary Society 
opened at Bor in 1905, another at Malut in 1906 and a third at Yei. 
After the Southern policy was declared and implemented, the schools in 
Southern Sudan had not only different curricula and syllabuses but 
different media of instruction. And the teaching methods differed too. 
Local languages and English were used in the South, while in the Northern 
Arab controlled areas (with the exception of Nuba Mountains), Arabic and 
English languages were used as the media of instruction in schools. For 
nearly 25 years, the education in Southern Sudan was run differently from 
that of the North, until the policy was abolished in 1947, when the 
policy of separate education, and politico-economic development was 
cancelled. But it was only after independence in 1956 that the neo- 
colonial state in Sudan under the control of Arab Islamic political 
parties (who inherited it from the British Colonial forces) reversed the 
pattern of education in the South. Sir El Khatim el Khalif a, then Prime 
Minister, in his address to the Round Table Conference on the South held 
in Khartoum, 16-25 March 1965 stated that: 
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.... national governments hastened soon after independence to 
assume their full educational responsibilities in the South and 
put institutions of learning under their direct control as in 
the north and put into effect a unified educational policy 
which is a basic essential in nation building. "65 
When Sudan was made independent on Ist January 1956, there were only two 
senior secondary schools in Southern Sudan with nearly 200 students in 
each school, while those students looking for secondary education were 
more than a thousand at that time, given the number of intermediate 
schools which was more than ten. There were also 24 primary schools 
throughout the region and more than 60 bush schools in various villages, 
all using English and local languages, depending on the province or 
district concerned. 
There were two basic views - one by the southern elite or politicians and 
another by Northerners representing the neo-colonial state. For Southern 
nationalists, the British Colonial state and the missionaries were to 
blame for the limited education in the South which kept the south 
backward and primitive in terms of modern education. 66 The principle for 
decolonization was not applied in the South. According to this principle, 
".... a sufficient number of trustworthy and well educated 
(local) inhabitants capable of assuming the responsibilities of 
administration and (endowed with) a reasonable level of general 
education and understanding to ensure that self- government 
does not merely mean the exploitation of the masses by the few 
behind the facade of democracy. "67 
And yet Southern Sudan, with nearly 4,000,000 people in 1956 had only two 
senior secondary schools and a few intermediate and primary schools as 
mentioned above. The Sudanese government quoted above committed to re- 
unification of educational patterns throughout the country began with 
confusion, and a plan to destroy the already established British pattern 
of education in the South and replaced it with Islamic Arabic patterns of 
education. The State was committed also to replace Christian missionarary 
schools with Islamic Arab-based institutions or schools under Arab 
teachers which would create anti-christian, anti-English and anti-African 
traditions group from the south. Since this policy could not be 
implemented under the pseudo- democratic system in the Sudan, the 
northern politicians handed over the whole plan to the new military 
government of Gen. Ibrahim Aboud which used force to carry out its 
policies of Islamization and Arabization. In 1958 when Aboud took power, 
a socio-political and religious programme, with limited economic 
programmes sandwiched between was embarked upon. The first target was to 
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force the tribal chiefs to adopt Arab names and Islam to replace European 
names and Christianity which was prevailing mostly in the urban areas in 
Southern Sudan. The second area to be affected was education where all 
the schools were taken over by the neo-colonial state and Arabic was 
ordered to be used as the medium for instruction. 68 William and Oduko 
wrote to support this point: 
"In the south..... all private (missionary) schools were seized 
by the Sudanese Government soon after independence and such 
schools are no longer permitted. A Southerner is absolutely 
forbidden to open any type of school. Education in the south 
must now be imported only the Northern Government which sees to 
it that only the type of education calculated to render 
southerners permanently subject to Arab rule is imported. "69 
This statement was confirmed by the Sudan Almanac in 1960: 
"The Government system of education is supplemented by certain 
non-government schools managed by the various communities which 
cater for the education of children of Sudanese -a number of 
Ahlia (Arab owned) intermediate schools aided by substantial 
grants from the government, provide a valuable asset to the 
government system. "70 
But southerners were not only refused to open private schools, but 
prevented by the state police. In addition to that Islamic Koranic 
schools from primary level were established as main alternative schools 
throughout the south, while education in the Northern Sudan was going 
smoothly as laid down by the British colonial state with minor changes. 
In 1962, all the Christian missionaries were expelled and their 
properties seized by the state including the schools. Sunday as a holy 
holiday in the south was changed to Friday which is the holy holiday for 
Muslims, denying the Christians in the South their right to worship or 
attend church services on Sundays. Tribal chiefs were told not only to 
become Muslims but to make their children go to state Muslim schools and 
to change their names to Arab names as a condition for the children's 
acceptance to Islamic primary schools. Furthermore several mosques were 
built by the state in some towns and villages in the Southern Sudan. 
The role of the state in running education in the Southern Sudan is 
documented by the Sudan Almanac in 1961, which stated: 
"A national system of education which is government controlled 
has been firmly established in the three provinces since the 
take over of the mission schools in April 1957. These schools 
have now been integrated in the system of the government 
schools already in existence forming a unified system which is 
now being gradually assimilated to its counterpart in the 
northern provinces. "71 
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What is here is the Arabization and Islamization of the pattern of 
e ucation and with the main aim of Arabizing and Islamizing Southern 
Sudanese children and teachers first. For example all Southern Sudanese 
primary and intermediate teachers were taken to Northern Sudan provinces 
especially Gezira in order to teach them 
tabic 
language and Islamic 
culture. 72 The teachers in question were made to return to the South to 
teach in Arabic, since in 1962 Arabic was adopted by the military regime 
as the only medium of instruction throughout the country. But it is 
important to point out that the Arabic introduced to the South was 
different from the one in the north, east west and central Sudan. The 
type of Arabic used, which continued to be applied in the south, is known 
as 'special Arabic for Southern Sudan'. This special Arabic is of a lower 
standard compared with that of Northern Sudan. The special Arabic is a 
combination of local (or pidgin creole) Arabic dialect and some African 
words spoken by the Jallaba and their customers in the markets and 
Malakiva (Suburban areas). The difference between special Arabic and the 
other Arabic used in the Northern schools, is that the one in the North 
is classical Arabic and rather international in its relation to Arab 
world, while the one in Southern Sudan is inferior and local, in the 
sense that the Southern students educated in the south had to sit special 
Arabic exams different from that being given to those students in the 
north. Furthermore, the type of Arabic grammar and literature used in the 
north is advanced, so that a student from southern Sudanese schools would 
not be able to pass in the Sudan School Certificate exams (the only 
certificate which is nationally set). As a result, Southern Sudanese 
students wishing to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Military and 
police colleges, Faculty of Law and other educational colleges found it 
difficult because most of them could not pass classical Arabic. Also, the 
majority of Southern Sudanese students failed to get the Sudan General 
Certificate of Education because of their failure to pass Arabic which is 
a compulsory subject, to be taken by all students in the Sudan and which 
must be passed, otherwise no school leaving certificate will be given to 
those who fail it. So in the field of education, Southern Sudanese 
students are made inferior, weak and dependent by their low standards in 
Arabic. For the Southern Sudanese leaders (elite) and students' parents 
the educational system is used to favour Arab national groupings, who 
form 90% of the students in the higher institutes of learning, including 
Khartoum, Gezira, Juba and Omdurman Islamic Universities. 73 
The educational system therefore plays a big role in the development of 
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under-development and regional inequalities in the country as a whole. 
Furthermore the educational policies adopted in 1969 under the military 
rule of Gen. Ibrahim Abboud and which have continued to be popular among 
the ruling sectarian leaders was meant to keep the southern people 
educationally backward. For example the Islamic Koranic schools opened by 
successive regimes in the South were to produce half-educated southerners 
(like the Arabized Ansars from Gezira Abba, Kordofan and Darfur) who 
would blindly support the sectarian masters and be against their non- 
Muslim parents and relations who were education in mission schools. The 
whole educational policy in the country was based on the assumption that 
if the Southern Sudanese young generation was educated, Islamized and 
Arabized, through the use of Arab-oriented syllabuses, excluding English, 
and other local languages, the result would be the reproduction of a 
group which would be pro-Arab, Islamic and Northern Sudan. 
74 After such a 
group was produced, then the state or ruling Class could physically 
eliminate all educated southerners from the English or Christian 
orientated schools. 
75 For 6 years, the Aboud military rule in the South, 
more than 100,000 people were massacred because they had resisted the 
colonial policies of Aboud. There were also more than 80 Islamic centres 
or mosques in Southern Sudan, half of them being built in West Equatoria 
in the rural areas, where a few tribal chiefs agreed to Arabization and 
Islamization, merely adopting Arab names, when dealing with state 
representatives such as administrators, police and merchants who were 
prominent in Southern politics. 
But these Arabization and Islamization policies in the South failed to 
produce those supportive elements aimed for. On the contrary, it produced 
Southern nationalists, most of whom joined the Southern Liberation 
Movement of Anya-nya I and fought against what was seen to be Arab 
imperialism and settler colonialism in Sudan. 
76 
During 1958-1964, the number of primary, intermediate and secondary 
schools remained the same in Southern Region, while the number of mosques 
and Islamic schools increased, though the number of children decreased 
with the increase in political violence. 
The Sudanese regimes which followed Aboud's military rule, tried, 
unsuccessfully, to continue with Arabization and Islamization. But in 
May, 1969, a progressive Military government took over and cancelled all 
the religious programmes in the South. In 1972, the military government 
reached an agreement known as the Addis Ababa Accord which 
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Southern Provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria were 
granted self-rule as one region, with one regional government. The 
implementation of Addis Ababa Accord in Southern Sudan brought into being 
a system of Government consisting of a Parliament (or Assembly), 
Executive Organ (or HEC), a full-scale apparatus with civil services, 
police, wild-life forces and prisons. Among the regional ministries was a 
regional ministry of education to cater for the needs of education in 
Southern Sudan. At the time this regional government was established, 
there were four senior secondary schools, the first two established by 
the colonial state (ie. Rembet and Juba Commercial School, still using 
English as the medium of instruction, with Arabic as a subject) and two 
new schools, one for girls and another for boys. There were three 
technical intermediate schools for the first time, three teacher training 
institutes and a few intermediate schools for girls with Arabic (and 
English) in two teacher training institutes, as a medium of instruction, 
while all technical schools with Arabic as the medium of instruction and 
several primary schools as well. For example, in 1972, with the exception 
of Rumbek Secondary School, Juba Commercial, Juba Day Intermediate and 
Tonj intermediate school were in English while the remaining schools were 
Arabic in pattern. 
The regional government set out to organize education from senior 
secondary school level to primary school level. The main problem was lack 
of teachers and books, plus school premises themselves, some of which 
were destroyed during the war, or broken down because of lack of 
maintenance, or still being used as army garrisons etc. 77 Two patterns of 
education were found. The English pattern was still used in the only two 
senior secondary schools which were the best in the south - ie. Rumbek 
and Juba Commercial secondary schools. There were three other 
intermediate schools using English as a medium of instruction - Malek and 
Juba Day, plus a few primary schools in Equatoria and Lakes Province. 
There were 5 Islamic (Mahad Helmi) Koranic Schools and 15 primary schools 
- known as Mahad Iftidaya Koranic Primary Schools) which did not function 
to their full capacity for children and parents fled from the towns 
following the massacre of educated southerners in Wau, Awiel, Renk, 
Malakal, Juba, Bor, Rumbek, Yirol etc. during the civilian rule of 1965- 
69. During this time, most teachers were killed leading to the closure of 
all schools in the south and their transfer to Northern Provinces, 
especially Khartoum. All four senior secondary schools were returned to 
their respective premises only after the regional government was 
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established in April 1972. The most affected schools were Arabic based 
ones for there were no Arabic teachers, because they had refused to come 
to teach in the south, following the transfer of northern administrators, 
police, judges, prison warders etc 'Out of the South'. Also the central 
ministry of Education was not ready to send books, either in English or 
Arabic, leaving the Southern schools almost useless. An attempt to solve 
the shortages of Arabic teachers was made by asking Egypt to send 
teachers to teach in senior secondary schools only, but this only made 
things worse, for most of the Egyptians sent were inexperienced and their 
Arabic and way of teaching was unknown to the students. So for 10 years, 
senior secondary schools like Malakal Boys and Girls, Juba Girls, and 
Renk Boys and Girls failed to send a single student to a university and 
even the kind of certificate obtained was very low. 
Although the number of senior secondary schools had increased in 1982-83, 
as shown in Table 19, the contribution of most schools in sending 
students to university were further reduced than when there were only two 
schools (ie. Rumbek and Juba). Table 19 shows that the number of senior 
secondary schools increased to 30 with two technical secondary schools 
(the first of their kind) in 1982-83 while the number of Junior Secondary 
Schools increased from 50 to 115 and primary schools rose to 777. The 
Teacher Training Institutes reached 5 in 1982/83. 
Under the Southern Regional Government, a university was established in 
1978, and several colleges, eg. Ox-plough Institute in Rumbek, Yambio 
College of Agriculture and Forestry, Amadi Institute of Rural Community 
Development, Institute of Accounts and Finance in Juba, multipurpose 
College in Juba, plus vocational training centres in Wau, Malakal and 
Juba were established. Southerners were never given an equal chance to 
study in Khartoum or Gezira University as they used to be, because the 
examination council under the exclusive control of Arabs, claimed that 
Southerners would not be able to pass national exams. For example, in the 
1960s Rumbek Secondary School used to send many students to university of 
Khartoum, because all examinations were marked in London, and the results 
sent to Sudan, but under Nimiere, education was corrupted, and this led 
to marks and places at university being put up for sale on the black 
market. Examination papers were the first target, and southerners who had 
no money to buy examination papers or places at university had to 
struggle alone against all odds to get into university. 78 
The establishment of Juba university was a great help, giving at least 
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132 southern students the chance to enter university each year and more 
than that to Egyptian universities. It was agreed by the Egyptian 
Government and the Regional Government in 1975 that about 300 southerners 
should enter Egyptian universities each year, but the central government 
in Khartoum snatched more than 150 places away and gave them to northern 
students, in spite of the fact that the South was more backward in terms 
of higher education. 
Finally, as Table 8.2 shows, by the end of 1981/82, the number of 
children enrolled in primary education, intermediate, secondary school in 
academic and technical schools and those teachers under training were 
increased, and for the first time education was given a high priority by 
the regional government. For example, Primary education had 153,923 
children enrolled, while those enrolled in intermediate schools numbered 
27,472; secondary schools, both academic and technical had 12,540 
students and 1684 teachers under training. This has continued until now 
and without the war, and education in Southern Sudan would have greatly 
improved. From these two tables it can be seen that students attending 
educational establishments have increased in number. Also the number of 
university graduates in Southern Sudan has increased too. In the 
elections of 1982 and 196, the number of graduates increased to more than 
2000. 
Table 6.18: 1 Growth of Domestic Products at current prices and per 
capita income in Sudan 
------------ ----------------------- 
GDP (Ls) 
-------------------- 
Per Capita 
Income 
------------- 
1955/56 
---------------------- 
284.2 
-------------------- 
27.42 
1956/57 314.6 29.52 
1957/58 311.4 28.42 
1958/59 321.7 28.55 
1959/60 347.8 30.02 
1960/61 357.2 29.95 
1966 457.4 33.35 
1967 489.9 34.78 
1969/70 602.6 36.76 
1970/71 637.6 37.83 
1971/72 752.0 51.00 
1975/76 
------------- 
1,848.0 
---------------------- 
105.00 
------------------- 
Source: Ten-year Plan of Sudan and National Income Accounts of the 
Department of Statistics of the Sudan Government, prepared in 
1987. 
1 Although the above table was prepared to represent the growth of 
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domestic product of the Sudan as a whole, it actually represents the 
growth from the most developed areas of Sudan, which are the 
Northern regions plus some parts of Kordofan and Eastern Region. As 
stated in this chapter, the economic development in the South had 
continued to remain static, even after the Addis Ababa Agreement 
because Central Government failed to release development funds to 
the south. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ANATOMY OF POLITICAL AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE SUDAN :I 
7.1 introduction 
The proceeding chapters have attempted to define, describe and analyse 
the current problems in the Sudan. It has generally been argued that the 
problems were precipitated by the existence of socio-economic and 
political injustices. It has equally been argued that the existence of 
uneven development, regional disparities, nepotism, corruption, 
domination, exploitation and repression in the Sudan serve as evidence to 
these injustices. 
Similarly it has been argued that the same political and socio- economic 
injustices have led to the emergence of political instability or 
constitutional crisis, political uprising, military coups d'etat or 
military intervention in national politics by force and crowned with the 
anatomy of political and liberation movements from the most backward 
regions of the Sudan, which we will elaborate at length in this chapter. 
We will argue that the existence of political and liberation movements in 
the Nuba mountains, Darfur, Southern and Northern Funj and Ingnesa, 
Eastern and Southern Sudan, is natural and inevitable because of the 
growing impoverishment of the socio-economic conditions of the majority 
of Sudanese people from these regions. 
It is therefore reasonable here to support the notion advanced by the 
SPLA/SPLM that the current crisis is national and not a southern one. 
It will also be argued that what is taking place in Sudan is the normal 
class struggles between the masses (working class, peasants and rural 
poor) on the one side and the ruling classes and the neo-colonial state on 
the other, which are particular to the peripheral capitalist societies, 
not only in Africa but in Latin America and Asia, where various class 
struggles are taking place. 
Class struggles in the Sudan are carried out under various covers, 
including economic, political, religious (ideological), ethnicity, race 
and the likes. In addition to that, class struggles may have different 
degrees of intensity - from passive opposition to hostile and dramatic 
confrontation, from silent to open and/or spontaneous rebellion. 
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Furthermore, various forms of class struggles are also connected to 
different forms of class organizations and the class alliances that are 
forged in the process of the struggle and to the nature and the stage of 
the general class struggle etc. So in the Sudan we can find a genuine 
demand for social justice being. reduced to a tribalistic struggle or 
religious conflict depending on the interests of the ruling class and the 
neo-colonial state in the conflict in question ie. whether or not the 
distortion of demands for social change would result in the further 
control of the oppressed class. 
Marx has emphasized in his writings a long list of means by which 
capitalists and the capitalist state exercise control over the masses of 
the working class, mostly indirectly and by peaceful propaganda and 
economic means. 
For Marx, the following are some of the ways the capitalist class. 
controls and influences members of the society: 
1. Religious organizations. 
2. The media, which in modern society means radio, television, newspaper 
and all forms of advertising. 
3. The educational system. 
4. Legal system and the courts. 
5. Control of jobs and co-opting of many potentially dissident workers 
into top positions to pressure and condition people into a pro- 
business frame of mind. 
6. Family, the institution that transmits the need for 'discipline' and 
'respect' in order to get ahead in the work world. 
In the Sudanese case, the ruling class uses more racial, ethnic, 
religious, regiona; .. triba]. and economic influence to 'divide' and 
'rule' the Sudanese masses. 
It is the author's intention from this juncture to reject the notion of 
the 'classless Sudan' as claimed by the sectarian bourgeoisie, academics 
and policy makers in the Sudan and that like all the peripheral 
capitalist countries, the Sudan has various classes. The most important 
is the bourgeoisie with its several sections and the working class with 
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its sections allied to the peasants. 
The peasantry consists of pastoralist cultivators and nomads who are 
dependent on subsistence agricultural production but integrated into the 
market economy through the merchant: ' capital or petty bureaucratic 
bourgeois and the neo-colonial state which collects poll tax fines from 
them. 
Section 7.2.1. up to 7.2.7. seeks to examine, describe and analyse the 
origins, the development and the objectives of political and liberation 
movements in Northern Sudan since the Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule 
hitherto. Attempts will be made to show what actually went wrong and what 
continues to go wrong. Emphasis will be laid on the new awareness and 
consciousness among the oppressed in the Northern regions, which is used 
here to include the two western regions of Darfur and Kordofan, Central, 
Eastern, Northern and Khartoum regions. 
7.2 THE ANATOMY OF POLITICAL AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE SUDAN 
THE CASE OF OTHER UNDER-DEVELOPED REGIONS. 
Historical background 
7.2.1. The White Flag League 
Any study of contemporary political and liberation movements in the 
Sudan, should attempt to examine critically the White Flag League, its 
role in the 1924 supposed revolution and how and why the attempted 
revolution failed. It is important also that such study should 
investigate thoroughly why the most affected was the African national 
group. Such a study should equally examine the role of the Arab and 
Arabized national groups in the failure of the revolution to realize its 
objectives and aims, and later the elimination or execution of members of 
the African national group, not of the members of the Arab and Arabized 
national groups. Furthermore, such a study should assess the damage done 
to the nationalists from non-Arab people by a petition signed by 38 
persons who called themselves 'sound elements' in June 1924, exposing and 
condemning the leaders of the White Flag League and all the Egyptians who 
were thought to be behind the uprising. The signatories of this petition 
made the following statement: 
"Firstly that we are extremely grateful for all that the British 
officials have done for the welfare of the Sudan which has 
resulted in the country's advance and progress. Secondly, our 
great loyalty and sincerity to the British Government which is 
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unalterable. Thirdly, our perfect and complete assurance and 
that we have had no connection with the movement which is now 
in progress in Egypt, nor is the movement in accordance with 
our desires. "1 
The editor of Alhadara magazine, owned by leading sectarian leaders, the 
'big three Sayids', Sayed Abdel Rahman al Mahdi (Ansar), Sayid Ali 
Mirghani (Khatimiyya) and Sayid Al Hindi (Hindiyya); published his 
comments on the 1924 revolution which was defeated by various forces, 
both internal and external. 
"The White Flag League should know that it is embarrassing the 
entire country. Those who demonstrated were the poorest and the 
lowest strata of unrecognized members of the society ..... the 
storm created by the scum of society (has) disturbed people of 
status, merchants, businessmen and men of good origin. "2 
The two passages quoted above provide ample evidence which may explain 
the current attitude of the dominant sectarian bourgeois ruling class in 
Sudan towards other Sudanese nationalities, which are non-Muslims and 
those who are non-Arabized Muslims. As shown by the existing documents, 
the sectarian leaders were supporting the British forces because they saw 
tha kIif former slaves were allowed to take political power in Sudan, all 
the slaves would be freed and slavery would be abolished for ever. They 
also thought that former slave raiders, traders and owner would be 
punished severely by the revolutionary government, if it was' established. 
it was thehore logical for the 'businessmen and men of good origins' to 
use any meads, in order to prevent the White Flag League from taking over 
political power. 3 
The subsequent execution of both leaders and supporters of the White Flag 
League singled out, which have not been documented by the Sudanese 
scholars until now, was not surprising at all. Even those scholars who 
have attempted to mention it in their writings, had very little to show 
exactly what went wrong and that an uprising which was almost spontaneous 
and supported by most Sudanese from all racial, religious and social 
backgrounds, failed to achieve its goals or objectives, not because the 
enemy was strong but because those who pretended to support the struggle 
did not actually take part in the final episode, as expected. 4 At worst, 
those same supporters instead became witnesses against those whom they 
were supposed not only to protect but to support in fighting the same 
enemy to the bitter end. 5 Even those soldiers who were committed to the 
struggle did not participate as expected. It was not surprising therefore 
that those who suffered most, were the non-Arab national groups from the 
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southern, eastern and western Sudan respectively. 6 For example, all the 
leaders of the White Flag League, who organized the 1924 disturbances 
were killed with the exception of the Arab elements who were pardoned for 
some reason, probably connected with an appeal from the Arab national 
group, most of whom did support the colonial authorities or perhaps a 
double agent was planted in the movement by the British. What was clear 
was that four out of seven of the White Flag League were killed; one, 
Abdel Fadil Almaz (Nuer) was killed while fighting, while three of the 
others, Hassan Fadl al Mula (Nuba), Thabit Adbel Rahim (Dinka) were 
court-martialed and shot. Ali Al Banna, who was court-martialed and 
sentenced to death was never executed and his death sentence was commuted 
to life imprisonment. He was later released. One of the reasons why Ali 
Al Banna was not executed and subsequently released, was connected with 
an intelligence report which had suggested that he had supplied 
information on the Malakal incident and from that time on he had become 
an informer for the colonial authorities. 7 Sayid Farah who was reported 
wounded in Khartoum was smuggled out of Khartoum to Egypt, on November 
27th, and he was not arrested until independence. 
Ahmed Saad Mohamed, one of the ringleaders, was only sentenced to fifteen 
years imprisonment half of which he never completed. He never fired a 
shot against the enemy until his arrest. 8 
Northern officers whose names appeared in the intelligence reports were 
either never arrested or they were arrested but later dismissed. Almost 
all officers from southern and western Sudan backgrounds were summarily 
dismissed. Some were imprisoned whether or not their names appeared in 
the intelligence reports.? For example, Zein Abden Abdel Tam (Dinka by 
origin) was dismissed, while his colleague whose name had appeared 
several times in some intelligence reports (ie. Abdalla Khalil) was not 
dismissed until he retired and joined the Umma Party, later to become the 
second Sudanese to become Prime Minister, in 1957, after political 
independence in 1956. 
Mohd. Omer Bashir had attempted to offer two main reasons which led to 
the failure of the 1924 uprising to achieve its goals, which he termed 
external and internal weakness. The external was connected with Egyptian 
troops in the Sudan based in Khartoum who had encouraged the mutiny 
though most of them did not take part and some collaborated with the 
enemy against the Sudanese revolutionary groups. 
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The Sudanese weaknesses were enumerated by Mohd. Omer Beshir: 
"... the objectives of the revolt were not always clear to all 
the officers and men. Most of .... the younger officers were 
members or sympathizers of the White Flag League ... The more 
senior officers such as Adbullla Khalil and Hamid Sabh were 
connected with the Sudanese Union Society and were less 
committed to this idea. ....... lack of communication and co- 
ordination between the Sudanese officers in Khartoum an those 
in the outer districts was the second major weakness. The 
organization of the army members of the league was not as 
efficient ... Informers had infiltrated 
into the organization 
and supplied the administration with news of its plans and 
activities. In El Obeid an agent was planted to inform on 
Mohammed Salih Gabriel and was able to frustrate the plans of 
the League in Western Sudan. "9 
Mohammed Omer Beshir went on to say that: 
" ... narrow sectional 
interests - regional and tribal appeared 
from time to time within the army and the League. According to 
an intelligence report in 1924, parallel to the White Flag 
League, existed a Black Flag League consisting of black 
officers in the army who, being black, did not fully trust 
their Arab colleagues and looked upon themselves as the 
national inheritors of authority. Omer al Khalifa Abdulla, Zein 
Al Abdin Salili Hassan, Mohd. Al Zein and Surur Ruston were 
mentioned in connection with this organization. Differences 
between the Arabs and the blacks undermined the army and 
civilian organization of the revolutionary movement. "10 
The other significant reasons which were mentioned by Mohd. Omer Beshir, 
further stated that: 
" .. Encouraged 
by Egyptian promises of support, the Sudanese 
officers had acted before they were fully prepared. Because 
senior Sudanese army officers, such as Abdulla Khalil, had kept 
aloof until ...... the leadership of the army had been allowed 
to pass into younger, inexperienced hands and hence the rash 
action taken. Right from the beginning the White Flag League 
had been penetrated by agents and informers. Mohammed Ali Salih 
who turned King's evidence during the trials, was planted in 
the League by the intelligence department. Mohd. Gabriel Al 
Dar, a Sudanese army officer, who had worked closely with 
Mohammed Salih Gabriel in El Obeid and who had responsibility 
for the demonstrations and contacts with the western tribes, 
was also an agent. "11 
These reasons were quite big sufficient to destroy any plans against the 
British colonial authorities in the Sudan. Equally effective to the 
Movement was the opposition of the religious leaders against the White 
Flag League, who were reported to have been hostile towards the entire 
movement not because their objectives and aims were unacceptable to them, 
but because of racial prejudice because the leadership of the movement 
was dominantly black Africans. 
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Like other attempted revolutions or state takeovers by the black 
Sudanese nationalists, the White Flag League was destroyed and almost all 
the black Africans, both officers and men, who did take part in it were 
dismissed from the army and civil service. They were also expelled from 
their homes to Kassala, Gaderif and the southern Sudan. The most affected 
were the wives and children who were forced to flee to unknown areas, 
where their lives were governed by oppression and coercion. Their 
families and themselves were denied basic human rights as a punishment, 
not only to those who participated but to all black people in general. 12 
For example, all the leaders of the League were either executed, or 
imprisoned, or exiled to remote areas in the south, west or east or to 
Egypt never to return even to their families. Ali Abdel Latif, Obeid Hag 
al Amin, Ali Al Banna, Mohd al Mahdi, Al Khalifa and Mohammed Bakheit 
were transferred from Khartoum north prison, to Wau in the south. Ahmed 
Omer, Hassan Sharif and Ali Aba Yazid were released and deported to 
Egypt. 
Finally, the reorganization of the Sudan Defence Forces was carried out 
specifically to deprive the African majority from entering into the army 
in order to prevent a repeat of the 1924 uprising. The division of the 
army into Arab and non-Arab elements with support from the Arab group 
both inside and outside the army was responsible for the emergence of 
later policies such as the closed District Ordinances sometimes known as 
the Southern Policy, Nuba Mountains Policy, etc. The division of the army 
was misleading. For example, the naming of the different army divisions 
such as Eastern Arab Corps., Western Arab Corps., Equatoria Corps. etc. 
was not without a major reason against the non-Arabs as in the east and 
west the Arabs were and continue to be in the minority. To deny three- 
quarters of the (African) population in the western and eastern Sudan the 
right to participate or work in the army, police or the civil service 
because they were black, and because some of their fellow countrymen had 
led an uprising against the colonial regime was a grave injustice on the 
part of the British. 
Arabization and Islamization and the leaving of all slaves with their 
Arab masters under British rule prevented the indigenous Africans from 
rejecting colonialism and imperialism. It was therefore logical that all 
positions, the army, police and prison officers were held exclusively by 
Arab or Arabized people while the bulk of the so-called Arab army in the 
western and eastern Sudan (especially soldiers) were black Africans under 
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the command of an Arab. It was his job to see to it that all soldiers 
should adopt the Arab language and Islamic faith as their mode of 
communication and belief. The establishment of the Arab army in northern 
Sudan where the Africans remain in the majority was the starting point 
for the establishment of Arab settler colonization in a similar manner to 
what they did in Southern Africa,. Zanzibar, and elsewhere. It was equally 
the origin of the emergence of Arab political, military and economic 
hegemony in the Sudan which has continued to this day. This was confirmed 
by a study conducted by Mohd. Omer Bashir in which he wrote the 
following; 
"The reorganization of the Sudanese battalions was given priority 
in this programme of reform. Steps towards this end had been 
taken ... with formation of an Equatoria Corps, an Eastern Arab 
Corps and a Western Corps. The Equatoria Corps was recruited 
from the Ragan tribes of the south for service in the south, 
the Eastern Arab Corps was formed after the occupation of 
Darfur. A new organization - the Sudan Defence Force came into 
being ... organized on an area 
basis. "13 
The simple question to be asked is: are (or were) the Arabs in the 
majority in the western Sudan or are the Arabs in the majority in the 
eastern Sudan or the Sudan? The answer to all questions is "no. " 
7.2.2 The Black Bloc and Black Progress 
The Black Bloc was set up immediately after the defeat of the uprising in 
1924 to help and provide a service to the black community of the three 
towns in Khartoum who were victimized after the attempted 1924 
revolution. Dr Mohd. Adham, one of the founder leaders, told the author 
how the British Colonial authorities in Khartoum, Atbara, Port Sudan, 
Malakal, Wau, etc. systematically destroyed peaceful and innocent black 
communities. 14 This was achieved by mass dismissal of black people in 
both the organized forces (police, army and prisons service) and the 
civil service, expelling them from their homes and sending them to 
Kassala or to various concentration camps in Gezira and Nuba Mountains to 
work as labourers regardless of whether they had previously held a 
position of, rank before or not. Those who were put in organized state 
prisons were not safe as they were subjected to torture. It was through 
this inhuman treatment that most officers became mentally imbalanced and 
Ali Abdel Latif, the leader of the White Flag League, who was hit on the 
head in Wau's prison, became paralysed. He remained like this until his 
death. How many black officers, men and soldiers had suffered a similar 
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fate was not easy to find out by the leaders of the Black Bloc due to 
security. 
The destruction of black power in the army was supported by the Arabs and 
Arabized Sudanese who acted as informers and witnesses against the black 
officers and soldiers. As a result, the Arab officers and men were 
rewarded with positions in the army of the blacks they replaced, and also 
given their homes and property. Ajak, one of the surviving leaders of the 
Black Bloc, told the author how most of their former 'friends' in the 
army turned against them in order to be promoted or financially rewarded 
and that they helped the police or authorities by handing over wanted 
black officers or men. 15 There were several thousand pounds sterling 
reward paid to those who made it possible for the police to arrest the 
wanted members of the White Flag League. This is how the Arab and 
Arabized northern Sudanese became beneficiaries of the destruction and 
elimination of Sudanese Africans who were prominent in the army, police 
and colonial state apparatus, prior to the 1924 disturbance. 
The Black Bloc was originally a secret organization, designed to help the 
displaced black people after the uprising and later it established co- 
operation societies throughout the Sudan, including the southern Sudan. 
In 1938 it established a political wing known as the Black Congress, 
after the Arab and Arabized Sudanese had formed the Graduates Congress. 
Dr Mohd. Adham and Sayed Kabsoun Ajak, the founders of the Black Bloc, 
Black Congress and Black Co-operative Societies, the first organizations 
of their kind in the Sudan, told the author that they refused to join the 
Graduates Congress because it was controlled and managed by the Arab 
sectarian families or leaders. This is quite true and is still being 
reflected today in Sudanese party politics. The formulation of the 
executive of the Graduates Congress, did not represent the common 
interests of all nationalities in the Sudan. Dr Adham, Sayed Kabsoum Ajak 
and other supporters interviewed by the author, said the Graduates 
Congress was composed of representatives of various sectarian families 
who, because of their historical link with the events of 1924, (ie. 
supporters of the colonial regime) were still afraid of the black 
national group. As a result the relationship between the leaders of the 
Graduates Congress, and the black community as a whole was not peaceful 
if not hostile. The crisis between the Sudanese Arabs and the Sudanese 
Africans continued during British Colonial rule and after independence. 
The blacks continued to be dismissed from their jobs while the Arabs took 
their places over. By the end of 1940, almost all black officers had been 
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dismissed from the army regardless of their rank. For example, Dr 
Mohammed Adham, who held the rank of major, was summarily dismissed in 
Malakal without any reason given. Adballa Adam Abdalla (Mangok Mabduk), a 
major, was dismissed in a similar manner. Dak Dhieu, a sergeant major, 
was also dismissed as was Bakheit Rok Reec, a captain, and several black 
members of the southern and western Sudan were dismissed after the Second 
World War. 
It was therefore natural for the dismissed officers, civilians or 
soldiers to join the Black Bloc. By 1945-1950, the Black Bloc was able to 
set up co-operative societies and all those who were politically 
conscious among the black Sudanese, were members whether from southern, 
central, eastern or western Sudan. The political executive of the Black 
Bloc was composed of representatives from the above areas or regions, 
regardless of religious background ie. both Muslims, Christians and those 
who believed in African religions were included as well. The main 
criterion was apparently race and politico-economic interest as clearly 
shown by the title "Black Bloc" or "Black Congress. " The members of the 
executive were as follows: 16 
1. Dr Mohd. Adam Adham (President) 
2. Sayed Kabsoun Ajak'(Secretary General) 
3. Sayed Abdalha Adam Mabouk (Vice President) 
4. Dr Abdel Wahab Abdien Abdel Tam (Deputy Secretary) 
5. Syd Stanislaws Paysana (Treasurer) 
Members: 
6. James Tumbura 
7. Buth Dhieu 
8. Syd Siricio Iro 
9. Dok Dhieu 
10. Chief Abdulla Luk Ajak 
11. Edward Odhok Didiko 
12. Chief Lual Dengkak 
13. Abdel Gader 
14. Reverend Philip Gabush 
There were more than twenty members of the executive. This group were 
more pro-Egyptian as they felt Egypt was nearer to them than the British. 
They failed to find out whether or not the Egyptians would help them to 
the point of risking their lives. The Black Bloc supported unity with 
Egypt which became a source of descent among the members. Those members 
who were brought up in the southern Sudan were not happy with all Arabs, 
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including Egyptians, and the idea of unity with such enemies was 
discouraging to some members. Those who supported unity with Egypt were 
opposed to the southern policy. Of course the Congress leadership had 
attempted to influence all the southern intellectuals to achieve 
political solidarity within the united Sudan and to prevent the isolation 
of the people of Funj, Nuba Mountains, southern Sudan, etc. The British, 
during the establishment of southern policy, had expelled most of the 
members of the Black Bloc from the south, treating them as if they were 
Arabs. This division was carried out by both the British and the northern 
members of various political organizations to weaken the Black Bloc. 17 
The Black Bloc could not be registered as a political party as the 
British Colonial authorities claimed that it was a racist organization 
and said that it would not be afforded recognition unless it changed its 
name and its objectives. The activities of the Black Bloc were outlawed 
and the British authorities and their collaborators started to dismantle 
it a few years after the 1924 uprising was crushed. The Closed District 
Ordinances, the Southern Policy, the Nuba Mountains policy, etc. were 
designed by the British policy makers to destroy any uniting of black 
political consciousness under the leadership of the Black Bloc whose 
headquarters were in Khartoum. The British Colonial authorities and 
their allies among the Arab settlers and Arabized Riverian tribesmen 
continued to fear unity of African nationalists in the Sudan. 18 The only 
way to stop such unity taking place was to institute ruthless laws and 
confusion among the black leaders and the masses at large. The events 
which followed after the Closed District Ordinance were implemented 
destroyed all black political power in the southern, western, central and 
eastern Sudan and destroyed national integration and unity. Sanctions 
were imposed on the movements of the Black Bloc leaders and people from 
various Sudanese regions, to travel or interact. People from the southern 
Sudan for example, were screened and those who were suspected of being 
leaders of the Black Bloc, were given various labels to incriminate them 
and were subsequently expelled from their own region, i. e. forced into 
exile. Furthermore, southerners were not allowed to go to the Nuba 
Mountains and Funj areas, let alone Khartoum or northern Sudan. The same 
restrictions applied to people from Nuba Mountains, Funj, etc. they were 
not allowed to visit their respective friends or relatives in certain 
'closed' regions. The idea that Arabs and Islam was prevented from 
penetrating into those closed areas was not true. There was no reason 
other than being a member of the Black Bloc that people like Abdalla Adam 
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Mangok Mabuock, a Dinka from Rumbek, and several supporters of his were 
expelled from their village and sent to the eastern Sudan. On top of 
that, the removal from Wau and Malakal prison of members of the White 
Flag League (including All Abdel Latif) and prisoners, who were sent back 
to the northern provinces clearly points to support of our discourse. 
Further, there was no other possible reason to prevent Africans from the 
Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains or Funj area from integration except that 
their common enemies as defended by the British and their supporters were 
removed. Even normal forms of communication and social interaction was 
forbidden without a good reason. This was explained away in terms of 
security which was the monopoly of the colonial authorities and Arab 
elements, who had replaced the Egyptians and the dismissed members of the 
Black Bloc or White Flag League. 
19 
The damage caused by the British Colonial authorities and their allies 
among the Arab settlers and Arabized riverain tribesmen on the unity of 
the Sudanese people could be measured in terms of the final 
disintegration of the black movement in the Sudan after independence. Of 
course the disintegration of the unity of the Sudanese began with the 
emergence of a Sudanese army segmented into a regional army when it 
should have been a national army. 
20 
The names attached to those regional 
armies with the support of the Arab elements were the seeds of today's 
crisis in the country. The naming of the regional armies is important in 
that they were all Arabized names, even though in the western and eastern 
Sudan the majority of the population were Africans and not Arabs. It had 
been said that the Black Bloc was a racist organization and yet here were 
the real racists, the authorities. They had executed or persecuted 
several innocent people because of the colour of their skin. It was 
therefore applying double standards for the British Colonial authorities 
to preach non-racial policies on the one hand, while condoning it on the 
other. It was equally wrong for the British not to allow the Black Bloc 
to be registered as a political party like the Arab controlled political 
parties which are still controlled by some Arab Islamic families. Yet the 
Black Bloc, with its millions of supporters was denied participation in 
decision making, especially on national issues, which have fragmented 
Sudanese society, by the state. 
There are questions which should be answered in the interest of peaceful 
existence or as a solution to the current crises. Why did the Black Bloc 
fail to mobilize effectively and attempt to take political power whether 
by democratic elections or not, since the black people were in the 
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majority throughout the country? What went wrong after the short period 
of unity between the blacks in the north and the blacks in the southern, 
western and northern Sudan ceased from 1956 up to 1965? Why did the 
People's Social Democratic Party, organized by the founders of the Black 
Bloc, fail to attract more support from southern politicians? What was 
the stand of the leaders of the Black Bloc in the north towards the 
uprising in the south? Did they, or did they not, support the struggle in 
the south? What went wrong that the Black Africans in Darfur, Nuba 
Mountains and eastern Sudan, decided to form separate political 
movements? As we shall see below, ie. the General Union of Nuba 
Mountains, Darfur Development Front, Beja Congress and the Union of 
Southern and Northern Funj. 
What was the role of the dominant ruling class in the disintegration of 
the Black Bloc into a fragmented and weak movement which is still 
vulnerable and weak and depends on its enemy for its survival in terms of 
funds, etc.? Who is to blame for this weakness, could it be blamed on the 
general weakness of the leadership of the Black Bloc who continued to 
believe that Egypt was their home and the Sudan was part of that? 
The next questions are on the role of the Egyptians in the defeat and 
destruction of the Black Bloc: 
1. The Egyptians are not black and therefore it was natural that any 
political movement based on such principles would not be of interest 
to them. 
2. Why did they not advise the Black Bloc to change the nature and even 
their approach to politics? 
3. Did the Egyptian leaders help in the destruction of the Black Bloc? 
4. Since the Egyptian leaders were committed in their support for the 
Ashagqa Party, which was an Arab pro-Egyptian party, the choice for 
Egypt was quite clear and yet the leaders of the Black Bloc did not 
realise this and if then they did become aware of this they did not 
do much to change that or their own strategy. 
Perhaps the changes came too late when the People's Democratic Radicalist 
Party was established. 
How weak was the leadership of the Black Bloc? Did support or opposition 
to the emergence of a separate movement in the south, in Darfur, Kordofan 
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and eastern Sudan take place? 
The activities of the movement were outlived. The British authorities 
insisted that it would only allow members of the Black Bloc to set up co- 
operative societies and not political parties in the name of race 
"Black". 21 
As regards the Egyptian support, the Black Bloc received none from the 
leading Egyptian politicians who instead financed the Arab based 
political and religious families. The Black Bloc, established for the 
first time in Sudan a magazine in the Arabic language entitled 
"Africa". 22 Dr Mohd Adam Adhad and his colleagues failed to convince the 
British to allow them to register until independence when the British 
Colonial authorities handed political and economic power to their allies 
and collaborators among the Arab tribes and Arabized elements, leaving 
other non-Arab groups outside the power class. 
The post independence politics were dirty and short lived. That is to 
say, independence was achieved on Ist January, 1956, but two years later 
the military was called upon by the Umma Premier, Abdalla Bey Khalil, to 
take political power by force which we have already discussed previously. 
1930's apartheid was established in the Sudan to prevent Africans from 
uniting. For example, Nuba Mountains was a closed area, southern Sudan 
and the Funj area were also closed on the pretext that the indigenous 
people were being prepared i. e. being educated by the British to a point 
where they would be able to decide their own interests. The question that 
should be asked here is, Was that true? and if so, Were their development 
policies geared towards that? The evidence shows the opposite was true. 
No eco-development, educational or political development took place in 
those areas until the British left. Instead development of all kinds was 
concentrated in areas where Arab and Arabized elements had settled in 
great numbers. 
7.2.3 The General Union of Nuba Mountains 
In sub-sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 we have attempted to trace the origins of 
the 'growth of black political consciousness' since the 1920's. We argued 
that the White Flag League of 1924 was one of the first resistance 
movements organized by the indigenous Sudanese during the Anglo-Egyptian 
colonial rule which began with the reconquest of Sudan in 1898 and 
continued until independence sixty years later (1.1.56). Other political 
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and liberation movements, apart from the Black Bloc, included the Agaar 
Dinka, Atuot Dinka, the Nuer, Azande, Nuba Mountains, the Beja of 
Ethiopian Hills, the Ingesna tribes of Ethiopian foothills and several 
others in which several lives were lost on both sides. 
As in the case of the General Union of Nuba Mountains, it was the first 
of its kind in the contemporary politics of Kordofan region. Like the 
political and liberation movements in other under-developed regions of 
the Sudan, it was precipitated by the issues related to political and 
economic regional inequalities. It is important to state here that Nuba 
Mountains of southern Kordofan continues to be one of the areas seriously 
neglected by all the regimes starting with the Anglo-Egyptian colonial 
regime which actually concentrated all development efforts on the Valley 
of the Nile to the north of Khartoum, the Blue and White Nile areas 
immediately south of Khartoum, central Kordofan and the southern part of 
Kassala province. 
As is clear from this study, the imbalance in development was a result of 
uneven distribution of development resources or material resources and 
was often noted even within the same provinces or regions as well as 
between regions or provinces. For example, southern Kordofan, southern 
Blue Nile, northern Kassala, to name a few, are typical examples of cases 
where development and economic progress took place in one part of the 
same province or region, while the other part was left without. Other 
disturbing examples include cases of agricultural and industrial 
development in southern and northern Funj, southern Kassala and Port 
Sudan, southern and northern Kordofan and even in various urban centres 
whereby a few merchants were able to control capitalist agricultural 
production and industrial establishments, through which a large sum of 
profits are accumulated and concentrated in the hands of the said 
Jallabas. In Damazin, Gessan and Roserises areas, Arab merchants were 
able to acquire capital and became rich while the indigenous tribes were 
very poor and without any decent accommodation, food, health facilities, 
education for their children and adequate land to cultivate. Here the 
majority of people depended on subsistence economy while others were 
agricultural labourers on their former land which the state had 
confiscated and redistributed among the rich Arab merchants. 23 In 
general, the subsistence farmers, whether in eastern or southern Sudan or 
in Nuba mountains, are the poorest of the poor and could not apply for 
any schemes which required financial guarantees or the availability of 
sufficient capital to finance a scheme which required possession of 
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necessary agricultural machinery, sufficient agricultural knowledge and 
experience and lastly. having managerial ability and time to run the 
scheme. 
Apparently, the basis on which the allotment of agricultural schemes have 
been made, have not been easy for the poor subsistence and agricultural 
labourers to meet except in the case of those who were ambitious. Kursany 
maintains that: 
"The criteria which were set out, for the allocation of the 
schemes in the rainfed areas eliminate, from the outset and 
chance for the poor classes of the Sudanese society to acquire 
any project ... These laws 
(criteria) and measures guaranteed 
the allotment of the schemes to individuals who came from 
outside the areas of rainfed farms and what is more serious, 
who were not farmers and had no genuine interest in farming 
activities. Their major objective is to maximize their profit 
with the minimum cost incurred in the production process. Most 
of the scheme owners practice farming as a s2$sidiary activity 
and are engaged mainly in the trade sector. " 
It is because of such dual functions of the Sudanese merchant capitalist 
class, that have made many observers confused and had to define the 
situation in accordance with their interests. In most cases, the Sudanese 
merchants who have been involved, have been described as either "an. 
absentee" or as "suitcase farming", which are in reality the dominant 
group in society. Furthermore, Kursany and Affan have attempted to study 
the southern Kordofan case especially on the Habila schemes. Affan found 
out that 83 per cent of the scheme owners were non-farmers, 6 per cent 
belonged to co-operative societies and 11 per cent were genuine 
farmers. 25 The point I would like to make here is that schemes such as 
the Habila, Gash, etc. brought economic differentiation to the individuals 
who form the majority of the population because of the unequal allotment 
of schemes and also the unequal distribution of financial credit 
practised by the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan and other international 
financial bodies who have been engaged in giving credit facilities 
charging a high rate of interest. The mechanized farms in Habila like 
elsewhere in Gezira are being given to those who meet certain conditions 
or rules as laid down by the neo-colonial state. Although the areas under 
dura cultivation increased from 33,000 feddans in 1943 to 6,329,000 
feddans in 1979/80, the majority of the indigenous tribesmen in southern 
Kordofan became more alienated, poor and impoverished due to policies 
adopted by the state authorities. These included various criteria devised 
for the allotment of schemes which created inequalities not only between 
the Arab immigrants, who became the main benefactors of the schemes as 
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they were able to meet the conditions laid down and because the 
authorities responsible for the allotment of the schemes are dominantly 
people of Arab origin or Arabized Arabs themselves, which Kursany has 
described as outsiders. Furthermore, the private capitalists found in the 
Nuba mountains were exclusively outsiders who benefited from credit 
facilities from both foreign financiers such as IBRD, IDA, and others who 
"channelled their finance or private capital and schemes known as the 
'guided' sector in order to differentiate them from domestically self- 
financed schemes under the central Ministry of Agriculture. "26 
Here the role of the state in the emergence of capitalist agricultural 
farms and the creation of inequalities between regions and among people 
within the same region or province has been found by this study as 
crucial. It was this role of the state that made nationalities from the 
most backward areas such as Nuba Mountains, not to trust the state and 
its various apparatus. The fact that the state has been seen as 
strengthening the position of private capitalist elements who are 
outsiders as well, exacerbated the conflict between the state 
representatives and the private capitalists on one side, and the 
indigenous population on the other. 
It was due to these inequalities and injustices committed against the 
people of Nuba mountains, from the time of the Arab slave merchants and 
Turco-Egyptian colonial penetration, which were continued by the Mahdist 
authorities, the Anglo-Egyptian colonial state, and adopted by various 
regimes which have ruled the country after independence 33 years ago, 
that the General Union of Nuba Mountains was formed. It was formed in the 
1960's in order to fight on behalf of the poor peasants who have been 
displaced from their lands due to the establishment of the schemes, and 
also on behalf of the people of Nuba Mountains in general who, like the 
southern Sudanese and those of Beja and Igesna areas, were deprived and 
whose areas were not developed by the state controlled by the capitalist 
elements. 
The support received by the General Union of Nuba Mountains from the 
masses in various elections held since its establishment in 1965 until 
the last elections in 1985 was strong. For nearly twenty years the 
leadership of the General Union of Nuba Mountains had enjoyed popular 
support and had continued to control the territorial seats in various 
constituent assemblies during the 10 years of liberal democratic rule in 
the Sudan. 
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In the 1986 elections, the founders of the General Union of Nuba 
Mountains, had an agreement among themselves which led to a split. This 
resulted in the formation of the Sudan National party, which had wider 
political appeal, not only to the oppressed people of Nuba Mountains, but 
to all Sudanese people who share similar conditions. The main objectives 
of the party include redistribution of political and economic resources 
throughout the Sudan. The dominant leader of the General Union of Nuba 
Mountains, became the leader of the Sudan National Party. 
Reverend Philip Abbas, one of the founders of both the General Union of 
Nuba Mountains and the Sudan National Party, was also one of the leading 
members of the Black Bloc movement since the 1940's and continued to work 
within it until he formed the General Union of Nuba Mountains in 1964 
after the fall of General Abboud. The formation of a regional political 
movement in the Nuba Mountains was dictated by the fact that the Black 
Bloc had failed to unite all the Sudanese black Africans and was 
therefore unable to defend their interests against those of the powerful 
Arab forces which control political and economic power in the country, 
including military power since independence from the Anglo-Egyptian 
colonial rule. 
The formation of the Sudan National Party was influenced by two issues. 
Firstly, the struggle for leadership within the movement in 1985. 
Following the fall of the Nimiere regime many political parties and 
movements were'formed, each with regional backing. The intellectuals from 
the Nuba Mountains who had not actively taken part in politics before, 
entered the arena and such personalities as Professor Amin Amouda, Dr 
Nud, Dr Zakaria and many others joined the Union of Nuba mountains and 
tried to reorganize it. Here the seeds of division were markedly sown. 27 
The new group, with new ideas, became a threat to the old charismatic 
leadership of Reverend Philip Abbas - the veteran political leader from 
the Nuba Mountains. He had been involved in the armed struggle against 
Arab domination from the 1960's to 1985, and had been subjected to 
continued arrest by various Arab controlled regimes in Khartoum. From 
1969-1977, he was condemned to death by the Nimiere regime, charged with 
treason or armed struggle against the regime. After the national 
reconciliation, he returned and continued the struggle within and which 
ended in several attempted coups which apparently failed, but the fact 
that he was arrested together with coup instigators and accused and r 
charged with racist coups attempts, shows the extent of his influence 
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within the armed force. One of the attempted coups by the non-Arab 
officers and men in the army in which Reverend Philip Abbas was accused 
and arrested, was in September 1985, where 80 soldiers, including the 
Reverend Philip Abbas were arrested. He was later released (for the 
fourth time) on such charged. Over six of the soldiers were tried and 
executed, while 68 others were given prison sentences ranging from six, 
ten, 12 and up to 20 years. 
Finally, GUN and SNP draw most of their support from the Nuba Mountains. 
The leadership of both organizations contested elections in 1985. The SNP 
won seven of 13 territorial seats in the election, while GUN lost. The 
leader of SNP, in order to prove his claim of being a national leader, 
stood for election in Khartoum, his first time. He overwhelmingly passed 
his opponents, who were from the dominant, rich Arab orientated political 
parties. 
The role of the SNP leadership in the emergence of the Sudan rural 
solidarity and Union of Sudan political parties, was quite considerable. 
The party, like all parties, suffers from financial problems for carrying 
out its enormous propaganda against the rich, Arab political parties in 
the north. 
How dependent is the SNP? Why were members of the SNP in the constituent 
assembly divided, which led to two wings of the same party? What are the 
actual differences between the leadership of SNP and GUN? Why were there 
differences between SNP and other parties during the elections of 1985 
including SRS? 
7.2.4 The Darfur Development Fund 
The Darfur Development Front, like the General Union of Nuba Mountains, 
came into being in the 1960's, precipitated by the inequalities and lack 
of investment in the region. Darfur is one of the areas in the Sudan 
which is backward in a similar way to southern Sudan. The aims and the 
objectives of the Darfur Development Front were in a way different from 
those of southern Sudan, and Nuba Mountains, which we shall analyse. 
In Darfur province (latter region), various Islamic religious sects have 
been able to Arabize and Islamize most of the indigenous African tribes. 
The historical background of Arab and Islamic penetration starts from the 
early periods of long distance Arab traders and slavery,. which-we do not 
-have space to elaborate on-here., Suffice it to say however that the 
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Islamic and Arab influence in Darfur has dominated the area for a long 
time before and after independence. Despite the fact that Darfur was only 
brought under the Sudan in 1916 by the Turco-Egyptian colonial forces, 
the sectarian forces have been able to integrate it into the Arab and 
Islamic dominant political set up which inherited political and economic 
power from the British Colonial authorities in 1956. The alliance between 
the Tijania Islamic sect and the Ansar of the Umma Party was enough to 
unify most of the masses under the Umma party, or Mahdi family. 
Therefore politics. in Darfur during the first few years of independence 
have been under the influence of the Mahdi family and Umma Party as well, 
so during the elections of 1953-54,1956-58, and even during the 1965-66 
elections, the Umma Party, National Union Party (now DUP) and Islamic 
front used to select their candidates for national elections from 
Khartoum and send word to the leaders of various tribes from the Imam al 
Mahdi and Sayidi Ahmed Mirghani in order that their candidates be 
elected. Local political elements were not consulted or considered as it 
was assumed that those candidates chosen were messengers from the Imam 
and Sayidi Ali Mirghani and had to be elected without question. This 
continued until 1966 when the citizens of Darfur met and decided that 
while they would remain within those religious orientated political 
parties, the future candidates for national elections should be chosen 
from among them, ie. from citizens within Darfur so that those elected to 
the constituent assembly would always return to Darfur to help the people 
who had elected him. They argued that those who were brought from 
different areas to be elected as representatives of various parties in 
Darfur, had never returned after they were elected an therefore, there 
was no way of making them accountable to the masses who had elected them. 
It was therefore felt by those politically conscious citizens of Darfur 
to set up the Darfur Development Front, not as a separate political 
party, but as a pressure group composed of members of three religious 
parties, namely the Umma Party (which controls the majority of 
territorial seats), NUP or DUP (the second largest political party in the 
area) and the Muslim Brothers or National Islamic Front. There were also 
independent members from the main Arab and Islamic orientated political 
parties who were not significant in terms of number and influence. This 
situation continued from the 1960's until the 1985 elections when the 
Umma party received a majority both from Kordofan and Darfur regions and 
this therefore gave the party a majority in the constituent assembly. The 
leader of the party formed a coalition government with the DUP which had 
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the second largest members in the constituent assembly (ie. Umma Party 
101 members and DUP 66 members). 
However, the Darfur Development Front had also been trying to co-operate 
with the members from other under-developed areas, for example, GUN, Beja 
Congress and political parties of the southern Sudan. Mr Ahmed Deriage, 
one of the leaders of the Darfur Development Front, who is an independent 
member had been arguing that representatives from western Sudan, ie. 
Darfur and Kordofan, should seek a federal system of government from 
their dominant ruling parties. The dominant ruling parties had rejected 
this call and continued to exploit and oppress the people of the area. In 
other words, DDF has not been able to bring about socio-economic 
development to Darfur until this time. Such failures encouraged 
intellectuals and the youth to demand separate regions and separate 
political parties for Darfur during the Round Table Conference in 1965- 
66, when ways to solve the so-called southern problem were discussed 
between the northern political leaders and the southern Sudan leaders. 
The call for a separate region for Darfur increased tremendously in 1972 
under Nimiere's regime, when southern Sudan was granted local autonomy 
within the united Sudan. The refusal by the Nimiere regime to grant both 
Darfur and Kordofan self rule led to feelings of anti-Nimiere and 
increased support for the sectarian Umma Party. This was reflected by 
attempted coups which failed to materialize. For example, in the 1975 and 
1976 coups Hassan Hasien and Mohd. Nur Saad were organized by the members 
of the armed forces from these two provinces which became regions in 
1980, when Nimiere agreed to recognize the so-called northern Sudan into 
five regions, namely central, eastern, northern, Darfur and Kordofan. 
The division of western Sudan into two regions came into being because 
the leaders of the DDF had demanded that Darfur should be separate from 
Kordofan in order to give it a chance for socio-economic an political 
development. It was argued that northern Kordofan was well advanced 
economically compared to Darfur and southern Kordofan and therefore its 
unity with Darfur would be a disadvantage to the Darfur people. So in 
1980, six regions were created by Nimiere. It was found that even under 
separate development there was no quick solution to the problems of 
Darfur. 
After the creation of the Darfur region, the DDF leadership planned that 
all the governors, or the entire regional government, civil service, 
371 
police, prisons, etc. were to be recruited from within the locality of 
Darfur region. When the president appointed the second governor from 
among northern Sudanese citizens, the people of Darfur rejected him 
vigorously. An attempt by Nimiere to impose him on the region was met by 
hundreds of thousands of people lying down on the airport runway to 
prevent the supposed governor's plane from landing. As a result Nimiere 
gave in and appointed Mr Ahmed Derange as the governor. He was a popular 
choice as he was a member of the Fur tribe, the largest of all tribes in 
the area, though he failed to solve the hunger and development issues. 
His attempts to get financial support from central government in order to 
solve the problems of hunger, disease and lack of financial investment 
which were threatening the region fell on deaf ears. 
The governor of Darfur resigned in 1984 and left the country to go to 
Western Europe, where he stayed until now. During the last elections, 
politicians in Darfur followed their traditional parties, namely Umma, 
DUP and Islamic Front. The Umma party gained the highest seats in the 
area. 
In 1987 a division among the members emerged, created by the political 
violence in the area between the Arab militia, armed by the state, and 
the African tribes, supplied with arms by the Chad regime whose 
assistance was given after they discovered that Libya was training and 
arming Arab tribes in the region. In 1987 the youths were able to defeat 
the older generation in a general assembly meeting held in Nyala. The 
executive was composed of 16 members who set up the Darfur Resistance 
Movement. The first demand by the new executive body was to change the 
existing constitution and enact one that would address itself to the new 
approaches and demands of the community. The meeting authorized the 
executive to prepare and produce a new constitution within two months. 
In an interview with the new president of the organization, Mr Abdalla 
Kater, in Khartoum, he indicated that the Front was going to transform 
itself into a political party completely independent of any other 
political parties and that the Front would put up candidates for election 
during any general elections in the future. 
28 
On January 5th 1988, the Darfur Development Federal Party was born out of 
the Darfur Development Front, with Mr Abdalla Kater as its president. Mr 
Ahmed Deraige, the former governor of Darfur during Nimiere's rule, 
became its first patron. The Party was committed to a federal system of 
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government as the only system for Sudan. The Party rejected the Islamic 
constitution and the September Islamic Laws imposed by the Nimiere regime 
as not right for a country like Sudan which was composed of multi- 
religious, multi- cultural and multi-racial groups. 
It is important to note here that supporters of the traditional sectarian 
parties were removed from the ranks of the new leadership. The Party 
condemned political violence taking place in Darfur, known as armed 
robbery. The Secret Civil War, as it has sometimes been called, has been 
very expensive for the region. Several thousands of innocent people have 
lost their lives and several thousand houses and villages have been 
burned by the Arab militia. They migrated from Kordofan to Darfur, 
looking for grazing areas and fought for a number years against the Dinka 
tribesmen and were defeated. The actual basis of the war in this region 
is not different from the civil war in the south. The cause can be traced 
to political and economic struggles between the Arab tribes and the 
African tribes in the region. In November 1987, a committee of 25 members 
set up by the Arab tribes sent an open letter to the Prime Minister, Mr 
Saddiq al Mahdi, with copies being sent to both the constituent assembly 
and the State Supreme Council, outlining their grievances both against 
the policies of central government in the region and the policies of 
regional government. The Arab leaders claimed that they were the natural 
rulers of the country in general and particularly the Darfur region 
because they had brought Arab civilization and the Islam religion to the 
country and had defended it hitherto. In Darfur, the Arabs were in the 
majority with 80% of the regional economy in their hands, 60% of educated 
people in the region were Arabs and yet they had been denied the position 
of governorship and as power in the region had not been given to them, 
they would declare war against the African tribes in the area. As a 
consequence of these threats, the civil war in Darfur increased in 
intensity from month to month until the current stage. 
Attempts by central government to solve the problem failed and the secret 
war continued unabated. 
7.2.5 The Beja Congress 
The Beja Congress was established before independence and continued to 
operate until this period. It began as a political organization which put 
its candidates up for election as far back as 1953 and later in 1955-56. 
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The emergence of Beja Congress was precipitated by inequalities not only 
within the region and other regions, but because of the injustice 
perpetrated by the Arab settlers to the indigenous tribesmen within the 
same region. For example, northern Kassala is more developed than other 
parts of the province. 
The struggle among the Beja tribesmen from the time of its inception, had 
identified its interests with other oppressed regions. As such, the Beja 
Congress joined the Black Bloc in the 1950's and continued until then. 
Although the social and economic basis of Beja Congress differs from that 
of Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan, the Congress has never ceased to 
expose the injustices and inequalities which have been inflicted on the 
people of the area. 
These injustices and inequalities can be traced to the Anglo-Egyptian 
Colonial period and which was continued by the various regimes which 
ruled the country after independence. The British, in eastern Sudan, like 
in western and southern Sudan, favoured the Arab elements under the 
Khatmiyya Islamic Sect which became the landlords, masters, merchants, 
local government administrators, police and prison officers, judges, 
civil servants and religious leaders etc. while the indigenous tribesmen 
were largely kept uneducated and backward. The establishment of the 
Khatmiyya Islamic Sect under the leadership of an Arab immigrant who 
claimed to be a religious leader or Khalifa, with support from both the 
British and Egyptian Colonial authorities, greatly affected the socio- 
economic and politics of the region. Similarly, the Mahdist family in 
western Sudan and Abba Island, were able to create certain conditions 
which made, the local population recognize and accept the family as holy. 
The leader of the Mirghani family, Ali al Mirghani, who was knighted, 
became known as Sayidi (my master) to the local population. He received 
more than thirty thousand pounds sterling from the British government as 
well as another considerable amount of financial assistance from the 
Egyptians. He was given most of the cultivable land in Kassala by the 
Colonial authorities, 'which had an immediate effect on the local 
inhabitants. They were forced to evacuate their land which was now owned 
by the new landlord, -Ali al Mirghani, and many members of the Beja tribe 
were displaced and reduced to being farm labourers or urban destitutes. 
In terms of development, eastern Sudan has been considered one of the 
main areas which has experienced agricultural progress, for example, in 
Gadarif, Kassala and even Port Sudan. Yet this study found out that only 
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the immigrant Arabs and Arabized Northerners had benefited from this 
economic growth. Politically, the Arab settlers are headed by the 
Mirghani family, who had continued to control the politics of the region 
whether under British Colonial rule or after independence. 
This monopoly of political and economic power, by outsiders, had been 
responsible for the emergence of Beja Congress as early as 1953 who 
continued to struggle for equality and justice for the Beja tribes in 
eastern Sudan. Unlike the Darfur Development Front, Beja Congress was set 
up as an alternative political organization to oppose exploitation, 
expropriation, domination and oppression by the outsiders, or Arab 
settlers. It is this racial factor which led Beja Congress to join the 
Black Bloc in the 1950's and 1960's. 
In 1965 the Beja Congress emerged as a political force representing the 
Beja people and in elections held that same year, the Party won 10 out of 
13 seats allotted to that area, defeating the Khaktimyya or Mirghani 
family for the first time. From then onwards, political mobilization was 
stepped up by the leaders. 
The Congress was faced with a financial crisis not only in mobilising the 
people, but to carry out the party activities and this plus other factors 
were responsible for the failure of Beja Congress to maintain its 
influence or support from the masses. Of course, the Beja Congress 
continues its struggle against a well established, rich capitalist 
organization who enjoys immense foreign support. With an economic crisis 
created by drought, and uneven development, the influence of the Congress 
suffered a great deal, especially among the people who were largely 
illiterate. While at the same time, the Mirghani family and their party 
the NUP and later the DUP, was gaining ground because of its economic and 
state power under its influence. For example, most of the administrators 
or state officials transferred to the eastern Sudan were supporters of 
the DUP and continued to be under the directives of the Imam or Sayidi 
Ali Mirghani or Ahmed Mirghani and to carry out party propaganda and 
mobilize various tribes in the interests of the family and the party. It 
is true to say that a war was declared against the members or leaders of 
the Congress who suffered harassment from the police and local government 
officials in the area who tried to incriminate them or arrest them, even 
though no crime had been committed. This resulted in members leaving the 
area or ceasing their political activities against 'Sayyidi' the leader 
and patron of the party. 
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The influence of the Khat4miyya sect has been rather weak although during 
elections most of the voters vote for the DUP. This weakness can be seen 
from its failure to Arabize the Beja tribesmen as well as the anti-Arab 
attitude in the area and is a measure of the degree of the failure of the 
dominant Arab religious sect in the area. Furthermore the real 
measurement of failure by the dominant ruling Arab national group has 
been the inequalities and backwardness which persistently continue to 
exist side by side with well advanced capitalist farms and industrial 
establishments under the control of the immigrants, or Arab settlers, who 
also control the merchant capital sector throughout the area. Here we 
found a classic example of inequality within the same area, which in 
general is classified as relatively developed compared to southern and 
western Sudan. The reality of this is that those who are poor or 
destitute are the indigenous members of Beja tribesmen while their 
neighbours, the Arab settlers, are the richest of all with links to the 
capitalist economy through capitalist agricultural production, industrial 
and merchant capital. It is the capitalist penetration in this region 
that has resulted in the emergence of very poor and impoverished people 
living side by side with the very rich landlords, merchants and 
industrial capitalists, in the same province. 
In 1959 a report on the national income of the Sudan divided the country 
into regions and according to the rate of income of each region or 
regions. Eastern Sudan, or Kassala, was grouped with northern and 
Khartoum provinces which according to the Department of Statistics of the 
Republic of the Sudan, on the distribution of national income, in 1955/56 
had the second highest per capita of Ls. 33, while region B, which is the 
Blue Nile province, had the highest per capita of Ls. 42. Kassala, 
northern and Khartoum province with 22% of the population and 33.5% of 
the total area of the country had 20% higher per capita national 
income. 29 Yet in Kassala the majority of the population were living below 
the poverty line ie. living as destitutes both in urban and rural areas. 
This happened again in the 1983-85 drought when most of their herds died 
and this also affected the peasants who were dependent on agricultural 
production. The differences in income are also reflected in terms of 
social integration whereby the majority of the Beja tribes people (ie. 
473,000 out of 675,000) speak their local languages. 30 As a result of 
their lack of education the Beja tribe formed the bulk of cheap 
agricultural labour, domestic servants and other low paid workers 
throughout the eastern region. 
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The establishment of a regional government throughout the northern 
provinces of Khartoum, Blue Nile, Dongola, Darfur and Kordofan, did not 
bring any socio-economic or political change. Poverty, lack of resources 
and impoverishment continued to exist in the area with inequality and 
disparities as the main dividing line in the eastern Sudan. 
The result of these regional disparities and inequalities, led to the 
emergence of regional political violence, described by the dominant 
ruling classes as armed robbery. This armed robbery has clearly become an 
organized resistance movement known as Militia Osman Digna, one of the 
former leaders during the Mahdist rule. This armed militia has been 
engaged in various organized robberies since 1985.31 
Finally, the Beja Congress was able to participate during the last 
elections in 1985, where it won only one seat out of 13 seats allocated 
to the region. Before the army coup on 30th June, the only member of Beja 
Congress was reported to have moved to the DUP. It is important to state 
here that the Beja Congress did join the Sudan Rural Solidarity and the 
Union of Sudan African parties and was able to set up branches throughout 
the region and which participated in the 1985 national election. 
7.2.6 The Union of Southern and Northern Funj 
Southern and northern Funj is one of the areas that is largely backward 
and under-developed, like the Nuba Mountains, southern Darfur, northern 
Kassala and the southern Sudan. Like southern Kordofan and Kassala, 
southern and northern Funj have been increasingly integrated into the 
capitalist market economy through the established capitalist farms at 
Damazin, Gissan, Abu Naam, Rosesires Dam etc. and also through the 
industrial establishments, which include the dam which generates 80% of 
national electricity production serving the Blue Nile, Khartoum, White 
Nile and Eastern Provinces. 
Southern and northern Funj, being part of the Blue Nile province, which 
is considered the most developed area in the whole country, is equally 
considered as being developed. But this development is not reflected in 
the per capita income of the masses in the area. The benefactors are 
found among the Arab immigrants who exclusively control the private 
agricultural sector, industrial establishments, commercial sector and the 
state machinery in the region. The indigenous people have not benefited 
from educational facilities, credit and agricultural schemes as 
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distributed by the state, therefore the indigenous tribes form the bulk 
of cheap labour, together with western and southern Sudanese who migrate 
seasonally to look for casual work. 
Like the Nuba mountains, the majority of the indigenous people have been 
displaced from their lands which have been taken over by the state 
mechanized department of Central Ministry of Agriculture, and 
redistributed to the rich merchants including Saudi capitalists, American 
companies, Japanese and Kuwaiti businessmen who have invested in cash 
crops for foreign markets, while the indigenous people have had to become 
domestic servants and agricultural labourers. The majority of the 
tribesmen have been forced to either move into the hills where they have 
no amenities such as schools, medical services etc. which are offered by 
the local government institutions. 
During fieldwork studies, the author was able to visit both Damazin and 
Kurmuk plus the surrounding villages. As in the southern, eastern and 
western Sudan, the local population were found to be among the poorest 
and had no decent shelter or housing or water to drink. Also, it was 
mainly the indigenous tribes who were found to be largely uneducated and 
living in shanty areas near the urban centres, namely Damazin, Abu Naam, 
Gissan, Kurmuk, etc. The author was told by the leaders of the Union of 
southern and northern Funj that with the exception of one local 
government officer, almost all state employees controlling the police, 
army, judiciary, accounts, wild life (tourism), education, banks and 
agricultural schemes, etc. were all outsiders, mostly from the Arab and 
Arabized national group. 
Despite the fact that the majority of the people are Muslims, the Arab 
elements have not been able to integrate the Muslim community socio- 
economically and politically. For several years during independence the 
Arab merchants, teachers, etc. have been controlling politics in this 
area and some merchants had even contested and been elected in this area. 
The reason for such domination by the Arab group comes from ancient and 
recent history where Arab slave raids and Arab settlement have resulted 
in repression, domination and oppression of the masses for centuries. 
Wendy R James pointed out that, 
"There has been over the last two generations or so a tendency 
for people in this region ... al Rusayris and Kurmuk districts 
to claim Funj or northern Sudanese Arab identity without any 
obvious interpretation .... "32 
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This claim is a common problem with those Africans who have found 
themselves under the domination and oppression of Arab elements which is 
usually known as Arabization, Islamization and assimilation of indigenous 
Africans in the Sudan. In the Khartoum area (Omdurman to be exact) the 
author found several thousands of people of southern Sudan origin who 
have more than three identities and names. For example, some people would 
claim that they were Arabs and Muslims with Arab names, while in certain 
circumstances that same person who claimed that his or her name or 
identity was John or Deng and either from southern or western Sudan 
depending with whom the person was talking. This is clearly an identity 
crisis, and has contributed to the lack of national integration and for a 
certain dominant Arab ruling class to demand the transformation of 
Africans into Arab men regardless of the impossibility of such a thing. 
For example, the dominant Arab ruling class has claimed that the Funj or 
those of Ingesna tribes, Fur, Zakawa, Beja and even the Nuba people of 
Nuba mountains, have been considered as Arabs because they were Muslims 
and speak the Arabic language. This claim has been supported by the neo- 
colonial state for the last thirty-three years of independence. For 
thirty-three years the existence of Africans, let alone their being the 
majority in the north, has been persistently denied. The southern and 
northern Funj, like other areas, have been victims of such colonial 
domination for centuries and yet the majority of these people have 
managed to a greater extent to retain their African languages and 
culture. 
It was therefore due to the failure of the dominant Arab ruling class to 
integrate economically, socially and politically, that led the people of 
this area to retain their cultural heritage and political independence 
under severe and oppressive conditions. It is equally as a result of 
these inequalities and injustices that led to the emergence of the Union 
of Southern and Northern Funj, which automatically sought to join other 
oppressed and exploited nationalities who have established similar 
movements, some of which have already been dealt with in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the role of the members of the Union of Southern and 
Northern Funj in the emergence of Sudan rural solidarity, has indicated 
that the claims and propaganda about the non-existence of Africans in the 
so-called northern Sudan, was misleading indeed. This point is made clear 
by the tension between the Arab settlers in the north and the African 
majority, reflected in the current crisis in Darfur and Kordofan regions 
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between the African and Arab tribes. The fact that the SPLA/SPLM has been 
able to recruit several officers and men from southern and northern Funj, 
the Beja tribes, Nuba Mountains, Darfur region and even among the Arab 
and Arabized Sudanese explains that racial and religious representation 
are not enough to win any political support from any national group. In 
other words, the power of the sectarian Islamic leaders is being 
gradually eroded and it is only a matter of time before all the oppressed 
and exploited all over the country will not hesitate to revolt against 
the injustices and inequalities here after. 
The emergence of a separate political movement from southern and northern 
Funj has been a result of the rejection of slavery, exploitation, 
oppression and domination of one social group over another group in the 
name of God or Allah. The 1985 general elections marked the liberation of 
the people of southern and northern Funj from slavery which had survived 
in the area for nearly five hundred years. In addition, the participation 
of the people of this area in the process of liberation of the entire 
oppressed people, has been a great development in the Sudanese political 
change since independence. 
As found out by this study, all the leaders of the Southern and Northern 
Funj have been able to join the Sudan rural solidarity, the Union of 
Sudan African parties and finally the SPLA/SPLM in order to make a common 
struggle a success. 
7.2.7 The Sudan Rural Solidarity 
The Sudan Rural Solidarity came into being in November 1985, when 13 
political parties and trade unions, formed a united political 
organization. The political parties and trade unions include the General 
Union of Ingesna Mountains, the General Union of the Nuba Mountains, the 
General Union of Southern and Northern Funj, the General Union of the 
Funj Area, the Southern Sudan Political Association, the Upper Nile Trade 
Union Alliance, Sudan African Congress, Southern Sudan Trade Unions 
Alliance in the National Capital, Darfur Development, People's 
Progressive party, Sudan African National Party and Juba University 
Teacher's Union. 
The Sudan Rural Solidarity made a political declaration on 27th December 
1985, which was made up of eight points as a basis for solving Sudanese 
problems if they were adopted. These points included basic human rights 
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democracy, the Sudanese national identity, the economy, the system of 
government, the type of constitution, foreign policy, national elections 
and the September Sharia Laws. 
The Solidarity rejected the September Sharia Laws imposed by the defunct 
regime of General Nimiere, because they remain "oppressive and subjugate 
the masses without due regard being given to basic rights, pressing 
economic conditions and social background in the multi-cultural, multi- 
religious and multi-ethnic Sudan. "33 
As regards democracy, Solidarity reaffirmed its commitment to a multi- 
party system as it means to achieve political, economic and social 
democracy. Solidarity aspired to a parliamentary set-up which would be 
extended to the regions as a guarantee of the effective participation of 
the masses in the decision making at rural level. 34 
On this basis and despite the fact that the regional communities are 
basically traditional, the Sudan Rural Solidarity had cautio_. ed the 
transitional government to carefully revise the native administrative 
system with a view to modernizing it and making it more democratic. 
On the Sudanese identity, Solidarity affirmed that Sudan is a 'multi- 
cultural, multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-ethnic country. ' The 
SRS stated that these elements have coexisted peacefully in the direction 
of "unity in diversity", for a long time. Solidarity leaders argued that 
the role of the state in building and achieving a national identity and 
unity in the Sudan must originate from these elements of historical and 
cultural diversity, and that the cultural character of the Sudanese 
nation must be based on the non-dominance of one culture over the others. 
'Diversity enriches rather than weakens the fabric of the nation', the 
SRS pointed out. 35 The SRS called upon the state to endeavour to provide 
equal opportunity for all the cultures to develop without hindrance, or 
one particular culture being imposed over the others. 
On the subject of national economy, the SRS stated that efforts must be 
exerted to establish an integral economic plan in which a proper balance 
is made between the economic and social needs with a view to achieving 
self sufficiency and that it is essential to effectively mobilize all the 
human and natural resources in a way in which it will not disturb the 
social structure in a negative way against the least developed 
majority. 36 Furthermore the leadership of SRS argued that the rural areas 
or 'countryside' must receive comprehensive development with more 
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attention being paid to the least developed areas in order to eliminate 
discontent, thus making the country more peaceful and stable. 37 
The SRS saw the decline of the environment as a result of bad 
developmental planning or human activities against natural resources 
(such as forests) is posing a threat to man, animal and plant alike. 
Therefore efforts must be exerted to halt this decline. 38 
The Sudan Rural Solidarity was concerned with the system of government 
and whether it would be able to shoulder the national responsibilities 
more efficiently and effectively. Because of this, and after considering 
the size of the country and its diverse cultures and means of livelihood, 
the SRS felt it could not be ruled through a centralized authority. It 
was felt that the most appropriate system for governing the Sudan should 
clearly define the distribution of political power between the centre and 
the regions. In this context, the SRS leadership strongly recommended 
that the federal system of government was the most appropriate for the 
Sudan. 
On the constitutional issue facing the Sudan, the SRS was more concerned 
with the need for a permanent constitution in the country. Such a 
constitution should guarantee to all citizens their basic human rights 
and freedom to practice their religious beliefs, develop their cultures 
and protect their economic and social rights in a multi-racial, multi- 
cultural, multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and a united country. 39 
As regards the national foreign policy, the SRS stated that the 
government should adopt a foreign policy which would protect the 
sovereignty, defence of justice, honour and integrity, without being a 
satellite to any other country. Positive non-alignment was considered as 
an historical stand of the Sudanese people and should be maintained in 
order to reaffirm national sovereignty and in solidarity with liberation 
forces. The Sudanese national identity must be reaffirmed in the 
international and popular diplomacy and so must the policy of good 
neighbourliness. 40 
On the national general elections, the Sudan Rural Solidarity reaffirmed 
that elections were the means by which the entire popular will was 
delegated to some people who would represent the country in the running 
of its affairs. That general elections should be held only if the entire 
country was enjoying peace, security and stability, in order to ensure 
freedom of movement, fairness of the process and the participation of the 
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majority. Carrying out partial elections can only mean that the 
delegation of the popular will was incomplete and the elected assembly 
could not in any way be considered to represent the entire nation. The 
SRS made it very clear that 
"in order to avoid grave detrimental effect to the unity of the 
country, peace, security and stability, must prevail throughout 
the whole country, especially the areas affected by the civil 
war before the elections". 41 
Furthermore, the SRS demanded from the transitional government that the 
following be carried out: - 
1. To guarantee basic human rights as stipulated in the international 
convention on human rights; 
2. To adopt freedom of expression, belief, association and movement 
regardless of sex, creed or origin; 
3. To observe the supremacy of the rule of law and the independence of 
the judiciary; 
4. To respect the independence of the universities, the other higher 
institutions, museums and the statistics and data collection 
centres; 
5. To guarantee the impartiality of the national mass media such as 
radio, TV and state controlled newspapers and safeguard them against 
monopoly by the government of the day; 
6. The government to repeal all repressive laws including the September 
Islamic laws and national or state security act; 
7. That the election act must be amended to include a better 
representation of the modern forces which are effective in the 
process of social transformation and progress; 
8. That the geographical constituencies should be fairly distributed in 
a manner commensurate with the size of the population in each; 
9. That the elections commission should be completely independent such 
that it can perform its duties effectively and impartially. 
The leaders of the 13 organizations that made up the Sudan Rural 
Solidarity had hoped to unite as a unique political front to work towards 
achieving a lasting peaceful solution for the problems of the less 
developed regions. They equally hoped to gain supporters and members of 
other national forces to work for open dialogue in order to create a 
sound democratic society for all Sudanese, regardless of their race, 
creed or religion. 
The first enemies of the Sudan Rural Solidarity included the Arab 
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oriented parties such as the Umma Party, DUP and NIF which accused 
Solidarity as a racist organization. The main reason for fearing the SRS 
by the traditional sectarian parties was because Solidarity had 
penetrated areas which formed the political backbone of the sectarian 
parties. For example, the northern and southern Funj, Ingesna Mountains, 
Darfur, Kordofan and even Khartoum, were seriously affected by the SRS 
activities and that was a political blow. 
The Umma Party, DUP and NIF plus the transitional military regime and the 
council of ministers used all their means to weaken the SRS so that by 
the time of the general elections in 1986, the SRS was much weaker and 
almost paralysed. Each organization within the SRS pulled out and 
participated in the general election which they had at first rejected. 
During the elections, all candidates who contested seats as members of 
the SRS were defeated because of the weakness of the party. The actual 
failure came when the dominant sectarian leaders were able to divide the 
leaders of SRS and each organization was able to set its candidate 
against the other candidate, within the SRS. As a result, votes were 
divided among the SRS members and the winners were their enemies. 
The state controlled mass media, such as radio Omdurman, national TV 
services and newspapers were mobilized to defeat the members of the SRS 
in the elections. The mass media accused the SRS of being anti-Islam, 
anti-national unity and anti-Arab. The leadership of the SRS was accused 
of being supporters of SPLA/SPLM and five of them were arrested and 
charged with inciting racial uprising and confrontation. The attempted 
coup by some non-Arab soldiers in September, 1985, was said to have been 
organized by the leaders of SRS and those of the SPLA/SPLM. 68 soldiers 
were jailed with sentences ranging from 12 to 30 years. Reverend Philip 
Abbas, the first chairman of SRS, was arrested and detained without trial 
for nearly six months. Similarly, Mr Samuel Aru Peter Gatkuoth, Professor 
Amin Mohd Alamin Hamuda and Hassan Kunda, all leaders of SRS, were 
detained with over 30 other civilians, for the alleged coup. 
Although the Sudan Rural Solidarity was weak politically in terms of 
representation in the constituent assembly, it was clear to the ruling 
national grouping that the struggle for equality has spread to all people 
in the less developed regions, which constitute the Sudan Rural 
Solidarity. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE ANATOMY OF POLITICAL AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE SUDAN: II 
8.1 Introduction 
The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement which came into being after the 
violent uprising of 1955, was the first organized armed resistance in the 
region. The Anya-nya force was the military wing of the SSLM. The 
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and its military wing, Anya-nya, was 
committed to the total liberation of southern Sudan from Arab colonialism 
with the ultimate aim of establishing an independent sovereign state for 
the Africans of southern Sudan. The Africans, who form the majority of 
the so-called northern Sudan, were apparently considered by southern 
nationalists as part of the Arab and Arabized dominant national group. 
The term Anya-nya, as defined by the movement, comes from the Madi word 
which means 'snake poison', and its use came into being in 1963 when the 
military wing was reorganized. 1 
The movement and its military wing was dissolved in 1972 following the 
Addis Ababa Agreement which granted self-rule to the southern Sudan 
national group. It is important to point out that the Anya-nya forces 
were absorbed as a single military unit known as the Southern Command and 
this consisted of six thousand officers and men. 2 
The second Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement and its military wing 
Anya-nya II came into being a few months after the Addis Ababa Agreement 
was implemented in 1972. The Movement, like the first one, was 
precipitated by what the leadership of the movement described as a sell 
out of southern Sudanese people. Anya-nya II was to continue with the 
programme of total liberation of the southern Sudan from what they termed 
'Arab domination' [colonialism] and with the aim of establishing an 
independent sovereign state. 3 
It is important to note that these two movements had similar political 
objectives, but failed to achieve them. Furthermore, most of the leaders 
of this movement we shall argue remain bourgeois orientated 
ideologically, for their general interest in the struggle was to gain 
political positions, state contracts, state loans, agricultural schemes 
and others. 
The third political and liberation movement to have originated from the 
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southern Sudan is the Sudan people's Liberation Army and its political 
wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. Unlike the first two 
movements mentioned above, this movement clearly stated its first 
political manifesto in August 1983, that it was committed to liberating 
the whole of Sudan from the bourgeois, sectarian established neo-colonial 
state, in order to create a new Sudanese state and nation united and 
federal in its formation and structure. 4 As we shall show in this 
section, the objectives of this movement are different from the previous 
movements which had originated from the southern region. The SPLA/SPLM as 
shown by its policies and leadership composition, is a national movement 
representing the oppressed and the exploited Sudanese all over the 
country. 5 
In this section, attempts will be made to compare and contrast the above 
liberation movements in terms of their objectives, strategies and 
ideologies. 
8.2 The Ten-year Period of Addis Ababa Agreement and the Emergence a4 
South-Sudan Liberation Movement and Anva-Nva II 
The emergence of several anti-government political movements in the 
Southern Sudan, a few years after the implementation of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement (which ended a 17-yr bloody civil war) was commented upon by 
most southerners interviewed by the author. They related it not only to 
poor implementation of the Agreement but also with violation of the said 
agreement by the central government authorities. It is to be noted, that 
after the end of 18 months of the Interim Regional Government, there was 
considerable dissatisfaction among southerners who felt that the central 
government had failed to honour its commitments to the Agreement, in many 
areas and prominent among them were the failure of central government to 
meet its financial obligations to the region, the deliberate interference 
of the Northern Military leaders in the leadership arrangement in the 
Southern Region, the failure of the central and regional governments in 
the resettlement and rehabilitation of the ex-Anya-ya soldiers, the 
attempts by the central government authorities to integrate the 6,000 
Anya-Nya absorbed forces to the Sudan Army before the five years 
mentioned in the Act was reached, was a clear case of violation of the 
Act itself and the transfer of Anya-nya officers to Northern Sudan 
controlled unit was also an act of violation of the Agreement. 
So the emergence of The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and Anya- nya 
II as its military wing was precipitated by the deliberate violation of 
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the Addis Ababa Agreement by the president of the republic who was also 
one of the architects of the Agreement in question. 
The non-implementation and the violation of the Agreement by the Sudan 
Government was not surprising to most Southern Sudanese politicians, and 
intellectuals and even to foreign observers who had been following 
Sudanese politics since independence. A commentary made after the 
ratification of the Agreement in February 1972 confirmed this: 
"It has never been difficult in the past for the North and South 
to sign an agreement. In fact there have been too many but they 
always failed because of non-implementation. If this agreement 
is to have a lasting effect, Nimieri and Southerners must do a 
number of things prior to implementation. 
1. Both Nimieri and the Southerners must educate the Northern 
public about the terms of the agreement. This is to dispel the 
fears that the south will use the present concessions to 
separate in the long run.... 
2. Nimieri should appeal to the world for massive aid. Some 
parts of the agreement may not be implemented any aspect of the 
settlement is likely to be exploited, for the opponents of the 
accord will easily jump in an remind the southerners that it is 
the usual northern game". 6 
The above carried a lot of truth. For example, it is true to say that the 
causes of the first bloody civil war were precipitated by the non- 
implementation of too many agreements and promises made by the dominant 
ruling Arab oriented national groupings since 1950 and none of them was 
honoured. 7 It is equally true to say that Addis Ababa Agreement was not 
accepted by all Northern Sudanese. After all Nimieri's government was not 
democratically or popularly brought to power. But usurped political power 
by force. In addition to that, the relationship between the government 
and the sectarian parties especially the Ansars of Umma Party and the 
Communists was very bad after the massacre of Ansar and the Communists by 
the government in 1970 and 1971 respectively. Similarly not all 
Southerners did accept the Agreement and they had to be persuaded to 
accept the Agreement because of what it was offering the southern people. 
At this juncture, it must be stated that the principles of, and 
concessions made in the Agreement were generally accepted by most 
Southern Sudanese people. It should equally be stated that the 
implementation of the Agreement was not a complete failure; there were 
both successes and failures. Although perhaps it may be argued that the 
failures were more than the successes. So it may be stated here that some 
important parts of the Agreement were implemented while at the same time, 
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some important parts which were implemented were again violated and those 
important aspects which should have been implemented were not. 
Firstly, the Agreement was based on the recognition that there was a 
problem which could be solved peacefully through compromise and 
concessions based on 'give' and 'take' on both sides. Secondly it was the 
first time that the Northern political and military leaders had accepted 
the southern demand for separate political and cultural identity based on 
unity in diversity. 8 Thirdly the Agreement was based on mutual trust 
which was lost during the 17-year war. Fourthly and more importantly, the 
Agreement brought into being a system of self- rule for the Southern 
Sudanese people. That is to say, the Southern people were free to select 
their leaders, who would administer all their political administrative 
and economic affairs. In fact, the Southern Region was to have vastly 
increased its control over such important fields as government activities 
as finance and local taxation, education, social services and welfare and 
economic development fo the first time. 
It is to be noted that the establishment of regional government was 
accompanied by the emergence of a petty bourgeois ruling group in the 
region for the first time. The political leadership in the southern 
region, after the establishment of legislature and executive organs was 
made up as follows: The President of the High Executive Council and the 
Regional Ministers, the M. P. s of the Regional Assembly, its speaker, two 
deputies, provincial commissioners, their deputies within the Provinces, 
Senior Assistant Secretaries of the Sudan Socialist Union, Commanding 
Officers and their deputies in the region, police and prisons 
commissioners, chairmen and general managers of the Regional Development 
Corporations, Directors General, and their deputies. Because of its class 
composition and orientating this group was to represent bureaucratic 
petty bourgeois elements in 1972. And it was this group who reaped the 
socio-economic and political benefits of the Agreement. The lower stratum 
of the regional government which consisted of the working class, the 
peasantry and the urban destitutes, were victims of various failures of 
the Agreement. 
The differences between the two groups was the material and political 
benefits which accrued to the ruling clique. This was quite apparent in 
the incomes received, types of decisions made by the leadership in 
question and which were binding on the very poor. 
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In terms of material benefits, the leadership group were to enjoy 
enormous facilities, which included the highest salaries or financial 
reward, free furnished accommodation, free state car, fuel and driver. In 
addition because of their class position, members of the ruling clique 
were to have great access to state wealth, in form of contracts, house 
loans, car loans, hire-purchase lorries and other business loans. For the 
first time, some leaders were able to accumulate great wealth and became 
shareholders in the national and international businesses or 
transnational corporations, and they also had access to thousands of 
acres of land from central government, cheaply, ie. to purchase 
mechanized lands through the state in order to establish capitalist 
farms. In most cases, lands were to be leased at high rents to tenants 
who became absentee landlords within a short time. The political 
leadership also decided to import several hundreds of hire-purchase 
saloon cars and lorries, worth millions of Sudanese pounds, in order to 
give to regional government directors on credit, instead of investing the 
money on a productive project, or projects for the betterment of the 
living standards of the southern masses whose economic and social 
situation has not changed since the establishment of regional government. 
As a result, a small number of Southern Sudanese acquired property of 
considerable value. Here the foundation of capitalism and capitalist mode 
of production was re-established and expanded, although the state of 
capital accumulation locally was still weak. The emergence of a few 
relatively very rich indigenous southerners, against the very poor 
majority was enough to explain the level of capitalist penetration in 
Southern Sudan after the establishment of government in 1972. 
It is to be noted that under the regional government, some limited 
development took place over the last ten years of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement in the following fields: 
1. Education 
Under the Regional government while the old schools destroyed during the 
civil war were reconstructed, renovated and new schools were established, 
fe. to say, education was expanded enormously. Primary education was made 
compulsory and free primary education was introduced in almost every 
village throughout the southern region. In addition to government primary 
and intermediate schools, there were new self-help and government aided 
schools, which were locally built by village communities and then 
requested the regional government to provide teachers and books. At the 
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end of 1982/83 there were 777 primary schools, instead of 86 in 1972. 
Intermediate schools increased from 30 to 115. Teachers' Training Schools 
increased from 2 to 6. Six new colleges came into being as follows: 
1 Linguistics Institute, 2 Agricultural Institutes (Rumbek ox-plough and 
Yambio Agriculture Institute) one rural community development and 
cooperative studies (in Amadi), The Juba Multi-training centre, the 
fifth, the sixth is public administration and administrative reform, 
seventh is the Institute of Accounts and Business Studies, 8th the School 
of Medical Assistants, 9th School of Nursing and 10th the Mayo Institute 
of Technology. There was also the university of Juba to cater for higher 
educational needs. The result was an enormous increase in well educated 
southern citizens who joined the working class of the region for 
development. Table I shows the regional distribution of schools in Sudan 
from primary, intermediate and secondary schools, with southern region in 
third position with 777 primary schools, while Central Region was the 
first, with 1,796, the Second, Kordofan with 946, Northern Region was 
fourth with 756, Darfur and Eastern Region had 675 and 625 each and with 
Khartoum having less primary schools, ie. 519. It should be pointed out 
that the position shown on Table 8.1 was the highest ever got by the 
Southern Region since independence or southern provinces. 
In Table 8.2 the Southern Regions were the least represented among the 
pupils and teachers at all levels. This shows the degree of illiteracy in 
Southern Sudan which is more than 85% allocated to Sudan as a whole by 
the World Bank in 1981. In this Table the three Southern regions 153,923 
pupils in the Primary Schools, 4,783 Primary School teachers, 1051 
Intermediate School teachers and 456 Academic, Technical and Teachers 
from Training Schools, compared with over 355,802 pupils from Darfur and 
Kordofan while Central Region got the highest of everything from pupils 
and teachers in primary and in Intermediate and Secondary Technical and 
Commercial Schools. 9 
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Table 8.1: Regional Distribution of Schools in Sudan, 1981/82 
Region Schools Public Private Total 
------------ ------------------ 
Primary 
-------------- 
1,796 
--------------- 
0 
----------- 
1,796 
Central Intermediate 534 13 547 
Secondary 53 7 60 
------------ ------------------ 
Primary 
-------------- 
675 
--------------- 
0 
----------- 
675 
Darfur intermediate 108 0 108 
Secondary 11 0 11 
------------ ------------------ 
Primary 
-------------- 
624 
--------------- 
2 
----------- 
626 
Eastern Intermediate 97 6 103 
Secondary 15 3 18 
------------ ------------------ 
Primary 
-------------- 
519 
--------------- 
22 
----------- 
541 
Khartoum Intermediate 187 47 234 
Secondary 30 25 55 
------------ ------------------ 
Primary 
-------------- 
946 
--------------- 
0 
----------- 
946 
Kordofan Intermediate 146 2 143 
Secondary 13 5 15 
------------ ------------------ 
Primary 
-------------- 
756 
--------------- 
3 
----------- 
759 
Northern Intermediate 242 1 243 
Secondary 33 4 37 
------------ ------------------ 
Primary 
-------------- 
191 
--------------- 
35 
----------- 
227 
B. Ghazal Intermediate 28 0 28 
Secondary 
----------------- 
3 
-------------- 
0 
------ ------------ - 
Primary 184 
--------- 
176 
----------- 
360 
Equatoria intermediate 36 0 36 
Secondary 
--- 
5 
--- - - 
0 5 
------------ --------------- 
Primary 
--- -- ---- 
221 
--------------- 
1 
----------- 
222 
Upper Nile Intermediate 30 2 32 
Secondary 
- - -- -- 
6 
----- 
1 7 
------------ -------- - - -- 
Primary 
--------- 
5,912 
--------------- 
240 
----------- 
6,152 
TOTAL Intermediate 1,403 71 1,474 
Secondary 169 45 214 
Source: Department of statistics, pp. 39, Khartoum, 1983. 
Similarly in Table 8.3 which is connected with admission to various 
Sudanese Universities and polytechnics from 1970 to 1984. In this table, 
the Southern Sudan remained the most disadvantaged region in the country, 
because of its representation by terribly low percentage of students 
admitted even to the university of Juba where half of the intake was 
supposed to come from Southern Region. 10 
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TABLE 8.2: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS AND TEACHERS IN SUDAN 1981/2 
Academic 
Pri mary Intermediate Secondary 
Region ---------- ---------- --------- ----------- -------- --------- 
Pupils Teachers Pupils Teachers Pupils Teachers 
----------- 
Central 
----------- 
456,494 
---------- 
13,870 
--------- 
89,903 
----------- 
4,337 
-------- 
36,663 
--------- 
1,311 
Darfur 137,310 4,486 17,797 957 5,816 277 
Eastern 141,486 4,792 27,321 1,144 11,039 518 
Khartoum 214,051 4,310 50,791 1,669 32,813 906 
Kordofan 218,492 5,369 25,902 1,329 10,149 344 
Northern 184,273 6,361 45,535 1,974 18,355 662 
Bahr el Gha zal 32,491 949 4,741 177 1,869 225 
Upper Nile 32,431 1,064 5,282 306 2,448 225 
Equatoria 77,676 1,419 13,385 430 2,195 225 
----------- 
Total 
----------- 
----------- 
1,491,704 
----------- 
---------- 
42,620 
---------- 
--------- 
330,657 
---------- 
----------- 
12,323 
---------- 
--------- 
121,347 
--------- 
-------- 
4,243 
-------- 
Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1983, pp. 39 and 
43. 
It should be noted that this unequal distribution of schools, teachers 
and the admission of pupils and students to various schools and levels of 
education created dissatisfaction among Southern politicians, teachers or 
intellectuals and students because it strengthens the Northern domination 
and exploitation in this field. So those Southerners who were against the 
Addis Ababa Agreement had claimed among other things, that the Agreement 
had not solved this issue. Table 8.3 shows the unequal intake of Southern 
students to Khartoum. It did not the inequalities in the field of 
education, but has reaffirmed regional disparities which were the causes 
of the first civil war. Table 8.4 shows various admissions to Sudanese 
Universities and Polytechnics by year. 
2. At Economic Development Level 
Following the establishment of Regional Government in 1972, regional 
development objectives were as follows: 11 
1. Increasing food production in the south with a view to achieving 
self-sufficiency; 
2. Encouraging cultivation of cash crops with the aim of commercializing 
the traditional agricultural sectors; 
3. Developing on a priority basis a minimum network of transport and 
communication links to connect developing areas as well as those with 
development potential; 
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4. Bringing to the maximum number of people opportunities for general 
and functional education with emphasis on the development of 
economically productive skills; 
5. Encouraging productive skills and initiatives, particularly in the 
industrial sector; 
6. Recognising the importance of rural development as the foundation of 
sustained economic development through self help. 
r 
It is perhaps from the economic development policies where the real 
processes of articulation and rearticulation of various pre-capitalist 
modes of production took place. Beginning with the fiscal year of 
1972/73, five special development budgets were approved for Government 
implementation and the appointment of Dr. Lawrence Wal Wol as a State 
Minister for planning in Central Region created a great hope that 
development funds will easily be released for the south. The total amount 
approved in these special development budgets was S38,362,633, but the 
actual expenditure was far below expectations12 (See Tables 8.3 and 8.4) 
ie only 20% of actual estimates was released which was roughly 
LS7,860,000 out of LS38,300,000 various reasons were advanced for the 
poor execution of the first development projects financed by these funds. 
The most important of these included: 
1. Shortage of Capital 
2. Shortage of technical personnel in various sections 
3. Scarcity of building materials machinery, equipment vehicles and 
spare parts 
4. Short supply of fuel 
5. Difficulties in intra-regional and international, transportation and 
communications, due to shortages of basic infra-structural facilities 
in these fields and through operating difficulties. 
The development of infrastructure was equally considered. All bridges 
were maintained and new concrete bridges were constructed including Wau, 
Tonj, Juba and Kit bridges. Also four modern roads were constructed 
linking Juba-Maridi-Wau, Juba-Numile, Juba-Torit-Kenya, Juba-Yei Road and 
Juba-Rumbek-Wau, which began in 1980. 
Agricultural production was given great importance and investment was 
encouraged in the following areas; 
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-- Mechanized farming in Renk 
-- Cooperative farms at Awiel 
-- Rice Schemes in Awiel, Malakal and Bor 
-- Coffee plantation in Western Equatoria 
-- Tea plantation on the Eastern Bank 
-- Dura schemes in Aliab, Jebel, Lado in Juba and Bor 
-- Potato plantation 
-- cotton schemes in Nzara and oil palms 
-- Tobacco plantation 
-- Fisheries schemes including ponds in Yambio 
-- Forest plantation mainly hardwoods, and Timber 
-- Jute 
-- Fruits canning factory 
-- New varieties of seeds for agricultural production were 
freely distributed to the cultivators or farmers. 
In addition, the regional government established three development 
corporations, namely Regional Development Corporation (RDC), Equatorial 
Trading Corporation and Regional Insurance Company, each with several 
business enterprises and branches. 
Furthermore the Regional government provided various kinds of loan, 
including agricultural loans for farmers, who would produce food 
sufficient for the market. The regional authorities also discourage 
subsistence farming by giving those farmers who produced more special 
gifts, depending on the tribe or area concerned. There were also small 
state projects established and they include saw mills for timber or 
hardwood. Similarly, the regional government established rangers and 
Dairy farms in most urban towns. 
The Central Government had the major projects including the White Nile 
Brewery (Wau) which was built but the company never succeeded, Tonj 
Kenaf, Mongalla Sugar and Agro-complex projects, Malut Sugar, Jonglei 
Canal Project, Awiel Rice project, Aliab and Jebel Lado Upper Talanga Tea 
Project, Wau Canning Factory, Nzara Agro-Industrial complex, Juba 
University, Juba Electricity Project, Wau Electricity, Cement Factor at 
Kabeot, Limestone mills at Afrat Nahas, Goldmines at Kapoeta, weaving and 
spinning mills, building of two dams near waterfalls to be used for the 
generation of energy. 
In the field of energy, geological surveys for the region were undertaken 
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in an attempt to investigate the potential mineral resources, exploration 
of gold, caromite and iron ore or copper was carried 
\hstern 
Bahr el 
Ghazel and the oil in Bentiu. Other central government projects in the 
South included the development of international airports in Juba, Wau and 
Malakal. A Southern Region Airlines was also budgeted for and Southern 
Students were sent for training as pilots and engineers. Table 8.5 shows 
the planned and realized investment in Southern Sudan during the 6th Year 
Plan period, which ended in failure. 13 
TABLE 8.5: ALLOCATION OF FUNDS INVESTED IN GOVERNMENT PROJECTS 
-------- ------------------------ 
Annual Allocation 
------------------- ------------ 
Realized 
------- 
as % 
Year (LSM) Realized 
Original Revised 
------------------- ------------------- 
Original 
------------ 
Revised 
------- -------- 
1977/78 
----- 
32.39 32.49 6.13 18.9 18.9 
1978/79 39.45 22.50 7.82 19.8 34.8 
1979/80 41.59 20.50 10.31 24.8 50.0 
1980/81 38.14 20.50 12.80 33.6 62.0 
1981/82 36.60 16.00 13.40 36.6 83.7 
1982/83 43.04 16.00 
------------ 
8.13 
------------------- 
18.9 
------------ 
50.6 
------- -------- 
TOTAL 
------------ 
231.31 127.99 
--- 
58.59 
------------------- 
25.3 
------------ 
45.3 
- -------- 
Source: 
--------------------- 
B. Yongo-Bure, Prospects for Socio-economic Development 
------ 
of the 
South in the Search for Peace and Unity in the Sudan, F. M. Deng 
and P. Gifford. 
Table 8.6 shows the distribution of banks in Sudan, which shows that 
Southern Sudan received the least number. 
3. At Community Development Level 
As a part of socio-economic development, the Regional Government 
established community centres in the urban areas known as Neighbourhood 
Centres, Women's Union and Youth Centres as affiliated sections of the 
Sudan Socialist Union which was the ruling party under Nimieri. 
In the villages, Development Communities were formed to cater for socio- 
economic needs of the villages. Attempts were also made to provide clean 
water in both villages and towns and so boreholes were increased in 
number. 
In the districts, the Area Councils were created to plan and organize 
socio-economic and political development from the village level to the 
Rural Council Centres. Here adult education, police stations and wildlife 
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camps were established in various villages for the benefit of the rural 
community. Additionally, villagers were encouraged by local government 
and rural community officers who were to provide technical advice. 
4. At Health Service Level 
Since the colonial period and throughout the neo-colonial rule in Sudan, 
health service was limited to towns, which had less than 5% of the 
population. Any attempt by the neo-colonial state to create dispensaries 
in various villages, where there was a primary school, failed to meet is 
objectives, due to lack of trained personnel and the lack of drugs or 
medical supplies. 
Before the establishment of Regional Government there were 20 hospitals 
with a limited number of beds, doctors and supplies. In addition, there 
were 12 health centres under the management of medical assistants and 24 
dispensaries scattered throughout the villages. As shown by Table 8.7, 
the population per doctor, specialist, nurse and hospital bed and number 
of beds per doctor by region in 1982, Southern Sudan was one of the most 
peripheral in terms of health services. Other areas include Southern 
Kordofan, Darfur, Southern Blue and Eastern Kassala. 14 
TABLE 8.7: POPULATION PER DOCTOR, SPECIALIST, NURSE AND HOSPITAL BED PER 
DOCTOR BY REGION, 1981/82 
---------------------- 
Pop. per 
----------- 
Pop. per 
----------- 
Pop. per 
------------ 
Pop. per 
-------------- 
No. of beds 
Region doctor specialist 
-------- 
nurse 
------------ 
Bed 
------- 
per Doctor 
---------------------- 
Khartoum 1 369 
--- 
5 474 456 
---- 
484 
-------------- 
2 
Central 14 643 67 360 1 445 1 156 12 
Northern 9 783 30 500 864 654 14 
Eastern 9 324 41 928 1 421 1 945 9 
Kordofan 9 585 89 222 1 196 1 449 13 
Darfur 49 600 160 470 2 871 2 491 19 
Southern 42 739 
------------- 
173 
---- 
333 
------- 
2 977 1 
------- 
203 41 
--------- 
Average for 
----- ----------- -------------- 
all Sudan 8 261 
---------- 
23 
---- 
707 
------ 
1 298 1 035 7 
------------ 
Source: Health Statist ics 
------------- 
and Research Dept. 
----------- 
Ministry of 
-------------- 
Health, quoted 
by Yonga Bure, in The Search for Peace and Unity in the , __by F. M. Deng and P. Gifford, the Wilson Center Pres s, Washington DC, 
1987. 
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This clearly shows that even after 10 years of health development in 
Southern Region, it still had the highest number of patients per doctor, 
the highest population per specialist, the highest population per nurse, 
the highest population per bed and the highest number of beds per doctor. 
The situation in Southern Region was caused by unequal distribution of 
health resources throughout the country as shown by Table 8.8 below. It 
can be seen that the number of hospitals, beds, health centres, 
dispensaries and dressing stations in the three southern regions included 
those which were established ruling the 10-year period of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, under the Regional Government. 15 
TABLE 8.8: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH FACILITIES IN SUDAN 1981/2 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Region Hospitals Beds Health Dispen Dressing 
Centres saries Stations 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Central 42 4,129 74 259 624 
Darfur 12 1,605 17 62 92 
Eastern 14 2,008 24 119 185 
Khartoum 22 3,528 35 57 68 
Kordofan 16 1,657 24 116 195 
Northern 21 1,583 41 156 187 
Bahr el Ghazal 10 1,077 1 36 85 
Equatoria 11 1,266 1 54 137 
Upper Nile 10 952 3 28 46 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTAL 158 17,205 220 882 1,619 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Department of Statistics, Khartoum, 1983, p. 65. 
It should be noted that the number of hospital beds, health centres, 
dispensaries, dressing stations, doctors, medical assistants, nurses, 
midwifes increased during this period. In addition, three medical 
schools, three nursing schools, one leprosy school, two midwifery schools 
were established. Also a regional laboratory and regional medical store 
was set up. 
In spite of all these attempts to develop Southern Sudan, it still 
remained backward by the end of 1981. The degree of regional inequality 
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was largely high in every field, for example, the rate of economic 
growth, the number or projects in the region, the rate of the standard of 
living, the number of hospitals, doctors, medical assistants, nurses, 
health centres and dispensaries remained very low. Life expectancy, adult 
literacy, rural health infrastructures, primary education, higher 
education and specialization, both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
remained low. Furthermore, agricultural production from various schemes 
and projects were just as poor. 
Regional Basic Needs indicators as shown in Table 8.9 while Table 8.9 
illustates the Degree of Relative Backwardness for the various regions. 
The failure of the bureaucratic petty bourgeois oriented regional 
governments to achieve any relative economic development in the South was 
responsible for the dissatisfaction which began to be felt during the 
first years after regional government was established and this still 
remains true even today. 
It should be noted that all regional governments of Southern Sudan were 
all capitalist oriented and were therefore committed to the total 
transformation of the south into a capitalist society. This they failed 
to achieve, creating instead various inequalities more profound 
among Southern people where a minority group became relatively very rich, 
while the majority of southern people became more impoverished than 
before. 
The persistent economic and political crises mentioned have arisen over 
the poor implementation and violation of the Addis Ababa Accord of 1972 
by central government. These problems caused considerable anger and 
dissatisfaction in the South. Major causes of dissatisfaction which led 
to the emergence of political movements may be divided into six: 
(1) problems resulting from Northern Sudanese interference in the making 
and determining of political leadership in the South following the 
first regional elections of 1974; 
(2) The summary dismissal of over 32,000 ex-Anya-nya guerrillas, without 
providing alternative employment in 1974; 
(3) The violation of the 1972 Act, especially in the provision covering 
the integration of 6000 Anya-nya officers and soldiers in 1975; 
(4) The imposition of the Jonglei Canal and the plan to resettle 2.5 
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million Egyptian peasants along the canal in 1975; 
(5) The failure of central government to provide promised funds for 
special development projects as stated in the 1972 Act. The failure 
of government to spend a proportionate amount of the national budget 
within Southern Sudan on projects under its auspices; 
(6) Attempts to redraw the borders between Southern and Northern Sudan 
and annexe them to the north, including the oil district of Bentiu, 
the rich agricultural areas of Malut, Renk, and Kadok, the nickel and 
uranium areas in Southern Sudan; 
(7) The decision to build the oil refinery in Koshi instead of Bentiu and 
the later decision to pipe the crude oil to Port Sudan for export; 
(8) The unconstitutional dissolution of the regional government and the 
People's Regional Assembly in 1980,1981 and 1983. 
1. Problems resulting from the Northern Sudanese Interference 
in the Making of and the determination of political 
leadership of Southern Sudan. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
The Addis Ababa Agreement had provided for a democratic parliamentary 
system whereby the people's regional assembly was free to elect a 
president of the High Executive Council and present the name and person 
elect to the President of the Republic who would merely endorse it. The 
People's Regional Assembly was the sole authority electing whoever the 
majority would feel would stand up firmly in defence of all Southern 
interests against sabotage, and who would administer the region justly, 
efficiently and achieve socio-economic progress (one of the most 
important conditions for ending the Civil War in 1972. In essence, the 
President of the Republic could neither appoint nor sack the President of 
the High Executive Council, as stated in the Regional Act of 1972 
(Article 18): 
"The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed 
and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation 
of the People's Regional Assembly. "16 
After the first elections in 1974 the President of the Republic violated 
this provision and interfered in the regional leadership arrangements by 
nominating his candidate in accordance with bye-laws of the Sudan 
Socialist Union and imposed, him on the people's Regional Assembly as the 
sole candidate of the ruling party. To make sure that this candidate was 
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the only person for the post, he sent his first Vice President, Maj. Abul 
Gossim Mohd Ibrahim to Juba (then the regional capital) to order all the 
members of the People's Regional Assembly to accept the recommendations 
of the President and the Sudan Socialist Union that Abel Alier should be 
the only candidate for the Presidency of the High Executive Council. When 
the request was rejectej the first Vice President threatened to arrest 
those identified as ring leaders and closed the People's Regional 
Assembly and dismissed all elected members. Although all these 
interventions and threats were unconstitutional, the military leaders of 
the central government insisted, and several Southern leaders were 
dismissed from their political executive offices. Southern politicians 
were then divided over the issues and the violation of the Agreement was 
carried out easily. Some of the leading Southern politicians were 
arrested and detained for a long time. The violation of this section was 
repeated again in 1978, more vigorously in 1980,1981 and 1983 
respectively. The consequent emergence of political organizations not 
only opposed to this violation but also the Agreement and the regional 
government, which was considered vulnerable as it did not have proper 
safeguards. Distrust and anti-national unity, anti-Arab and anti-Northern 
feelings were exacerbated and the relations between southerners and 
Northerners was seriously damaged. 
2. The Dismissal of 32,000 ex-Anya-nya from their Jobs 
without giving them Alternative Employment 
---------------------------------------------------- 
The Regional Act of 1972 had provided for all ex-Anya-nya forces who were 
not absorbed in the army, police, prisons, wildlife and other departments 
to be employed in any state controlled job as labour and to remain until 
he/she could get an alternative income. But within 2 years of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, over 32,000 labourers were summarily dismissed, without 
any alternative job being found for them. The main reasons were two: 
i. The Central Government, which had promised to provide salaries and 
wages for all Regional Government employees and labourers, did not 
provide the finance needed for nearly a year. This was common 
practice in the schools, where teachers did not receive their 
salaries for a long time. 
ii. The Special Fund Commission for Rehabilitation, Repatriation and 
Resettlement which was supposed to pay all the expenses, failed to do 
so, instead the funds were misappropriated in Khartoum's luxurious 
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Sahara Hotel, where thousands of pounds were paid as rent each 
month. 17 For the 32,000 ex-Anya-nya forces and their families the 
Agreement was dead and the war of independence had to begin again and 
the first targets being Northern traders and soldiers who were seen 
as exploiters. 18 
3. The Violation of the 1972 Act covering the integration of 
6000 Anya-nya forces absorbed into the National Army 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
According to the provisions of the Act, known as "Temporary Arrangements 
for Composition of Units of the People's Army Forces in the Southern 
Region, " the armed forces in the Southern Region was to consist of 'a 
national force called the Southern Command, composed of 12,000 officers 
and men of whom 6000 should be citizens from the Southern Region and the 
other 6000 from the outside the region and that such arrangements to 
remain in force for a period of 5 years, subject to revision by the 
president of the republic on the request of the President of the High 
Executive Council acting with the consent of the people's Regional 
Assembly. All these provisions were violated right from the start. First, 
the national army stationed in the South which had over 30,000 soldiers 
was never reduced to 6000 as agreed, and a complaint against this 
violation by both southerners (who were members of the Joint Military 
Commission) and some senior officers of the absorbed Anya-nya forces in 
1974 was ignored. This led to some kind of dissatisfaction and mistrust 
and fear among southern soldiers. As a result, rebellion among southern 
soldiers was created and several violent incidents took place in Wau, 
Malakal, Bor, Juba, Torit, Actus, Rumbek etc. where hand grenades were 
used, causing several deaths. 19 The early rebellion was only prevented by 
personal advice from various southern leaders to the Anya-nya forces to 
be patient and give peace a chance. 20 An attempt by Lt. Gen. Joseph Lago 
(former Anya-nya leader who was absorbed in the national army to be the 
first Southern Sudanese to hold such as post) to convince his former 
soldiers, was successful in some areas, but a failure in others. For 
example, in Malakal, Gen. Lago was shouted down as a traitor and Lago 
reacted by summarily dismissing Lt. Col. Samuel Gai Tut, who became one 
of the strongest leaders of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and 
Anya-nya 11.21 
The second serious violation of the Act was an arbitrary decision by the 
President of the Republic who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
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Forces to integrate 6000 Anya-nya soldiers as soon as possible, into the 
national army in 1975, without consultation with the President of the HEC 
and the People's Regional Assembly. In February 1975, the President of 
the Republic had instructed the Khartoum Army Headquarters to transfer 
all Southern officers outside their units and to take them to the north 
without consultation with the President of HEC, and the People's Regional 
Assembly on the matter. This action was resisted by Southern officers in 
vain and some of them lost their positions in the army by being pensioned 
off prematurely. The next order was given to Brigadier Abel Chol a 
Southern within the national army to impose integration and transfer of 
Anya-nya forces absorbed to the northern Sudan. In March, 1975 Brigadier 
Abel began his mission, in Akobo Garrison, where he flew in with his 
forces to join the national army stationed in Akobo, side by side with 
Anya-nya forces. Brig. Chol tried to force the Anya-nya forces in Akobo 
to get in cars provided for them to leave their camp. This resulted in a 
fierce resistance, leading to mutiny by Anya-nya forces led by Lt. 
Vincent Kuany and Corporal Bol Kur. The mutineers opened fire on Brig. 
Abel Chol's forces, killing the Brigadier and some of his men. 
Immediately Vincent Kuany and his forces fled into the bush and began a 
new armed resistance. The rebels, as they were called, were joined by 
those who were already dissatisfied, specially those officers who were 
dismissed and those elements from 32,000 Anya-nya who were laid off early 
and they formed Anya-nya II as it became known. The support for Anya-nya 
II grew rapidly, despite the attempts by both the Regional and Central 
Government to contained the situation. The attempt at crushing the rebels 
was unsuccessful, but the Government managed to restrict the rebels to 
the Ethiopian borders in Upper Nile for over 7 years. The Central 
Government was forced to bring its policy of integration to a halt, until 
such time when peace, trust and understanding was restored between the 
southern and northern Sudanese nationalities. Although the Central 
Government was able to suspend its police until 1980,1981 and 1983. 
4. The Imposition of the Construction of the Jonglei Canal on 
the Southern Sudanese People. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Although the studies on the Jonglei Canal go back to 1904, the Anglo- 
Egyptian colonial government was not able to implement the proposals. The 
canal was planned and studied by the Condominium Government in Sudan with 
the main objective of increasing the flow of water to Egypt and Northern 
Sudan to assist their-Agricultural development, which was dependent 
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solely on irrigation. 
Like all colonial projects in Sudan, Jonglei canal was primarily intended 
to serve Egyptian needs for water, without any consideration of the local 
population which could be affected. A British scholar presented a study 
to Sudan in 1948 warned: 
"chief characteristics of the area, and habits and customs of the 
local tribes will be affected. The tendency to belittle the 
importance of the local circumstances and treat the problems on 
lines suited to the conditions in Egypt or northern Sudan, is 
likely to lead to a serious confusion of facts in future. If in 
addition complications are caused by applying methods 
unsuitable to local conditions not only may the success of the 
Scheme be impaired, but the welfare of the local 
inhabitants. "22 
The condominium reaction to the above report was the establishment of a 
government investigation team on the effects of the canal on the 
population where the canal was to be dug. The Jonglei Investigation Team 
entrusted by the Government has the following terms of reference: 23 
1. examining the interests of local inhabitants 
2. working out reasonable forecasts for remedial measures. 
The interests of the local people identified by the team 
included the following: tribal grazing lands and seasonal 
movement of herds, the effects of annual flooding by the river 
and rain on tribal livelihood and the movement of population, 
tribal communications, hunting, fishing practices, plus general 
interests, like river and land communications and future 
accessibility to ports. 
The team which was established in 1948 submitted its report in 1954. In 
the end, the findings of the team proved that the canal would cause 
adverse effects on the environment and population if it were to be 
implemented. These effects include: 
".... a whole chain of ecological events resulting in changes in 
soil type, vegetation and hence grazing values. Changes will 
follow from the draining of the swamps.... Moreover in some 
reaches there may be a heavy reduction in the fish population 
in others no reduction but an increased dispersal of fish in 
deeper water making them more difficult to catch. There will 
also be effects on the land in the flood plain, which when 
exposed is actually or potentially of value for crop 
production. " 24 
The report went on to point out: 
"under present conditions the economy of the inhabitants is well 
adapted to the characteristics of the environment... It seems 
safe to say that the large majority of the people in this 
area... are dependent on the natural fluctuations of the Nile 
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for their livelihood even though the dependence is largely 
seasonal and restricted to the dry months of the year... This 
chain of effects which will start with hydrological alterations 
and end in no less radical changes in the local economy, 
changes which are likely to be detrimental unless steps are 
taken to provide sound alternatives. "25 
The team also found that nearly two million southern tribes people will 
be affected by the canal. 26 
The condominium government having instituted several studies on the 
Jonglei Canal decided to shelve it until Sudan achieved its political 
independence in 1956. It should be noted that the report by the team 
failed to recommend any development projects for the south after the 
would-be canal was completed. 27 
The post independence regimes in Sudan did nothing about the Project. It 
was only after nearly 20 years that the canal issue was brought to the 
surface by both Sudan and Egyptian governments. 
Like the colonial government, the Sudan government, under General Nimiere 
decreed in 1974 that the digging of the canal should begin, without any 
consultation with the President of the HEC and the People's Regional 
Assembly. Objections were submitted to the President of the Republic, who 
refused to the call to stop the project until further studies had been 
carried out. The President made clear that his decree could not be 
discussed with anybody and had to stand. He went on to say that the 
project was within the Central Government domain and it was also in the 
national interest. Several socio- economic projects, including 
agricultural projects, schools, health services, boreholes, modern roads, 
etc. would accompany the developing of the Scheme. But the southern 
leaders insisted that since the purpose of the project was to drain all 
the water from the Sudd throughout the southern region to the benefits of 
Egypt and Northern Sudan, exclusively and to the detriment of the south, 
the Central Government should stop the project until the region made its 
own studies on how the canal would affect the region. Otherwise, the 
people of the south would continue to oppose the project by any means 
until it was abandoned completely. 
But the central government, having made an agreement with the Egyptians 
on the project, appointed a joint committee to execute the project. In 
September 1975 the project began to be implemented, starting in Jonglei 
Province as planned. Information was leaked that both Sudan and Egypt 
were going to bring 2.5 million Egyptian workers and farmers to settle 
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between Jonglei and Malakal provinces. In reaction, the southern public 
demonstrated throughout the southern towns, being worst in Juba, then the 
capital of southern region. Thousands of students, politicians and other 
citizens took part. Three students were killed and many were injured by 
the police. Several members of the People's Regional Assembly were 
arrested and put into prison. The central government persuaded the 
Regional Government to accept the project, on the grounds that economic 
and social development will be carried out in the areas through which the 
canal would pass, and would include health services, educational 
facilities, transport and communications etc. as promised by Central 
Government. 
28 
It should be noted that until 1983, there were no economic or social 
projects begun, while the digging carried on as scheduled. No roads, no 
schools, no agricultural projects, no health services were provided, 
while three quarters of the project was completed before being stopped in 
1983-4 by forces of SPLA/SPLM. The damage done to the trust, respect and 
understanding continued to be very much increased. 
5. The failure of the Central Government to provide special 
funds for the socio-economic development of Southern 
Region 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The failure of the Central Government to provide special funds for the 
rehabilitation of southern socio-economy infuriated both southern leaders 
and those politically conscious southerners. The nature of revenue 
assigned to the Regional Government has already been mentioned, and 
includes taxes levied by Central Government, but collected by Regional 
Government; taxes levied and collected by Central Government and taxes 
levied and collected by regional government. However these were difficult 
to collect from Arab merchants and traders, employees of the Central 
government working in offices and institutions situated in the region. 
For example, the army, bank of Sudan, Unity Bank, post offices, 
judiciary, railways and river transport excise duties, money collected as 
charges by customs in post offices, sugar stores petrol and petroleum 
departments. 
According to the Agreement, the national government was supposed to 
provide funds to assist regional economic development. The budget should 
have been LS1.4 million during the 18-month transitional period and LS7 
million for the period 1973-74. In the 18-month transitional period. the 
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central government provided only LS560,000 out of the approved Special 
Development Budget of LS1.4 million. Similarly, only LS400,000 out of LS7 
million was paid by central government to the region. In 1977-78, the 
Southern Region was allocated LS30 million for the Development Budget, 
plus LS14.4 million to central government projects in the region. Thus a 
total of LS44 million was allocated, out of a total of LS307 million -a 
14% share of the national development budget - was allocated. However, 
less than LS5.6 million was actually released to the Region, while all 
central government-projects remained unimplemented. The same practices of 
non-release of funds continued until the collapse of the Regional 
Government and the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983, when President Nimiere 
divided the South into three regions. This was an unconstitutional move, 
leaving Southern Sudan economically backward. 29 Because projects such as 
the Malut Sugar Scheme, Mangalla Sugar and Agro-industrial projects, Tonj 
Kenaf Factory, Kapoeta Cement Factory, Nzara Textile and industrial 
complex, White Nile Brewery at Wau, Jonglei Rice Scheme, Wau Fruit and 
Vegetable Canning Factory, Jebel Lado, Aliab and Ajak Dura Schemes were 
left uncompleted. The funds allocated for these were diverted to develop 
northern regions. The following development projects which were completed 
and began full production may be cited as examples of injustices in 
distribution of economic resources in the country. For example, Central 
region was found to have 12 major industries, such as Genuid, Halfa 
Gadid, Western Sennar and Haggar Assalaya Sugar Schemes, plus Kennana 
Sugar (one of the biggest sugar schemes in the world. As for other 
industries, there were the Malut Textiles in Kosti, Hashasa Friendship 
Textiles and Hag Abdalla Textile factories; the Abu Naama Kenafa, Kosti 
and Dueem Jute Factory, Cement factory in Rabak; the Hides and skins 
factories of the Gezira. In the Eastern Region, there were three 
industries in full operation - Port Sudan Textiles, Food factory in 
Kassala and the Paper Cartoon Factory in Aroma. Khartoum Region had 8 
major industries, which include two textile factories (Khartoum North and 
Friendship Ready Made Clothes); food factories (Rahad and Khasm al 
Girba); 2 hides and skins factories (Khartoum Tannery and the White Nile 
Factory); two paper factories (Blue Nile and Central Massabak). Kordofan 
and Darfur were found to have three industries, Kashm Textile Complex in 
Kordofan, while Darfur had Nyala Textile and Food Canning factory in 
Babonusa. Northern Region was found to have two industries, Gundu Textile 
Scheme and Canning factory at Karima. 
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All these industries in Northern Sudan represent the degree of uneven 
development and regional disparity in Sudan and have led to regional 
complaints against the Arab dominated state. The south only had Wau Fruit 
Canning factory (which was in production until 1978). It suddenly stopped 
production due to lack of spare parts, raw materials and maintenance. 
The regional disparities, uneven development and political crisis between 
the Southern Region and Central Government worsened in 1977, when an 
enormous investment was made by Arab states, concentrated in Central', - 
Khartoum, and Northern Regions only. A multilateral Arab fund, known as 
Triple Aid was inaugurated in 1977 under the auspices of the Kuwaiti 
based Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. It was planned that 
a ten-year investment programme costing over 6.000,000 dollars to fund a 
large number of interrelated schemes designed to bring an annual growth 
in Sudan's agricultural sector to an estimated 6x. 
30 Although 
implementation of these projects was delayed owing to the problem of 
infrastructure and financial difficulties, the. Southern leaders were 
disappointed with policies based on inequality by Central Government. 
It should be noted that all attempts by various regional governments to 
get funds were unsuccessful. Another disappointment was when the 
president of HEC and some of his ministers visited, Kuwait, Holland, 
Britain and West Germany obtained financial aid for development of 
Southern Region, but the funds were legally channelled through Central 
Government in Khartoum and misappropriated. No complaint was powerful 
enough to force the Bank Authorities to release funds. All these crises 
were followed by violence against Northern traders in Rumbek, Gogrial 
etc. 
6. Attempts to annexe some territory of Southern Sudan to 
Northern Sudan unconstitutionally 
------------------------------------------------------ 
The desire by Northern Sudan to annexe some parts of Southern Sudan goes 
back to condominium rule, when Northern Sudanese politicians influence 
the British colonial authorities to redraw the borders in Sudan, so that 
Northern Upper Nile Province (including Renk, Rdbak, Malut, Kadok and the 
present Blue Nile covering Funj and Ingesna areas, and in Bahr el Ghazal, 
the Abeyi Dinka District, Northern Awiel, now known as 'Arab River' and 
West Bahr el Ghazal area, Kafiea Kingi and Alfrat Nahas areas) could be 
annexed. However, the British only agreed to annexe Abeyi, Funj and 
Ingesna regions to the North. 
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The Regime of General Ibrahim Abboud contributed to this senseless 
corrupt conspiracy to steal Southern Sudan's rich areas by Northerners. 
Abboud, like the British colonial authorities, arbitrarily annexed Kafia 
Kingi Rabak and other areas because of their very rich agricultural and 
mineral resources which were under-utilized. 
In order to avoid the same annexation of any part(s) of Southern Sudan to 
the North by Arab settlement, the leaders of the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement during the Conference which brought the Addis Ababa 
Agreement managed to include a provision as a safeguard against these 
illegal practices. Article 3 Section III adopted as safeguards reads: 
"Southern provinces of the Sudan means the Provinces of Bahr el 
Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile, in accordance with their 
boundaries as they stood on January 1st 1956 and any other 
areas that were culturally and geographically a part3Qf the 
Southern complex as may be decided by a referendum. " 
This Agreement was never to be amended without the consent of a two- 
thirds majority of all Southern Sudanese people through a democratically 
held referendum. 
32 It was considered a great safeguard against any 
injustices or unjust decisions being imposed on Southern Sudan. It was 
also thought that Abeyi, Rabak and the Southern Blue Nile (the Funj and 
Ingesna) and the Nuba mountains people would be able to use a democratic 
referendum as a means of joining the Southern Region freely, whenever 
they so wished. 
The 1980 Bill passed by the People's National Assembly to annexe the oil 
rich District of Bentiu, rich agricultural lands of Northern Awiel, 
Kadok, Renk, Malut and some parts of Nasir in Eastern Upper Nile after 
their economic potentialities were known was not surprising to many 
Southern Sudanese politicians and masses for two reasons: 
1. Southern Sudanese politicians were aware that a great number of 
members of the defunct political parties who joined the government 
after the so-called National Reconciliation of 1977 was made, were 
against the Addis Ababa Agreement and were trying to destroy it at 
possible opportunity. And they had to be stopped by any means. 
2. The President of the Republic himself had been noted for violating 
the said Agreement and specially when he proposed in one of the 
Sudan Socialist Union Conferences, held in Khartoum to divide or 
rather to decentralize Southern Region into three or more 
regions. 
33 
Therefore it was not surprising to hear such matters 
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being raised by Northern Sudanese leaders, whether they were 
military officers or politicians. 
The reaction from Southern Region by both political leaders and the 
masses was tremendous. There were spontaneous demonstrations throughout 
Southern Region and by Southern Sudanese MPs in Khartoum and southern 
communities in Khartoum as well. The southern Sudanese MPs in the 
People's National Assembly, People's Regional Assembly and the Regional 
Government wrote to be the People's National Assembly and the President 
of the Republic demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Bill, stating 
that "what the National Assembly had done was constitutionally illegal 
and outside the power of the National Assembly. 34 
The President of HEC made a strong speech over Radio Juba, assuring the 
Southern Sudanese people that the borders should remain as they were on 
1.1.56. The President of the Republic seeing the violent reaction from 
the South made a tactical decision by rejecting the Bill in its totality 
and the matter was considered as closed. But both Southerners and 
Northerners became aware that old mistrust, prejudice and struggles have 
started again. And it should be mentioned that the border crisis was a 
clear indication that south/north relations were moving towards negative 
direction and was a great cause of worry for those southerners who did 
not want another civil war if only it could be prevented. 
7. The Building of the Refinery at Kosti instead of Bentiu 
------------------------------------------------------- 
The decision by the central minister of Energy and Mining to site the oil 
refinery at Kosti, nearly 600 miles away from Bentiu where the oil was 
found in 1981, equally caused the crises as created by the border 
disputes mentioned above. The proposed oil refinery was to be the second 
in the country. The first was built in Port Sudan for handling primarily 
imported crude oil. But the one of Kosh was to handle the bulk of crude 
oil from the Bentiu area, and any other crude oil from Western Sudan when 
available. 
An American oil company. Chevron began prospecting for oil in Western 
Sudan in 1975, but failed to find oil in any wells that they dug. By 
1977, the company moved to Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Upper 
Provinces. In 1979, oil was struck at a place which was named as Abu 
Gabra, between Bentiu and Muglad in Southern Darfur, but it was in a 
small non-commercial quantity. So the company moved deep inside Bentiu 
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District and struck oil for the second time, in large quantities at a 
place named by those involved as "Unity II". In both cases, the central 
government made official statements on state radio in Omdurman stating 
that 'oil was struck in south-south-west of Khartoum' in a well called 
Abu Gabra at Mugland and the other was a repeated announcement, "south- 
south west of Khartoum and in a new well called 'Unity II'. " No mention 
of Upper Nile or Bentiu nor the Southern Region was made. All state 
controlled Arab newspapers declared that the oil was discovered in 
Western Sudan. For nearly three years since oil was found in 'Unity II' 
inside Upper Nile, no Southern Region Authorities were informed by both 
central government or Chevron oil company. All employees and students 
sent on training by the company, were all Northern Sudanese. It is 
important to add that when oil in large quantities was found in Bentiu, 
the President of the Republic had to visit the 'Unity II' well. Before 
leaving for the area, it was announced on state radio in Omdurman that 
the President was going to visit the site of a great well "The Unity II" 
in Southern Darfur, and the Governor of Darfur came to Muglad where the 
celebration would take place. The President of the Republic went to 
Muglad as announced to meet the Governor of Darfur and other celebrants, 
and all were taken by helicopter to Bentiu District to meet 
representatives of Chevron Oil Company (who had established their offices 
and residences at Bentiu Rural Area Council) at Bentiu. The President 
visited the Bentiu District of Upper Nile Province without information to 
the Vice President of the Republic and President of High Executive 
Council, the Commissioner of Upper Province, the chairman of the Security 
Committee at the Provincial level and the Assistant Commissioner of 
Bentiu and the security committee of the area was quite unprecedented 
since the establishment of self-government in Southern Sudan in 1972. The 
occasion was carried live on Radio Omdurman and Southern Region 
Authorities were not only shocked but confused by the news. The 
Commissioner of Upper Nile with his Security Committee had to commandeer 
a Sudan Airways 36 seater plane to take them to Bentiu in order to 
witness the historic occasion. The President and his entourage were 
surprised to find the commissioner of'Upper Nile, who presented himself 
as the Commissioner of-the Province and a representative of the President 
of the HEC who could not come because of lack of information. The 
Commissioner, who assumed he was the host, introduced the President of 
the Republic and his delegation to the Provincial Authorities. From 
Bentiu, the commissioner took the President to the Unity II well and 
other wells, like Unity III. Then the President with his delegation, flew 
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to Muglad and the Commissioner of Upper Nile returned to his Malakal 
headquarters. 35 
The reaction of the Regional Government was to ask the Office of the 
President of the Republic to give information on the planned visit of the 
President of the Republic to Bentiu, and the announcements which were to 
be made about the location of Unity II and Unity III wells which were 
visited. But no reply was forthcoming, either from the President of the 
Republic or the Central Minister of Energy and Mining. The Chevron 
authorities denied having anything to do with government policies and 
announcement. 
After the above mentioned incidence, the President of the High Executive 
Council paid a visit to Bentiu and the two wells, Unity II and III. The 
author was one of the members of the entourage as Assistant Secretary for 
Political and Economic Affairs in the Secretariat General of HEC, to 
report on the visit. After the fact finding mission, the President of the 
HEC, sent the Regional Minister of Energy, Mining and industry with a 
letter requesting the President of the Republic to provide the Southern 
people with facts connected with the oil found in Bentiu. The President 
of the Republic instead suggested to the Regional Government of the South 
that the disputed areas including Bentiu should be organized into a 
separate region to be known as the 'Unity Region' which will be governed 
directly by the President of the Republic himself. This suggestion was 
immediately rejected by both the HEC and the People's Regional Assembly 
and accusing the central Minister of Energy and Mining of trying to 
dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
In 1981, the President of the Republic issued a Presidential decree to 
locate the oil refinery in Kosti, instead of Bentiu. It was stated by the 
President that the decision to locate the said refinery in Kosti was 
taken on purely technical grounds and on the advice of the Chevron oil 
company. For Southern Sudanese people and politicians, it was considered 
as a political decision just the same as when the border annexation was 
planned and executed. The southern leaders then decided to seek a 
political solution in order to change the site to Bentiu, where oil had 
been found in a larger quantity. Both the High Executive Council and the 
People's Regional Assembly who took very a tough political stand. The 
Southern Public was furious about the central government's new attempt to 
loot and exploit them of material resources and reduce them to live in 
poverty and destitution. The People's Regional Assembly in March 1981 
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took the matter very seriously and made the following resolution in one 
of its sessions. 36 
a. To appeal to the President of the Republic to show once again 
fairness and justice for the people of the Southern Region and to 
site the first refinery of Sudan's crude oil in Bentiu, where this 
crude was discovered, for this area needs more than Kosti needs every 
advantage such as an oil industry could offer in terms of jobs and 
development, and to quickly reverse the decision of the Central 
Minister of Energy and Mining taken under the influence of the Multi- 
national company, which cared very little about the interests and 
welfare of the people of this part of the country, and suspend any 
activity of the Chevron Company which tends to indicate the siting of 
the refinery at Kosti. 
b. Disapproves of the attitude of the Central Minister of Energy and 
Mining for deliberately ignoring the Regional Government of the 
Southern Region and violating without consultation with the Regional 
Government on an issue of such a vital interest to the people of 
Southern Sudan. 
c. Rejects the Partisan attitude of the Central Minister of Energy and 
Mining exhibited in the manner in which the decision to site the 
refinery at Kosti and not in Bentiu was and in the non-participation 
in the training and employment of southerners in this vital industry. 
d. Disapproves of the attitude of the Chevron Oil Company in blatantly 
and deliberately taking part or side in a politically motivated 
decision which clearly adversely affects the interest of the people 
of the Southern Region. 
In addition, several protests were staged by Southern Sudanese people all 
over the south and north. Several letters of protest were sent to the 
President of the Republic by Southern intellectuals and students. 
Seminars and symposiums were organized by southern students in both Juba 
and Khartoum Universities to discuss the refinery issue. 
The views of Southern Sudanese were clear and straightforward on the 
relocating of the refinery at Kosti. For them it could only hasten the 
already rapidly growing dissatisfaction in the Southern Region against 
the Northern Sudanese politicians and their supporters. For the Southern 
masses, the issue of the oil and refinery was a case of further 
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exploitation, oppressing and repression of Southern People which 
represent the core policy of the ruling northern Sudanese leaders. And 
that the plans in question were to deprive permanently the Southern Sudan 
in general and Bentiu area in particular, various economic benefits which 
the refinery would generate. For example, apart from providing jobs there 
would be the opportunity to train the necessary skills associated with 
the oil industry so that the employment problem would be reduced, while 
the growth of basic and the necessary infrastructure could only benefit 
an extremely backward area, such as the Southern Region. 37 
The discovery of oil in the South in a large commercial quantity had a 
political implication. For some Southerners, it was a relief that the 
false impression on the Northern public that Southern Sudan was an 
economic liability to the Northern would not be there. It will also 
correct the false impression about the south which had been considered 
only as a huge reservoir of unskilled labour or as an economic appendage 
of the north. 38 
In spite of all the opposition from the Southern Region mentioned above, 
the President of the Republic refused to change his policy or his Decree. 
The Government and the People's Regional Assembly had only two choices 
whether to reject or to accept the Presidential decree. If they accept 
the decree they will lose the confidence of the Southern people and if 
they reject the decree, then they will be forced by the President of the 
Republic to resign although such a provision was not there in the 
agreement. The Regional Government attempted to diffuse the crisis by 
suggesting to the President of the Republic that, while the Regional 
Government would accept the decree issued it would like to have the 
president of the 
4'epublic 
to establish a mobile refinery for the Southern 
Region fuel requirements, economic projects including modern roads, 
communications and schools in Bentiu area, which is one of the most 
backward district in the South. The Regional Government in turn had to 
convince the People's Regional Assembly and the Southern masses that it 
was in the interests of the Region to have a compromise with the 
President of the Republic who is seen as a friend of the Southern 
people. 39 The President of the HEC made the following announcement to the 
Southern people over Radio Juba: 
"In constitutional and executive terms, the President of the 
Republic is the final authority in this matter.... The role of 
the Regional Assembly and Government is to persuade him to 
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adopt the recommendation they make as his decision. But if he 
does not accept our appeal, we should abide by the decision, 
however, disappointed we may feel. "40 
The Regional Government called upon the Southern people to accept the 
President's decision in the interest of peace and unity. So the southern 
Sudanese people were humiliated and cheated again by the Northern 
leaders. The President of the Republic accepted the decision of the 
Regional Government and also accepted the request made therein. So the 
President of the Republic issued a decree creating a one million Sudanese 
Pound project in Bentiu to start immediately and also it was stated that 
mobile refinery will be established in Bentiu as requested. Until the 
eruption of the Second Civil War ie. after three years later on and until 
the time of writing this thesis, no project was begun and anger and 
dissatisfaction continued to rise gradually and some rapidly until the 
War. 
8. The Unconstitutional Dissolution of HEC and People's 
Regional Assembly 
----------------------------------------------------- 
According to the Agreement the President of the Republic can neither 
appoint nor relieve the President of the HEC of his office as stated in 
Article 18,1972, Regional Act. 41 The President of the Republic had no 
legal authority to dissolve the People's Regional Assembly in the 
Southern Region because it is not answerable to any authority but the 
Southern Sudanese electorates. While the President of the HEC and his 
ministers were answerable to both the People's Regional Assembly and the 
President of the Republic and that would mean that both authorities have 
the power to relieve the HEC. 
The President's decision in 1980,1981 and 1983 to dissolve both the HEC 
and the People's Regional Assembly was unconstitutional and was therefore 
illegal. It is important to point out that the President of the Republic 
was able to carry out some of his illegal decisions and violations 
against the Agreement with some help from certain Southern politicians 
usually nicknamed as "stooges", "traitors" or "opportunists", who have 
made Southern Sudanese politicians divided and to be easily ruled by the 
Arab oriented national group. 42 In reality these illegal decisions to 
dissolve the Southern Regional Government and Assembly were opposed by 
"n 
the majority of Southern Sudanese while the minority who has been the 
benefactors bas continued to support the sectarian leaders, in spite of 
public opposition. 
423 
The 'divide and rule' policies used by President Nimiere were quite 
successful in the south to the extent that some prominent southern 
leaders including the former leaders of the Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement and Anya-nya and also those of Mr. Abel Alier who had 
represented the central government during the Addis Ababa Agreement. For 
example, Mr. Abel Alier accepted the violation of the Agreement in 1974, 
when Nimiere interfered with Southern leadership selection by declaring 
Abel as the sole candidate, a decision which was not rejected by the 
supposed defender of the Agreement. Similarly in 1980, Mr. Abel's group 
persuaded President Nimiere to dissolve the HEC under retired Lt. Gen. 
Joseph Lago and the People's Regional Assembly because they felt that 
Lago had unconstitutionally removed the speaker and deputies of the 
People's Regional Assembly in 1979. The Southern leaders again accepted 
the violation of the Agreement. 
The same could be said of the Anya-nya leaders, specially Lt. Gen. Joseph 
Lago who kept quiet when Nimiere violated the Agreement several times, 
specially when ex-Any-nya officers and soldiers were forced to integrate 
with northern or even when several Anya-nya officers were dismissed, 
without any public protest by Lago. Similarly, Gen. Lago was involved in 
the 1981 Nimiere's decision to dissolve illegally both HEC and the 
People's Regional Assembly, without any protest. Lago and his group were 
involved in the dissolution of Addis Ababa Agreement when it supported 
the division of the Southern Region into three separate administrative 
regions without any major protest among the former SSLM/Anya-nya leaders 
among most Equatorians. 43 
It is true to say that most Southern Sudanese were equally opposed to the 
above mentioned dissolutions of both Regional Government and Assembly and 
had equally contributed to the worsening relations between Southerner and 
Northern Sudanese rulers in the Sudan and which in the author's opinion 
contributed to the emergence of the Second Civil War in the Sudan. 
It should be noted that by the end of 1981, the Anya-nya II forces were 
operating in Eastern Upper Province. It was also the period in which 
Anya-nya II leaders were lucky to get into the Southern Region 
Administration, for example, Samuel Gai Tut became a Minister of Wildlife 
and Lt. Col. John Kuony as the Commissioner of Jonglei Province and were 
not only the main supporters of the movement but the ringleaders, of the 
movement. Both leaders were arrested in 1982, when they were caught 
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supplying the Anya-nya forces with guns and ammunitions of all kinds. 
The arrest of a Regional Minister of Wildlife and Commissioner of Jonglei 
Province made everyone aware that the possibility of a full civil war was 
imminent unless the Central Government had to solve those most urgent 
factors which were encouraging the growth of the crisis. The Anya-nya II 
was based on the support of former Anya-nya soldiers and officers mainly 
from Upper Nile Province until the beginning of 1983. The supporters of 
Anya-nya II claimed that "Addis Ababa Agreement was a fraud intended to 
blindfold the Anya-nya armed forces to lay down their weapons. "26 And 
that the trust which was promised by the spirit of the Agreement was not 
achieved. This failure has led to distrust and no confidence which were 
responsible for various mutinies in Akobo, Awiel, Juba Airport, Rumbek, 
Kapoeta and Bor respectively. These incidents were indeed expression of 
people's aspirations for justice, equality and democracy, which has 
continued to be denied to them. 44 
The Anya-nya II 2nd Political Manifesto of 1986 stated among other things 
that the organization was fighting for a just system of government, which 
it named as federal, based on liberal democracy with free enterprise and 
also with policy of welfare state. The movement hopes to solve 'the south 
problem' through dialogue ending in another Agreement with whom was not 
stated. How will the federal system mentioned as the ideal system which 
end the backwardness and uneven development was not quite clear. It was 
not also clear whether the movement will be representative of the current 
three Southern Sudan Regions of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile 
or only one region and on what basis was not made clear. Another point 
not made clear was the conditions under which the objectives, policies 
and programmes of the Movement will be implemented. As we shall attempt 
to show in the next sub-section it suffices to say that SSLM/Anya-nya 
failed to achieve any of its objectives until its disintegration in 1988. 
Furthermore after the death of Samuel Goi Tut and Akual Atem, the 
Movement became a Sudan Government Militia fighting alongside Government 
troops. The events which led to the Movement's disintegration will be 
discussed in the next sub-section on the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement and Sudan people's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA). 
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8.3 The Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation 
Army (SPLM/SPLA) 
8.3.1 The Origin and the Formation of Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
and Sudan People's Liberation Army 
The Sudan People's Liberation Army came into being on 16th May 1983, 
after the 105 Battalion of the former Anya-nya I forces (which were 
absorbed) in the Sudan Army and stationed in Bor, Capital of Jonglei 
Province, Southern Region, was attacked by Sudanese troops dispatched 
from Khartoum to disarm the troops in Bor, Pachella and Pibor. These had 
refused to be transferred to Northern Sudan early in January, and were 
forced to defect into the bush after bloody fighting. The 105 Battalion 
and the garrisons in Pochella and Pibor were under the overall command of 
Major Karbino Kuanyin who led the mutiny against the Northern-Sudan based 
army. They were soon joined by Lt. Col. John Garang de Mabior who was 'on 
leave in Bor, at the time of crisis and Major William Nyuon with his 
forces from Ayod Military Garrison. They were joined by defections of 
other Southern units of soldiers, police, prison warders wildlife guards 
and other civilians who were supporting the Southern soldiers. All the 
defectors brought with them their weapons, including rifles, machine 
guns, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and even two tanks. Amongst the 
officers who defected emerged Lt. Col. John Garang de Mabior as the 
leader of the group which later named itself as the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army. The defectors were able to have direct contacts with 
Anya-nya II Forces which had been operating in Awiel, and Amath in 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Maban, Pibor and Pochella in Upper Nile. 45 
The causes of the mutiny in Bor were numerous which had led to the 
emergence of Anya-nya I and II, and many other political movements, some 
of which have already been dealt with above. There had already been 
several mutinies which included Cap. Alfred Aguet's led mutiny which was 
equally a fight against injustice and the deliberate violation of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement, specially the provision on the military aspect. 
The death of Brig. Emmanuel Abur and Lt. Col. Gabriel Makoi as a result 
of Aguet mutiny in 1981 was a great cause of bitterness for both the ex- 
Anya-nya forces and politicians against the Nimiere Regime, which was 
accused of having created the conditions which precipitated the mutiny. 46 
It is to be noted that the years from 1980 to 1983 were years of crises 
in the Southern Sudan. For example, apart from the border, and the 
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refinery crisis already mentioned above, there were three other important 
issues which equally encouraged most Southern Sudanese to join the anti- 
central Government political groups in the South. These three issues may 
be summarized under the following headings: 
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1. The continuous attempts to dismantle the Southern units within the 
Southern command; 
2. The policies of redivision of the Southern Region illegally; 
3. The adaptation of most repressive policies and the unconstitutional 
imposition of Islamic Sharia laws which were taking place. 
1. The Continuous attempts to dismantle the Southern Units 
within the Southern command 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
In 1981, Major General Sadieq al Bana was transferred to the Southern 
Region as a commanding officer to the Southern Command which was composed 
of 15 battalion of which six of them were composed of former Anya-nya I 
Forces while the remaining 9 were composed of Northern and other 
Sudanese. The Southern battalions were distributed as follows: 
104 battalion for Naser, 105 for Bor, 110 for Juba and 117 for Kapoeta. 
General al Bana came to the Southern Region with specific programmes of 
the central government to implement. One important part of the General 
Mission was the final dismantling of the six battalions of former Anya- 
nya I, after having transferred outside the Southern. According to 
"Chapter six, Section c" of the SPLM manifesto, entitled "The Military 
Dismantling of the Addis Ababa Agreement and ensuing Military crisis" 
described what was planned as follows: 
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"Transfer to the North of the 6,000 absorbed Anya-nya I 
battalions and their planned eventual liquidation in Northern 
Sudan. The plan envisaged the transfer of three battalions 
during 1982/83 and the remaining battalions in 1983/84. The 
first transfer included Battalions 105.110 and 117. Battalion 
110 (Awiel) has all been transferred except for its support 
company that is still resisting in Malut. Battalion 117 
(Kapoeta) is still resisting transfer except for one company. 
Battalion 105 (Bor) resisted and planned to capture Juba 
before their transfer could be implemented. The second 
transfer for 1983/84 to involve Battalions 104 (Nasir), 111 
(Rumbek) and 116 (Juba). " 
and the manifesto went on to say, 
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"The above attempts by the repressive minority clique regime in 
Khartoum to dismantle the Addis Agreement on the military side 
were used by prominent absorbed Anya-nya I officers as a basis 
to organize two contingency plans within the Sudanese Army. 
(a) The first plan was to attack and capture Juba capital of 
the Southern Region. This plan was to be executed by Battalion 
105 with reinforcement from Torit and Kapeota and from Anya-nya 
II who were to assemble near Ayod and Pachalla. A Socialist 
Government was to be established in Juba and measures taken to 
assist in transforming the situation in Khartoum. 
(b) The second plan in the event that Khartoum attacked first 
displacing and dislodging Battalions 105 and 104 from their 
bases, was to regroup and reorganize to wage a protracted armed 
struggle for the total liberation of the Sudan. It is the 
second plan that has become necessary. Khartoum attacked Bor 
and Pibor Garrisons on 16/5/83 and later the Ayod Garrison 
attacked Khartoum forces that were sent to arrest the 
commander. " 
It should be stated here that the above quoted passages carried a lot of 
truth as far as the Author is concerned. The author was still in the HEC 
Secretariat General as Assistant Secretary General for political and 
economic affairs and was involved in accompanying the President of High 
Executive Council to those districts where there were crisis due to the 
mutiny. For example, in 1980,1981,1982 and 1983, the author accompanied 
the President of HEC on his fact finding visits to Wau, Awiel, Malut, 
Malakal, Rumbek, Kapoeta, Torit and Bor which he had meetings with both 
officers and men of the Southern Command in these garrisons mentioned 
above which were attended by the author who took the minutes of the said 
meetings on behalf of the Secretariat General of HEC. 
As was made very clear by the Commanding Officer of the Southern Command 
who accompanied the President of the HEC and spoke as a representative of 
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in Sudan, who also the 
President of the Republic, the transfer of former Anya-nya I forces 
(absorbed into National Army) to Northern Sudan was a Central Government 
decision which was not subject to any regional government acceptance 
specially after five years. 50 The decision to transfer all battalions of 
the former Anya-nya I forces to Northern Sudan was also a military one 
which could not be questioned by Southern politicians by officers and men 
of the Southern units. The first Battalion which was ordered to leave for 
the North was Battalion 110 whose members mutinied early in 1981 and 
returned to base only after its commander had killed his two senior 
officers for reasons not made available to the public until now, and has 
therefore been shaken by that incident and through pressure from local 
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leaders employed by the Central Government totconvince the soldiers who 
had no senior officers from-within'the battalion and was persuaded to go 
to Khartoum, with minor incidents. The second battalion ordered was 117 
and 105 but both refused to leave their garrisons to be deployed in any 
part of the south. Attempts by the President of HEC and the People's 
Regional Assembly to persuade the commanders of both battalions was 
without success. The President of HEC accompanied by the Commanding 
Officer and the members of the Regional Assembly and the author flew to 
Kapoeta in September 1982 and had a long meeting with officers and men of 
117 Battalion where they accused the Regional Government of collaboration 
and siding with those who were against the South. They also accused the 
Central Government and Gen. Al Bana, the Commanding Officer of Southern 
Command of violating the Addis Accord. 51 The Commanding Officer in turn 
accused the officers and men of Southern Sudan Battalions, and specially 
those of Kapoeta and Bor of mutiny, which he said would be punished 
severely if they continued to reject orders. 
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The Commanding Officer made all kinds of attempts to resume order, 
including bribery, blackmail and threats of court martial, but these were 
to no avail. For example, Major Kerubino KVanyin was accused of 
corruption, embezzlement of public funds and misuse of military 
cooperative society's funds etc. Another means used was the refusal of 
Juba to release salaries for more than three months to 105 Battalion in 
order to create division within the garrison, especially against the 
officers, but all failed to persuade major Kuanyin to change his mind. 
General al Bana did not stop there. He arranged to have Major Kerubino 
murdered by his military intelligence in November 1982, which failed and 
subsequently led to the death of one of the members of military 
intelligence sent to murder him. 
In January 1983, General Al Bana sent 150 Northern troops to replace the 
105 battalion, in Bor and those troops in Pachalla and Pibor garrisons, 
but the Commanders of these garrisons refused to leave their respective 
areas. The Commander of the Northern troops, Lt. Col. 
Oman 
Mustafa though 
senior in rank to Kerubina, could not persuade him to change his mind and 
instead of declaring war, he decided to set up a new military camp nearly 
five miles away from where Major Kerubino and his troops were staying and 
the two forces stayed in Bor for five months without any conflict, and in 
May Lt. Col. Osman's troops did not take part in the fight between the 
105 Battalion and the new group sent from Khartoum. 
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A final attempt to persuade Kerubino and his troops to go to the North 
was made in March 1983, when both Central and Regional Government 
selected some members of the People's Regional Assembly, some regional 
ministers and some army officers specially from the Dinka tribe and who 
were personally assumed to know major Kerubino were sent to Bor by Mr. 
James Joseph Tumbura, the President of HEC, to persuade the major and his 
men to transfer out of Bor, but it all ended in failure. Among those who 
were sent to Major Kuanyin included Lt. Col. John Garang de Mabior, Major 
Arok Thon and Major William Nyuon who later joined the rebellion after 
Major Kuanyin and his soldiers defected into the bush after they were 
attacked on 16th May 1983 by the Khartoum Army. 53 
The Commanding Officer of Southern command and the President of the 
Republic had very little influence in Southern Sudan at that time of 
crisis. Their only supporters were mainly re-divisionist group, mainly 
from Equatoria who had no influence over Major Kerubino Kkanyin and the 
President of the HEC, who himself a pro-divisionist was hopeless and 
confused. The majority of southern Sudanese were angered by the arrest of 
several southern Sudanese politicians who were opposed to the President's 
policies of redividing the Southern Region without the usual means laid 
down in the constitution. The Central Government decision to sign the 
Charter of Integration between Sudan and Egypt, the siting of oil 
refinery at Kosti, the realization that division of Southern Region into 
three was imminent, and the forced transfer of Southern Battalions to the 
North, combined to focus once again violent readiness of Southern 
Sudanese to face, what was considered to be Arab aggression on the people 
of the South. Consequently, demonstrations spread all over Bahr al Ghazal 
and Upper Nile Provinces. In Bahr el Ghazal, the Sudan Socialist Union 
offices were set on fire. The same took place in Rumbek, Awiel and 
Gagrial and in Upper Nile. The Police saved the SSU Offices which were 
narrowly set on fire, and in Juba the Vice President of the HEC. Mr. Dhol 
AcUXtl and the Speaker of the People's Regional Assembly were arrested 
following their open opposition to the President of the Republic on his 
policies and specially on division of the south. In addition, the 
activities of Anya-nya II were tremendously increased in Northern, Bahr, 
el Ghazal, where 13 Northern traders were killed, in Abeyi District, the 
traditional permanent civil war between the Arab tribes and the NgO( 
Dinka erupted into war, and in Maban and Malut Arab farmers and traders 
were attacked, killing eight of them. 
In the heat of all these crises the central government or the commander 
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in chief of the armed forces (the President of the Republic), his Defence 
Minister and the Commanding Officer of Southern Command decided to crush 
the 105 Battalion forcefully, and on 15 May 1983, any' estimated 2000 
soldiers, in over 30 Magerius (Lorries), full of soldiers, 11 tanks 
(armoured cars) and 20 commandeered private lorries to carry food and 
more soldiers-- attacked the Bor 105 Battalion, numbering only 80 
(without armoured cars etc. ) forcing major Kerubino Kvanyin to withdraw 
into the bush, after being shot in the arm The garrisons at Pibibr, 
Pachalla and Ayod immediately defected into the bush also, to avoid being 
attacked. No exact casualty figures from both sides have ever been made 
available to the public. What was known, was that the commander of the 
Government forces who led the attack was confirmed killed and several 
others on both sides were killed, and many were indeed wounded. 
The public reaction to this attack was as usual divided. For example, in 
the Southern Region, where the issue of redivision had caused the people 
to separate into the pro-divisionist group, who supported the central 
government and were for division, and the anti-redivisionist group, who 
formed the majority, view (and encompassed most of the population of 
Southern Region) that this was a war against the Addis Ababa Agreement. 55 
The dominant Northern Sudanese Sectarian leaders supported the central 
government on its policy to crush the rebels in Southern Sudan. But the 
attack was opposed by Lt. Gen. Abu Kadok (Chief of Military Operations) 
and Lt. Gen. Yusuf Ahmed Yusuf (responsible for Military Administration) 
and they tendered their resignations following the fiasco. These were 
accepted by the President. For those who were generally opposed to 
Nimiere in Northern Sudan, the attack was acceptable as long as it 
created new enemies of the dictator. 56 
The Southern Sudanese in the army were divided in the same way that the 
politicians were. For example, some Equatorians in 105 Battalion and 
members of the Fqrfit tribe supported the division of the South, and were 
secretly opposed to their commander, Major Kuanyin, until the time of the 
attack. During the fighting they deserted and fled to Juba. On their way, 
the Equatorians in 105 Battalion met Northern troops who killed some at 
once; others were arrested and brought to Juba and subjected to severe 
torture and others were humiliated, abused, and their clothes were torn 
from them and they were forced to walk to Juba naked. 57 
On the other hand, there were mass desertions throughout various military 
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garrisons in Southern Region, notably Torit Kapoeta, Nasir, Malakal, 
Malut. This ultimately led to a mutiny in Rumbek and these soldiers and 
officers went into the bush, taking all their guns and ammunition, 
joining up with those of 105 Battalion under the command of Major 
Karubino and Major William Nyuon forming a large force under the name of 
Sudan People's Liberation Army under the command of Lt. Col. John Garang 
de Mabior and Major Kerubino. 
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As a result, Southern politicians who fled to the bush after the Bor 
incident, veteran politicians (like Joseph Udoho, Clement Nmoboro, Martin 
Majir, Dr. Justin Yac, Dhol Aciul, Matthew Ubur, Lual Ding and Benjamin 
Bol), conferred and formed a political wing to be known as Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement. Seven committees were formed, the first being the 
Military High Command under John Garang with Major Kerubino Kuanyin as 
his deputy, and Major William Nyuon as Chief of Staff. The Offices of 
foreign and political affairs were taken by Joseph. Martin Majir was 
given Legal Affairs, Dr. Justin Yac was given Finance, Services and 
Relief, Dhal Acuil was given the position of Deputy Chairman of Social 
Services and Relief. Information Affairs was offered to Matthew Ubor who 
turned it down. 
The number of SPLA forces gradually increased after President Nimiere 
decreed (on 5th June 1983) the redivision of Southern Sudan into smaller 
regions. Several thousand southerners were expelled from Khartoum, under 
"Kash", and some political leaders were arrested in the south. Finally, 
the introduction of Islamic Sharia laws was imposed on the whole country, 
causing thousands of students and young men from the villages to flee to 
the bush to join the new Movement. 
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After having received all these volunteers, Lt. Col. Garang Mabior 
contacted both Samuel Gei Tut and Akuot Atem, leaders of Anya-nya to come 
together in order to form one political and military organization under 
one leadership to be selected by the three groups. But unfortunately no 
agreement was reached between Anya-nya and SPLA which had greater support 
than SSLF and in July. the leaders of SPLM/SPLA agreed their first 
political manifesto in which the objectives, the structure of both the 
political and military set up were laid down. 
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The manifesto defines 
both SPLM and SPLA. SPLM was described as a national progressive 
liberation movement led by revolutionaries who were dedicated to the 
socialist transformation of the whole country. 
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"The Sudan People's Liberation Movement shall have an armed 
component to be known as "The Sudan People's Liberation Army" 
Both organizations were run by one executive body known as the Politico 
Military High Command of the SPLA/SPLM. 
8.3.2 The Objectives and Political Ideology of SPLM/SPLA 
The creation of a new Sudan is one of the central themes of SPLM/SPLA 
ideology, objectives and programmes. The Movement has spelt out its 
objectives, ideology and programmes in its political manifesto, Letter of 
Appeal, addressed to the Sudanese people on the founding of the SPLM/SPLA 
in July 1983. The Movement describes itself as a socialist revolutionary 
liberation movement committed to the transformation of the whole country, 
including socio-economic and political systems currently under the 
sectarian despotic rule. 
In its political manifesto the Movement laid down the strategy for 
development, expansion and the transformation of Sudanese political 
movements in general and Southern Sudan in particular into a (united) 
genuine liberation movement. This strategy is summarized as follows: 
(1) SPLM/SPLA to recruit large number of Southerners from all over 
Southern regions; 
(2) To win over supporters from a variety of southern political 
opposition groups including the National Action Movement (NAM), 
Movement for Total Liberation of South Sudan (MTLSS), Equatoria 
Central Committee (for re-division)(ECC), Council for Southern 
Sudan (CUSS), the Congress of New Forces (CNF) which included the 
Fur, Nuba Beja, the Union of Southern and Northern Funj and 
Ingesna, former Anya-nya I officers and soldiers and Anya-nya II; 
(3) To give proper political and military training for all recruits under 
the aims, objectives and ideology of the Movement; 
(4) To transform all the fighting forces into a socialist revolutionary 
group committed to national unity, nation-building on the basis of 
the Movement's philosophy; 
(5) Politicization. organization and militarisation of the peasantry 
within the liberated areas and assign revolutionary commanders to 
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supervise them; 
(6) Contacting all opposition groups in both north and south, specially 
intelligentsia and trades unions with the view to forming a united 
front with these groups, provided that the leadership of such fronts 
remains armed and progressive. 
It should be noted that the SPLM/SPLA leadership after establishing its 
political and military infrastructure, spelt out its ideology, and 
objectives throughout 1983-1990 using various means including the 
political programme of action, press releases, conferences, interviews, 
policy statements, books etc. which have been made public so far. The 
most prominent objectives of the SPLM/SPLA may be summarized thus: 
Firstly, the SPLM/SPLA had to organize all Southern Sudanese Liberation 
and political movements and transform them from separatist regional 
movements with reactionary leadership to a united socialist national 
liberation movement, which would be engaged in a protracted armed 
struggle against the forces of the 'old Sudan' until its regime's forces 
are violently overthrown and the entire system of government, political 
and economic institutions are abolished and a socialist democratic 
revolutionary government established in the 'New Sudan'. The movement 
maintains a second option, and that is a peaceful solution to be agreed 
between the Movement and its allies, and those of 'old Sudan' on the 
other, provided that the present regime agrees to dissolve itself, 
including the national army, judiciary, police and the entire old state 
apparatus, in order to reorganize and restructure the political and 
economic institutions, so that all nationalities be represented, that is 
to say, the main objectives of the Movement are achieved through peaceful 
means. 62 
Secondly, the Movement is committed to liberate all Sudanese people under 
oppression, slavery and exploitation, regardless of their region, 
religion, race or ideology; to abolish all kinds of injustice, 
inequalities, dependencies, sectarianism, clientilism, patronage etc.; to 
provide a consistent social democratic solution to the nationality and 
religious questions which have contributed to the crises in the country; 
and finally, to establish a federal socialist state, according autonomous 
status to the various regions within the context of a United Democratic 
Socialist Sudan, where all races will live equally as Sudanese, and where 
everyone will enjoy freedom of worship, equal human rights and justice. 63 
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As regards to the question why the Movement for the whole Sudan 
originated and is led by a Southern Sudanese, the chairman and commander- 
in-chief of the SPLM/SPLA, Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior in his first 
official appeal to the Sudanese people in March 1984, made the following 
statement: 64 
"The burden and incidence of neglect and oppression by successive 
Khartoum clique regimes has traditionally fallen more on the 
South than on the other parts of the country. Under these 
circumstances, the marginal cost of rebellion in the south 
became very small, zero or negative, that is in the South it 
pays to rebel. " 
He went on to say: 
".... It is clear and natural that a vanguard movement for the 
liberation of the whole Sudanese people had to have its origins 
in Southern Sudan. Any armed struggle must have as its point of 
departure the immediate and genuine needs and demands of the 
masses of the people. "65 
The SPLM/SPLA leadership has managed to live up to its objectives and 
principles, regardless of the difficulties, by gaining not only the 
support but the recruitment of non-southerners from all over the Sudan, 
among the leadership of the movement, among the officers, and among the 
general fighting men. For example, in the political military High 
Command, there is Commander Yusuf Kawah from Nuba Mountains as a member, 
together with Dr. Mansuor Khalid (from Khartoum Province) as adviser to 
the Chairman and Commander in Chief. There is also the alternate 
Commander, Yasir Arahman of Gezira as adviser to the SPLM/SPLA leader. 
Among the leading commanders are found non-Southerners commanding 
battalions. For example, Commander Yusuf Kawa commands the Rahat 
(Lightening) Battalion, composed mainly of citizens from the Nuba 
Mountains. Another example comes from the Northern and Southern Funj 
where Commander Abu Lela Jima Adam from Kurmuk who is now responsible for 
training SPLA soldiers and has commanded different battalions or SPLA. 
When Kurmuk, Gessan and others were captured, he became commander and 
chairman of Southern and Northern Administration areas. In addition, 
there are several alternative commanders from Western, Northern and Funj 
areas among the SPLA officers who were either capture by SPLA forces or 
voluntarily joined the movement. 
Although it is not easy to say with certainty how many Northern Sudanese 
Officers and men are in SPLA/SPLM, the author was given the rough number 
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of 6 commanders, 15 alternate commanders, with 5000 men distributed in 
various battalions. 
The SPLM/SPLA in its attempts to win over supporters had to make public 
its political and socio-economic programme of action, which are directed 
towards the oppressed and exploited poor, from various area, specially in 
the less developed regions. The notional programme of action is: 66 
"1. We are committed to the liberation of the whole of 
Sudan and to maintenance of unity of its people and its 
territorial integrity. 
2. We are committed to the establishment of a new and democratic 
Sudan in which equality, freedom, economic and social justice 
and respect for human rights are no mere slogans but concrete 
realities we should promote cherish and protect. 
3. We are committed to solving the nationalities and religious 
questions to the satisfaction of all Sudanese people and within 
the democratic and secular context and in accordance with the 
objective realities of our country. 
4. We stand for genuine autonomous or federal governments for 
the various regions of the Sudan, a form of regionalism that 
will enable the masses, not the regional elites, to exercise 
real power for economic and social development of their 
cultures. 
5. We are committed to a radical restructuring of the power of 
the central government in a manner that will end, once and for 
all, the monopoly of power by any group of self-seeking 
individuals whatever their background, whether they come in 
the 'uniform or political parties, family, dynasties, religious 
sects or army officers. ' 
6. We firmly stand to put an end to the circumstances and 
policies that have led to the present uneven development of 
Sudan, a state of affairs in which vast regions of the east, 
south, west and far north find themselves as undeveloped 
peripheries to the relatively developed central regions of our 
country. 
7. We are committed to fighting racism which various minority 
regimes have found useful to institutionalize and that has 
often been reflected in various forms and colours, such as the 
apartheid-like "Kasha" a policy under which many poor and 
unemployed have been forcibly driven en masse to their regions 
or origin mainly Western and Southern parts of the country, for 
the simple reason that they do not 'belong' to Khartoum which 
the ruling clique think is their home along and not all the 
Sudanese people. 
8. We are dedicated to the eradication of 'tribalism' 
sectionalism and provincialism, which have of late been fanned 
by the regime and self-seeking politicians to divide and weaken 
the Sudanese struggle. " 
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This passage constitutes a great challenge to the sectarian bourgeois, 
which could not longer accuse the SPLM/SPLA of being anti-Arab and anti- 
Islam, or being separatist for the Movement accepts Islam and Arabic as 
it does other religions and languages, to be part of the Sudanese 
historical heritage and of value. The fact that all Sudanese Muslims, 
Westerners, Easterners, Northerners, Christians, Arabs and Africans were 
all suffering made the SPLM/SPLA to accuse the ruling sectarian elites as 
enemies of the people. Here the movement has managed to disarm the ruling 
national grouping with most of its political slogans and they have again 
shifted to new accusations, such as 'communist' and 'anti' Islam which 
has been rejected by SPLM/SPLA leaders. The ideology of the SPLM/SPLA is 
socialist but the dominant sectarian parties have accused the movement of 
being Marxist and opposed to religious ideas. In general, the movement 
accepts being socialist and adopts the concept of class as the basis of 
its socio-economic and political ideology. As to the content of the 
SPLM/SPLA's socialism, Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the Chairman and 
Commander in Chief of SPLA/SPLM made the following comments; 
"The content of our socialism cannot be determined mechanically and 
equated with communism as Nimiere would like the Western world to 
believe. The concretization and particularization of socialism in Sudan 
shall unfold as the armed struggle and as socio-economic development 
programmes are implemented during and after the war and according to 
Sudanese local and objective conditions. "67 
The adaptations of the concept of class by SPLM/SPLA marked a new 
dimension in the main stream of Sudanese politics, which used to be 
analysed and described only in terms of race, religion or cultural 
differences, between Africans and Arabs, Southerners and Northerners, 
Muslims and Christians or pagans, Nilotics and Equatorians, Fur and 
Razeigat etc. It marked a significant department from sectarian and 
bourgeois approach to Sudanese politics. Consequently, SPLM/SPLA was 
accused of being a communist movement supported by communist countries 
which are said to be enemies of Islam and the Muslim world. This 
accusation and many others have been dismissed by the SPLM/SPLA leaders 
as fallacious assumptions without any basis. The Movement has maintained 
that their socialist ideology is base don special Sudanese conditions and 
has nothing to do with Marxism. 
In order to transform those officers and men who join the movement into 
socialist revolutionary forces, the movement has established a political 
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military school, a radio and a newsletter for ideological orientation to 
fit the concept of 'New Sudan'. In the political military school, based 
on the Ethiopian border, the following subjects are taught; Ancient and 
modern history of Sudan, Sudanese political economy and geography, 
socialist principles including the concept of class struggle, the 
objectives and ideology of the movement, including the type of system of 
government which the movement will establish after the victory, the 
guerrilla warfare and its effects, the role of foreign powers in the 
current political violence in the country, and a study of selected civil 
wars in Africa and Latin America, plus military training in all its 
aspects. The length of the course is 9 months for non-graduates and non- 
trained military officers, while it is 6 months for graduates of 
university and military college. 68 
The SPLM/SPLA radio is a part of the propaganda weapon of the Movement 
and it demonstrates and clarifies the commitment of the Movement to its 
objectives and ideology. For example, the news, comments and political 
statements or press released are made in various languages, including 
Arabic, English, Nuer, Baria, Shilluk, Zande, Latuka, Dinka, Kariesh. 
This shows the various nationalities which would be able to participate 
in the New Sudan Government, participating in decision making such as 
never happened in the 'Old Sudan'. It meant also that all Sudanese 
nationalities, their cultures, religions and their politico-economic 
interests would be given the same importance. It also meant that the 
concept of unity in diversity would become fully operational. The 
importance of the concept of 'Unity in Diversity' to the movement stems 
from the fact that various nationalities in a multi-racial, multi- 
religious, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic society can co-exist- 
peacefully through equal respect and genuine acceptance of each others' 
values. 69 
The other important aspects of SPLM/SPLA ideology include the national 
flag, whose colours are defined in certain ideological terms, ie. 
describing ideas, values or beliefs which each colour on the flag 
represents. There are five colours, black, red, gree, white and blue 
with a red star on it. See Appendix no. 16 for a description of the 
flag. 7° 
The national anthem, war songs or revolutionary songs, military titles, 
names of various battalions and code of honour are also basic to the 
ideology of SPLM/SPLA. 
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Although the movement is still in a state of transition, it is in place 
here, to state that it has been able to achieve so much during the 7 
years of its life, compared with Anya-nya I which could not carry out in 
ten years a quarter of what SPLA has achieved already. For example, the 
Movement was able to capture four provincial towns (ie. Rumbek, Bor, 
Torit, and Nasir) and a dozen districts - Yirol, Akobo, Kapoeta, Munderi, 
Ayod, Pachalla, Numile, Kaj-Kaje, Mayom, Kurmuk, Gessan, Akon, Talodi - 
and several military posts in Southern and Northern Funj, Nuba Mountains 
and Southern Sudan which are known as Zone one, referring to the South, 
while zone two refers to northern regions. 
Similarly, SPLM/SPLA has been able to dismantle various separatist 
organizations or movements in the south, which include the Southern Sudan 
Patriotic Front, the Movement for Total Liberation of Southern Sudan and 
Anya-nya II. Of course, the cost of dismantling these movements, 
specially Anya-nya II has been very high indeed. For instance, Anya-nya 
II leaders were violently eliminated by SPLM/SPLA, apart-from-several 
thousands of lives lost on both sides. The Anya-nya II leaders were 
defeated in their attempt to join government forces as. a so- called 
friendly force, and became a bottle-neck for the progress of SPLA/SPLM 
until most of its leaders joined the movement in 1987.71 It is to be 
noted that a few Anya-nya II forces are still fighting alongside 
government soldiers. 
Finally the movement was able to achieve some very important objectives 
in relation to its ideology and national integration and national unity. 
one important aspect of SPLM/SPLA success has been the establishment of a 
legal code of justice, known as 'Penal and Disciplinary Laws of the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)' covering all kinds of crime in the 
liberated areas. The implementation or application of these laws clearly 
shows the extent to which justice and human rights are respected by the 
Movement. Furthermore, the movement has managed to unite both non- 
socialist and socialist Sudanese in general and southern Sudanese in 
particular against the various Khartoum regimes. The Movement has also 
brought together southern unionists and separatists under the banner of 
SPLM/SPLA. The Chairman and Commander in Chief has told the Sudanese 
people in various radio announcements and interviews that all oppressed 
and exploited Sudanese regardless of their race, religion, region and 
ideology should unit against all injustice, inequality, corruption, 
racism, nepotism etc. being committed by the Khartoum regime. The 
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Chairman and commander in chief told Southerners, separatists and non- 
socialists that there is a common goal which brings all the oppressed and 
exploited together, that is love of freedom, equality and justice in 
Sudan for all. If these are achieved, the need for separatism, war or 
political violence will cease to exist. And all Sudanese people - Arab 
and Africans, Muslim and Christians, can manage to live together in 
peace. 72 
8.3.3 The Structure, Organization and Leadership of SPLM/SPLA 
The structure, organization and leadership of SPLM/SPLA have been 
subjected to various changes since it was established 7 years ago. These 
changes have been necessitated by various policies and strategies which 
the movement has adopted from time to time. These changes are seen as 
normal, specially when the liberation has not yet been completed. 
In August 1983 when the SPLM/SPLA was established, there were only two 
organizations, namely the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
composed of 6 committees under the chairmanship of civilians. The second 
organization is the Sudan People's Liberation Army, which is a military 
wing of the SPLM. Both the SPLM and the SPLA are under one leadership - 
Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior who was elected by officers and men who 
began the rebellion in Bor, Pachella Ayod and Malakal in 1983. The SPLM 
committees include the Executive Committee, Central Committee (the 
highest bodies of the Movement, followed by the Foreign and Political 
Affairs Committee, the Administrative and Legal Affairs Committee, 
Financial and Economic Committee, Information and Radio, Relief and 
Rehabilitation Committee and the London based Committee all of which were 
answerable to the Chairman of the SPLM and the Commander in chief of 
SPLA. 73 
The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was basically under the 
Military High Command as the highest body which was made up of five 
permanent members, which include the chairman and commander in chief, his 
deputy as second in command. The third is the Chief of Staff, his deputy, 
the fourth is also chief of Administration and the fifth member is the 
Chief of Operational Intelligence and Logistics. The Military High 
Command which was given the lead to conduct the liberation war, by the 
SPLM Executive and Central Committees became prominent. At this period, 
there was a degree of autonomy in each organization until March 1984 when 
the movement was reorganized again. Figure I shows the structures of the 
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SPLM and SPLA in 1983 before the reorganization. The Chairman and 
Commander in chief, who is the highest authority of the movement is 
responsible for the formation of various committees and appointment of 
members and chairmen and commanders of committees and military units. The 
Chairman and Commander in chief of the SPLM/SPLA established SPLM 
branches in London, Nairobi and Addis Ababa to manage foreign relations 
in these capitals. 
In July 1984 the Chairman and Commander in chief, in consultation with 
members of his Executive Committee, Central Committee and Chairmen of 
various committees and permanent members of SPLA High Command decided to 
merge all the committees into one Military-Political High Command, 
although both SPLM and SPLA continue to be used as if they were 
structurally and hierarchically separated and autonomous. After the 
merger of the two, the leadership of the movement established a 
revolutionary war institute in which all political and military officers 
and semi-civilian - military administrators are to be trained before 
giving them assignments. The Military Institute which was located at 
Bilpam near the Ethiopian border, has provided the Movement with 
efficient, dedicated and courageous officers which have led to various 
military victories. 
A consequence of the merger was the emergence of the political military 
high command, replacing the executive and the central committees of the 
SPLM, while the other sub-committees such as foreign and political, 
administrative and legal, finance and economy, information and radio and 
relief and rehabilitation were subjoined to various committees under each 
permanent member of the political military high command of the SPLM/SPLA 
until a later date. Those who were occupying the positions in the 
dissolved committees were taken to the Political Military Institute for 
Military training and political orientation for a period of six to nine 
months and on completion were given military ranks. Afterwards they were 
given assignments in various positions in the military set up or 
appointed to manage relief supplies, both in the refugee camps and in 
Addis Ababa and Nairobi where the Movement had established offices to 
monitor relief and other affairs of the Movement. 
As a result of the militarisation of all active SPLM members, the 
Movement at the end of 1984 was transformed into a military organization 
and almost all former civilian politicians were absorbed into the SPLA. 
The first ranking arrangements in the movement resembled the 'old Sudan 
441 
Ficture I: Organization of SPLMN/SPLA in 1983 
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Military Structures' and ranks. 74 The Military High Command was renamed 
the Political Military High Command and became the highest political and 
military organ of. the movement, its five permanent members becoming both 
political and military leaders of the Movement. Although the membership 
of the Political-Military High Command was increased by the absorption of 
what was to become known as alternate members, the new members were to 
have no voting power on major movement policy-making. The alternate 
members are also non-permanent and are subjected to replacement at any 
time, depending on the decision of the Chairman and Commander in Chief of 
SPLM/SPLA who has the sole authority to appoint and relieve all members 
of the Military-Political High Command, including the permanent members. 
Apart from the Military set up, the Movement has also created certain 
institutions and affiliated them to the Movement and appointed military 
officers and men to run them. These included local administrative, 
judicial and relief organs set up to operate in the liberated areas. 
In addition, numerous civilian politicians appointed by the Chairman and 
Commander in Chief of the Movement were affiliated to SPLM/SPLA. Some of 
these were members of the first organized SPLM of 1983 such as Mr. Joseph 
Obuho, Dr. Justin Yac, Dr. Mansour Khalid among others. 
Figure II shows the structure of the SPLM/SPLA between July 1984 and 
December 1985. As already explained, the SPLM/SPLA decision to give SPLA 
more power was based on Section 21 (c) of the Penal and Disciplinary Laws 
of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, signed by Col. Dr. John Garang 
de Mabior, Chairman of the Movement and Commander in Chief of SPLA in 
July 1984 which states: 
"The Sudan People's Liberation Movement shall at the initial 
stage of gradual transition from civil war to total take-over 
of the whole country, exercise executive and judicial authority 
with assistance from the SPLM. "75 
This clearly shows that the role of SPLM as an autonomous body ceased by 
the end of 1985. Attempts to resist this merger by civilian politicians 
was vigorously suppressed by the Chairman and Commander in Chief of 
SPLM/SPLA and the permanent members of the Military High Command. The 
arrest and lengthy detention of some SPLM leaders such as the veteran 
politician Mr. Joseph Oduho, former Chairman of the Political and Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Judge Martin Majer Gai, Former Chairman of the Legal 
and Administrative Committee also the author of the SPLM/SPLA Penal and 
Disciplinary Laws; Mr. Benjamin Bol Akok who was then SPLM/SPLA London 
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Figure II: The Structure of SPLM/SPLA in 1984-85 
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based committee (who died while in detention in Ethiopia in 1985) bear 
witness to the crises created by these changes. 76 
In 1986, the SPLM/SPLA was again reorganized and the Relief Section of 
the Movement known as the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association 
established in 1985 was formally separated as a non-political 
humanitarian autonomous organization. This Association was established to 
ensure the provision of relief, rehabilitation and development assistance 
to Sudanese people in the SPLA-controlled areas of Sudan and in refugee 
camps etc. outside Sudan. It was mandated by SPLM/SPLA to regulate and 
coordinate the activities of Agencies engaged in relief, rehabilitation 
and development work in these areas. The SRRA exists to promote and 
facilitate the provision of assistance in response to the Sudanese 
people's desperate need and to help agencies to overcome the problems of 
operating in the present difficult conditions. 
On 29th September 1986, the Chairman and Commander in Chief formed a 
four-man committee, led by Lt. Col. William Nyuon Bany, member of 
SPLM/SPLA political military High Command and SPLA Chief of Staff, to 
reorganize the SRRA. In a memo, the Chairman and Commander in Chief 
directed the committee to make the following structure for the new 
SRRA. 77 
This shows in a pictorial fashion, the organization and relation of SRRA 
to SPLM/SPLA. The highest organ of the autonomous SRRA is the Board of 
Directors which is the Governing Board, elected by a refugee committees 
in various camps. The Board comprises seven members who are answerable to 
both Political Military High Command and the Refugee Council who elects 
them. 
The Executive Committee is the second highest organ of SRRA and consists 
of a Secretary General and Senior members of staff: - 
-- Secretary General 
-- Deputy Secretary General 
-- Logistics Officer 
-- Publicity Officer 
-- Finance Officer 
-- Receptionist/Typist 
-- Driver/Messenger 
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Figure III: Organization and Relation of SRRA to SPLM/SPLA 
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While the members of the Governing Board of Directors and the Refugee 
Committee are dispersed, mostly in Ethiopia, the Executive Committee 
members are based in Nairobi. There are branches outside the Kenyan 
Capital: inside the Southern, Western and Southern Blue Nile of Sudan, 
and in foreign countries such as Britain, Ethiopia, France, Holland and 
West Germany. The Executive Committee is answerable to both board of 
directors and the political military high command. 
Regarding the changes made in SPLA, they consisted of the abolition of 
the higher military titles, such as Lt. Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier, and 
General, as well as titles related to academic achievement, such as Ph. D. 
holders etc. The new titles adopted include commander, for those who are 
in the higher military ranks. Majors became known as alternate 
commanders. The political military high command was increased to 13 
members, 8 of whom were alternate members and 5 remained permanent 
members. This situation remained unchanged until November 1988, when 
successes on the war front brought more people under the administration 
of the Movement and who desperately needed various services ranging from 
medical, security, education (for children) transport, veterinary, legal 
and administrative services. These successes also prompted the need for 
economic development and reconstruction of the liberated provincial 
towns, Rural Councils and villages. These victories included the 
liberation of most of Upper Nile Region, where two out of three major 
provinces and three quarters of the districts and rural councils, 
followed by the collapse of Anya-nya II forces, subsequently incorporated 
into SPLM/SPLA. The liberation of Eastern Equatoria province included the 
historic town of Torit, where the first Southern nationalist uprising 
began. 79 This period also marked great SPLM/SPLA victories in Bahr el 
Ghazal regions, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile province in Central 
Region, where new administrative, security, legal and social services 
were needed. 
In 1988-89 the SPLA/SPLM was again reorganized and the areas in which the 
movement was either in control or actively in operation was divided into 
13 administrative military zones. Each zone was divided into district, 
local councils and villages. 
The Chairman and Commander in Chief created two commissions in his 
office, each with chairmen, and answerable to him or whoever deputizes 
for him. He has the power to appoint or relieve them. The commanders of 
various zones were appointed as alternate members of the political 
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military High Command, though without power to vote on various policies 
of the movement. 
The Commissions created are: The Commission for Production and Services, 
and the National Economic Commission. These Commissions were established 
or organized socio-economic development and the provision of services to 
liberated areas and to the refugee camps outside Sudan. SRRA falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Commission for Production and Services. It was 
expanded and new committees were created with sectoral responsibilities 
only. Sectoral Committees included the following: Education, Medical, 
Coordination, Agriculture and Fisheries, Veterinary, Stores and 
Equipment, Press and Information, Water, Religious Affairs, Field 
Coordinator, Liaison Officer in Nairobi, Accounting Section (Nairobi 
based), Relief and Social Welfare. In addition, Branch offices in London, 
Paris, Bonn, Amsterdam, USA and Canada. 80 
The Chairmen of these committees from the central committee of SRRA, 
which automatically replaced both the Board of Directors and the 
Executive Committee. The Central Committee comes under the authority of a 
Secretary General under the direct supervision of the Chairman of the 
Commission of Production and Services. All members of the Central 
Committee including the Secretary General were appointed by the Chairman 
of the Commission of Produce and Services with the approval of the 
Chairman and Commander in Chief. 
Penal and Disciplinary Laws of Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
After the SPLM/SPLA leaders had formulated the political manifesto and 
embarked on the laws to govern the conduct of the war and regulate the 
administration in the liberation areas, the penal and disciplinary laws 
were promulgated in July 1984, having been signed by the Chairman and 
Commander in Chief. They were enacted to: 81 
-- Ensure that the socialist revolution was correctly launched; 
-- Minimize the incidence of human suffering that usually accompanies 
war; 
-- Curb the level of crime that rose before the elimination of Anya- 
Nya II and other highwaymen and robbers; 
-- Destroy forever the social diseases of corruption, cheating, theft, 
robbery, and exploitation of the masses by their enemies; 
-- Ensure the preservation of wildlife resources which, for a long 
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time, have been the subject of well-armed poachers; 
-- Control and discipline the movement's military and civilian 
cadres in their daily contact with the population, ie to establish law 
and order in the areas under SPLM/SPLA control; 
-- Regulate various administrative relations. 
The Movement has established courts in the liberated areas in order to 
implement these laws. 
Here is should be noted that the provisions of these laws do not apply to 
customary law jurisdiction traditionally exercised by Chief's courts over 
civil cases. The courts in the liberated areas are part of the military 
and administrative structure of the movement. The judges in most cases 
are military officers with law qualifications or ones who have acquired 
enough judicial experience before joining the Movement. For instance, 
former local government administrators under the old Regional or Central 
Government are deemed to be qualified as judges. Former police officers 
and law graduates are also considered to be qualified to act in this 
capacity. The command structure and administrative apparatus of the 
Movement and SSRA is shown below: 
These structures are not to be considered final because SPLM/SPLA is 
still evolving and varies between regions or zones and also with time and 
successes of the Movement. The final form can only be seen when total 
liberation is achieved. Figure IV shows that the Chairman and Commander 
in Chief is the highest authority, in terms of political and military 
power. The Chairman and Commander in Chief is assisted by members of the 
Political Military High Command who are arranged according to their 
military hierarchy, ie. The Deputy Commander in Chief becomes Deputy 
Chairman of the Movement, while Chief of Staff becomes number three, 
followed by the Deputy Commander in Chief of Staff as number four. Fifth 
is the Chief of Administration and Logistics. Other members follow in 
accordance with the date of their appointment to the Political Military 
High command as alternate members. Alternate members are zonal 
commanders. 
The Third group in the hierarchy is advisory, composed of civilian and 
military advisers. This also includes the Chairman of the National 
Economic Commission, the Secretaries General of SRRA Central Committee 
and the National Economic Commission Committees. The Chairman of 
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Figure IV: The Command Structure and Administrative Apparatus of 
SPLM/SPLA and SSRA in the Liberated Areas 
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SPLM/SPLA is represented in Zimbabwe, Canada, USA, France, West Germany 
Kenya and Ethiopia. 
The fourth group in the hierarchy are the alternate commanders, civilian- 
military administrators and SRRA Chairmen of various sectoral committees 
in the liberated areas, refugee camps and in other countries. 
The highest authority in a zone"'is the Commander who is an alternate 
member of the Political Military High Command. He is assisted. by the 
alternate commanders of various districts and rural alternate commanders, 
civilian military administrators and representatives of SRRA at local 
level. The last in the hierarchy are the tribal chiefs who are the 
representatives of the local population at village level. 
It should be noted that SPLM/SPLA has adopted indirect rule in its 
dealings with peasants, who have continued to be governed by this system 
since Independence 33 years ago. 
These structures are not definitive since three regional capitals, Wau, 
Juba and Malakal are not yet liberated by the Movement. Also, Southern 
Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Southern Darfur have not yet been 
liberated, although the Movement has been operating in these regions for 
the last two years. The Civil War has not even reached places like 
Northern and Khartoum areas. Therefore the current structures are 
provisional only. 
The description of the structures cannot be complete if there is no 
mention of the Women's Union and the Youth Organizations of the Movement. 
The women are very important because of their active contribution both in 
fighting and in the service sector. The women are represented by a 
women's battalion with their senior offices who are fighting alongside 
the men. 
Finally, the strength of SPLA/SPLM consists of 60,000 officers and men, 
divided into 60 battalions or more. The estimated number of officers is 
1500, both senior and junior. There are 13 zonal commanders and 150 
alternate commanders. There remain 1333 junior officers (ie from captain, 
Ist Lt. and 2nd Lt. ). The Political Military High Command is composed of 
15 commanders, including the chairman and commander in chief and his 
deputies. There are also military civilian administrators. 82 
451 
8.3.4 The SPLMISPLA System of Government and Its Proposed 
Policies on Various Sudanese Problems 
The SPLM/SPLA leadership and its political manifesto describes the 
Movement as socialist and a notional Movement committed to the liberation 
of all oppressed and exploited Sudanese people from the regime of the old 
Sudan, currently under the control of the sectarian families. The 
Movement plans to establish a socialist revolutionary federal government. 
The manifesto goes on to say that the federal constitution will be 
secular and democratic, with various checks and balances in the various 
institutions such as Parliament, an independent judiciary, cabinet and 
free press are to be created. In addition, all citizens will enjoy 
equality before the law. Each state shall have power to select its 
leaders democratically and the state government shall have full power 
over natural resources within the state. The following guidelines for 
solving various problems, especially uneven development and regional 
inequalities based on religion and culture. 
On the problem of uneven development and regional inequalities, the 
SPLM/SPLA manifesto states that the first task is to dismantle the 'old 
Sudan' and its institutions set up through exploitation and oppression, 
and replace them with socialist organizations with a mandate to crush all 
forms of injustice in the country, to embark upon a programme geared 
towards closing the gap between the poor and the rich, between the most 
backward areas and those more advanced regions. Furthermore, the Movement 
claims that the participation in decision making in Sudan has been 
limited to those who control the national resources and political power. 
'New Sudan' will establish more schools in less developed regions, more 
agricultural projects, more health services, develop proper concrete 
roads, communications and transport facilities and exploit various 
productive resources in the field of animal, forestry and fishery 
production. 83 
On the religious and cultural conflicts which have been used by the 
ruling class, the Movement has proposed that all Sudanese nationalities 
have the right to worship and adhere to any religious beliefs that each 
group prepares to maintain. Every nationality has the freedom to maintain 
its culture, language and customary laws, provided they do not create 
antagonism between or among various nationalities in the country. The 
Movement prepares to adopt the concept of 'Unity in diversity', a 
perspective which the Movement believes has been misused and exploited 
under the sectarian military regime of Nimiere, and which led to the 
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collapse of the May regime in 1985.84 
The leadership of 'New Sudan' believes that Arabs, Africans, Christians, 
Muslims and others can peacefully co-exist in a new Sudanese society 
where equality, justice and hard work will reign. The Movement believes 
that racism, ethnicity, tribalism, regionalism and religious differences 
are used by the various bourgeois leaders to weaken the Sudanese struggle 
so that looting and exploitation should continue. Dr. Mansour Khalid, 
adviser to SPLM/SPLA leaders explained the movement's policies on these 
topics as follows: 85 
"Future stability in Sudan hinges on this issue - "the issue of 
the less developed regions"-. In effect, this is what the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and all regionally based 
resistance movements are about.... The SPLM is quite different 
from any of the past movements which have emerged in the 
South.... SPLM is a Movement with a national vocation which is 
appealing to all Sudanese of all religions and races to join 
its ranks. The Northerners are called upon to accept that the 
SPLM is a national movement, even though its origins are in the 
south. 
However, there is one psychological barrier: the inability of 
many northern elements to believe that a southern-based and led 
movement can have national claims and that it is not simply a 
pressure group seeking to achieve regional aspirations. If the 
parties in the North cannot overcome this psychological barrier 
and recognize the 'southerners' as an essential national force, 
it is they who in the long run will be called 'separatists'. " 
Dr. Khalid went on to point out the stand of the Movement on economic 
development and he said: 86 
"Sudan needs balanced economic growth and equitable 
apportionment of the benefits of development. This 
will be the greatest challenge facing the elites since they 
have been and remain the main beneficiaries of the fruits of 
development.... Our Country cannot afford the luxury of a few 
winners and many losers - we are all winners and losers 
together. " 
On the issue of Islamic-Arab tradition in Northern Sudan, Dr. Khalid 
clearly stated: 
"The Sudanese need to be Sudanese first before they can be 
anything else. Unity, national self-definition and development 
are therefore the challenges facing the political forces - the 
forces that shall make or break the Sudan. "87 
These passages are quite clear enough for any reader to know the 
SPLM/SPLA is different from the separatist movements such as Anya-nya I 
and II and sectarian movements in the North. The political aim of 
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SPLA/SPLM has been explained at length by Northern Sudanese like Dr. 
Mansour Khalid and many others. 
88 
Furthermore, the increased numbers of Northerners joining the Movement 
over the last three years (as found by the author) is evidence of 
success. 
It should be noted also that the SPLM/SPLA has made it a part of its 
policy that Arabic will continue in its current position, while other 
languages are being developed as part of the national language of Sudan. 
SPLA/SPLM radio bears witness to that. And that Arabs, like African, are 
equally Sudanese and have equal rights to enjoy the benefits in Sudan. 
Although this study has not been able to give the actual number of 
Sudanese Arabs in the Movement, or non-southerners, yet there is enough 
evidence to show that there are thousands of people from Southern and 
Northern Funj (Southern Blue Nile), Southern Kordofan and those of 
Darfur. This cannot be denied, especially as some of them have been 
participating in the fighting, and in various peace dialogues as leaders 
or members of the delegations. 
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As a part of its policy and strategy for protecting the movement and its 
successes, the SPLA/SPLM categorizes its enemies into two - Internal 
'real and potential enemies' and 'external real and potential enemies'. 
90 
The internal, real and potential enemies of SPLA/SPLM are again divided 
into two. The first consists of Northern Sudanese bourgeoisified and 
bureaucratic elite, which have everything to lose'from a socialist 
revolution, and that their domination in both North (West, East, North 
and Central included) South will be destroyed and their multi-storey 
buildings and other properties might be lost. This group of elite is 
considered more dangerous for they will fight fiercely to protect those 
interest using Khartoum's reactionary army which is itself a part and 
backbone of Sudan's ruling elite. 
The Second group of enemies consists of 'Southern Sudanese Bourgeoisified 
and Bureaucratic elite' which falls into two main categories, those who 
were and those who were not associated with Anya-nya I. And that their 
interest is the same, although they have internal differences as to who 
should be dominant politically in the South. Their real interest, like 
that of the Northern Elite, is self- enrichment including the building of 
multi-storey buildings and amassing of other forms of wealth. And that 
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"under the circumstances, either of these categories of southern 
elite will try to hi-jack the SPLM/SPLA by infiltrating its 
leadership and taking it over for their own advantage, or 
failing to hi-jack the Movement, they will try to organize 
their own political parties, similar to those of the 1960s with 
likely assistance from USA and Western Europe. The Southern and 
Northern bourgeoisified and bureaucratic elites will sometimes 
be in conflict with each other as they were during the 17 years 
war and at times in collusion as they were in 1972 when they 
concluded the Addis Ababa Agreement. Both will always try to 
deceive the people by using the nationality and religious 
questions to further their own advantage and keep Sudanese 
people in both Southern and Northern Sudan divided and weak. "91 
The external real and potential enemies of SPLM/SPLA consists of two 
groups, namely the 'African and Arab reactionary countries' and 
'Imperialism'. 
Those reactionary African and Arab countries, according to SPLM/SPLA have 
real and imagined interests in Sudan. And that they will also feel 
threatened by socialist engulfment and will be instigated by 
international reaction against the Movement. 
Similarly, the Movement believes that religious fundamentalism, like the 
nationality question will continue to be used by the Sudanese ruling 
clique in both north and south as a tool to deceive and divide the people 
in order to perpetuate their rule and exploitation. The Movement provides 
a correct and consistent policy on religion. Under SPLM Government there 
shall be separation of state, mosque and church. And that all religious 
faiths in the country shall have complete freedom to practice without 
hindrance or intimidation, provided that this freedom is not abused and 
used for political purposes. And that Sundays shall continue to be days 
of worship in the country. 
The Anya-nya II reactionary commanders, as they are known to SPLA/SPLM 
leaders, are considered as enemies of the Movement. This is because they 
have been trying to protect their war-lord interests as these will be 
threatened by a people's revolutionary war, which necessarily prohibits 
any acts of banditry. It is also likely that reactionary political 
parties posing in some form as South Sudanese Liberation Movements will 
spring up and try to collide with Anya-nya II bandits. 92 
The Movement has identified its real and potential enemies as the 
reactionary African and Arab regimes and 'imperialism'. 93 The African and 
Arab countries which are against SPLM/SPLA have both political and 
economic interests. 94 In addition, these countries, according to the 
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Movement, are afraid of socialist engulfment in the area. The fact that 
Sudan is potentially rich in Agriculture, minerals, including oil, gold, 
uranium, especially in the South, makes the country a target for 
Westerners and Americans who have already invested in oil and 
agricultural exploitation. 
The findings of the Author on what SPLM/SPLA manifesto and other 
documents have stated are apparently affirmative. The first SPLM/SPLA 
enemies include the Sudanese Army directed against the Movement by 
bourgeoisified and bureaucratic elites from both South and North Sudan. 
The main enemies of the Movement in the'three regions include the three 
governors, regional ministers, politicians in the Regional People's 
Assembly and Sudan Socialist Union and their supporters who were 
benefiting from the system and traders and merchants whose interests were 
threatened by a new civil war in the south. The other enemies from 
Southern Sudan found by the author include some very prominent Anya-nya I 
officers absorbed in the national army and are enjoying various 
privileges which they do not want to lose. Some of them, after having 
been retired, have been able to accumulate wealth and property in the 
form of buildings, cash, lorries, shops, agricultural land and cash in 
the banks and do not want to be disturbed. Some politicians and southern 
officers were ready to join the Government of Nimiere in order to protect 
their interests. In Equatoria Region, the governor and his ministers and 
the pro- divisionist elements who have just benefited from the new system 
and who expected more. The Regional elites went further to organize a 
tribal militia composed of destitutes, deceived to defend the interests 
of the ruling clique in Juba town, while the poor became victims of both 
forces. 95 
Similarly, the Governor of Upper Nile Region and his supporters who have 
just taken over the new regional political and economic power, set up 
anti-SPLM/SPLA militia committed to destroy the Movement. The Governor of 
Upper Nile Region contacted the Central Government to finance a new 
militia directed against the SPLA/SPLM new recruits coming from northern 
Bahr el Ghazal, thousands of Dinka youth travelling to join the movement 
still being organized near the Ethiopian border. 
In October 1984, the Anya-nya II Forces and SPLA/SPLM fought, which led 
to several deaths on both sides. As a result, SPLA/SPLM managed to kill 
the Anya-nya II leaders, Samuel Gai Tut among them. Anya-nya II forces 
were driven out of their bases so making it easy ýO(the Governor of Upper 
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Nile to convince Anya-nya forces to join his militia in order to fight 
alongside the Khartoum Government Army. Anya-nya II was later named as 
the friendly forces. The Anya-nya II leaders who were of the Nuer tribe 
were able to mobilize their countrymen against any Dinka person who came 
to their village. The most unfortunate was the murder at the hand of 
Anya-nya II leaders of Akuot Atem, the only prominent Dinka politician 
and a handful of his supporters. Abdulla Shoul and Gordan Kuong who were 
among the first leaders of Anya-nya II were said to be responsible for 
the death of Akuot Atem and his supporters. 
In Bahr el Ghazal Region, the Fartit tribes and the Government Dr. 
Lawrence Wol Wal agreed to fight against the SPLA/SPLM publicly in Wau, 
where a mock execution of Col. Dr. John Garang took place. But the Fartit 
with support from the Government army, want the actual execution of John 
Garang and his supporters. And therefore the Fartit Militia was 
organized, armed and directed against the supporters of SPLA/SPLM, who 
were singled out by some anti-Dinka elements as the main force behind the 
movement. As a result, Dinkas became targets in Upper Nile, by the Anya- 
nya II and their Nuer supporters. In Equatoria, Manadam and Baria were 
organized to kill any Dinka found in the region and several were murdered 
in cold blood early in 1985. 
After the overthrow of the Nimiere Regime it was thought the politicians 
would try to seek a quick solution but they failed. Instead the bourgeois 
political parties who gained power after June 1986 general elections, 
decided to continue with all the policies laid down by Nimiere, specially 
the September Islamic sharia laws which were imposed by presidential 
decree in September 1983. Under civilian parliamentary rule of 1985-1989, 
what was predicted by SPLA/SPLM took place. The bourgeois Southerners and 
Northerners united in order to water down any peaceful solution attempted 
by both SPLM/SPLA and the progressive alliances in the north. The, 
bourgeois southern politicians agreed to be bought with political-, 
positi9n¢)like ministerial governorship and 'quota' of essential 
commodities and cash in terms of millions of Sudanese pounds were used to 
weaken the struggle by politicians who are only self-centred. The 
establishment of Southern Council, based in Khartoum to replace the High 
Executive Council, and was accepted by Southern Sudanese politicians who 
were even signatories of the Addis Ababa Agreement was clearly indicating 
the weakness of Southern politicians to accept. It was a council for 
Southern Sudan based in Khartoum which was not only redundant but 
powerless. Here over 30 Southerners are appointed as ministers without 
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any single department nor any work to do, but to receive thousands of 
pounds in terms of salaries, privileges, houses, rent etc. without 
producing anything. In Khartoum in 1987, the author found that Southern 
Council was not created by Parliament but by order of the Prime Minister 
without Parliamentary approval. Because of this, Southern Council could 
not have a budget of its own but had to receive funds from a special 
account under the office of the Prime Minister. In spite of all these 
difficulties, the Southern Council receives still more than half a 
million pounds a month to pay all expenses including salaries. In order 
to maintain such positions and privileges, the Southern Sudanese 
politicians involved agreed to fight against SPLA/SPLM and its supporters 
in any way possible. So several political parties were organized 
dependent on the ruling sectarian families. 
8.4 Attempts to Solve the Sudanese Political Crises and Various 
Alternative Solutions since 1985-89 
8.4.1 Attempts to Solve the Political Crises under the Transitional 
Military Regime from April 1985-May 1986 
Nimiere's attempts to end the Civil War peacefully in the middle of 1984 
failed. His first contact, came, when he visited Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, 
President of Kenya, and asked him to mediate between the SPLA/SPLM and 
the Sudan Government. Nimiere also asked the Egyptian President, to 
contact Ethiopian and other African leaders to convince the leader of 
SPLA/SPLM to come to a negotiating table anywhere in Africa in order to 
seek a peaceful solution to the problem, but all the attempts failed to 
bring the SPLA/SPLM leaders and Nimiere or his representatives to 
negotiating table. 
In January, Nimiere sent his brother, together with Saudi businessman, 
Hannan Khashougi and the British businessman, Tiny Rowland of Lonrho who 
had established concrete interests in the Sudan, to contact Col. Dr. John 
Garang de Mabior and to offer him the position of 1st Vice President of 
the Republic and President of High Executive Council, after the 
Presidential Decree no. 1 on the division of the Southern Region was 
cancelled. 
96 In addition, Nimiere offered to abolish the September 
Islamic Laws he had decreed in 1983, to build an oil refinery in 
the South, to return Hafrat Nahas and Abeyi of Southern Kordofan to the 
South, to return to the 1974 constitution which recognized Addis 
Ababa Agreement and the Southern Sudan as one region. Nimiere also 
promised to increase development projects in the Southern 
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Region, reinstate all Anya-nya I officers who had been dismissed and to 
reorganize the Southern Command and to promote all those officers and 
soldiers who have not been promoted for a long time. And also that no 
section of Southern Command would be transferred to the North again. 
Nimiere furthermore, promised not to be involved, in any leadership 
struggles in the South and that Southern Region will be free to select 
their leaders and the leaders will be free to develop material and 
natural resources in the Region. To provide concrete evidence for his 
offers Nimiere dismissed all the Muslim Brothers in his government 
whether Ministers or judges and put over 200 Muslim Brothers including 
Dr. Turabi, Yasin Ali Amer and others in jail. But unfortunately the 
SPLA/SPLM leadership turned down the offer and the war continued until 
Nimiere's Regime was overthrew on the 6th April 1985, after a popular 
uprising which had demoralized the Regime, while Nimiere was in USA on an 
official visit. 
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The popular uprising of 6th April which overthrew Nimiere's Regime, was 
organized by the trade unions, which include professionals, Alliance of 
New Forces National Front, which consisted of Umma, DUP, and the Sudan 
Communist Party plus other groups affected by the system. When the 
Government of Nimiere was about to collapse while Nimiere was in USA his 
defence Minister, General Sawar al-Dahad took over, and established what 
he termed the Transitional Military Council (TMC) consisting of 15 
Military Officers only three of whom were Southern Sudanese, the first of 
its kind for Southerners to be included in any military council (for 
General Abboud and Nimiere did not include any Southern Sudanese as 
members of the Coup, Military Council). After having formed a 
transitional Council of Ministers dominantly composed of civilians with 
exception of Minister of Defence and Interior who were soldiers, the 
Chairman of (TMC) and the Prime Minister called upon the SPLA/SPLM 
leaders to stop fighting and return home, since Nimiere was no longer in 
power. This call was supported by the Umma Party, DUP, the Communist 
Party and the Trade Unions and the National Alliance and Anya-nya II 
supporters and those members of BGR and Equatoria who were opposed to 
SPLA/SPLM from the beginning but was totally rejected by most Southern 
Sudanese politicians and masses who supported the Addis Ababa Accord. 
This call by the Military Regime was a part of the objectives, which were 
outlined, by the (TMC) under seven points, which included, a national 
political programme based on respect, for human rights together with the 
independence of the judiciary and the press, to restore the national 
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economy, to reorganize the armed forces, work to strengthen national 
unity. And that peace in the Southern Region was to be reached by 
"direct-dialogue' based on equality of rights and duties. The 
military leaders, made a statement to assume the Sudanese 
masses that 'The People's Armed Forces do no want... to 
exchange the past regime for a Military regime 
robbing the people of their political rights. "98 
The military statement added that 
".... it would supervise the implementation of democratic 
transformation by creating a neutral democratic atmosphere to 
ensure the holding of free and neutral elections. " 
The Political Military High Command in response to the TMC Peace 
initiative and presented the movement's own version of national dialogue 
and peace in September 1985 which was as follows: 99 
"(a) a High Command reaffirms and assures the Sudanese people 
that the SPLA/SPLM fights to bring about a real and permanent 
peace and to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of 
the Sudan 
(b) The High Command recognises the necessity for, and will 
continue to seek, national dialogue among all political forces 
in the Sudan for the formation of "New Sudan" as that was 
affirmed over Radio SPLA on 22nd March, 9 April, and 26-27 May 
1985. 
(c) In the present situation, the SPLA/SPLM will come to a 
dialogue with the other political forces, as represented by the 
Trade Union Alliance (TUA), other Unions than may be outside 
that Alliance, the Political Parties, the Sudanese Army, and 
Government of the day, in Khartoum. 
(d) It is the responsibility of the government of the day in 
Khartoum (since the de factor legislative and executive powers 
are there) to ensure the necessary favourable conditions for 
national dialogue to exist so that such a government does not 
become an unnecessary (armed) fetter to the national dialogue 
and peace. 
(e) Since the Transitional Military Council (TMC) has taken upon 
itself the responsibility to ensure the necessary favourable 
conditions for national dialogue in general the government in 
Khartoum must be seen by all to be genuinely in pursuit of 
peace. In the present situation in order for the SPLA/SPLM to 
come into the national dialogue, the TMC as the government of 
the day in Khartoum, must commit itself to discuss the 'problem 
of the Sudan' by the state of emergency, cancel Nimiere's 
sharia laws, and cancel Nimiere's agreements with Egypt, that 
is the Defence Pact and the Economic and Political Integration 
Treaty. " 
The TMC and the civil council of ministers response to SPLA/SPLM peace 
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and national dialogue proposal was favourable but ran short of what was 
demanded by the Movement. The Government failed to address itself to the 
central problems which have been facing the Sudan, which include the so- 
called Southern problem, the Sharia Laws, the economic crises in the 
country and the political crises between the ruling national group, as 
represented by the regime of the day in Khartoum and the national groups 
in other backward regions and who have formed their own regional 
political movements to fight, for their rights and justices. 100 The 
Military Regime in Khartoum failed to equally address the issues related 
to decentralization or federation, foreign policy and how the crises of 
regional inequalities in the Sudan will be resolved. 
The Military Regime instead committed itself to a Military Strategy to 
destroy the SPLA/SPLM. In October 1985, the TMC launched a military 
offensive code-named "Sabur Zaida" or great patience, calculated to 
achieve a military victory over the SPLA/SPLM forces. In addition, the 
military regime, launched an extensive diplomatic campaigns, in form of 
missions to some Arab and African countries, and in Europe, the Mission 
visited London, Paris, Bonn and Washington, using those anti SPLA/SPLM 
politicians from both south and north but to no avail, no military 
victory was achieved nor any diplomatic success made. The SPLA/SPLM in 
turn made its military offensive and political propaganda as well. 
Although there were numerous contacts between the SPLA/SPLM on one side 
and the TMC, Council of Ministers, Trade Unions and various political 
parties on the other, no negotiation took place, where the Transitional 
was seriously involved. For example, several letters, were exchanged 
between the Regime and the SPLM/SPLA political Military High Council 
without any success. The TMC leader, General Sawar al Dahad could not 
even implement what he had stated in his transitional constitution. It is 
to be noted the TMC had abolished the permanent constitution, made by 
Nimiere but could abolish Sharia Laws on grounds that he had not made to 
do that. one of the decrees the TMC abolished was the No. 1,1983, which 
redivided the Southern Region into three, and General James Loro was 
appointed as the transitional President of HEC composed of five members. 
Instead of sending the HEC leader with his members, the TMC asked them to 
stay in Khartoum for the time being. Meanwhile, three Governors were 
appointed sent to their respective regions. This was done deliberately, 
to confuse and bribe those Southern politicians who were interested in 
positions in order to get personal benefits only. For one full year, the 
HEC in Khartoum was redundant doing nothing. For one year, the Southern 
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Sudan was without any legal code of law to which police and judges could 
try various crimes specially in the towns. And for one year, the 
Government was not able to negotiate with SPLA/SPLM and the War therefore 
continued until General elections were partially held in 1986 and which 
brought to power an Umma Party and DUP controlled coalition Government. 
As shall be shown in the next section, the only successful national 
dialogue which took place during the transitional military rule in the 
Sudan was held by SPLM/SPLA, Alliance of National' Forces, held in Koka 
Dam Ethiopia. 
Finally, the author is convinced that General Sawar al Dahab, the 
Chairman of TMC, his Deputy General Taj el Din Abdullah Fadl and Dr. 
Gizoubi Dafalla failed to abolish the Sharia Laws because of their 
connection with Muslim Brothers and National Islamic Front (NIF), which 
actually made Nimiere . 
impose Islamic Laws. The events which took place 
during elections and after elections, did indicate that the three 
mentioned above worked hard to help members of NIF to win easy seats of 
the Graduates which were specially created by the Military Government in 
order to help the NIF. Furthermore, after both Umma Party and DUP agreed 
to form a Government Syd Mohd Osman Mirghani the leader'of DUP invited 
General Sawar al Dahalp to join his party and to be the President of the 
Supreme Council a position given to DUP after the Umma party took the 
post of Prime Minister. But the general refused and instead, he accepted 
an offer by the Dr. Turabi the leader of NIP to become Chairman of Dawaa 
Islamiya (Islamic Call organization) which he still holds. The same 
organization has employed both Dr. Gizouli Daffalla and General Taj al 
Din Abdullah Fadl in leadership post. General Taj al Din, has been 
accused of being the Commander of the NIF Militia an underground military 
force. All three have also supported the current military regime under 
the officers committed to Islamic Fundamentalism of the NIF. 
8.4.2 The Koka Dam Declaration and other Peace Initiatives 
After the SPLA/SPLM and the military regime failed to agree on how the 
Sudanese political problems will be solved, the National Alliance for 
national salvation, called upon the movement to hold a preliminary 
dialogue to discuss the ways and means to solve the problem peacefully. 
On 20th March 1986, the Preliminary Dialogue between SPLA/SPLM and the 
National Alliance for National Salvation was held at Koka Dam, Ethiopia. 
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The meeting which was opened by Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior, and Dr. 
Rhalid Yagi, President, Council of the National Alliance for National 
Salvation, was the first of its kind since the establishment of SPLA/SPLM 
in 1983. 
The Council for National Alliance for the National Salvation was composed 
of trade unions, professional associations and political parties, with 
the exception of the Democratic Unionist Party, which had refused to 
participate in the conference, the Muslim Brothers and National Islamic 
Front (NIF), which was not invited, due to the role the leaders of these 
groups had played under the defunct Nimiere Regime. Those political 
parties which participated, included the Umma Party, the Sudan Communist 
Party, the Southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA), Sudan African 
Congress (SAC), People's Progressive Party (PPP), Sudan National Party 
(SNP), Sudan African National Union (SANU), Sudan African People's 
Congress (SAPCO), Darfur Development Front (DAF), the General Union of 
Nuba Mountains (GUN), the Beja Congress (BC), the newly formed Union of 
Southern and Northern Funj and Ingesna, and other small parties which 
were formed after the fall of Gen. Nimiere's Government from power. 
After four days of discussions, the preliminary dialogue, attended by 
over 50 delegates from SPLA/SPLM and National Alliance and others issued 
a declaration to be known as 'Koka Dam Declaration, 24th March 1986', 
which was in fact a proposed programme for National Action. Both groups 
in the preliminary dialogue for certain essential prerequisites which 
were intended to foster an atmosphere conducive to the holding of the 
proposed National Constitutional Conference. The main items in the 
declaration were: 101 
"(a) A declaration by all political parties and the Government 
of the day of their commitment to discuss the Basic Problems of 
Sudan and not the so-called problem of Southern Sudan and that 
shall be in accordance with the Agenda agreed upon in this 
"Declaration. " 
(b) The lifting of the State of Emergency 
(c) Repeal of the 'September 1983 Laws', and all other laws that 
are restrictive of freedoms. 
(d) Adoption of the 1956 constitution as amended in 1964 with 
incorporation of "Regional Government" and all other such 
matters on which a consensus opinion of all the political 
forces shall be reached. 
(e) The abrogation of the military pacts concluded between 
Sudan and other countries and which impinge on Sudan's National 
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sovereignty. 
(f) A continuous endeavour by the 'two sides' to take the 
necessary steps and measures to effect a cease-fire. " 
And in addition the Resolutions of SPLM/SPLA Politico-military High 
Command on National Dialogue and peace in Sudan, presented to both TMC 
and the Council of Ministers, were agreed upon as essential pre- 
requisites for convening the proposed Constitutional Conference. 7ie. '{ 
therefor 
_TMC and 
the Council of ministers were to dissolve themselves 
and to be replaced by a New Interim Government of National Unity 
representing and the political forces including the SPLA/SPLM and the 
Armed Forces, which was rejected by the government. 
The 'two sides' further agreed that the proposed constitutional 
conference shall be held under the banner of peace, justice, equality and 
democracy. They also agreed that the Agenda for the Conference mentioned 
above should be comprising of the following: -102 
"(i) a The nationalities question 
b The religious question 
c Basic human rights 
d The system of rule 
e Development and uneven development 
f Natural resources 
g The regular forces and security arrangements 
h The cultural question, education and the mass media 
i Foreign policy. 
(ii) The two sides have agreed that the above agenda does not in 
any way purport to be exhaustive. " 
After it was agreed that a public commitment was necessary. The two sides 
set up a joint liaison committee comprising five members from each side 
to conduct consultations with one another. 
It was agreed that the Koka Dam Declaration was to be issued in both 
Arabic and English, and that the English text, was to be the 'original' 
and in the event of any discrepancy, it would prevail over its Arabic 
equivalent. In the final statement the two sides appeared to the Sudanese 
people as represented in various political parties, trade unions and 
associations and also agreed to work earnestly for the realization of the 
objectives of the declaration. 
While the Koka Dam Agreement was predictably rejected by both the DUP and 
the NIF which did not participate, the Agreement was hailed by all 
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leaders of political parties, including Saddiq al Mahdi, the leader of 
Umma Party. 
The SPLA/SPLM, before the Koka Dam Agreement in March, had a meeting with 
a top delegation of SSPA on 2nd February 1986 to discuss the current 
outstanding national problems of Sudan. The two high-level delegates, 
after a series of meetings, agreed to make a joint communique on 8th 
February 1986. The join communique covered several issues surrounding the 
current problems and prominent among these included: 103 
1. The abolition of the September 1983 Islamic 
Sharia Laws and the State Security Act 1973. 
2. The abrogation of the military and political 
agreement between the Nimiere region and the 
Egyptian Government. 
3. The lifting of the. State of Emergency. 
4. The cancellation of military protocols between Sudan and Libya. 
5. The commitment of all political forces including the 
Government of the day to solve the problems of Sudan and not the 
so-called problem of the Southern Sudan. 
6. The prior commitment by the TMC and the council of ministers to 
dissolve themselves after such a conference in order to pave the 
way for the formation of a broad-based national government. " 
It should therefore be noted here that all the contacts between the 
SPLA/SPLM and various political leaders and parties, ended in some kind 
of positive agreements which support a peaceful negotiated solution to 
all problems and the establishment of the 'New Sudan' which would be 
federal in all aspects. But, it was very clear, that the TMC and the 
Council of Ministers were not ready to accept any proposal but theirs, 
and the consequence was military confrontation until the general 
elections which were partially run in Southern Sudan. 
In the next section, the author will attempt to examine various peace 
initiatives during the Saddiq rule, ie from June 1989, when the military 
coup of Brig. Bashir overthrew the civilian government. 
8.4.3 The Peace Initiatives during Saddiq A1-Mahdi's Rule 
The general elections of 1986 which resulted in a hung constituent 
assembly, brought Saddiq al Mahdi to power as Prime Minister in a 
coalition government between the Umma Party and DUP, plus some Southern 
Sudanese parties. 
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In the elections, the Umma Party under the leadership of Saddiq al Mahdi, 
emerged as the largest group with 100 of the 262 contested seats. Umma 
won 98 of the 205 northern geographical seats, maintaining its 
historically strong position in the Western Regions of Darfur and 
Kordofan, and in the White Nile area of the Central Region. The DUP got 
the second largest seats 63, while the NIF obtained 51 as the third 
largest group. The Sudan African parties, with 36 seats came the fourth 
group, while Sudan Communist Party got only 3 and the independent group 
obtained 6 seats. 
As a constituent assembly, neither the Umma nor the Democratic Unionist 
party nor the National Islamic Front was able to form a government on its 
own, due to the fact that none of the 11 political parties represented in 
the constituent assembly had a clear majority over the other parties 
combined. So the Umma Party which had the largest number of seats had the 
main responsibility to choose any political party or parties in order to 
form a coalition Government. The Umma party decided to choose the DUP as 
the main ally in order to form a coalition government, which was 
accepted by the DUP. Both parties agreed to divide up the existing 
ministerial positions. The Umma party which took the position of Prime 
Minister, had 8 ministerial positions also, including, Finance and Trade 
and Commerce. The DUP, which was given the position of the President of 
the Supreme Council was also given 6 ministerial positions which included 
Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, and Interior as well as the 
position of Commissioner of Khartoum. 
The Umma and DUP in a planned political strategy, agreed to break up the 
Sudan African parties which was composed of Sudan National Party, (8 
seats), PPP (9 seats), SAPCO (8 seats), SAC (3 seats) and SPFP (8 seats), 
by offering ministerial positions to some individuals and party members. 
The plan to break up the Sudan African parties started from the time of 
the formation of the Supreme Council, when both Umma and DUP leaders 
selected Dr. Facifico Lolik as a representative of the Southern Regions, 
although Dr. Lobk was defeated in the elections. After the election of 
President of the Supreme Council and the Prime Minister, the Sudan Africa 
Parties had informed the leaders of both Umma and DUP that they were not 
going to participate in the government unless the two parties agreed to 
abolish the September Sharia Laws and to revive the 1956 constitution 
which was brought to an end in 1964. And when this condition was 
rejected, all the members of the African parties walked out of the 
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constituent assembly. While they were out, Dr. Pacifico was nominated and 
elected by the northern political parties and remained there in spite of 
the opposition of all Southern representatives in the Assembly, including 
the members of SAPCO where Pacifico was Secretary General. But the 
appointment of Mr. Aldo Ajo Deng, a rebel from SSPA, as a minister, Dr. 
Wango of PPP and SAPCO and Ministers, plus three governors of Southern 
Regions was a great breakthrough for the two ruling parties. As a result, 
SSPA was divided into two, and the Sudan African parties were weakened. 
After the formation of the coalition government, the NIF representatives 
formed the official opposition in the Assembly. 
In a policy statement made in the Constituent Assembly, the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Saddiq al Mahdi, outlined his political and economic 
programmes and the strategy to solve the main problems facing the Sudan, 
including the Southern problem. 104 The strategies laid down by the Prime 
Minister to the political crisis represented by the Civil War in the 
South, include the use of the diplomatic weapon to mobilize international 
support, the mobilisation of internal front, including the use of 
military might and the Constitutional Conference or National dialogue to 
seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. As regards the September Islamic 
Laws imposed by the Defunct Niemere's Regime, the Prime Minister stated 
that he was going to abolish them after new Islamic alternative laws were 
produced by the Government. The Prime Minister also stated that his 
government was committed to a peaceful solution and would be ready to 
meet Dr. John Garang anywhere. 
In order to show that the government was committed to a peaceful 
solution, the Prime Minister created a new ministry known as the 
"Ministry of Peace" to be responsible for peace and national 
reconciliation, and a minister, under secretary, directors and the 
supporting staff were appointed and stationed at Friendship Hall. The 
minister and his under secretary set out a working programme for peace 
and several academics and committees, were set up to collect various 
information related to the Sudanese problems to help the government to 
prepare peace plans. The Government also sent several delegations to 
SPLM/SPLA to discuss ways and means, for holding the Constitutional 
Conference. 
In 1987 the Prime Minister held a meeting with the leader of SPLM/SPLA, 
Col. Dr. John Garang in Addis Ababa. In that meeting, Saddiq told John 
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Garang that he came to meet him not as a Prime Minister, but as a leader 
of the Umma Party which had signed the Koka Dam Declaration. He went on 
to say that as a Prime Minister, he will not recognise the Declaration 
because DUP, the 2nd largest party in the Constituent Assembly and which 
is a member of the coalition government did, not recognise the Koka Dam 
Agreement. And that similarly, the NIF which was the official opposition 
in the Assembly did not accept the Agreement and therefore, it was going 
to be difficult for him to implement any part of the Agreement without 
general consensus. 
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The SPLA/SPLM leader insisted that the Koka Dam Declaration should be 
implemented by Saddiq's government in its totality. The SPLA/SPLM was 
supported by most members of the African parties and some of the National 
Alliance and National Salvation. But the Prime Minister made it clear 
that a new Agreement which will be acceptable to DUP and NIF was quite 
necessary as a first step towards peaceful solution. As a result, 
Saddiq's meeting with Dr. John Garang ended in failure and that was the 
last direct talk between them. 
After Dr. John Garang, Mr. Saddiq al Mahdi failed to solve the problem 
the war was intensified. The Prime Minister went to the press to inform 
Sudanese in general and the world at large that those who would suffer 
most in the war would be southerners and the Government organized an 
armed tribal militia, in Equatoria, Upper Bahr el Ghazal and the Arabs 
of Kordofan, known as 'Muraaleen'. 
106 The massacres of Dinkas in Awiel, 
Wau and Juba resulted in several thousand Dinkas losing their lives and 
was a direct result of Government policy. A report by Amnesty 
International covering the period under Saddiq's rule, estimated that 
250,000 died-107 
The SPLA/SPLM in turn fought back; two civilian transport planes and more 
than a dozen military planes were shot down; several towns were captured 
by SPLA/SPLM (Mayom, Jokau, Akoba, Leer, Waat), followed by Nasir, 
Pangak, Bor Conor, and other military garrisons in Upper Nile, BCR, 
Rumbek, the capital of the Lakes Province, Yirol, Awerial and small 
garrisons in Equatoria, Kapoeta, Torit, Ikotos, and later, Nimule, 
Parijok, Tali, Mundri and others. 
In Central Region the SPLA/SPLM forces captured Kurmuk, Gisan, Yali and 
many rural councils in Southern Blue Province. Similarly the SPLA/SPLM 
forces were able to penetrate into Southern Kordofan and captured small 
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rural centres containing army and police forces. 
While the war was in progress, various political parties, individuals and 
ruling coalition parties were involved in seeking a peaceful solution. 
1987-8 saw several delegates visiting Addis Ababa, Kampala and Nairobi in 
order to meet SPLA/SPLM leaders, which included the NIF, the Union of 
African Parties. Individuals like Dr. Francis Mading Deng, former 
Nigerian Head of State, the Bishops, foreign heads of state from Uganda, 
Kenya, Zambia, and Zaire were involved in the peace crusade, all in vain. 
In September 1987, the Prime Minister formed a high level committee of 
nine members, headed by. Dr. Pacifico Lolik member of the State Supreme 
council and members included Mr. Matthew Obur - President of Southern 
Council, based in Khartoum, Mr. Aldo Ajo Deng, Minister of 
Communications, Mr. Ret Choul, Minister of Local Government, Lawrence 
Modi Tombi, Minister of works and social welfare. Dr. Ibrahim Almin, 
Deputy Commissioner of Khartoum, Prof. Hamad Omer Bagadi,. Umma Party 
Representative, retired Lt. Gen. Yusuf Ahmed Yusuf, DUP representative, 
Dr. Ahmed Said DUP representative and Dr. Abdel Basit Said, Under 
Secretary of the Ministry of Peace and National Constitutional 
Conference. as the reporter of the conference. The terms of reference of 
the committee included the study of all peace initiatives and proposals 
already made since the April uprising and any available documents, assess 
and examine their importance and make a report and recommendations to the 
Prime Minister on their findings. The recommendations were to indicate 
ways, means or alternative solutions to Sudanese problems. 
After the committee had thoroughly examined and analysed, the available 
documents and the already held peace initiatives and proposals, it found 
that there were more points in which the SPLA/SPLM on one side, and the 
Government and various political parties and individual people had agreed 
upon the points of disagreement between both groups. The Committee, for 
example, noted that the Islamic Shariah Laws were found to be central to 
the breakdown of all peace talks. The 2nd issue was the lack of trust, 
conflict and fearful threats between Southern and Northern Sudanese 
politicians. The 3rd point noted was that it was apparent that both sides 
of the conflict were not yet convinced that no one will win the civil war 
in Sudan, nor will peace be achieved by force in the area. And both sides 
were not genuinely committed to peaceful solutions. Based on the 
findings, the Committee made the following recommendations: 
108 
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(1) The formation of a High Level Committee 
The Committee proposed to the Government to form a high level 
committee, with enough power to be able to push and to defend the course 
of peace and such a committee should do the following: - 
(i) To lay down a comprehensive strategy in order to achieve peace 
by benefiting from the available information and reports made 
by state agencies. 
(ii) To form a high level delegation capable enough to implement 
and execute the following matters: - 
A To organize and prepare or create the possible conditions for a 
meeting between Saddiq al Mahdi, the Prime Minister and Colonel John 
Garang, leader of SPLA/SPLM and to discuss the following issues: - 
(1) The security issues, which include a cease-fire, the light of 
State of Emergency and cancellation of military pacts or 
Agreements between Sudan and Foreign countries. 
(2) The alternative laws. 
B To have direct contacts with SPLA/SPLM leadership for the formation 
of National People's Committee ready to implement all resolutions. 
C To use internal and international political affairs. 
D The Prime Minister should send to different Heads of State his 
envoys to explain the Government's policy towards a peaceful 
solution. 
E To organize the participation of political parties or political 
forces in the high level committee to contact SPLA/SPLM. 
F To prepare a National Charter for peace to unite the internal front. 
2. To Lay Down a Programme of the Internal Front 
The Committee realized that any peace initiatives or proposals either 
from within or without will not be completely successful unless the 
internal front is solidly central, ie. all political parties, the 
Government, Army and trade unions have to agree on one strategy and plan, 
and that the programme agreed upon by the internal front leaders would 
be brought before the masses for popular approval. Such a programme 
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should-consist of the following: - 
1. The Constitutional Aspects 
a. To win the popular support for the alternative laws. 
b. To establish the basis of equal participation in the distribution of 
political power. 
c. To review the system of regional rule or-government and to 
consolidate the laws governing the establishment of regional system 
of government. 
d. To speed up the enactment of the local government laws and the native 
administration laws. 
2. Ministry of Peace and National Constitution Conference 
The Ministry for peace was created to be responsible for the 
implementation of state policies on peace. The committee sees that the 
responsibilities of the Ministry of peace and they included the direct 
contacts with SPLA/SPLM on behalf of the Government or on the national 
level in order to bring peace to the area. In addition to the existing 
functions, the Ministry of Peace should perform the following: 
(i) To supervise relief and rehabilitation 
(ii) To receive international relief (Aid) for development. 
3. The Organization of Popular Support 
(i) To organize a conference for national popular support for 
international and local plans for a peaceful solution. 
(ii) To organize national media and information for the purpose of peace 
and democracy. 
4. On International Politics 
The Committee supported diplomatic contacts at the higher level, 
specially in the African countries on International affairs for the 
purposes of peace with help from neighbouring countries, and that there 
should be follow-up of all peace initiatives by foreign countries and 
regional organizations to inform them what has been happening in the 
country. The Committee paid more attention to the neighbouring countries 
which included Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire and Chad for they know the 
Southern Sudan. 
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5. On Relief and Rehabilitation 
a. To organize relief and rehabilitation based on the recommendation of 
the Committee which was on the ground that the most affected areas 
were those under civil war and those displaced people in the 
national capital and other towns. 
b. To lay down plans to execute various relief programmes for the war 
affected areas and people. 
c. To lay down a separate plan for the reception of the returnees and to 
resettle and rehabilitate them after a peace Agreement has been 
reached between the groups in conflict. 
In conclusion, the Committee for Peace and Constitutional Conference 
recommended that the search for peace must continue and the people, the 
state and the international community should also be involved in all 
attempts to solve Sudanese problems peacefully. 
The Committee which completed it work on the 1st November 1987, submitted 
the report to the Prime Minister, Mr. Saddiq al Mahdi who dissolved the 
Committee after having read the report and recommendation. 109 
The author who had been following most activities of the committee, 
contacted all 9 members to find out what steps the Prime Minister would 
take after that and the majority of members including the Chairman told 
the author that the Prime Minister was not happy with the recommendations 
and had instructed the Chairman to keep the report very strictly 
confidential and not to give any copy to unauthorized people. All members 
of the committee were told by the Prime Minister that they should not 
talk to press or anyone else about their report until he gave permission 
otherwise legal steps would be taken against anyone who failed to observe 
his instruction. 
The press and various political parties contacted the Prime Minister in 
order to explain the peace committee report and recommendations and the 
Prime Minister would answer that he was still studying the report and 
would explain later, after he had finished with it. The Author went to 
the Office of the Chairman of the Committee in the palace, and after a 
long wait the Chairman allowed him to enter his office. The Secretary of 
the Chairman informed the author that the Chairman would not be able to 
see me that day and that the author should write what he wanted to speak 
to him about. I wrote on the 'copy' of the report for research purposes. 
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The Chairman wrote on the note sent to him that the report was not for 
public consumption as yet and that he should wait until it was made 
public. The author went to the office manager of the Chairman, Col. Samir 
Khamis of Prisons, Equatoria Region, seconded to the Palace as Manager of 
Dr. Pacifico Lalik, member of State Supreme Council. After having 
explained to Col. Rhamis his research objectives, and why the report in 
question was very important, the manager told him that he would let him 
have a copy to photocopy and return the original for the number was known 
and it would be a problem for him if one copy went missing. The Col. told 
the author that it was illegal to show or give the Report to anyone, but 
he was prepared to face anything in the name of Southern Region and he 
handed over the whole Report. 
It is important to point out here that the Prime Minister failed to meet 
the author, in spite of 4 appointments made. It is equally important to 
point out that the Prime Minister never released the Report until he was 
overthrown on 30th June 1989 by the current military junta. 
After the failure of both Umma Party and the Government of Saddiq al 
Mahdi to agree on any peace formula with SPLA/SPLM, the Democratic 
Unionist Party, the main coalition partner in the Government of Saddiq al 
Mahdi, took up the task of finding a peaceful solution to the problem. On 
16th November 1988 the DUP and SPLA/SPLM leaders managed to agree on a 
peaceful solution. 
The Agreement reached between Mohammed Osman of Mirghani, leader of DUP 
and Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Chairman and Commander-i-Chief of 
SPLM/SPLA in Addis Ababa, consists of the following: 110 
(i) to freeze the September Islamic Laws; 
(ii) to observe a cease fire; 
(iii) to life the State of Emergency; 
(iv) cancel military agreements between Sudan, Egypt and Libya; 
(v) to dissolve the current coalition government and to form a 
national unity caretaker government; 
(vi) to hold constitutional conference to include all political 
forces to discuss and then decide on a solution to end the 
problems of Sudan as a whole. 
The DUP/SPLM/SPLA Agreement was rejected by both the Umma Party of Saddiq 
al Mahdi and the National Islamic Front party of Dr. Hassan al Turabi, 
while the majority of political parties, trade unions and professionals, 
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including the Army, supported the Agreement. In Khartoum a popular mass- 
reception to welcome Mohd Osman Mirghani was attended by more than half a 
million people. In spite of all this popular support, the Prime Minister 
summoned the Council of Ministers for a meeting to decide on the 
Agreement. The Council of Ministers which was composed of three main 
sectarian Arab oriented political parties, ie. Umma, DUP and NIF, was 
therefore controlled by Umma, and NIF parties which had a majority, and as 
a result, the council by majority rejected the peace agreement. 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister passed the decision to the Constituent 
Assembly where both NIF and Umma Party, had, a comfortable majority for 
approval. - f 
After both the Council of Ministers and the Constituent Assembly had 
rejected the peace agreement. the DUP pulled out from the coalition 
government. Saddiq al Mahdi's Umma Party and Turabi's NIF formed a new 
coalition government with some Southern Sudanese political parties. In 
the Constituent Assembly the DUP became the main opposition party and 
supported by the representatives of African parties and Sudan Communist 
Party. -- 
The coalition government -of Umma Party and NIF did not last because there 
was strong opposition within the Umma Party, from all the trade unions, 
professional associations, political parties, masses throughout 
demonstrate and supported by the army, led by 150 senior and junior 
officers. While the civilians in various political parties and the trade 
unions demonstrated in Khartoum and other major towns, like Wed Medani, 
Port Sudan and Atbara, the Army officers gave an ultimatum and a warning 
to the Government of Saddiq in February 1989, combined with a demand for 
genuine steps to solve the Sudanese problems which had precipitated the 
current. civil war. The Prime Minister was forced to dissolve the 
coalition government and was forced to call upon the DUP African Party, 
the Sudan, Communist party, the trade unions and the professional 
associations to form a government of national unity. But the NIF refused 
to join the government after its members had resigned from the Umma party 
and NIF coalition government. 
The coalition government for national unity was formed with all the' 
political parties with members in the constituent assembly represented 
with the exception of NIF and the independent group in'the Assembly. The 
trade unions and the military were also represented in the cabinet. The 
National Islamic Front became the official opposition with 48 members 
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only, for three of its members in the Assembly had resigned from the 
party and joined DUP on the grounds that the NIF was not interested in 
peace, nor stability of the country. 
The Government of National Unity adopted and endorsed the Addis Ababa 
Agreement between Mr. Al-Mirghani and Col. Dr. John Garang of 16th 
November 1988. The Constituent Assembly also endorsed the Agreement with 
clear majority. The SPLA/SPLM Chairman and commander in chief responded 
by declaring a cease-fire for two months, subject to renewal. The new 
government sent a high level delegation to meet SPLA/SPLM leaders in 
Addis. During the meeting, it was agreed by both parties that the 
government and the movement were to have another meeting on 4th July 1989 
to prepare the constitutional conference. It was also agreed by the two 
parties, the government was to begin implementing the Al-Mirghani/Garang 
agreement as soon as possible. on 30th June a pro-National Islamic Front 
group of officers made a successful coup d'etat and the Agreement died 
down. 
The military regime of General Omer Hassan Bashir, claimed that the 
Revolution took place because the Government and the political parties 
had failed to solve all national problems and only resorted to their 
local or internal differences, and the new government was to solve the 
main problems facing the country solved peacefully, but it abolished 
instead, all peace agreements and initiatives and to start from square 
one. Until the end of 1989, the military regime was not able to accept 
any SPLA/SPLM demands for recognition and acceptance of Koka Dam and 
Mirghani and Garang's Agreement as the basis for any negotiations. 
Furthermore all the attempts by the former USA President to mediate could 
not bear fruit. Instead the military regime organized its own 11- months 
conference on the current political crisis in the Sudan where certain 
resolutions were passed and adopted as basis for the military regime to 
follow. Among the recommendations by the conference. was the establishment 
of Federal System of Government where Islamic Laws will be the basis of 
legislation for all nationalities on the Federal level meanwhile each 
state will be free to choose any type of laws acceptable to the people in 
the state. And that the question of Sharia Laws in the Sudan could be 
left to the constitutional conference (or referendum) which will involve 
SPLM/SPLA and the military regime only excluding all national political 
forces. The failure to reach an agreement between the military regime and 
the SPLA/SPLM has resulted to the resumption of war while peaceful 
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solution to the problems was ignored by both sides. 
8.5 The Role of External Political Forces of the Emergence and 
an Development of Sudanese Political Crises since 1972-1989 
In this section the author will attempt to examine an discuss the role of 
external political forces in the emergence and the development of the 
current civil war in Sudan. 
In its political manifesto, the SPLM/SPLA affirms the existence of 
"External real and potential enemies", and which consists of two groups, 
the 'African and Arab reactionary countries and the Imperialist 
countries'. For SPLM/SPLA, the African and Arab reactionary countries 
comprise those countries which 'have real and imagined interests in 
Sudan'. 111 And that 'They will also feel threatened by socialist 
engulfment, and will be instigated by international reaction. "112 
The imperialist countries or the other hand equally have real interests 
in Sudan because Sudan is potentially rich in agriculture and actually 
rich in minerals (oil and uranium) in Southern Region. 
113 
In this study, the author has managed to identify those African and Arab 
reactionary countries, mentioned by SPLA/SPLM's political manifesto, as 
real and potential enemies. Those countries described in the same 
manifesto as imperialist, are also identified by the author. The Author 
used various ways to obtain evidence. ' supporting SPLA/SPLM perspectives 
on external factors, which included interviews of SPLA/SPLM leaders, 
political leaders in Khartoum and London. International and local media 
ie. radio news, newspapers, magazines and books relevant to the Sudanese 
political crises are also used as evidence. 
The first to be identified are the African reactionary countries which 
SPLA/SPLM leader think are real and potential enemies. The majority of' 
SPLA/SPLM leade7interviewed stated that they have no real enemies in 
East and South Africa with the exception of Republic of SouthL Africa 
and the reasons are very clear. In West Africa, the Movement said there 
are no real enemies with the exception of some political leaders who did 
not like SPLA/SPLM because of the misconception that the movement is 
anti-Islamic, which the sectarian leaders in Sudan and those supporting 
them have successfully propagated in the international media and press. 
Some Western African Muslim leaders have shown directly their anti- 
spLA/SPLM feelings by refusing its leaders the opportunity to visit their 
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countries in order to explain the causes of the civil war in Sudan. 114 
in North Africa, both reactionary and semi-progressive countries have 
been showing anti-SPLA/SPLM feelings in their media, press etc. The 
North-Western African countries had formed the Union of Arab countries in 
1986 composed of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya to 
promote Arabism and Islamism, the twin words of Arab nationalism. The 
organization mentioned above is financed by Libya for political 
expediency and Libya has interests in the Sudan, where it has an army 
stationed in Western Sudan, since 1985 to fight against Chad. Libya 
supports the Khartoum Government financially and directly fighting 
spLA/SPLM using Libyan Air Force bombarding movement targets including 
civilian villages, and several Libyan plans have been short down in both 
zones (ie. I and 11). 
115 Here it is easy to assume that the entire 
members of the Union of Western Arab States are against SPLA. SPLM because 
of Libyan involvement and because they may see the movement as being the 
enemy of 'Arabism and Islamism' which in their position as Arab 
nationalists should be defended and protected. 
116 
it is important to say that Egypt, although it has been trying to play 
the neutral game, is seen by SPLA/SPLM leaders as a real enemy because of 
its historical and potential interests to annexe the Sudan, if not 
exploit it. Since in Chapter 2 the Author has explained the nature of 
Egyptian historical interests in Sudan, it suffices to say here that 
Egypt continues to be dependent on the Nile and is a potential threat to 
the independence and national integration of Sudan. 117 
As for the Arab countries, whether reactionary or not, their policies, 
activities and media have shown anti-SPLA/SPLM tendencies. While most 
Arab countries claim that they support the minority clique ruling Sudan 
on racial and religious grounds, this study argues that there are other 
ulterior motives which have also played crucial parts in encouraging Arab 
countries to intervene always in Sudanese internal political development. 
As described in chapters 2 and 3, the existence or Arab Settler 
colonialism in Sudan, is confirmed by the activities of Arab countries in 
Sudan, just like the Western European Countries for the White minority 
regime in South Africa. Like South African whites, the Arab minority 
clique in Sudan have been calling upon Arab countries to defend and 
protect Arabism and Islamism in Sudan, otherwise history would repeat 
itself, and the same thing would happen as happened in Zanzibar in 1962. 
This would mean that if SPLM/SPLA took over power in Sudan, all Arabs 
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would be thrown out and all Arab interests would be destroyed and Sudan 
would cease to be an Arab state as it had always been. 
118 Countries like 
Oman, Qatar or United Arab Emirates are usually reminded of John Ukele 
the leader of the revolution and what he did to the Arab State of 
Zanzibar and its Arab ruling families. 
119 The call for Arab Unity to 
defend Arab civilization (ie. Arab culture and Islam) and Arab hegemony 
in Sudan, became the basis of Sudanese foreign relations, whose 
membership to the Arab League and other Arab Regional organizations are 
given special importance while relations with non-Arab African countries 
are ignored or given no importance unless for political gain or 
expedience only. 
120, 
The other ulterior motive in urging most Arab countries to support the 
minority ruling clique in Khartoum is its economic interests. This 
economic factor is not new and goes as far back as the long-distance Arab 
slave traders before the present name Sudan was adopted. This point is 
made clear in the following quotation: 
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"Both British colonialism and more recent foreign capital 
(investment) share one primary objective: a high return on 
investment, British Manufacturers wanted cheap cotton and the 
oil rich Arab states now want cheap food. This is the economic 
reality behind the oft-quoted reference to Sudan as "bread 
basket of the Arab World". Most significant in this respect is 
the massive Kuwaiti and Saudi financing of development 
projects employing western firms and techniques. These 
. 
projects include large irrigation schemes like Rahad and Kashm 
al Girba and the construction of the Jonglei Canal designed to 
bye-pass the Sudd and thereby increase the river Nile flow. " 
And other development projects where Arab and Western capital was 
involved include Kenana Sugar Scheme', the 1 million acre commercial 
cattle farm being developed by AZL International (a subsidiary of USA 
Company) the mechanized farming project in Damazine area. the western 
savannah development scheme, the IDA financed New Halfa Agricultural 
Rehabilitation Scheme, plus the White Nile Oil company with Chevron Oil 
Company, Arab capital and British firm (Lonrho). 
122 
There are several other small and large agricultural schemes financed by 
the Arab countries including the multi-lateral Arab Fund, known as 
'Triple Aid' which was established in 1977 under the auspices of the 
Kuwaiti based Arab Fund for economic and social development and which 
envisaged a '10-year investment programme, costing over 6 billion US 
dollars to finance a large number of interrelated schemes designed to 
bring the annual growth of Sudan's agricultural sector to an estimated 
6%. '123 
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It should be noted that the planned massive Arab investment in Sudan 
failed to achieve the annual 6% growth target and instead Sudan ended up 
in crisis or regional inequalities and with huge debts amounting to 
almost 15 billion USA dollars before the ten-year investment programme 
was completed. 124 
The main reason for the Triple Aid investment Programme to fail was 
because the aim was not to develop Sudan economically but to transfer its 
resources, whether raw materials or animals and agricultural products to 
the Arab countries. And it was for these reasons that the so-called 
Muslim multilateral fund and others were used to finance small projects 
in the fields of horticulture, dairy processing, glucose production, 
poultry farming, cattle ranges, trade, banking, imports and exports 
activities including the hard currency markets both white and black. The 
transfer of material resources from Sudan to Arab countries specially 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Oman and Libya consist of thousands of tons 
of meat, chickens, milk, vegetables airlifted daily from various Sudanese 
airports, Khartoum, Port Sudan, Damazine, Wed Medani, Atbara etc. without 
customs authorities being involved but a few top level officials who are 
paid foreign currency directly into their private accounts, while the 
Sudanese masses remain poor. While Sudanese meat was shipped to Arab 
countries, the Ministry of Commerce and Trade had to import meat of all 
kinds from Australia and elsewhere. Similarly, Sudanese Sugar from Kenman 
Hager Assalaya, Kashm al Girba and Guenade was sent to Arab countries 
while the government had to import sugar, rice etc. at a high price which 
the poor Sudanese could not afford to pay. 
Furthermore, in spite of the massive investment of a 25 million dollar 
vegetable scheme, constructed by Ritz Pompen of West Germany, the 75 
million dollar Arab Sudanese poultry company plus a slaughter house, 92 
million dollars edible oils project, 37.5 million dollar starch glucose 
factory, 88 million dollar Arab Sudanese Dairy Company, 36 million dollar 
feedmill scheme by SWECO, Sweden, and others, with total investment of 
250 million dollars, plus 200 million Euro-dollar loan organized by 
Adrian Khashogi, the Saudi multi-millionaire invested in textiles, 
matches, soap and glass industries, the economic progress of the country 
continued to go bad. 
125 
In addition, Arab controlled projects, the Arab Bank, most of them 
carrying false names or Islamic titles, were set up to make financial 
control and transfer of profits much easier and these banks include Arab 
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Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDIA) the OPEC special fund, 
the Kuwait based inter-Arab investment Guarantee Fund, the Saudi 
Development Fund, and the Islamic Bank, the Feisal Islamic Bank and 
Feisal Islamic Investment Company. The marriage of Arab and western 
European finance capital completed the scenario of the exploitation and 
expropriation of Sudanese material resources. 
The exploitation of Sudanese wage-labour forces by Arab countries led to 
the revival of neo-slavery. While several thousand Sudanese were employed 
in personnel, accounts, administration and labourers in both industrial 
and agricultural schemes in Sudan, the Arab countries set up the policy 
of 'brain-drain' for several thousands specialized cadres and millions of 
labourers now working in various Arab countries as semi-slaves most of 
whom are underpaid. 126 
It is because of these interests in Sudan, that the country is seen as 
being threatened by the SPLA/SPLM socialist orientated policies, that led 
the Arab and Imperialist countries to fight the movement. Both Arab and 
Imperialist countries have to defend their interests, by supporting 
European Finance Capital to complete the process of exploitation and 
expropriation of Sudanese material resources. 
The other area of exploitation was the Sudanese wage-labour force, which 
has always been subject to foreign exploitation since the slavery period. 
Historically, the Arab slave trade exported Sudanese to Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates in order to use them as 
labourers in various fields including domestic servants. 
The abolition of slavery through United Nations Human Rights convention, 
deprived badly those imperialist countries which had depended on slave 
trade as the cheapest source of labour. But the internationalization of 
capital and labour, facilitated the creation of neo-slavery under 
capitalist production. The new emigration of Sudanese labour in search of 
employment began in the 1960s when Sudanese went to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Lebanon and Oman as cooks, drivers, labourers etc. but in a small 
number. In 1973-79 the number of Sudanese labour emigration increased 
tremendously mainly because of oil price increases and resulting in the 
boom in oil exports of North Africa and the Middle East. 
For example in 1975 the estimates of Sudanese emigrants rose from 26,000 
to over 60,000. In the 1980s the level of emigration had reached an 
estimated 250,000 to 500,000 or more workers, plus another 100,000 
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dependents abroad. The United Nations, International Labour Office, on 
employment and Economic Reform, in the Sudan, has estimated the number of 
Sudanese working in four Arab countries, namely Kuwait, Yemen, United 
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (while countries like Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon were not examined) as high as 1.6 million migrants 
excluding unrecorded labour emigrants, estimated at 100,000.127 
ILO estimated that more than 90% of Sudanese workers abroad (SWA) are 
male and over 80% of them are married, the average being their mid-30s, 
while a large proportion of SWA are formally unskilled. Another estimate 
by ILO shows 40% to be unskilled and illegal workers. 
128 This migration 
is clearly a major drain on artisanal, intellectual, technical and 
managerial skills that in other circumstances could have served Sudan's 
domestic economy well. 
129 Table 8.11 shows the pattern of SWA skills. 
Yemen has the highest proportion of unskilled SWA (54%) and United Arab 
Emirates the lowest (27%). Furthermore, Yemen received 20% of the total 
number of illiterate Sudanese workers abroad (See Table 8.12). An 
estimated equivalent of 50% of replacement stock of technicians, 
assistants and skilled workers graduating within Sudan 
TABLE 8.11: SKILL PROFILE OF SUDANESE WORKING ABROAD IN FOUR GULF 
COUNTRIES 
---------------- 
Category of 
--------- 
Saudi 
-------- 
Kuwait 
-------- 
Yemen 
------------ 
United 
-------- 
Worker 
------------ 
Arabia 
--------- -------- -------- 
Arab Emirat 
----- 
es TOTAL 
---- 
Managers 2,523 
ý 
337 119 
------- 
312 
-------- 
3,291 
Professionals 12 757 1,018 1.326 2.461 17,742 
Technicians 7: 018 520 410 2,319 10.261 
Administrators 5.589 597 252 2,981 9.510 
Clerks 15.301 1,566 902 2,753 20,522 
Skilled workers 56,924 2.841 1,219 8,805 69,789 
Semi-skilled 
workers 
---------------- 
22,398 
--------- 
1,219 
--------- 
291 
------- 
1.326 
-------- 
25,234 
TOTAL 
---------------- 
122.510 
--------- 
8.098 
--------- 
4.519 
------- 
---- 
20-957 
------------ 
-------- 
156,349 
-------- 
Source: Hazli Choucri: Final Report: A study of Sudanese Nationals 
working abroad, Vol. 1,1985, quoted by ILO, Ceneva, Employment 
and Economic Reform: Towards a strategy for the Sudan, 1986. 
might have been emigrating between 1977-1980. As much as two thirds of 
the technical and professional workforce of Sudan may have been abroad in 
1985. The SWA have had on average 12 years of work experience before 
leaving, so the human capital outflow is more than that indicated by 
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TABLE 8.12: TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CENTRAL TO REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 
SUDAN 
-1 
Regions 
----------------- 
1983/84 
---------------- 
1985/86 
------------------ 
1986/87 
-------- ---- 
1. 
-- 
Northern Region 52,000,000 55,000,000 
---------- 
118,300,000 
---- 
2. 
------------------- 
Eastern Region ' 
---------------- 
37,100,000 
------------------- 40,000,000 ----------------- 105,200,000 
---- 
3. 
------------------- 
Central Region 
------- 
---------------- 
72,000,000 
---------------- 
------------------- 86,000,000 
------------------- 
----------------- 
205.700,000 
- ---- 4. 
------------ 
Kordofan 47,500,000 50,000.000 
---------------- 
132,100,000 
---- 
5. 
------------------- 
Darfur 
----------------- 
---------------- 
38,000,000 
---------------- 
------------------- 40,000,000 
------------------- 
----------------- 
114, ooo. ooo 
----------------- ---- 6. 
-- 
HEC Region 
--------- 
- 50-000 
---------------- 
2,500.000 
-------------- 
1,500,000 
---- 
7. 
-- 
---------- 
Equatoria ý 
------------------- 
21,400,000 
---------------- 
----- 
24,500.000 
------------------- 
----------------- 
85,000.000 
----------------- -- 8. Upper Nile 
- --------- 
17,300,000 
----------- : ----- 
19.300,000 
----------- 
58,000,000 
---- 
9. 
---------- 
Bahr el Ghazal 
----------- 
19,300,000 
---------------- 
-------- 
21,500,000 
---------------- 
----------------- 
52,000,000 
---- 
10. 
-------- 
National Capital 31,100,000 
--- 61,000,000 ----------------- 131,000.000 
---- 
11. 
---- 
------------------- 
Regional Reserved 
------------------- 
---------------- 
335.700,000 
---------------- 
------------------- 454,900.000 
------------------- 
----------------- 
1003,300,000 
---------------- 
Source: Fadlalla, Bashir Omer, Unbalanced Development and Re ional 
Disparity in the Sudan, University of Khartoum Press, 198 . 
0 
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educational levels. Table 8.12 shows educational level of Sudanese 
working abroad in the four Gulf countries based on weighted observations 
M. 
The above mentioned migration of Sudanese to Arab countries, affects not 
only Sudanese Society but the national economy too. It also revives the 
process of slavery causing Sudanese workers to be underpaid and being 
mistreated as well as treating them as half human beings. 
TABLE 8.1 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF SUDANESE WORKING ABROAD "//yj 
` 
j/` ULf 
COUNTRIES 
------------------- 
Educational 
--------- 
Saudi 
-------- 
Kuwait 
------- 
Yemen 
---------- 
United 
-------- 
level Arabia Arab 
Emirates Overall 
------------------- 
Post-graduate 
--------- 
2.1 
-------- 
5.2 
------- 
1.1 
---------- 
4.8 
-------- 
2.5 
University 5.0 5.6 14.2 8.1 5.7 
Technical Institute 2.7 2.8 2.3 11.0 3.7 
High School 11.1 20.6 38.6 23.6 14.1 
Intermediate 16.7 28.6 6.7 14.2 17.0 
Primary 36.3 15.7 11.8 18.2 32.4 
Craft Training 0.8 3.4 - 2.6 1.3 
Illiterate 
-------------------- 
18.1 
-------- 
12.3 
-------- 
20.3 
------- 
5.6 
---------- 
16.6 
-------- 
Source: See Nazli Choucri above Table 6.1 
The combination of economic, political (labour and capital), religious 
interests as analysed above prompted the Arab countries to reject any 
social change which may affect their interests. The SPLA/SPLM call for a 
new Sudan where genuine justice, equality and human rights are fully 
maintained, can be seen by both Arab and Western countries as a communist 
threat. For 7 years most Arab countries with interests in Sudan have 
supported the Khartoum regime with funds and military equipment. 
Furthermore, some Arabs have been practically involved in the fighting 
against SPLA/SPLM forces. For example, Libya, Jordan and Iraq have 
several times bombarded SPLA/SPLM liberated towns in Southern Sudan, as 
well as Southern Kordofan and Southern and Northern Funj areas. SPLA/SPLM 
have claimed the shooting down. of 40 military aircraft while they were 
bombing the South and in 1989 SPLA/SPLM captured one Mig 23 Russian made 
fighter which is still under the authority of the Movement, together with 
its pilot. Iraq's plans were brought to bombard Kurmuk Gizzan, and 
other small towns in Blue Nile area in 1988 after SPLA/SPLH had captured 
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them. 
Those Arab countries involved in the civil war in Sudan do claim that 
they are fighting against Christian enemies in Southern Sudan, supported 
by the World Council of Churches. These countries also claim that they 
are defending Arabism, Islamism and their fellow Arabs in Sudan. 
But the truth of the matter is that these Arab countries and the Western 
European countries which have been supporting various Sudanese regimes 
have done so to further their material interests, since their political 
independence 34 years ago. For strategic purposes, both Arab countries 
and the Western finance capital do not want an economically and 
politically strong Sudan that can call into question malpractices 
involving foreign trade and aid and the looting involved. Hence it is 
logical to support, by all means, the established order. The question that 
may be asked is, can they maintain this system indefinitely? The answer 
known to most Sudanese is 'No'. 
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Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and 
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) on 3rd August 1983. 
5. A statement made by SPLAM/SPLM Chairman on August 3rd, 1983 op. cit. 
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CHAPTER 9 
The foregoing chapters have dwelt on two distinct subjects; the political 
and economic background to the current political crisis in the Sudan. 
Chapter 1 has been devoted to the theoretical and literature analysis. 
Chapter 2 has traced the origin of uneven development under various 
colonial powers. Chapter 3 and 4 have been devoted to the role of the 
merchant capital in the underdevelopment of Southern Sudan. Chapters 5 
and 6 have been devoted to the role of the sectarian political parties 
and the state apparatus, in the establishment of domination and 
exploitation of some national groupings by one powerful minority group. 
Chapter 7 and 8 have been devoted to the analysis of the origins, 
structure, ideology, leadership and various political programmes and 
strategies adopted by political and liberation movements from the 
backward areas. 
In the forthcoming pages the author will bring together briefly the main 
arguments as well as some aspects of the problems which have been ignored 
so far in order to make conclusions and proposals since the war of 
liberation has not only reached its end, but began especially in the 
northern regions among progressive tribes. 
This study has demonstrated that unequal distribution of national 
economic and political resources has been responsible for the existence 
of regional inequalities and injustice throughout the Sudan. This study 
has equally indicated that the current political violence (civil war) was 
precipitated by the following: - 
Repressive policies adopted by the state towards the national groups 
from the less developed regions. 
2. The widening gap of per capita income between the areas where 
development projects have been concentrated and the areas which have 
been underdeveloped. 
3. The political alienation or marginalization of national groups in the 
less developed regions, reflected in their limited participation in 
national decision making processes. 
The repressive policies adopted by the central Government during the post 
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independent period led to the 1955 Torit Uprising which became the basis 
of the seventeen year civil war in the Sudan which caused the death of 
over half a million Sudanese, the majority of whom were from the backward 
areas with Southern Sudan losing the largest proportion. Similarly with 
the Anya-nya II, the current violence in Darfur and SPLA/SPLM came into 
being because of the repressive polices adopted by various regimes in the 
Sudan. For example, the Southern Sudanese have been experiencing states 
of emergencies whether during military rule or civilian rule, for more 
than thirty of the thirty- three years of Sudan's independence. 
The existence of unequal economic opportunities have created the rapid 
widening of the gap of development between the areas where investment has 
been concentrated and the areas which have received little investment. 
The consequences of this uneven distribution of development projects, 
unjust appointments of senior and junior state officials and intake into 
the military police, prison service, colleges and universities, have 
created a monopoly of one national group over state jobs and resources, 
and therefore created more income differentials between those who 
controlled the state apparatus and those left outside in the cold. 
Similarly, the unequal distribution of political resources has led to the 
marginalization and alienation of most Of the other national groups by 
the minority or single national group, which had inherited political, 
economic and state power after independence. 
The above mentioned inequalities continue to be experienced by most 
Sudanese, in all the underdeveloped areas, whether in Central, Kordofan, 
Darfur, Eastern or in the Southern regions. They became more pronounced 
in the Southern region because the pressure of each item has been higher 
there than in other regions until very recently. This is confirmed by 
the fact that all the civil wars which have been experienced in the Sudan 
have originated in the Southern Sudan. The share of the Southern Sudan in 
all national and international funds allocated for economic development 
has continued to be the lowest. The share of educational facilities, 
health care, construction of modern roads and communication have also 
been the lowest. It is equally true that the share of the Southern Region 
in the state apparatus, including the national army, police, judiciary, 
foreign affairs and also in state corporations has always been the lowest 
compared to the share of the so-called Northern regions. The areas which 
have suffered similar injustices have been Southern Kordofan, Southern 
and Western Darfur, Southern and Northern Funj and the North of the 
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Eastern region (see Table 9.1 for further information). 
This study has also indicated that the people in those regions affected 
are the majority and represent more than 80 per cent of the population of 
the whole country. Another fact shown by the study is that the national 
groups in the affected areas are predominantly composed of people of 
African descent. 
on the other hand, this study has also demonstrated that those who enjoy 
economic and political monopoly belong to the minority group and 
represent less than 15 per cent of the entire national population. This 
minority group is mainly comprised of Arab and Arabized national groups 
which control over 90 per cent of national economic resources as 
reflected in the field of commercial enterprise, business or merchant 
capital; in the ownership of capitalist farms and industrial 
establishments in the whole country. Similarly, this minority also 
controls over 90 per cent of military and police officers, 90 per cent 
of senior state officials in all the ministries and departments 
including finance and economic planning, education, commerce and trade, 
the judiciary, foreign affairs and all universities and national 
research departments. This minority group also holds the greatest number 
of the political positions in the country. 
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As a consequence of all these controls, this minority group receives more 
than 90 per cent of the national income. it also receives more than 90 
per cent of places at universities and other institutions of higher 
education. It further enjoys more than 90 per cent of medical care, 
transport facilities, the best housing facilities, the best recreational 
services and last but not least, the highest standard of living in a sea 
of poverty which characterized the modern Sudanese towns. 
In two household budget surveys carried out in the Sudan in 1967-68 and 
1978-80, covering only six northern regions and involving 1,834 
households, results showed the existence of extreme regional 
inequalities. Table 9.1 shows the results of these two surveys. Although 
data on table 9.1 is not absolutely reliable due to lack of proper 
information on a comprehensive picture of the income inflow 
TABLE 9.2 Showing Regional Distribution of Key Policy Makinq Posts 
in the Central Government up to 1979-1987 (U 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Post Southern Region Northern Region 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Under secretary 0 100 
D/under secretary 0 100 
Chairman State Corporations 0 100 
Chairman National Research 
Council 0 100 
Vice-Chancellors of University 0 100 
Deputy Vice-Chancellors of 
University 0.9 99.1 
Ambassadors 2 98 
Directors 0 100 
D/Directors 0.9 99.1 
Army Generals 4 96 
Police Generals 0 100 
Prison officials 0 100 
Bank Managers 0 100 
Other senior state positions 
---------------------------- 
0 
--- 
100 
--- 
Source: Prepared by the author 
--------- 
for HEC and 
------------------ 
Southern Council 
files for resolutions and follow up. Feb. 1988. 
Khartoum. 
within the Sudanese economy, it does show a situation which most Sudanese 
feel exists. The general view, and one shared by the author, is that it 
is the best data so far and as such has been used by ILo experts in their 
survey of employment and equity in the Sudan. 3 
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TABLE 9.3 Distribution of Income of Rural and Urban Households 
in the Sudan. 1967-68 and 1978-80 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Decile Rural Urban Total 
--------------------------------------------------- 
1967-68 1978-80 1967-68 1978-80 1967-68 1978-80 
Bottom 2.3 1.0 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.0 
Second 1.3 2.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 2.6 
Third 5.5 3.6 1.7 4.9 4.7 4.0 
Fourth 6.0 5.0 5.4 5.8 5.4 4.8 
Fifth 6.6 6.1 6.5 6.8 6.3 6.0 
Sixth 8.0 7.2 7.6 7.9 7.7 7.4 
Seventh 9.8 8.8 9.5 9.5 9.7 9.4 
Eighth 12.1 11.1 11.6 11.3 12.0 11.5 
Ninth 14.8 15.3 15.7 14.0 15.0 15.5 
Top 26.7 
---- 
30.5 
--------- 
33.4 
---------- 
33.2 
--------- 
33.1 
------- 
37.8 
-------- ----------- 
Gini Ratio 
--- 
0.34 
------- 
0.51 
--------- 
0.41 
---------- 
0.42 
--------- 
0.41 
------- 
0.50 
-------- ----------- 
(Sample siz e 
households) (3,000) , (1,834), (4,080), (4,355), (7,080), (6,189) 
Source: Household Budget Survey (HBS) 1967-68, and Household income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) 1979-89, quoted by the Employment and 
Economic Reform in the Sudan, Geneva, 1986. 
It is clear from the above data that the distribution of income in the 
Sudan has become more unequal. The income share accruing to the poorest 
half of the population has declined from 21.9 per cent to 18.4 per cent 
in the 1970s, whereas the income share of the top 20 per cent has risen 
from 48.1 per cent to 53.3 per cent. overall, the Gini Ratio increased 
from 0.41 to 0.50, which indicates that the distribution of income moved 
from being moderately unequal to a very unequal one. Furthermore, Table 
9.1 shows that increased inequality originated in rural Sudan, whereas 
the concentration of income in urban centres hardly changed over time. 
But in actual fact the situation has changed with the exodus of millions 
of displaced poor people into the main urban areas in the country. The 
rural concentration ration increased from 0.34 to 0.51.4 In actual fact 
the rural-urban income disparities on the whole has widened. 
Table 9.4 shows the distribution of rural and urban household income and 
expenditure in 1967-68 and 1978-80, which may be a more reliable source 
because it reflects better the standard of living of households. This 
table therefore reviews the income and expenditure concentration ratios 
that have been derived from the two surveys. 5 
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TABLE 9.4 Gini Ratios of Rural and Urban Household income and 
Expenditure, 1967-68 and 1978-80 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Area Income Expenditure 
------------------------------------------------------ 
1967-68 1978-80 1967-68 1978-80 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Rural 0.34 0.51 0.30 0.48 
Urban 0.41 0.42 0.33 0.30 
Sudan 0.41 0.50 0.35 0.35 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: HBS 1967-68 and HIES 1978-80 quoted by the ILO in Geneva 1986 in 
the Employment and Economic Reform in the Sudan. 
An ILO report on the Sudan published in 1986 confirmed the arguments 
advanced above and the report in question states as follows6: - 
"A major dimension of overall income inequalities in the Sudan is 
regional. Regional income disparities are high and growing over 
time. The poorest areas of the country comprise the Western 
and Southern regions. Data for the latter are very scant but it 
is generally accepted that standards of living in the Southern 
Sudan are the lowest in the country. Hence, much of the 
inequality amongst regions is due to the relatively low income 
levels in the south. For the six northern regions, as much as 
40 per cent of the inequality is explained by inter-regional 
disparities. " 
Although the above passage is right on the degree of poverty in the 
south, there are other areas in Southern Kordofan, Southern and Northern 
FUnj, in Eastern and Darfur regions which may be worse than the Southern 
Region which false data has disguised. 
Although attempts have been made by various regimes to redress some of 
the imbalance of primary incomes through progressive taxation and public 
expenditure, the net distributive impact of such measures has usually 
been very small. As a result, these attempts invariably fail to solve the 
problems of social change, particularly the problem of uneven 
development. on the contrary, every. leadership that comes to power 
continues to concentrate investment in the already developed areas and 
the centralization of final decision making and political power by the 
same national group results in the gap between the more developed areas 
and the neglected areas continually widening and the degree of repression 
and oppression continually increases. There have been experiments with 
several systems of government which include Liberal Democracy, Military 
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Dictatorship and One Party Autocratic Rule. The Despotic rule and 
regionalism with presidential authority in the central government have 
led to corrupt institutions not expressing the interest or the general 
will of the people. The simple reason is that the ruling class which 
continued to be dominated by members of the same national group since 
independence, has refused all demands for social change, socio-economic 
and political justice. It has equally violated all human rights ethics 
adopted internationally by all members of the United Nations and has 
instead institutionalized and legalized all illegal malpractices leading 
to injustice, human rights violations, segregation and racism based in 
the name of Islam and Arab nationalism which it claims to represent. 7 
All these injustices have therefore led to a bitter political struggle 
between the people and the ruling strata. For those national groups in 
power, the problems appear in their true form as a class struggle, which 
is reflected in the activities of various trade unions, professional 
associations or national alliance for salvation. But to the people of the 
national groups in the backward areas who are excluded from power and 
financial benefits, the problem appears as one of a struggle between 
their people on the one hand and the whole national group in power on the 
other. The dominant minority ruling strata which has mistaken its own 
aspirations for power, riches and prestige, as the interest of the masses 
and their national grouping. It appeals to the national sentiments of the 
masses of their grouping by seeking to rally them against the complaining 
nationals as 'separatists' or 'imperialist stooges', or anti-Islamism and 
Arabism. 8 By doing so, the ruling class has actually attempted to justify 
the mass massacres, or genocide or its repressive and oppressive policies 
towards the national groupings from the backward areas and even against 
their own members who have rejected their policies. The consequence of 
this confusion has been firstly the real issues such as social progress, 
equal rights and justice, have been lost sight of. Secondly, the 
oppressed and the exploited continue to be effectively divided and remain 
weak. Thirdly, the dominant ruling class continues to use racism, 
religion, tribalism or ethnicity as a weapon against any national group 
who may oppose or threaten its political and economic hegemony, and 
finally, the suffering of the masses continues indefinitely, while the 
minority ruling class continues with its exploitive, repressive and 
oppressive policies. Lenin, in his "The Three Sources and Three Component 
Parts of Marxism", has pointed out how the people under a capitalist 
society would suffer, which he put as follows9: _ 
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"People always were and always will be the stupid victims of 
deceit and self-deceit in politics until they learn to discover 
the interests of some class behind all moral, religious, 
political and social phrases, declarations and promises. " 
For thirty-three years, the dominant Sectarian ruling class has been able 
to use Islamism, Arabism and Africanism, mass media and state resources 
to mislead the Sudanese masses, to a point where the problems of socio- 
economic and political progress have been substituted by the problem of 
rivalry among various national groupings, represented on one side by the 
Arab and Arabized minority ruling clique, and on the other, by the 
African majority, as a group not only being exploited and suppressed but 
seeing itself as being colonized by the Arab settler colonial forces and 
supported by Arab imperialist countries. The African national group has 
cited several examples of evidence of settler colonialism, slavery, neo- 
slavery and crowned with the Arab transfer of material resources from the 
underdeveloped areas to the regions marked as the Arab homeland. 
The African majority continues to be considered as inferior, uncultured, 
savage, or infidels who are not fit to govern themselves and should 
therefore be governed by a 'superior' race, with a superior culture, 
language and religion. To justify this racism and injustice, the Arab 
dominant ruling clique had to adopt the policies of Arabization, 
Islamization and assimilation of all the Africans as a prerequisite for 
their full political and socio-economic emancipation. Furthermore, the 
existence of an African majority in the Northern regions, who are Muslims 
and yet are equally suffering along with the non-Muslim Southerners, is 
not only denied but condemned as anti-Islam and anti-Arab propaganda by 
communists, Imperialists, Southern Sudanese and the Christian 
missionaries. Those Northern Muslims and Arab Sudanese who support socio- 
economic and politfcal change in order to emancipate all Sudanese 
regardless of race, religion or political views are regarded as traitors 
or agents of foreign governments. 
The emergence of regional nationalism, in the form of a regional 
leadership demanding equal rights, equal representation in key policy 
making posts in the central government, ministries and departments, the 
national police, judiciary and foreign ministry, as well as equal 
representation on national financial institutions, like banks and various 
specialized corporations, and national research councils and National 
Admission Council and the National Examination Council, has been a cause 
of serious alarm among the dominant ruling class. 
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The most alarming news for the dominant Sectarian ruling class has been 
the emergence of SPLA/SPLM as a national liberation movement, committed 
to the unity of all national forces in the country in general and the 
backward areas in particular in order to liberate the entire country from 
neo-colonialism, Sectarian and bourgeoisie forces. The success of the 
SPLA/SPLM to win political support from members of various national 
groups, including Arabs, Muslims, Christians and others, marked a new 
dimension in the history of the country, especially when such support is 
genuinely given, without financial reward or prestige being gained on 
both sides. It equally marked the beginning of the new Sudan based on 
equality, equity and justice. The SPLA/SPLM objectives which include the 
separation of religion from politics, the liquidation of Sectarian 
bourgeoisie forces, the dismantling of the old political power base as 
represented by the economic base and the superstructure; and the 
establishment of a Federal Democratic Socialist State has been accepted 
by the masses. The movement has been able to penetrate all the tribal, 
racial, regional, religious, nationalist and ethnic boundaries. For 
nearly seven years, the movement has proved itself to be the first 
national liberation movement to be Joined voluntarily by all national 
groupings in the country, regardless or creed, race, regional background 
or family relations. It is most probably the only national movement that 
could be trusted not only by the national groups from the backward areas 
but also by those oppressed in the areas where development has been 
concentrated. It is the only movement which calls upon all Sudanese to be 
Sudanese first before being Africans, Arabs, Muslims, Christians, etc. in 
order to create a new Sudanese nation which has continued to be without 
direction until now. 
The SPLM/SPLA political strategy and programmes for transformation of the 
old Sudan into the new Sudan based on a new system of rule never tried 
before in the country, offers a chance for a genuine peaceful solution 
for the Sudanese political, economic and social crisis. SPLM/SPLA and the 
majority of Sudanese people support the establishment of a Federal 
Socialist Democratic secular system of government in the Sudan, after the 
reorganization of the national army, national civil service, political 
and economic structure, etc. to be followed by the redistribution of 
national economic and political resources. It is only by succumbing to 
the wind of change currently blowing throughout the world, exemplified by 
the events in Eastern and Western Europe, Latin America, Southern Africa 
and even Israel, that the Sudanese problems will easily be solved, 
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otherwise the only other choice will be between national disintegration 
and continuous civil war with an indefinite end and with all possible 
repercussions. For no one will be able to stop the wind of change 
blowing. Another fact is that Sudan will not be the same again, for the 
people have been made aware of their rights and how to claim or maintain 
them under all conditions. Another truth about the current Sudanese 
socio-economic and political structure is that they cannot be reformed 
but can only be abolished and replaced with new structures which will be 
capable of resisting the destroying forces of corruption, racism, 
tribalism, sectarianism, regional nationalism, oppressive and exploitive 
merchant class "Jallaba" and to eradicate slave trade mentality, black 
market mentality and many others which have been responsible for the 
existence of civil war or political violence, injustice, inequality or 
income differentials or gaps between the rich and the poor. 
Unfortunately, the SPLA/SPLM objectives will not be easily realised 
because of the weakness of the oppressed people on one side and because 
the dominant minority clique has significant support - both militarily 
and economically from the rich Arab and Islamic countries such as Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Emirates, Libya, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Yemen, Jordan and Egypt. 
Another weakness facing the SPLA/SPLM is the lack of financial and 
military equipment in order to meet the massive military capability of 
the state. 
Finally, any solution to the Sudanese current political crisis short of a 
SpLA/SPLM victory will probably not last long - not even as long as the 
period following the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
It is arguable that the most agreeable solution to the majority of the 
Sudanese would be within the following eight points: - 
The constitution of Sudan must be secular-federal with a 
parliamentary form of government and a legislature directly elected 
on the basis of adult franchise. 
2. Federal subjects to be limited to defence and foreign affairs, where 
in each case, a national army commission is created to make military 
policies; and for foreign affairs, a national council responsible for 
the appointment of all the staff including ambassadors will be 
formed. 
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3. There should be (i) separate currencies for both Southern and 
Northern regions, freely convertible into each other, (ii) in the 
alternative one currency subject to statutory safeguards against 
flight of capital from the south to the north. 
4. Power of taxation and revenue collections to be vested in the 
federating units, the centre to be financed by allocation of a share 
in the states taxes. 
5. Separate foreign exchange accounts to be kept for the south and the 
north Sudan, the requirement of the federal government to be met by 
all states in proportion or on any other fixed basis as may be agreed 
upon. 
6. Self sufficiency of Southern Sudan and other backward states in 
matters of security and defence. Here, old British systems of the 
military set-up be adopted and that is, each region should have a 
fixed number of army battalions composed of citizens from each region 
permanently stationed there. Each region will also be represented by 
a fixed number of officers and men which will form a national army 
under the command of a Joint Chief of Staff in order to prevent 
domination. Furthermore, an ordnance factory and military academy to 
be set-up in the southern region. The reorganization of the Sudanese 
armed forces will be the supreme prerequisite for the success of the 
Agreement based on this scheme. This is because the history of the 
country before, during and after the Anglo-Egyptian colonisation was 
marked by the Southerners' deep distrust of the enterprising and one- 
time slave-raiding Arab settlers in the north. The Anya-nya army was 
born on the eve of Sudan's independence out of this fear and had 
fought tenaciously for over a decade to rid itself of it. The 
emergence of Anya-nya II and finally SPLA/SPLH after the Addis Ababa 
Agreement had failed to maintain the security guarantee. Any lasting 
hope of settlement will have been founded on adequate security 
guarantees for the south. This is all the more important in view of 
Khartoum's declared intentions to unite with Arab countries and to 
use Arab military might as a guarantee for the security of Arab 
nationals in the Sudan, if any of their members face internal 
insurrection. in the midst of such uncertainties and with threats of 
an all purpose Arab Union, the Southern Sudanese with their distinct 
non-Arab culture and interests, will need more than ever before, 
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concrete safeguards assuring them that on the crucial question of 
security they can be masters of their own fate, until such time when 
genuine trust, justice and equality is established on all sides. 
7. The national capital should be removed from Khartoum to Bentiu area 
in order to allow those Muslims in Khartoum to choose freely the 
state laws they wish to adopt. While Bentiu as the new national 
capital should be free of any religious laws because it will belong 
to all free Sudanese communities or nationalities who will be free to 
worship any religion in their mosques, churches or homes. 
8. Arabic and English languages will be used as the main national 
languages on the federal level, but each state or region will be free 
to establish its own language or languages as a medium of exchange. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The study found that the only Deputy Vice Chancellor who was a 
Southerner was Dr. Akolda Mayen, former Senior Lecturer in the 
Faculty of Law, University of Khartoum. Dr. Mayen was appointed 
Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Juba in 1990. 
2. The study found that there was only one Southerner in the Department 
of Planning, Central Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in 
Super Scale in Group II. Mr. Isaac Bior Deng was a Director of 
Planning in the Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
but was dismissed in 1982 by a pro-Divisionist President of the High 
Executive Council, Southern Region. After both disagreed on the 
Division issue. Mr. Bior was later employed by the Central 
Government. 
3. The Author found that in Sudan, it was very difficult if not 
impossible to obtain information related to economic development or 
statistical data on income earnings and differentials. Those that are 
available are unreliable. It becomes more difficult in the South 
where very limited study has been carried out. 
4. In 1987, the Author visited squatters around the National Capital 
Khartoum, and the number of these 'residents', given to the author by 
the Chairman of Displaced People, was two million, including 1.5 
million Southerners. Similarly in Port Sudan and Wad Medani, it was 
found that nearly half a million displaced people were living. 
5. See Household Budget Survey (HBS) 1967-68, and Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) 1979-89 quoted by the Employment Economic 
Reform in the Sudan, Geneva, 1986. 
6. See ILO Report, quoted in 5, op. cit. 
7. Interview with Father Philip Abbas Gabush, in Khartoum in September 
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1987, ibid. 
Joseph Garang, 7be Southern Problem, ibid. 
This is quoted by Joseph Garang on the Dilemma of Southern 
intellectuals, Khartoum, 1970. Ibid. 
'3ý 
APPENDIX 
1 
APPENDIX 1 
RE: Khartoum Anyanya 
Negotiation Guidelines. 
The General Headquarters 
Anyanya National Armed Forces 
South Sudan 
January 24,1972 
The Commander in Chief 
Anyanya National Armed Forces 
Leader of the South Sudan Liberation Movement 
Members of the Anyanya. SSLM Negotiation Committee 
Dear Compatriots 
That we are strong, growing force and a power to be reckoned with in 
Sudanese politics. Status and future is evidenced by the fact that the 
Khartoum Administration is now interested in negotiating a peace 
settlement directly with the Anyanya. 
We must take a firm stand all the way in the forthcoming talks. The 
Nimeiri regime is a sick administration ripe to collapse any time. We 
must not be tricked into committing suicide to lay down our instruments 
of liberation arms, by a withering and dying regime just for the purpose 
of lengthening its own days of breath or just that some opportunistic 
Southerners find a means of employment in the blood of our people. 
We are already at war and we are growing stronger everyday while sooner 
or later the Nimeiri regime will go, but nothing will ever defeat us if 
we persist in the war. 
Let no one among you or among the enemy have the mistaken and 
opportunists view that these talks are the last chance of peace for the 
Southern Sudanese people. Let no one have the incorrect view that if 
these talks collapse and fail war will break out. we are already at war 
for the last nine to seventeen years. The Anyanya and the Southern 
Sudanese people are capable and ready to fight on for another nine years 
or more if no correct and acceptable solution is found. 
Any solution within the context of a New United Sudan must first and 
foremost recognize the Anyanya as the legitimate army of the Southern 
Sudanese people. The implementation of whatever degree of merging agreed 
by the negotiating armies and administrations to the United New Sudan 
must take not less than ten year; during this time the two armies and 
administrations must maintain separate identities while conditions for 
their gradual merging into the United New Sudan are being created by both 
sides. This is the only procedure that guarantees the future and 
interests of the Southern Sudanese people in a United New Sudan and the 
only objective indication that both sides are sincere in seeking the 
cessation of belligerancy, peaceful settlement and life in a United 
Sudan. 
Following is a more comprehensive presentation of guidelines to the 
spirit, objectives and strategy which should be adopted at the talks and 
which, if followed, could Possibly lead to a solution acceptable to the 
rank-and-file of the Anyanya and the Southern Sudanese People. 
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(A) THE OBJECTIVE REALITIES: 
The Central Problem in the Sudanese war is the dominance of Arab 
nationalism. It is historically a universal law that in whatever 
multi-nationality country where one of the nationalities is 
economically and politically (and therefore socially and culturally) 
dominant over the other nationalities, that country is pregnant with 
instability, discontent and crisis, eventually erupting in warfare. 
Such has been the case in the Sudan. 
II. The Southern Sudanese People, in conformity with historical 
necessity, took up arms against the glaring oppression and neglect 
meted on them by the forces of Arab Nationalism, an oppression and 
neglect which were as glaring as they were cruel, reckless and 
wrecking as they were arrogant. It was only after the virtual 
exhaustion of all peaceful constitutional possibilities of multi- 
national coexistence within a United Progressive Sudan that the 
disaffection and indignation of the Southern Sudanese People reached 
their human boundaries and war broke out, war had to break out. 
Constitutional guarantees against the exactions and barbarities of 
Arab nationalism, accommodations and adjustment to the mal- practices 
of Arab Chauvinism have all failed in the past to be respected and to 
meet the aspirations of the Southern Sudanese People. This is why 
war had to break out in the first place. 
IV. There is no reason, absolutely no objective reason for clearheaded 
Southerners and Northerners alike to believe after eight years and 
more of continuous warfare and repeated failures of some forms of 
constitutional guarantees, that paper constitutional guarantees are 
now going to solve the war in the Sudan. Any Southerner who holds the 
mistaken view that Arab Nationalism is now sincere, now means good 
business, now gives the South local autonomy in good faith and that 
this autonomy will be guaranteed by a few phrases scribbled on some 
sheets of paper stapled and bound together and christened "The 
Constitution", that Southerner either suffers from acute historical 
myopia or else advocates the treasonable stand of opportunism, 
national subjugation and continued Arab Chauvinism and domination; in 
short, such Southerner calls for surrender in a camouflaged form. 
V. it is historically evident that unless a correct consistent Social 
Democratic solution is found to the Central Question, i. e., to the 
problem of economic and political domination of Arab Nationalism over 
the other nationalities, then, any attempts at solving the war in the 
Sudan, no matter how refined and logical on paper, will always end in 
certain failure. 
VI. There is no objective indication that the Khartoum-based Arab 
nationalist administration are capable of concluding a consistent 
democratic solution to the Nations... with its predatory nature, 
and declared solution and as "local autonomy" within the context of a 
United Arab Sudan. Such muddleheadedness turns us back to 1963 and 
1965 and is an objective indication that the necessary mutation which 
would enable ruling Northerners to face up to the objective realities 
of the Sudan has not as yet taken root, 
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VII. There are only two possible ways of resolving the Sudanese crises: 
The birth of two nation-states out of the present (geographical) 
Sudan, or political autonomy for both the South and the North (and/or 
any other part that so demands, in a federated United NEW Sudan. 
Political Autonomy in this usage means that the autonomous regions 
have adequate political power, in terms of armed force, to protect 
the regions against encroachment by the federation or by one of the 
regions in the federation, and, furthermore, that a region retains 
the right to seceded from the federation if its interests are not 
adecruately served by the federation. (it must be clear to Southerners 
that the retention of the right to seceded from such a federation 
must be guaranteed by the federal constitution and by the existence 
of a physical Southern Armed Forces). 
VIII. We cannot dwell on the status of matters regarding the super- 
structure such as the judicial system, fundamental rights and 
freedoms, personal liberty, freedom of religion and conscience, 
freedom of minority to use their language and develop their culture, 
education, telecommunications, census, etc., etc. (all contained in 
Mading de Garang's proposed constitution for the democratic republic 
of the Sudan). The status of these and others will ultimately depend 
on whether the solution is two nation-states or political autonomy 
above for the two regions (or more) in a federated ... Sudan. 
and not be allowed to ... the deliberation of 
the ... part VII 
above. 
(B) 
it is imperative that the basis and necessary conditions be for these 
basis and conditions to develop and mature so to objectively arrive at a 
United (NEW) Sudan and lasting peace. This approach is to start from the 
objective realities of the Sudan. it is chauvinistic and naive to start 
with the assumption of a United (ARAB) Sudan and then turn around and try 
to ... the contradictory objective realities 
to conform to the subjective 
naive assumption and wishes of a United Arab Sudan. Hence it follows from 
the objective facts in Section (A) that for a United New Sudan the 
following conditions must be met: 
I. Arab Nationalism in the Sudan must be categorically renounced. This 
concretely means that Arab Nationalism must no longer be an internal nor 
(therefore) an external policy and practice in the United NEW Sudan. 
II. There are at present two armies, the Anyanya and the Army of the 
Khartoum administration; these armies are now at war in the Sudan. This 
point we hope is recognized by all as an objective existence for that is 
precisely why there are negotiations. Well, if the Sudan is to be one 
United country, if this is the interests of both Northerners and 
Southerners, then which of these two warring armies will be the army of 
the NEW Sudan, the Anyanya, the Army of Khartoum administration, or both 
and how.... 
III. The Anyanya must then firstly be accepted by the Khartoum 
Administration as the Army of South Sudan. Failure to recognize the 
Anyanya as the legitimate Army of South Sudan would amount to denial or 
refusal to admit a physical existence, and the result of such naivety 
would be the inevitable collapse of the negotiations and the continuation 
of the war whether anybody likes it or not. 
IV. The solution to the war and for the United NEW Sudan must be viewed 
as a synthesis of two armies (the Anyanya and the Army of the Khartoum 
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rulers) and the formation of a new type of army consistent with the 
particularity of the NEW Sudan. The solution must not be looked at or 
hoped to be (as is always the case) the ABSORPTION of one army (the 
Anyanya) into the other (The Army of the Khartoum Arab Administration), 
but rather as we said as a SYNTHESIS of the two warring armies. Whether 
such a synthesis is possible depends on whether the necessary mutation 
within the forces of Arab Nationalism and within the Anyanya exists. I am 
not aware that there has been such an objective necessary mutation, but I 
am only assuming it's implied existence for otherwise there would be no 
objective grounds for the negotiationst And the originators of these 
negotiations could legitimately be charged with treasonable political 
scheming and racketeering against the beloved People. 
V. A minimum period of five years must initially be allowed for the 
creation and maturation of the necessary conditions and mutations 
required by the merging of the two belligerent armies and 
administrations, into the NEW Sudan divorced of belligerency and of the 
basic cause of belligerence, Arab Nationalism. The armies and 
administrations of the Anyanya and of the Khartoum dictatorship must 
maintain separate identities during these five years of groundwork for 
conditions of Unity. 
VI. After the first initial five years of groundwork another minimum 
period of five years must be allowed for the actualization of the agreed 
degree of merging by the two armies and administrations. Merging and the 
actual objective formation of the NEW Sudan will be rapid in the second 
five year period, since the necessary conditions and mutations for a 
United NEW Sudan will have been created in the first five years of 
groundwork. 
VII. We have made the above recommendations (guidelines) after a brief 
presentation of the objective political realities of the Sudan, nota bene 
Section (a) above. We have made these recommendations without fear of 
intimidation and with sincerity, objectivity and to the best interests of 
the Peoples of South Sudan, Africa and the world. We strongly believe 
that a United New Sudan and lasting peace and progress can be arrived at 
only through ACTION and not through PAPER declarations, resolutions and 
mechanical scheming. If the solution is sought within the spirit and 
logic of the above facts and recommendations, then peace, progress and a 
United (NEW) Sudan are possible objectives to realize. But if, on the 
contrary hand, a solution is sought within the spirit of Arab Nationalism 
and the context of a United Arab Sudan, then, gentlemen of the 
negotiations, instability, crisis and continued warfare are the only 
invited options and the Anyanya consistent with its historical and 
historic task of African liberation will take these options so 
mercilessly and mercifully placed upon its shoulders by bloody thirsty 
Arab Chauvinism. 
VIII. CONCLUSION: 
Should Arab Nationalism, through chauvinism, choose the option of 
instability and continued warfare, attempting, as it will, to find a 
"solution" within the spirit of Arab Nationalism and the context of a 
United Arab Sudan in whatever camouflage, then, the only strategic 
importance and usefulness of the negotiations to the Anyanya and the 
Southern Sudanese people is to turn the negotiations into an instrument 
of propaganda. This instrument, then, must be well used to indict Arab 
nationalism and chauvinism as the disturbing and initiating factor in the 
war situation. We must present this indictment with objectivity, 
conviction, firmness and (therefore) effectiveness to the Southern 
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Sudanese people, to the Sudanese people, to the African people everywhere 
and to the peoples of the world as a whole. We are a poor people engaged 
in a just war against petty oppression by Arab Colonialism: a localized 
repugnant oppression within the monstrous general oppression; we suffer 
double oppression and it is this oppression that has made us and left us 
so poor, "underdeveloped" is the jargon. We can not afford radio 
broadcasting and press facilities, indeed potent weapons available to the 
Khartoum Administrators of oppression. The negotiations (in the event of 
their inevitable collapse and failure) would provide us with the 
necessary broadcasting and press facilities to monitor our struggle to 
our people and to all peoples of the world. 
Long live the Victory of the Southern Sudanese People, 
Long live the Victory of the African People, 
Long live African Liberation and Revolution. 
We shall win, 
in the struggle 
Captain Garang Mabior Atenn 
Anyanya National Armed Forces 
Southern Sudan 
24/1/1972 
6 
APPENDIX 2 
THE SECURITY COMMITTEE REPORT ON SAFAH - ELDAEIN INCIDENTS AND "KASHA" IN 
THE CAPITAL CITY - KHARTOUM 
The security committee after receiving the convening order dated 2/4/1987 
from SSPA General Secretariat started its meetings to consider the items 
which require considerable investigations and to present 
its findings 
within three weeks time. Considering working plans and programmes, 
the 
committee resolved to meet three times a week, fixing Mondays, Wednesdays 
and Saturdays as appropriate meeting days at 6.00 pm each day. The 
Committee had five sittings in all, each lasting two and a half hours and 
devoted most of its time to outside contacts. 
SAFAH - ELDAEIN INCIDENT 
1. BACKGROUND: Although the Dinka Rezeigat conflict dates back to the 
time before independence with the main areas of fighting being along the 
River Bahr El Arab (Kiir) where Safa is a small winter station on the 
river, and the surrounding grazing pastures, the recent clashes have 
shown considerable developments as a result of the introduction of modern 
weapons in the fighting, especially on the side of the Rezeigat. Besides 
their traditional weapons, they also used modern machine guns, automatic 
rifles and the short guns. In 1975 for example, the Marialbai area of 
Chief Rinny Lual of Aweil District experienced terrible attacks from the 
Rezeigat which resulted in great loss of human lives and of animals. The 
same repeated itself at Safah in 1976 when they killed old aged people 
with women and children. In this report, the committee will confine 
itself to the investigations of the most recent incidents at Safah and 
Eldaein which occurred on the 19th - 28th March 1987. 
2. on the 19th March 1987, fighting broke out at Safah between the 
Rezeigat Militia, later supported by the Army of Western command on one 
hand and the SPLA on the other. The mixed force of the Army and the 
militias were reported driven back with heavy losses both in men and 
material, including animal wealth of the militia were also lost. The 
wounded from both the Army and the Militia (Rezeigat) were evacuated and 
brought to Eldaein Hospital for medical treatment. 
ELDAEIN DISTRICT 
3. The evacuation of the wounded Militias with the news of defeat to 
Eldaein plus the loss of their animal wealth at Safah aggravated the 
situation. The local authorities of this district were composed of the 
Chief Executive officer, Adam El Tahir, the Chief Police Inspector, Major 
Kamal and Police Officer Ali El Mana, all of them were citizens from the 
area and of the Rezeigat tribe in particular. The organised forces in the 
District by that time were composed of: - 
(a) The Army section which was guarding the wounded soldiers. 
(b) The Town Police who were mainly citizens of Eldaein (Rezeigat). 
(c) The Railway Police which was a mixed force of different tribes of the 
Sudan. 
The local tribes inhabiting the town and the surrounding areas consist of 
the Rezeigat, the Furs, the Borno, the Falata, the Nuba and the displaced 
6,000 registered Southerners - mostly Dinka. This number was officially 
7 
registered and were being supplied by the Relief authorities. This was 
reported by an eyewitness by name Chief Mayan Akot Bol who escaped death 
very narrowly in Eldaein. He reported constant more arrivals to Eldaein 
after registration and were not in the mentioned number above. 
THE ATTACK IN ELDAEIN 
4. At the arrival of the wounded Army and Rezeigat Militia evacuated from 
Safah to Eldaein between the 19th - 25th March 1987, moves to attack the 
Southerners (Dinka) residing in Eldaein started to circulate between the 
Rezeigat Militia men and their supporters. in Hilla Rubi Rabi a 
residential area in Eldaein town in which many Dinkas lived. The Rezeigat 
launched an attack against the Dinkas, the result of which was 3 Dinkas 
and 2 Rezeigat killed. This happened early on 27th March 1987. The Dinkas 
were able to repulse any attacks by the Rezeigat at their lodging areas. 
Discovering the impossibility of exterminating the Southerners (Dinkas) 
at their positions of their own choice, as indicated by the way they 
stood against the attack, the local authorities headed by the Chief 
Executive officer and the Police officers decided to remove them to an 
open place near the railway station. They were told that a train was made 
ready to move them away from Eldaein for their safety. Believing the 
words of the authorities, they accepted the offer and moved to the 
railway station an, an open place which made them vulnerable and above 
all disarmed of their traditional basic weapons like the spears and 
sticks with which they were resisting attacks. When all were moved to 
the railway station, defenceless, most of them women, children and old 
aged people, were entered into the wagons and locked. 
5. The town police was the first to signal the attack by opening fire on 
the exposed poor people after which a mass attack came down on the 
railway station from different fronts. These Militias with their tribal 
supporters were either mounted on horses, camels and some on foot. Great 
volume of fire from deadly weapons was brought down onto the poor 
children, women, the old aged and defenceless men. The weapons of the 
massacre included machine guns, automatic rifles, swords and spears. 
6. Those who were already in wagons could not come out because the wagons 
were locked from outside as planned and this was confirmed by the police 
to be the first to open fire. Many others went into the cells of the 
railway police station in the belief that they were to be saved. Fuel was 
made available and both the wagons and the railway police cells were 
sprayed with fuel and all were set on fire. None of the people who were 
in these places survived. No one could tell as to who provided the fuel. 
(This being an account by the eyewitness). 
THE CASUALTIES 
7. a. There were conflicting figures about the exact number of the people 
killed. The two eyewitness investigated, reported 1,500 to 2,000 
respectively as the number killed. other reports from the sources 
close to the tribe who committed the Massacre put the death toll to 
1,700 killed. 
b. Two railway policemen who are citizens from the Southern Region were 
among those killed. 
c. The priest, Benjamin Kon, and six church workers - (Catechists) 
belonging to the Church of Christ were among the dead as they were 
killed in cold blood. 
8 
d. In a nearby station of Jalabi, 20 people were slaughtered, all of them 
Dinkas. Another station next to it was having six bodies of the 
Dinkas who were also slaughtered and were left exposed to vultures. 
e. 35 wounded Southern citizens rescued by the police force that arrived 
from Babanusa over twenty-four hours after the attack are now in 
Nyalla Hospital. 
f. All the dead people in Eldaein were buried in two main common graves 
dug by bulldozers and graders as ordered by the local authorities of 
the district. 
SURVIVORS 
8. Those who survived this incident were helped by other tribes who were 
not interested in the affair. These tribes were the Nuba, Falata, Borno, 
and Zagawa. The two eyewitnesses stated that only through their friends 
of the other tribes did they survive. Mr Agostino Anyuon was helped by a 
friend who later secretly hired a car to take him away from Eldaein. 
Chief Mayen Akot was saved the same way by a Public Health Inspector. 
These survivors could be divided up as follows: - 
a. 5,000 Dinka citizens who made their way to Nyalla and Kass are under 
threat of starvation, thirst, disease and lack of shelters and 
clothing. 
b. Over 500 children are reported to have been carried away by the 
Rezeigat Militia. There are reports already of widespread sale of the 
Dinka children by night in the following two stations in Western 
Sudan - Meiram and El Matareg. In these places, the price for a boy 
is LS. 700= and a girl Ls. 400=. These places have police stations and 
other Government units. 
c. Two railway policemen who are citizens from the South, one of them 
known as John Angui (Morfayiin) who narrowly escaped death from the 
incident, have been arrested and is now taken to Babanusa. These two 
police men know every detail of what happened in Eldaein for they 
were the eyewitnesses in the incident. No arrests in connection with 
the incident have been made up to now by the Government. 
THE "KASHA" OR ILLEGAL MASS ARRESTS 
9. There has been general talks and fears created by the arrests under 
what is termed as "Kasha". The fate of those arrested still remains 
unclear. Some reports say the arrested people are sent forcefully to the 
so-called production centres. Others say those arrested are in prisons at 
the suburbs of the city, detained indefinitely. More still, those who 
produce necessary documents, including identity cards, are given a number 
of lashes and left to go or detained. Properties found in the hands of 
these victims become the property of the Police executing the operation. 
Such arrests are only directed to people of the Rural Areas. 
10. The figures of the arrested citizens is still obscure and the 
statement by the Representative of the Commissioner General of Khartoum 
on 25/3/1987 in Sudan Times put the figure at 18,000 arrested under 
Kasha. This committee planned to find out the following: - 
a. The reason for the 'Kasha'. 
b. The total number of those arrested and their whereabouts. 
c. The instructions given to the Police who are carrying out the orders 
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of arrest. 
In order to acquire proper information, it was then decided to meet the 
Minister of Interior and the Commissioner General of Khartoum 
respectively. The Chairman of the SSPA mr Samuel Aru Bol in his letter 
dated 11/4/1987 asked the Interior Minister mentioned above to make an 
appointment with members of this committee to discuss with him the 
problem of the Kasha. The committee chairman, Hon. Brigadier General 
(Rtd) Andrew Makur went to the office of the Interior Minister where he 
was told by the Office Manager that the Minister says he will reply the 
letter of the Chairman of SSPA in writing after collecting necessary data 
from the Police Headquarters, up to this moment nothing has materialised 
from this statement. 
Meeting of the committee has not been possible with the Commissioner 
General of Khartoum because the Commissioner has not been able to make an 
appointment. 
RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT ELDAEIN INCIDENT AND KASHA 
11. The Interior Minister to be requested by the SSPA parliamentary group 
to make a statement about the Eldaein incident in the Assembly for the 
following reasons: - 
(a) There has been no arrests in connection with the Massacre in Eldaein 
up to now. 
(b) No statement made by the Minister of Interior to the Assembly point 
out facts about the incident. 
(c) The government delegations to Eldaein never included members from 
either the Southern Council or Bahr El Ghazal Administrative Area. 
(d) The figure found to have been killed in Eldaein is far greater than 
the figure admitted by the Government. This is an indication that the 
Minister of Interior is concealing the facts about the incident. 
12. The SSPA Parliamentary group should move a motion also requesting the 
Interior Minister to make a statement in the Assembly about the 'Kasha' - 
Reasons and why only directed to people of the Rural Areas. 
Security Committee Members: - 
1. Hon. Brig. (Rtd) Andrew Makur - Chairman 
2. Hon. Brig. (Rtd) James Ogillo - D/Chairman 
3. Col. (Rtd) Lawrence Aleu, - Secretary 
4. Maj. Gen. (Rtd) Ruben Mac - Member 
5. Sayed Ezekiel M. Kodi - Member 
6. Sayed Nikanora Manyok - Member 
7. Sayed Dr Manoah Pabek - Member 
8. Sayed Michael Akuar - Member 
9. Sayed Paul Tier - Member 
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APPENDIX 
KHARTOUM 24th Nov. 1978 
EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE NEWS AGENCY IN THE SUDAN 
SECRET REPORT TO BRANCHES OF STATE SECURITY BUREAU IN THE 
SOUTHERN REGION 
THE HEAD OF STATE-SECURITY BUREAU MALAKAL 
I wish to inform you that Egyptian Intelligence forces have arrived in 
the three towns Khartoum to detect the policy of the Regional Government 
because they do not know its policy towards oil and the area of refinery. 
The Regional Government does not know the policy that the South is a 
village in an island. That the National Unity is but a Cease Fire 
Commission. Southerners are not considered in National 1policies. The 
general volicy of Southerners is their pockets. We the force of Egyptian 
intelligence are ready to curve the policy of Regional Government 
officials in the South, be they outside as was said by Sayed Mohed Anuar 
El Sadad to your President Nimeiri that we stand behind you and are a 
symbol of your unity; and Egypt is an advanced Arab State in war and 
culture. I have sent you a force of Eight Egyptian Intelligence to detect 
the policy of Southern officials that tend to refuse the refining of oil 
in the North. 
ITEM I: REASONS OF_OIL IN THE SOUTH 
Egypt is an advanced Arab state and it sees that refinery of oil in the 
south will create a bottleneck for the Arab world in general. The South 
may eventually separate from the North. The Southerners do not understand 
the crude of current policies. There are reasons that let the Egyptian 
Intelligence force enter the Sudan. The Egyptian Intelligence can 
summarise the various political activities in the Regional Government. 
ITEM 2: THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH CAN BE COVERED 
BY THE EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE 
1. Egypt as an advanced country can fully control the South in general 
especially that there is disunity amongst the Southerners themselves. We 
do not allow the refinery of oil in the South but in Port Sudan. If it is 
decided that the refinery be in the South, as a bottleneck we shall stand 
behind the Northern sons of the country. This will not be Egypt but all 
the Arab countries will stand behind the sons of the Northern part of the 
county. 
if Southerners refused refinery of oil in the Northern part of the 
country then Southern Sudan could be destroyed; as we have here in 
Khartoum, force of Egyptian Intelligence after the consultation of the 
two Presidents over the Unity of Egypt and Sudan. Our aim is the final 
decision of refinery of oil and the policy. We were sent to Sudan by the 
President of the Sudan to detect the condition of our Southerners 
brothers and whoever are undermining the policy of Central Government 
from Southerners. 
We as Egyptian Intelligence organ in Khartoum we demand from all branches 
of State Security Bureau in the South to furnish us with adverse reports 
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against those intellectuals who work to sabotage the policy of refinery 
of oil outside the South. 
ITEM 3: Arab States Agencies have politically protested towards refinery 
of oil of the South in the South before the decision of your President 
Gaafar Mohed Nimeiri. 
Why will the oil benefit us in the Arab World. 
For the following reasons: - 
1. Answer (The oil could be a political weapon of the oil producing 
countries of the Arab World). 
2. The oil is for protection against European and African invasion. 
3. The world states receives Sudan with good policy and can offer in many 
things because the oil in the South is the best cruality in the world. 
The implements that will come to you in the Sudan for oil purposes are: - 
1. War planes, trains and river boats, 
2. Cars of all types, 
3. oil producing (Companies), 
4. Military force to contain political disputes between part of the 
country and the village south. The branches of the State 
Security Bureau in the South are requested to explain and to 
prove to us in reports the position of Southerners and their 
declared policy and thanks. 
Director, Egyptian Intelligence 
NewS Agency in the Sudan - Khartoum 
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INFORMkTION FROM COLLEAGUE FATHI AHMED MEMBER OF STATE SECURITY BUREAU 
HEADQUARTERS KHARTOUM 
I learnt from a very reliable source, that left on duty from Khartoum to 
Southern Sudan, as individuals composed of: - 
1. Eight from State Security in Khartoum 
2. Twenty from the National Security 
3. Twelve from the Military Intelligence 
OBJECTIVES: 
1. The final Agreement between Sudanese President and all Arab States was 
that the oil will be refined in the Northern Sudan. 
2. The above mentioned member serving in this duty are sent by the 
Interior Minister and Chairman of State Security Bureau in that they 
should meet the Vice President and Chairman of Flood Relief Commissioner 
in his house for more details on the conditions of the Southern Sudan. 
Thanks. 
COLLEAGUE: - MOHED ALI IBRAHIM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE MALAKAL GARRISON 
I am sending to you a strictly confidential letter for you to study and 
relay to me your stand and thanks. 
Your Brother, 
Abdel Rahim El Haj Ahmed 
State Security Bureau - MALAKAL 4.12.1978 
10.12.1978 About 8.30 am at the shop of Mawiya Nur, Malakal. 
information I got from brother Fathi Ahmed of the State Security Bureau 
is that the Vice President and Chairman of Flood Relief Commission said 
he had nothing to tell you but that on arrival to Malakal the Head of 
State Security in the Province will furnish you with better information 
as to the feeling of Southerners regarding area of refinery of the oil. 
Fathi Ahmed said they were sent by the Minister of Interior to detect the 
feelings of Southerners as to where they want the oil be refined. The 
same minister he said had instructed them that since the President had 
declared that the refinery of the oil be done in the North, Southern 
Intellectuals opposing this should be arrested. 
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APPENDIX 4 
DUTY PAPER ON PAN-ARABISM IN THE SUDAN IN THE LIGHT OF THE BASIC CHANGES 
IN THE SUDANESE POLICIES: 
OBJECTIVES: 
1. Higher strategic objectives for the Pan-Arab movement in the Sudan 
is: Eradication of the traces of Addis Ababa Agreement and its use for 
national objectives for the strengthening and consolidation of Arab 
States economically militarily and to enhance unity. 
2. The Pan-Arab objectives specified in this movement are: - 
(a) Control of basic planning economic and social institutions in order 
to eliminate the Zionist and Imperialist influence aided by the World 
Bank and World Organization. 
(b) Connection of Sudanese political development with Cairo for control 
and sanctioning of the new institutions set up by the Addis Accord. 
(c) Consolidate Arabism in the Sudan and liquidate tribalism and 
sectionalism in the Southern Provinces on Islamic Arab line and 
eradication of American-Israeli influence in the body of World 
Council of Churches. 
By the nature of these higher political strategic objectives, methods and 
means will be used that will enable the correction of the new political 
situation in the Sudan. 
The American and Israeli circles have exploited the Addis Accord; the 
World organizations, The World Council of Churches, the new political 
institution and other established methods to have full influence and 
control in the Sudanese policies. 
SUPPLEMENT : HIGHER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN ADDIS AGREEMENT 
(a) Isolation of Cairo; politically, nationally and religiously in order 
to obstruct Arab-Islamic influence and enhance Christian sectarianism 
to disturb the Egyptian economic development. 
(b) Establishment of a racial and sectarianism institution which would be 
directly tied to American-Israeli circle. This institution is to 
realise these objectives politically and to confront the Cairo 
leadership and its political system in order to induce them to accept 
American solution of Egyptian and Middle East problems. 
(c) To guarantee Red Sea militarily for the Israeli benefit by wiping out 
adverse policies made by the Sudan against Ethiopia. hence making 
Addis Ababa the base for striking Arab-Islamic policies of Cairo. 
Hence the Higher Strategic Objectives of the Pan-Arab movement demand 
quick utilization of method and means that will enable the balance of 
powers in the Arab interest by connecting political work in the Sudan 
with Cairo to ensure the spread of Arabism and thereby increase the 
Sudanese and Arab strength simultaneously. 
First: The approach should be the humanitarian basis on which the Addis 
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Ababa Agreement was based and that is social and economic 
development. 
Second: The social and economic approach should be on Arab method. 
Third: That South should be socio-economic circle. 
Fourth: The socio-economic Arab approach should be also politically 
guaranteed to clear off the political malice created by the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. 
Fif th: The socio-economic approach is to put the Arabs in the leadership 
of socio-economic and inter-national institutions that are 
encompassed by the Addis Ababa Agreement to choose the South as base 
for Pan-Arab movement in its socio-economic development. 
BASIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH 
First: South is (civilization vacuum) a backward area for isolation and 
alienation and is therefore a poor ground for Pan-Africanism. 
Second: It is basic of backwardness that the Imperialists; Israeli and 
Church circles can turn it into striking ground against Pan-Arabism. 
Third: The Addis Ababa Accord took the South as a ground to change the 
nature of Sudan politics and the Southern institutions to smother 
Pan-Arab political abilities. 
Fourth: The development in the South as a result of Addis Accord has made 
it direct danger for Arab friendly political institutions in Central 
and East Africa and the Islamic communities there, particularly the 
socio-economic system in Uganda. 
Fifth: The racial development adheres to the Arab .... .... .... 
Sixth: The socio-economic plans .... .... .... .... .... ..... 
Seventh: Arab economic movement in the South is economically, militarily 
important in Egyptian interest and for Saudi Arabia because economic 
integration is to be realised experimentally and on model basis in 
the South as a backward spot and a base for struggle. 
On the light of this economic and political change erupted by Addis Ababa 
Agreement, the Proposed Jonglei Canal Project is the leeway for Pan-Arab 
penetration to the South (Jonglei Canal - Integrated). The Jonglei 
Projects is technically to dig canal in Upper Nile - (White Nile) its 
length is 300 km. The digging of the canal is to store large quantities 
of water for Egypt and Sudan, reduce water soaked areas and eradicate the 
extensive Sudd region of thousands of square miles, to create the largest 
cattle breeding of needs of Egyptian and Arab markets viz - meat. 
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES THIS SCHEME CAN REALISE IN ARABIZATION PROCESS OF 
SUDAN? 
First: The digging of Jonglei canal will serve as a core link of the 
eastern and western provinces of the south with the north, thus 
making impossible the connection with Ethiopia and Mombasa - Kenya. This is to contradict the secret Mombasa Agreement. 
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Second: Digging of Jonglei canal will store the quantity of water needed 
for irrigation by both Sudan and Egypt - to match the movement 
against the Jonglei canal (FAO). 
Third: The Jonglei canal, in its socio-economic integrated form 
represents a basic issue in the progress and development of the South 
for geographical reasons because this region is inhabited by the 
strongest tribes in the South (Nilotics). These tribes have a strong 
integration and connection with the North in particular the Dinka 
tribe. These Nilotic tribes are unionists historically and therefore 
need stronger connection with the North. 
Fourth: Ref. to the Jonglei Integration Project, it is an extension of 
the traditional theory of absorbing the economic and social 
perspectives that are tied with the establishment of the canal; to 
realise common national objectives of Nile Valley in the light of 
apparent changes in the world and the Arab land, particularly in the 
Sudan after the Addis Ababa Agreement. The basic of the Sudanese 
scheme (Jonglei Canal) is a traditional one. 
WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE JONGLEI INTEGRATION PROJECT? 
First: That the Project is to cater for the advancement of the economic 
of both countries and a real expression of common interest. All the 
parties are to contribute equally and it should guide and control the 
economic progress of the Sudan in conditions when funds and liquidity 
are scarce. 
Second: The Project, in its socio-economic nature and reality is to 
equate with the Addis Ababa Agreement in the world and Arab circles; 
so that it carries the same weight and hearing like the Addis Ababa 
Agreement. 
Third: That the Project is to produce other joint economic institutions 
with intensive long and short term activities that will realise and 
consolidate Arab prevalence over the Colonial, Church; and Zionist 
influence. 
Fourth: The move towards the realization of the objectives of the project 
will be by stages that should in turn serve the set programme of 
action just like the stages in Addis Ababa Agreement. The methods 
should be developmental and not to overtake the special schemes that 
serve national interests; financial, commercial and social 
institutions that are periodically required should be established. 
Progress from stage to stage should be based on achievements from the 
previous one and should not be isolated or independent from one 
another. 
Hence, the beginning of the project should be totally tied with its 
completion. The completion shall have been determined from the 
beginning on modern basis (the issue and its implications) ..... No doubt that the methods and devices will determine the outcome which 
is the fruit of the methods and means used, be it national or 
Arabized. 
Fifth: The common interest should be verified in institutions that are 
constitutional in nature in line with those on which the Addis Ababa 
Agreement and its supplements are bases. It should have a legal 
entity and independent of the Governments so that it can ensure 
continuity of negotiation and discussion with representative of 
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interests of any participating Arab state. By so doing it should help 
the implementation of the scheme and safeguard against the intrigues 
of American-Israeli intelligence network in the political 
institutions in Khartoum. 
Sixth: Serious and strict concern about the Integration Program and 
Agreements thereon in the nature of and in context of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement and the Tripartite Mombasa Secret Agreement. The following 
should also be considered. 
1. Peculiar conditions of Cairo that demand its politic activity in 
the group strifes in each Arab State. 
2. Guarantee for the implementation of the integration its socio- 
economic aspects through constitutional, legal presidential 
decrees and economic and financial methods, so as to realise 
the programmed political implications, tied with the progress 
of the project as part of the Agreement. 
3. That an agreement be reached on the Jonglei Integration Project 
and be declared without reference nor clarification of any 
supplementary protocols. 
Seventh: The Integration project is the only unity that will give Jonglei 
Project its national and political implications and verify its 
importance. 
1. Tie the Integration Project schedule with financing and other 
legal joint institutions. 
2. Integration programme involves the digging of Jonglei Canal (130 
km) and to extend the area wider than the delta in Egypt; 
draining of the swampy areas and clearing them of insects, 
construction of roads for use in irrigation and light 
industries and establishment of local markets and exporting 
institutions for foreign markets. 
The integration project will create a new life-style in this area in 
accordance with the context of the project. The project encompasses 
the irrigation, improvement of land, nomadism, agriculture, roads, 
communication, light industries, local and foreign marketing, health 
and educational services. This integration in the Jonglei Project and 
in the bad conditions of the Sudan finance economy, should project 
the real presence of Arabs in the Sudan in important life aspects and 
to improve the economy of the Sudan; to generate opportunities for 
activation of Egyptian economy on the other hand. 
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APPENDIX 5 
96 Gunnersbury Avenue 
London WS 4HB 
25 March, 1986 
monsieur Abdou Diouf 
President de la Republique 
du Senegal 
Dakar 
Your Excellency, 
Warm greetings to Your Excellency and to the fraternal people of the 
Republic of Senegal. 
Your Excellency, just under four months after the collapse of Gaafar 
Nimeiri's government in the Sudan on 6 April, 1985,1 was forced by the 
situation to leave the country for exile on 24 August 1985. This is my 
second time to experience the discomfort of displaced people out of their 
country, because of circumstances created by the politics of the country. 
I am now in the United Kingdom where I am seeking asylum. 
I was the first to be hunted down by members of the Armed Forces, when 
they announced the fall of the government in which I was a member. i 
failed to understand the reasons behind that, because there was a first 
Vice President before me in protocol and in charge of the Country, who 
was arrested twelve hours after me and not taken directly to prison, but 
kept for some days in a rest house. Even the members of Nimeiri's former 
Revolutionary Command Council, though also taken to prison were arrested 
some hours after me. I was not satisfied with any explanation for being 
selected as the first to be arrested and then grouped with Nimeiri's 
colleagues in their revolution of 25 May 1969. 
1 have established that dishonesty and betrayal were committed by General 
Abdelrahman Swarradahab and his group of Generals in the Transitional 
Military Council towards Omer el Tayeb, the First Vice President, myself, 
the members of Nimeiri's former Revolutionary Command Council, and the 
rest of the team in the previous government. Because General Swarradahab 
and Lieutenant General Yusif Hassan el Hag were also with us in the 
Government before 6 April, they should have also been arrested and not 
found themselves high up in a new ruling Military Council, with 
Swarradahab as Head of State and signing papers for the arrest of his 
former colleagues. Omer el Tayeb had made it clear to us that there 
should be no worry, in the last emergency meeting of the Council of 
Ministers at 9.00 am before the announcement by the Armed Forces of their 
seizure of power in sympathy with the masses. Omer said that they had 
reached an understanding for a smooth transfer of power to avoid 
bloodshed and that everybody was to return to wait in the office for 
further instruction. He assured us that there would be no arrests and 
that Nimeiri would be asked to remain outside the country to avoid any 
further complications. General Swarradahab and the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces did not honour that pledge. 
My intention is not to defend the former President, but to present to 
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your Excellency, very objectively the situation. Although I was his 
counterpart in signing the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, former President 
Nimeiri never felt comfortable with me. He laboured hard to suppress me 
and to build other people as rivals to me in the South. 
Nevertheless, the May Revolution which he led, enjoyed popularity very 
widely throughout the Sudan. he was confirmed in office several times 
through plebiscites, and strongly supported by all the regular forces of 
the country. That gave the regime a longer life than any other since the 
independence of the Country. No section of Sudanese society can say they 
did not support the May Revolution or kept aloof from any involvement 
with the may regime. Those who did so, indeed, left the country and kept 
away until the collapse of the system on 6 April last year. 
Dr El Gizouli Dafaala could not have been the leader of the Doctors 
Union, if he had not been involved in the Sudanese Socialist Union, the 
only political organisation, the organ of the May Revolution. It was then 
the only authority that could permit and supervise such unions as the one 
El Gizouli led, which developed him as a public figure, later to oppose 
Nimeiri, and to become Prime minister after his fall. 
The new leaders, whether military or civilian, were blinded first by 
their desire to have their turn in some high positions of authority, and 
therefore tried to brush aside those who could stand in their way by 
implicating them in some troubles. The political party leaders in order 
to have their way clear, have to smear all those who have had some 
experiences in politics with Nimeiri. 
Your Excellency, Nimeiri signed the "Peace Agreement" with the South, 
which ended the 17 years old civil war, thus giving the Sudan the chance 
to put here resources towards development never seen before, and to gain 
an international reputation. Nimeiri's mistakes became apparent in the 
last two years of his rule. He might have been sick. That also should 
not be ruled out. It is not fair for General Swarradahab, all the regular 
forces, the entire civil service, and the Sudanese masses to try to 
detach themselves from Nimeiri and those five other officers who staged 
the coup on 25 may 1969, and worse still, to have the five officers 
prosecuted for staging the coup. Some of them were outside the 
government, thrown out by Nimeiri because they no longer shared his views 
by the time the regime collapsed. General Swarradahab should have felt 
guilty signing papers for the arrest of his former colleagues. The 
members of the present Provisional Government should examine themselves, 
because they seem not to differ in character from the previous government 
and appear to be following the same programme. Colonel John Garang de 
Mabior the leader of SPLA/SPLM, was right in that regard to term the new 
set up as the continuation of the May regime; as "May II", especially 
since both councils, the Military and the Provisional Council of 
Ministers, have refused to make any moves towards repealing the Sharia 
laws, proclaimed by former President Nimeiri. 
Your Excellency, with all this confusion I had decided and planned to 
leave the country when I was let out of prison, as there were 
speculations that I might be re-arrested. Indeed some of those released 
with me, or after me, were being re-arrested, including my immediate 
neighbour Ustaz Ahmed Abdel Hallim. 
Your Excellency, I was Vice President in the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan representing the Southern Sudan in the Presidency. 
That was the reason for my being there because there were other Vice 
Presidents. If, however, fraternity and equality existed in that 
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Country, as for example in Tanzania, I or any other person representing 
the South could also have had a turn to be the President of the whole 
Country. But because of what I have mentioned earlier above, the 
existence of South African apartheid in the Sudan in some form, I was 
only a Vice President without any responsibilities, and humiliated 
further af ter the proclamation of the "Islamic Sharia", by being 
separated in protocol from the rest of the Presidency. I was placed after 
the Chief Justice instead of the usual position after the First Vice 
President. Mr Abel Alier, a fellow Southerner and a Vice President before 
me and well known for his loyalty and friendship to Nimeiri, remained in 
the same position for thirteen years without being elevated to the 
position of First Vice President. Nimeiri therefore, though pretending to 
have been a fried on the Southerners, was inwardly racist and religiously 
intolerant. He skilfully arranged to place Southerners permanently into 
the position of third class citizens and confiscated the Anglican 
Cathedral in Khartoum because of its location near the Palace. In the 
same manner, he eroded the Addis Ababa Agreement practically to nothing. 
When he seriously started to do so by dissolving the Southern Regional 
Assembly and asked me forcefully to resign my position, as the President 
of the Southern "High Executive Council. ", I did resign, only to avoid 
conflicts that could have resulted in loss of human lives. But, since 
then, I was virtually under surveillance even after he re-appointed me as 
a Vice President to replace Abel Alier with whom he began to differ. He 
was just conducting his Machiavellian exercise of playing one brother 
against the other, so confident then of his grip of the Country. In 
actual fact I was a prisoner in an open prison in the Sudan from February 
1980 until Nimeiri's fall in April 1985. my concern has been, and still 
is in particular, the South; than the Sudan in general. 
Your Excellency, as can be viewed by a normal traveller, the Sudan is for 
all practical purposes composed of two peoples and two countries: the 
Arabized Islamic North; and the still indigenous African South with 
strong and influential Christian elements spread all over. Taking note 
of the fact that there are Christian and Muslim minorities in the towns 
in the North and in the South respectively, these two areas of the 
country are within themselves not homogeneous. 
The South is inhabited by different tribes with the characteristics of 
separate nations in miniature, distinctly categorised further into two 
main groups; the settled agriculturalists, and the semi-nomadic 
pastoralists. 
The North also is inhabited by various ethnic groups; indigenous and Arab 
immigrant peoples, with the indigenous population still retaining their 
traditions and cultures, besides the Arabic language that they speak and 
the Islamic religion that they practise with an African flavour. 
Christianity, nevertheless, has also taken root among the Nuba tribes of 
Southern Kordofan. Modes of life differ in the North from one area to 
another. 
Agriculture is be irrigation in the riverain areas of the extreme North. 
In the West, traditional rain cultivation exists in the Southern 
districts, side-by-side with livestock; northwards, partly agricultural 
semi-nomadic, and fully nomadic pastoralism becomes the way of life. In 
Eastern Sudan, mechanised rain cultivation is the main occupation, 
contributing considerably to the economy of the whole country and 
providing the staple grain for a sizeable portion of the population. 
Northwards pastoralism is also the practice. in the Central Region of the 
Sudan where lies the Gezira scheme, mechanised cultivation under 
government supervision provides the country with its main source of 
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revenue. It is mainly irrigated, but supplementary rainfall in July and 
August helps the problems of irrigation, though briefly. Southwards also 
traditional rail cultivation is practised. 
These are not all, but some of the facts about the Sudan. These complex 
problems and issues must be understood outside the Sudan. They have to be 
seriously considered in the search to find a lasting solution, so that 
the people in that troubled land can live peacefully. 
There are examples in other parts of the world, where arrangements have 
been drawn up, to encourage peoples of varying cultures and traditions to 
live peacefully as equals, side-by-side within common political 
boundaries. Nigeria in Africa is a very near example for the Sudan. We in 
the South have consistently advocated a Federal system of Government, to 
keep together and in peace the various peoples of the Sudan living within 
its vast area and varied climatic conditions. Since before Independence 
we have felt this to be the most acceptable solution to the Country's 
political and development problems. 
Your Excellency, the OAU has to appreciate our tolerance over the years, 
even after the loss of so many human lives amounting to the reduction of 
our population and persistent delays of any developments in the Southern 
Sudan. The OAU must caution the Arab members of its organisation not to 
take sides with those who claim Arab descent as against the others. They 
and the other Arabs outside Africa should rather look at the problems 
objectively with a view to finding an acceptable solution to all groups. 
After all, Africans and Arabs in the middle East suffered together the 
yoke of colonialism from the same Imperial Powers. The opportunist's role 
which Libya is playing in exploiting the situation in the Sudan is not 
what a sisterly State could do, one day with this brother in the name of 
socialism, and another day with the other brother in the name of Arabism 
or Islamic solidarity. What do we then understand of politics in the Arab 
part of Africa? Is it all wits, cunning and deceit? That method sustained 
Gaafar Nimeiri in power in the Sudan for quite a long time, but by the 
time he fell he had erased almost all the memories of his good works. 
Naturally, I would not wish to remain outside my country for too long. I 
am therefore anxious to see peace return to the Sudan soon, so that I may 
return to live at my home in Nimule in Eastern Equatoria to witness 
stability and development in the country as a whole. 
I do not on the other hand envisage anything good out of the proposed 
general elections in the Sudan this coming April. Those traditional 
Northern political parties calling for the elections hurriedly were the 
same parties responsible for the deterioration of the situation in the 
country that gave Nimeiri and his group of officers reason to seize power 
in may 1969. They are not expected to do better after the fall of 
Nimeiri. They are racing for power, only to attain legitimacy through 
elections of any form, in order to conduct the war more vigorously 
against the helpless Southern population. Previous records indicate that 
none of these political parties has shown any seriousness or objectivity 
in finding a political solution to the Southern issue. In the past they 
pursued military solutions much more than their own military. They have 
not changed. No one has even expressed sympathy with the Southerners over 
the "Sharia" issue, which added fuel to the fresh outbreak of hostilities 
now spreading northwards as well. 
Your Excellency, it is not practical to hold any meaningful elections 
anywhere in the Sudan outside the principal towns in the North at the 
proposed time, because the greater part of the South and the adjacent 
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districts in the North are now involved in the civil war which appears to 
be proliferating in all directions. Most Southern politicians have either 
fled the country or have gone to Khartoum for reasons of personal safety 
as refugees within the country. The rest of the population are scattered 
in the bush, in the towns, or across the borders in the refugee camps, or 
still struggling to cross the borders into the neighbouring states. 
In the Western and Eastern areas of the Country, the effects of the 
famine have devastated the countryside, with vast territories depopulated 
and homes abandoned. Many citizens have died of hunger or thirst, in the 
same manner that they lost most of their animals. The remaining 
population, hungry, sick and tired, are roaming about hopelessly in 
search of food, pasture and water for themselves and for their animals. 
Elections for them under the circumstances will be unwelcome and an 
unnecessary luxury. Their concern above everything is their survival with 
their remaining animals. They have no time to give the democracy being 
expressed by the present government and the numerous political parties 
that have mushroomed after the fall of Nimeiri. 
What may help is "serious effort" by whoever is in control in Khartoum to 
come to some understanding with Colonel John Garang de Mabior, who now 
appears to be the most effective opposition leader to the Government in 
Khartoum, and to have a halt to the hostilities, and open up real talks 
over the disputes. It must be unequivocally clear that the Sudan cannot 
return to what it was before. The country is experiencing for the first 
time a real revolution, a struggle by most of the oppressed peoples for 
freedom and equality. Those who have been privileged must see the point 
and not resist unnecessarily, so that the revolution does not become 
excessively expensive. 
Your Excellency, what is happening in the Sudan now has nothing much to 
do with religion. Even in the previous struggle, in which I took part, 
Muslims in the South fought alongside their Christian and pagan 
compatriots, if those who still practise their traditional beliefs are 
referred to as pagans. Neither has is anything to do with imported 
political theories because the bulk of the fighting men are not literate 
enough to read or hear over foreign radio broadcasts of those political 
creeds. But the effects of racial discrimination may be positively 
present. That may be what united peoples of the indigenous African 
tribes, when they found themselves grouped together in the suburbs of the 
principal Northern towns and treated more or less like the Black 
townships in South Africa. 
The struggle currently taking place in the Sudan is not very different 
from what took place in the United States of America, when the Blacks 
struggled for civil rights, or what is taking place now in South Africa 
where the oppressed majority of the population are struggling for 
political freedom and complete equality for all the people. Surely, they 
are not going to ask the Whites to leave South Africa and go elsewhere. 
Zimbabwe didn't ask the Whites to leave. So the Sudanese who don't look 
elsewhere, will not either ask those who think they have come from 
somewhere to return where they came from, unless they voluntarily choose 
to -- and I hope not. 
Your Excellency, I felt to convey this to you as the current Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), so that the leaders of the 
member States are made aware of the real situation and the problems facing the Sudanese people, and so that an acceptable solution, fair to 
all, is found to end the current hostilities so widespread in the 
Country. 
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I hope Your Excellency will take the trouble and examine carefully the 
remarks I have made, and give them the consideration they deserve. 
And may I assure Your Excellency of my highest esteem, and regards for 
Your able leadership of the people of the Fraternal Republic of Senegal, 
and Your highly deserved Chairmanship of the Organisation for the African 
Unity. 
Yours sincerely, 
Joseph Lagu 
Former Commander-in-Chief Anya-Nya Forces 
Former Leader of Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) 
Former President of High Executive Council (HEC) Southern Regional 
Government of Sudan 
Former Vice President of Democratic Republic of the Sudan 
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APPENDIX 6 
Student Union of Southern Sudanese in U. K. 
and Ireland 
London 
MEMORANDUM TO THE COMPATRIOTS OF THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 
Dear Citizens 
You are aware that President Nimeiri is no longer the beloved Father of 
the South; the Nation-Builder who stopped bloodshed in the Sudan in 1972. 
His proposal to divide the South into more regions is not different from 
the familiar colonialist strategy of 'divide and rule'. Apart from 
confirming Arab Imperialism over the Black Sudan, Nimeiri has agreed with 
the Moslem Brotherhood to abrogate the 1972 Constitutional Agreement that 
ended armed conflict between the Arabs and Africans in the Sudan. 
Nimeiri is ready NOW to deal a final blow to African identity of the 
Southern Sudan. The argument that there is a group of Southerners 
propagating for redivision. is nothing but an Arab tactic of deceiving 
world public opinion as well as dividing the Southern people into tribal 
groupings. This fact is clearly known to us and we have been in the 
Southern Sudan as a united community and people of the same struggle. 
We must reject, condemn and resist this unpatriotic treacherous Arab 
design to divide the South and dominate Africa as a whole. 
Equally important is Nimeiri's embarrassing decision to dictate Kosti as 
the site for building the oil refinery. His message to the Southern 
People was no less than a direct aggression and embarrassment to the 
Regional Government, the Peoples Regional Assembly and People of the 
South as a whole. 
Nimeiri knew that he had dismantled the armed wing of the Southern Sudan 
- Anya-nya - and thus expected no meaningful military opposition. We must 
tell the man that the people of the South have never lost the will to 
defend their interests and protect their existence and identity. 
We condemn Nimeiri's decision and demand that his decision must be 
reversed. The oil refinery shall be built in Bentiu, the source of oil in 
the Sudan. 
Unless the Southern Sudanese remain united and one; peace and prosperity 
will be impossible in the Sudan. Unless the oil refinery is built in 
Bentiu, Sudan will never exploit that resource ever. 
We call upon all the oppressed and exploited peoples of the Sudan to join 
the Southern people in condemning the minority Arab Government in 
Khartoum to (a) refrain from the politics of redivision, (b) Reverse the 
decision on the location of oil refinery in Kosti. 
We remain. Yours Suss. 
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Student Union of Southern Sudanese 
in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
London, 
United Kingdom. 
22nd December, 1981. 
H. E. Gafaar Mohammed Nimeiri, 
President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 
The Peoples Palace, 
Khartoum, 
Sudan. 
Dear Mr President, 
We the Southern Sudanese Students in the United Kingdom and Ireland have 
been following, with profound concern, your recent intention to temper 
with the Addis Ababa Agreement as embodied in the Regional Self-Rule Act 
1972. The Agreement clearly defines the three Provinces of the Southern 
Sudan as one Region. The so-called proposal to redivide the South into 
more regions therefore contradicts the National Constitution and is hence 
illegal. 
Prior to your present policy of redivision, there have also been 
successive attempts, on your part, to create political crises and 
instability in the South as shown by the following incidents: - your 
endeavour to create a Unity Province (with the intention to carve out 
resource rich areas of the South to Northern Sudan); your redrawing of 
the Southern Region's boundaries (in favour of the Northern Sudan) and 
your imposition to locate the oil refinery outside of the Southern 
Region. These acts are contrary to the aspirations and wishes of the 
Southern People (1978 to 1980,1980 to 1981). These actions on your part 
have made us to reassess and redefine our relations with your dictatorial 
and provocative policy objectives, and have left no reasonable doubt in 
our minds that peaceful coexistence between the South and North has 
reached its lowest ebb in the history of our country since the Addis 
Accord of 1972. 
Historical events since 1972 show that the Southern Sudanese masses have 
sincerely adhered to the word and letter of the Agreement. But clearly 
their peace-loving commitment has not been reciprocated. Instead we 
observe overt actions which disrupt peace, cause loss of lives in the 
South, and doubtlessly leading to the abrogation of the Addis Agreement. 
We have no doubt, Mr President, that you are implementing the policies 
engineered and propagated for by the Moslem Brothers and their allies. 
If your intention is to take back the South into pre-1972 period, (as the 
course of events in the coming weeks will show), then the People of the 
South will not stand aloof to see their legitimate and constitutional 
rights being tampered with. We deem it our duty to defend the existence 
and identity of the South by all means, and It any cost. The South will 
seek political, moral and material support, and call upon the people of 
other regions of the Sudan, to terminate the rule of the so-called 
central government of minority interest. 
We call upon our people in the South# the West, the East and other peace- 
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loving peoples to rise and to resist these concerted conspiracies against 
our People with the intention of installing a democratically-based 
Government of the Majority in the Sudan. 
Mr President, we know that you will soon hand over political and military 
power to Moslem Brotherhood. This knowledge is not new to us. For 
example, in October 1981, Mr Farough el Maghboul, your Minister of 
Cooperatives, publicly declared, in his address to a group of Moslem 
Brothers in Manchester, U. K., and we quote: "Nimeiri is a sick man and a 
spent force. He will hand over the government to us (meaning Moslem 
Brothers and allies). But we told him (i. e. Nimeiri) that he should hand 
over the South to us as he found it before 1972. We know how we will deal 
with them (i. e. Southern Sudanese). Whether the Southerners like it or 
not, Nimeiri is going to divide the South. " 
This statement of Maghboul is in line with your recent dismissal of the 
entire Sudanese cabinet and its reconstitution with a Moslem Brothers 
majority. 
We know that for you, Mr President, to succeed to divide the South 
constitutionally, you need three-quarters majority in the National 
Assembly and two-thirds majority of the population of the Southern 
Region. You realized, however, that you are not going to get such 
constitutional requirements and so you have reduced the voting power of 
the South from one-quarter previously, to less than one-fifth (i. e. 
twenty-eight Southern Members of Parliament) presently. This gives the 
South less than one-fifth of the National Assembly; a fact which makes it 
possible for the North to pass adverse bills irrespective of Southern 
protest. This indicates Mr President, that you are deliberately twisting 
the constitutional argument in your favour in order to achieve your grand 
design to divide the South. 
The Southern People do vehemently reject and ostensibly condemn, and will 
resist this treacherous move by Nimeiri to divide and fragment the 
historical entity of the Southern Sudan. Similarly, any attempt to 
withdraw the constitutional rights of other regions to exist as units in 
their own right will be opposed by the People of the South. 
LONG LIVE THE SOLIDARITY OF AFRICAN PEOPLE OF THE SUDAN AND DOWN WITH 
DICTATORIAL MINORITY GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY THE MOSLEM BROTHERS. 
Yours truly, 
The Executive Committee of the 
Student Union of Southern Sudanese 
in U. K. and Ireland. 
London, U. K. 
CC. 
H. E. President Arap Moi OAU Chairman 1981-82, Nairobi, Kenya. 
The President of the High Executive Council, Juba. 
Syd Clement Mboro Chairman of the Council for the Unity of South Sudan 
and President of its Executive Committee. 
The Sudanese Ambassador to the U. K., London. 
The Foreign Secretary, U. K., London. 
The USSR Ambassador to the U. K., London. 
The Secretary-General Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa, 
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Ethiopia. 
Student Union of Southern Sudanese in the USA and Canada, Washington D. C. 
Student Organization of Southern Sudanese in the Arab Republic of Egypt. 
The Student Union of Southern Sudanese in Lebanon, Beirut. 
The African National Front, University of Khartoum, Khartoum. 
The Student Union, Juba University, Juba, Sudan. 
The General Union of Sudanese Students in U. K. and Ireland, London. 
Graduate Association, Juba, Southern Region, Sudan. 
27 
APPENDIX 7 
KHARTOUH 
14th January 1987 
H. E. PRIME MINISTER 
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE, 
KHARTOUM 
Your Excellency, 
We the undersigned citizens on behalf of entire population of Northern 
Gogrial (Twic) feel strongly concerned to present once again a complaint 
not new to Khartoum Governments. 
On 24th December, 1986 (Xmas Eve) a large group of armed men known as 
Marahleen from Baggara Arabs entered Northern Gogrial Twic to the Eastern 
end of Gogrial bordering both Western Upper Nile Province (Bentiu) and 
Southern Kordofan about 40 miles from Abiei. 
The forces landed on unarmed and innocent population by use of modern 
weaponry that terrified the population whose to precipitated into the 
following losses: - 
1. one person killed. 
2. Took away 19 children and slain them later, we learnt. 
3. Looted over 10,000 heads of cattle that took them several days to 
drive to Abiei. 
4. Burnt down houses with properties inside. 
5. Burnt food stores which they could not carry away. 
These are the losses received by innocent population from their fellow 
countrymen armed by the Government to destroy them without ANY 
JUSTIFICATION AT ALL. This one incident in so many cases of this nature 
inflicted on bordering Dinka population from Awail to Bentiu for the four 
(4) years since 1983. 
The idea of armed robbery, destruction and killing began in early 1983. 
At first we were not aware that the Government of Khartoum had hand in 
it. But in the course of our complaints to Dictator Gafaar Mohed Nimeiri, 
it became very obvious that the scheme was a Government sponsored one as 
unveiled by Regional Government of Kordofan together with Khartoum 
Dictator. The art of complaint could not proceed with the Dictator and 
our people were left prey to Marahleen Arabs. After the fall of the 
Dictator we felt the popular uprising would correct the ills of Dictator. 
But alas, the Transitional Military Council made broad daylight armament 
of Marahleen for what they called "Self-defence against SPLA. " This 
scheme was entrusted to (RTP) General Fadallah Burma who managed it very 
smoothly against the very population they claim to be under their 
Administration and protection. The Marahleen were largely recruited, 
trained, armed and directed against the neighbouring Dinka population 
with intention of the following characteristics: - 
1. To kill population indiscriminately. 
2. To rape the population. 
3. To rob movable properties like livestock. 
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4. To destroy immovable properties like wells. 
5. To burn houses with contents. 
6. To burn food stores. 
7. To take away young men and women for abuses leading to final 
death. 
8. other inhuman acts. 
Your Excellency, if the reasons advanced by Dictator Nimeiri, the 
Transitional Military Council and your Government that the arming of 
bordering Northern tribes is for self-defence against SPLA then how much 
harm is being inflicted by forces in question on SPLA, or how do they 
defend themselves against SPLA when the actual person in pursuit is an 
innocent population and their properties.? We are fully convinced the 
forces in question are armed to take revenge on the innocent population 
simply because the leader of SPLA is a Dinka and his people must bear the 
suffering. This is a new phenomena to us otherwise the Sudanese would 
have taken of Dongola responsible for mistakes Jafar Mohd. Nimeiri 
inflicted on the Sudan. We are seriously aggrieved to see Government 
favours one class of citizens against their own fellow countrymen in an 
organized crime leading to violence, destruction, loss of lives, 
humiliation and still hear Government talking of building a nation out of 
which some citizens are made to feel alien to their Government. 
our letter of protest is to carry to your honour our message of grievance 
as a leader of the Umma Party in the first place. 
The Baggara and Reziggat are your constituencies historically and until 
today. These tribes have taken it upon themselves to be used by 
Governments in Khartoum to exterminate the Dinka population and to 
plunder their wealth as stated before. After your assumption of office as 
Prime Minister and minister of Defence we thought the conflict was now to 
come to end on the ground that you would be concerned with good 
neighbourhood of tribes bordering your constituencies. To our dismay 
nothing changed to that noble direction. Instead armament and intensive 
raids occupy our attention whose results are already on this paper. 
Secondly, we are writing to your honour as Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence on the assumption that the good of your office is for all 
citizens of the Sudan irrespective of whether they belong to ethnic group 
of man in power and in law and order accordingly. Above all, we feel 
there is democracy exercise of supposed to embarrass Sudanese committees 
in matters of law and right of protection. 
your Excellency, what Marahleen have been made to practice would achieve 
nothing except permanent "HATRED" associated with the Umma Party in our 
opinion. 
Again and again we appeal to Khartoum Government to be concerned with 
what is happening at the borders mentioned above. The ills which have 
been done on 24th December, 1986, plus current events occurring at moment 
of our letter, are living good examples in Abiei as one of the places 
where the looted properties are stored or kept. If any investigation 
committee is formed today it would get these facts very outstanding in 
Abiei. 
SIGNED 
1. Charles Majak Aler 
2. Philip Akob Akook 
3. Zacharia Deng Mangordit 
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4. Peter Ring Ajing 
5. John Dut Bol 
6. Thuch Malueth 
7. Abel Chol Manyor 
8. Anjelo Akook Mawien 
9. James Bol Adlang 
10. Arkangelo Ayuel Mayen 
cc to: - 
H. E. Chairman Council of State. 
H. E. Speaker Constituency Assembly. 
H. E. Governor Bahr El Ghazal Adm. Area - Wau. 
All Political Parties. 
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APPENDIX 8 
EQUATORIAL SALVATION FORCE (ESF) 
1. To be established as a Regional Force as part of the national 
Mobilization Scheme. It will form the basic elements of the Armed 
Forces there. To be locally recruited and deployed, in order that 
through its units, the Armed Forces receive the maximum co-operation 
from the inhabitants. 
2. The militias, officers and men of the Armed Forces, and the other 
Auxiliary Forces prematurely retired, are willing to serve, to be re- 
engaged to start the force. This can be effected immediately. The 
Armed Forces will provide: Technical support, training facilities, 
and fire cover on demands. 
3. The Equatoria Salvation Force (ESF), will roam the countryside, and 
provide security together with the other Auxiliary Forces. The units 
of the Armed Forces in Equatoria will be preserved for major 
operations of conventional nature, and will move in large formations 
to avoid defeats and consequently humiliations; as had occurred. Once 
the Armed Forces recapture a station or clear an area, the ESP move 
in, the Armed Forces then move ahead. 
4. Similar Forces to be raised in Upper Nile, USF, and in Bahr el Ghazal, 
the BSF. The Scheme is to be extended to the adjacent Northern 
districts, where the SPLA have exported their rebellion. 
5. Resistance units to be organized in the rebel held areas as was the 
case in Europe during the Second World War. Their tasks will be; 
sabotage, harassing the enemy, and disrupting supply routes. 
Joseph Lagu 
Lt. General retired. 
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APPENDIX 9 
MOTION TO THE PARLIAMENT 
BY 
Saved Abdel Nabi Abdel Gadir (Representative) 
Constituency - Malakal & Renk 
Mr Speaker, 
Sir, 
may I be allowed to put before the House the enclosed Petition by Jalhak 
Nyok, Dein Donglay, Ajeng Dein, Dein Shol, Noul Mahi and Yousif Abdulla 
on behalf of Dinka tribe of Renk District. 
Mr Speaker, 
Sir, 
This Petition summarises and relates to Private Agricultural Schemes 
since their start and which covered the whole area of that locality. 
These lands belong to the tribe and date back to the time of their 
ancestors. These Schemes, Mr Speaker, deprived the people from their rain 
cultivated lands and their grazing area. 
Mr Speaker, 
Sir, 
This Petition refers particularly to the strongest protest of the people 
against four newly approved Agricultural Schemes in that area. In spite 
of the fact that the people were and are still benefiting from this land 
and in spite of the repeated complaints and objections raised by the 
people, it is with regret that the authorities have ignored all this and 
granted the Schemes. 
The first of these is Birkat El Agab Scheme. Sixty of the population have 
applied for a Scheme in this area but their request was ignored and the 
Scheme granted to individuals who are not related to the locality and not 
even one person from the people and owners of the land was taken as a 
partner in the Scheme. 
The second is the Scheme of the late Sayed Gabil. This Scheme was 
approved lately without the knowledge and consent of the people. Forty 
of the people have previously applied for the same land to make it as a 
private Scheme. The land is still used by the inhabitants for rain 
cultivation and Dura stems on the land is an unquestionable proof. Again 
not a single man of the people was offered a share in the Company. 
The third is the Scheme granted to Sayed Hassan Abu Jabal. Twenty of the 
people applied for a Scheme on the same land but their proposal was 
rejected by the authorities and preference given to Hassan Abu Jabal. The 
first step taken by him was to burn about 100 huts which the inhabitants 
used occupy during the summer when they come for grazing with their 
cattle near the river. In addition he burnt all the grazing grass in the 
area rendering the cattle weak and could not stand against flies that 
cause mortality. 
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The fourth is the Jelhak Scheme. There was a big dispute on this land 
which resulted in the death of 13 of the inhabitants and 30 persons were 
sentenced to imprisonment to various periods on account of a quarrel 
between the Sub-tribes when the land was granted to one of the merchants 
for a Pump Scheme. The authorities acted rightly at the time by 
cancelling the grant and justly gave approval for Scheme to the Melut 
Agricultural Co. on the land, as a compensation for the land in the 
island which has been rejected by the authorities for technical reasons. 
It was a great shock and surprise to the people in general and Melut 
Agricultural Co. in particular to know that the authorities have bons 
back on their word and cancelled the approval to grant the Scheme to the 
Melut Co. and granted the land to Sayed Abbas El Deita & Co. Such action 
can only mean that the authorities are helping people not related to the 
locality to penetrate into the lands of the local inhabitants without 
consideration to the reactions of such deeds and totally ignoring the 
welfare of the inhabitants, their future and that of their sons. 
Mr Speaker, 
Sir, 
This petition reveals the fact that the local authorities has ignored the 
Resolution of the Council of ministers No. 747 dated 7.1.1956 which 
stipulates that local people should be given priority over others in 
grant of Pump Schemes and that other applicants should get the consent of 
the local people for the Scheme and give them the first choice to 
cultivate the land. The authorities have also ignored part of the said 
Resolution which forbids grant of extensions to existing non- Government 
Schemes and that licences to cultivate on non-freehold land should not be 
renewed on its termination to allow such Schemes to become co-operative 
or limited Companies among the cultivators themselves. 
Mr Speaker, 
Sir, 
I would like to point out to the Honourable Members of the House when 
touring my constituency during the Session I was horrified of the 
dissatisfaction and uneasiness prevailing among the Dinka tribes and are 
asking for the reasons for not constituting a Rural Council at Renk 
District and another at Melut which are the most important districts in 
upper Nile Province. They are also questioning the reason for the closing 
down of the Rural Council at Renk Established in 1952 and closed down for 
one reason or another directly after the Sudanisation of the 
Administration. 
Mr Speaker, 
Sir, 
The petitioners on behalf of their people most humbly request the 
Honourable members of the House to carefully consider their complaints 
and give the people fair treatment and equal chances and request that: - 
The proposed three Pump Schemes should not be granted to 
individuals other than the local people of the area. 
(2) That the Resolution of the Council of ministers should be 
strictly adhered to at all times and in all cases. 
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(3) That the authorities should Establish a Warranted Rural Council 
at Renk by Order from the Minister of Local Government and not 
by local order from the Governor of the Province. 
(4) That a Rural Council at Melut be similarly established. 
000000000000000 
A Petition supported by the necessary documents which are signed by 
Omdas and Sheikhs has been lodged for consideration by the 
House of Representatives. This petition is signed by the 
following six persons representing the various Dinka Clans of 
Er Renk District and who have authentication on behalf of the 
tribe: - 
GALHAK NGOK DAU 
DEIN DONGOLAI 
DEIN SHOL 
AGEN DEIN 
NUR MAHI 
YOUSIF ABDALLA 
This complaint is an important case which is threatening the people 
concerned exactly direct on their well being. 
These people besides being herdsmen, they are also good cultivators. The 
lands around them are theirs for some centuries past. They were the first 
who asked the Government for agricultural development and they are 
capable enough to do so, but the Authorities concerned before 
independence although were not very keen to grant licence for 
agricultural schemes, but have not allowed somebody else to do so. 
it is very shocking that their lands to be distributed in some way or 
another as really happened during the very recent years since the 
independence began. 
"The land to be allotted to whom who cultivates it" - this resolution has 
been passed by the Council of Ministers in his 152nd Meeting on 7th 
January, 1956 on the policy to be adopted in distribution of agricultural 
projects and schemes whose irrigation depend upon the Nile waters and 
that right in allotment of the lands is reserved for people of the 
locality. where is the application of this Resolution on the policy 
already now followed in Upper Nile Province when the authorities there 
have deprived the people from their rights and allotted the land to 
certain individuals who are not related to that place or have any links 
with it. (25 big Private Pumping Schemes besides small pumps). 
one of these big private pumping schemes is "Birket El'Agab" or what so- 
called "Parliament Representative's Scheme". The inhabitants of Geiger 
village have applied for this same place before anybody else since 1954. 
The Authorities in UNP started to switch them to other places once and 
once to promise them with another locality in substitute until they were 
sick and tired and complained to their Constituency M. P. who had 
submitted a question to the Minister of the interior on this subject but 
no satisfactory reply was given then. At last the same place was approved 
as "Birket El'Agab Scheme". Birket El'Agab is a name to a place about 7 
km far and although it carries a different nomenclature but has been 
established on the same site chosen for Geiger Co-operative Scheme. They 
have now a hanging licence and they know no place to start. In that their 
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application went in vain. This point is included in the petition now 
submitted to the Parliament. 
Still the people are patient enough and they together with their Omdas 
have petitioned the Governor, UNP requesting him to stop granting any 
more licences to individuals who are foreigner to the locality except on 
their consent and agreement. This was a genuine and legal request but in 
spite of that there was no response. 
Another big scheme has been approved to late Gabil Mohd. Gabil. This 
Gabil died very recently. The late was a big building Contractor of 
Khartoum and has no link at all with Renk District and there was no base 
whatsoever except that Sayed Ismail El Azhari (Ex Prime Minister) is 
marrying his niece Gabil died and left no children, except a widow. The 
scheme is just at the clearing stage. Such land is not, of course, be as 
part of inheritance to nephew and nieces. 
A third licence was granted to Sheikh Hassan Abu Jebel. 
This Hassan Abu Jebel is a famous citizen of Omdurman Town, well known 
also in Kosti, W/Medani and Sennar of BNP, in Port Sudan and Gedaref of 
Kassala Province as well as known to most of the MPs and a sincere friend 
to some of them. 
He is a dangerous economical adventurer who has collected thousands of 
pounds during the last war and spoiled it. He is known as capable by all 
means, legal or illegal, good or bad and by deceiving and bribing to gain 
grounds for his business and enterprises. Er Renk District as a part of 
the South and being then under the British Administrators was a closed 
locality for him and was not inviting --- but as soon as he heard of the 
several Private Agricultural Schemes being built up over these (25 in 
number) it was a good golden chance to him to try his luck. 
He succeeded and obtained a licence, although he has not any connection 
with Er Renk District specifically and generally he had no business in 
the south and had never been there once except during his very recent 
adventure. of course, being so, undoubtedly he was supported by high 
hands through his usual means. As soon as he has started, he began to 
insult the people by saying that he is going to cultivate the land and 
will not stop except as far as the Nile water could not reach and that he 
knows no body save the forest wolves and fowls and that a Dinka has no 
right over the land, but only a single Howasha tenant under him. 
This is apart from wiping off by fire several native hutg at Debbet El 
Sibir when preparing and clearing the land. 
The people petitioned about this case to the District Commissioner and it 
is astonishing the outcome was NIL and without even any sort of 
compensation if not he was really committing a crime punishable under the 
Sudan Penal Code. 
The Dinkas have a natural and legal right on this land, transferred to 
them from their fathers and grandfathers and so long as they have 
applied, they have the priority; it is absolutely unjust to have none out 
of these 25 existing schemes. At last after no good site is left and 
after repeated and continuous complaints to the Governor, UNPI and to the 
Minister of the Interior and to Prime Minister, 3 small strips along 
swampy Khors were granted North to Er Renk Aerodrome and West to lorry 
tracks where Nile flood remains for considerable period of the 
cultivation season and these are absolutely useless for cotton and are 
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insufficient to meet the demands of the people. 
The gist is that the well-off people from the North come and given the 
good table lands and poor Dinkas are deprived from their lands fertilized 
by their buried fathers and grandfathers. 
Er Renk Dinkas pray to God how miserable they are if no equal 
opportunities at least on their homelands and how they can continue to 
-live and consider the status of themselves and their cattle is now worst 
and they refuse to become servile class under Northerners Capitalists. 
Omdurman, 
11th June, 1957 
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APPENDIX 10. 
3rd August, 1983. 
Dear Comrade Professor Dominic Akec Mohamed, 
Greetings in the People's Struggle. AS you might have heard by now, I 
deserted the Sudanese Army after the Battle of Bor on 16/3/1983.1 am 
alive and well. We have regrouped here and organized the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA). The SPLA now has one Infantry Battalion formed from 
elements of the Bor, Pibor, Fashala and Ayod Garrisons and individual 
deserters from other garrisons in upper Nile and Jonglei provinces. 
2. We are not able to send you the SPM 
me and some of the comrades here, I 
progressive one. The following quote 
Manifesto summarises SPLM objectives 
Manifesto at present, 
assure you that it is 
i from paras. 21-23 of 
; and immediate tasks. 
but knowing 
a 
the 
"Although the Movement (SPLM) has started by necessity in the 
South, it aims eventually at engulfing the whole country in 
socialist transformation. The SPLM is fighting to establish a 
United Socialist Sudan, not a Separate Southern Sudan... The 
immediate task of the SPLM is to transform the Southern 
Movement from a reactionary movement led by reactionaries and 
concerned only with the South, jobs and self-interest to a 
progressive movement led by revolutionaries and dedicated to 
the socialist transformation of the whole Sudan. it must be 
reiterated that the principal objective of the SPLM is not 
separation for the South. The South is an integral and 
inseparable part of the Sudan. Africa has been fragmented 
sufficiently by colonialism and neo-colonialism, and its 
further fragmentation can only be in the interests of her 
enemies... The separatist attitude that has developed in the 
South since 1955 has caught the imagination of the backward 
areas in Northern Sudan. If left unchecked, the separatist 
movements in the South, East and West, coupled with the 
stubborn determination fo the pseudo-Arab nationalist 
bourgeoisie to hang on to power in the Sudan at all cost, will 
lead to the total disintegration of the Sudan. This imminent, 
latent and impending disintegration and fragmentation of the 
Sudan is what the SPLM aims to stop by developing and 
implementing a consistent social democratic solution to both 
the nationality and religious questions within the context of 
a united Socialist Sudan. " 
We agree that the call for a United Socialist Sudan may appear odd or 
unexpected, coming from a Southern Movement. But, objectively, this 
is the only solution that is in the best interests of our people in 
both South and North. A socialist transformation of the country will 
do away with all parochialism and chauvinisms that have plagued and 
bled the mother land for so long. 
III. We are confident and determined in the struggle and of ultimate 
victory. Ia personally appealing to you to join the SPLM and/or SPLA 
immediately. We should not allow again what happened in the first 
movement (Anyanya-I). Then, "revolutionaries" isolated themselves 
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from the movement and wrote it off as reactionary and imperialist 
inspired. Progressives in Southern Sudan abdicated their historical 
responsibility and gave the southern petty bourgeoisie the 
opportunity to lead a genuine People's Rebellion. Consequently, the 
interests of the masses of our people were compromised for petty 
bourgeois jobs in Addis Ababa through the so-called Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement in 1972. 
IV The major and immediate tasks of the SPLM, ie. to wage a protracted 
people's revolutionary war and to establish a United Socialist Sudan, 
are monumental tasks that require the correct quantity and quality of 
manpower. The movement definitely needs your active and total 
contribution, and I ask you to come here to join us. 
V. We have discussed these issues many times before, and I am sure you 
are aware of the gravity of the decision which you make should you 
decide to join us. I am also sure you will have many considerations 
to weigh in your mind before you come to a conscious decision. i 
would like here only to emphasize and to assure you that the 
necessary internal and external conditions do exist to assure final 
victory. 
In the Struggle 
(Signed): Col. /Dr. John Garang de Mabior. 
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APPENDIX 
CHARTER FOR NATIONAL UNITY 
FROM SUDAN AFRICAN PARTIES 
We members of the African parties of Sudan, 
Conscious of the historical Evolution of the Sudan, 
Aware of the Basic contradictions of this great nation, 
Particular about establishing permanent roots for peace, Unity and 
progress, 
Determined to prevent war, 
are hereby resolved to abide by the following charter. 
1 (A) THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Sudan, currently being multiracial, multicultural, multilingual, 
multireligious and embued with a wealth of diversified history, can 
only be maintained, wholly, by a logically sustained circularism in 
which basic human freedoms are guaranteed by convocation. 
(B) (a) above corrects the joint UMMA -DUP CHARTER that anticipates THE 
ISLAMIC 1968 CONSTITUTION as their proposed bases for Sudan's 
PERMANENT CONSTITUTION 
THE LAWS OF THE LAND 
a) These must be derived from none other source than the logic of 
national co-existence and service to the people. 
b) This provision nullifies the desire by individuals to intimate any 
particular HOLY BOOK or religious cultural heritage of divisive 
history. The SEPTEMBER 1983 LAWS and other Islamic CIRCULARS are such 
divisive legislations that must necessarily be repealed forthwith. 
SYSTEM OF. GOVERNMENT 
a) The Sudan has been centralized since its modern inception (1820-1986) 
the attempt by minority, almost family cliques to monopolize central 
power authority has been the major diagnosed government disease of 
the Sudan republic. That centralized monopoly is the direct cause fo 
war and dictatorial tendencies, civilian and military. 
For the sake of unity, democracy progress and human advancement, 
federation of the Sudan is a must. The details are left to the 
constitutional conference. 
b) In order to restore security peace and stability in our country and 
lay the foundation for tangible development, a constitutional 
conference shall be held soon after the formation of the proposed 
government of National Unity. For the importance of this conference, 
all aggrieved and interested parties from both within and outside the 
country, shall be invited to participate. 
4. NATIONAL RESOURCES AND GOVERNANCE 
a) Equal distribution of the national wealth according to regional and 
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population requirements. 
b) Representation of Southern Sudan by 1/3 in all National 
constitutional establishments. 
C) Specific representation of the West and East of Sudan along side the 
needed consideration for the least developed areas of the Nation. 
d) Democratization of the mass media, particularly the radio T. V. and 
the press in order to reflect the cultural diversity of the African 
and Arab Sudan. 
We are avowed to abide by these guidelines f or the sake of the one Sudan. 
SIGNED BY 
1- People's Progressive Party (PPP) 
2- Sudan National Party (SMP) 
3- Southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA) 
4- Sudan African Congress (SAC) 
5- Sudan African National Union (SANU) 
6- Sudan People's Federal Party (SPFP) 
7- Sudan National Action Labour Party (SNALP) 
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APPENDIX 12 
FOREWORD 
I have written this small book f or you, Anya-Nya soldiers and Southern 
Nationalists. You fight with great courage and dedication for the right 
of our people to live as free men, but many among you are not familiar 
enough with all the aspects of our struggle. The aim of this booklet is 
to make it absolutely clear to everyone of you why and f or what we are 
fighting. Knowing and understanding these things thoroughly, and bearing 
them always in our minds and hearts, will consolidate our ranks and 
strengthen our hands in battle. 
All Of yOU, comrades - in-arms, who can read English are called to help in 
translating and explaining the contents of this booklet to every Anya-Nya 
soldier. 
Signed .................... 
MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH LAGO 
Commander-in-Chief, A. N. A. r. 
January 1972. 
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CHAPTER 1: BEGINNING OF THE REVOLT 
When in 1954 the British and Egyptians decided to end their condominium 
rule of the Sudan and grant this country independence, our political 
leaders at the time clearly foresaw that the South was facing domination 
by the North. They therefore asked at once for guarantees that would 
safeguard the interests of the South. Both the British and the Egyptians, 
however, disregarded this reasonable demand because it conflicted with 
their own interests. Thus was the future of the South recklessly gambled 
with and the seeds of trouble foolishly sown. 
OPPRESSION AND PERSECUTION OF SOUTHERNERS 
As the British started leaving the South, their administrative posts and 
business firms were taken up by Northern Sudanese who previously had not 
been allowed to work or settle in the South. The Southerners began to 
feel more and more strongly that their country was being colonized by 
Arabs and that their great expectations from independence boiled down to 
the replacement of one master by another. The Northern officials looked 
down upon the Southerners, openly discriminated against them and on the 
whole treated them as subject people. Their arrogance and contempt toward 
the Southerners soon became unbearable. They kept on insulting and 
abusing us, often using the word "abeed" (slaves) when referring to 
Southerners. They lost no time in suppressing our political development 
by heaping obstacles on the path of our leaders or by directly preventing 
them from engaging in political activity. The imprisonment of Elia Kuze, 
a Parliament member for Zande District, and his subsequent trial was a 
typical example of the persecution of Southerners. 
SOUTHERN PROTEST 
Southern resentment of Northern policies and the way in which they were 
being implemented found expression in many forms of protest, but all in 
vain. As a consequence, Southern bitterness finally exploded in the June 
1955 riots in Nzara and the demonstration in Juba. In Nzara a number of 
Southern workers were murdered when a Northern Army officer by the name 
of Muatasim Abdel-Rahman El-Magbul ordered his troops to open fire on the 
crowd. Thus, for the first time, Southern blood was shed and hatred 
coupled with the desire for revenge started growing. 
REVOLT OF THE EQUATORIA CORPS 
These feelings towards the North and the Arabs quickly became widespread 
and reached such intensity that when, in August 1955, a unit of the 
Equatoria Corps was ordered to leave their arms behind and go to 
Khartoum, the Southern soldiers, suspecting a Northern plot against them, 
hesitated to obey. A Northern officer named Salah Abdel-Rahman then fired 
at and wounded his driver. The Southern soldiers broke into the arms 
store, grabbed their rifles and attacked any Northern they could find. In 
two days the revolt spread throughout the Province of Equatoria as well 
as to some areas in Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazal. For a short time, the 
South was virtually free of Northern domination. 
SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 
At that time the British Governor-General and British troops were still 
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in Khartoum. The Southern soldiers of the Equatoria Corps refused to 
listen to the appeal of Prime Minister Ismail el-Azhari to lay down their 
arms so that the case may be investigated and justice carried out. But 
when the same appeal was made by the British Governor-General, who also 
sent to them Mr. Luice, a former Deputy-Governor of Equatoria - they 
agreed. There was no investigation and no justice. instead, after the 
Southerners lay down their arms, Northern troops were let loose on them 
by El-Azhari while the last of the British left Sudan for good. There 
followed a blood-bath in which many Southern soldiers, policemen and 
warders were killed and the remainder taken to the North to serve long 
terms of imprisonment. Nobody was left to stand in the way of the 
Northern troops, who then occupied the South until this day. Together 
with them and the civilian Arabs, and the Egyptian and Soviet military 
advisers who followed them later, there came the systematic 
Neocolonialist and Imperialist robbing of our country: a genocidal 
campaign of mass murder, looting, rape, abduction, setting on fire of 
villages and crops. Hundreds of thousands of our people including many 
leaders either took to the bush or fled to neighbouring countries where 
they live as refugees. 
Any-nya soldiers, never forget all thisl Never tru t Arabst Never again 
shall we lay down our arms before freedom is secure in our own handsl 
2: THE RISE OF ANY-NYA 
During the eight years which passed from 1955 to 1963, while Arab 
persecution of our people continued in the South, many efforts were made 
to find a solution by peaceful means through political action. All these 
efforts failed, the nicely-sounding declarations made by Arab Politicians 
proving to be just empty words. Only one thing stood out clearly and this 
was what the Arabs themselves wanted then, as they do now: to dominate 
and colonize the South. To achieve this they try to impose on us Africans 
their religion, language and customs. By this method they want to turn us 
into Arabs and thereby conquer our country for good. 
Fortunately for us, during those unhappy years one hopeful development 
was also taking place - the seeds of Anya-Nya power struck roots and were 
slowly beginning to grow. When the Equatoria Corps surrendered its arms 
in 1955, not all of the soldiers did so. A few of them, together with 
some policemen and warders, escaped with their rifles to the bush and 
when they saw what the Arab troops were doing to the African people of 
the South, they at once started active resistance. This took the form of 
small sporadic actions against the enemy throughout Equatoria, but in 
particular in the Torit and Yei Districts. 
In 1962 when the military rule of General Abboud became so intolerable 
that many more Southerners escaped to the bush or went into exile, some 
groups of resistance fighters organized under the name of ASA (Azania 
Secret Army) and attacked army and police camps in Equatoria. But not 
long after, this organization disappeared. 
The following year - 1963 - with the return of more Southern ex-soldiers 
from prisons in the North similar groups were formed in Equatoria and 
Upper Nile but this time with a difference: these groups tried to act 
together, in coordination, according to instructions from one centre. The 
day of 19 September was set for all groups to strike at enemy targets at 
43 
the same time, and it was done. This organization did not disappear after 
its first strike: it continued operating, adopting for itself the name "Anya-Nya", which in due course all groups accepted. 
At the beginning we had to depend on our native weapons - spears, bows 
and arrows, but during 1964-65 the bad wind which blew over the Congo 
blew good over South Sudan. Arms belonging to the Congolese rebels passed 
in Anya-Nya hands and our operations against the Arab enemy soon became 
more numerous and more effective. Enemy units ambushed by the Anya-Nya 
provided us with more weapons and ammunition. We got stronger and grew 
quicker. 
The Anya-Nya was welcomed by our people as the army of South Sudan. it 
replaced the Equatoria Corps which had been disbanded following its 
revolt in support of the Southern cause. To commemorate that historical 
revolt and our direct link with it, we have incorporated in the Anya-Nya 
symbol the buffalo, which had been the symbol of the Equatoria Corps. 
SOUTH SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (SSLM) 
The existence of the Anya-Nya as a fighting force which the Sudanese Arab 
Army, despite all their efforts and modern weapons, could not overcome, 
gave fresh impetus and vital backing to the Southerners struggling on the 
political front. Thus the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) came 
into being with the Anya-Nya Armed Forced (ANAF) as its spearhead. The 
SSLM has already proved its worth by being the most united, stable and 
enduring of all Southern political organizations which had preceded it. 
With dedicated and hard-working representatives in major centres of the 
world, the SSLM succeeded in bringing down the wall of silence which had 
surrounded our struggle and in enlisting sympathy and material aid to our 
Movement. 
ANYA NYA'S ACHIEVEMENT TO DATE 
Unlike other freedom movements in Africa, the heroic struggle for 
liberation which the Anya-Nya have been conducting for many years failed 
at first to attract any attention and support from the free world. 
Consequently, we have been very short of funds and materials required for 
an efficient military organization. Nevertheless and despite all 
difficulties, we have achieved much. We have kept the Sudanese Army of 
the North engaged most of the time and struck fear and doubt in the 
hearts of the would-be Arab settlers. We have proved to the Arabs that 
the African people in the South resist their rule. Covernments rose and 
fell in Khartoum for lack of stability, a pre-requisite they were unable 
to assume so long as the war was going on in the South. Lastly, and this 
perhaps is our most important achievement, we have given our own people 
the only common institution to which everybody can look up with pride and 
hope. 
CHAPTER 3: THE CAUSES OF WAR IN SOUTH S 
Everyone of us understands that we are fighting for our rights as free 
men and that we were forced to take up arms only after all the peaceful 
means which had been tried failed completely. We are fighting for our human and African values, so dear to us. 
OUR FAMILY AND TRIBE 
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The enemy is waging a war of annihilation against us; he wants to-destroy 
us completely so that he can take over our country for himself . For 
generations past he has been trying to do this, even carrying away our 
women and children to sell them as slaves in foreign lands. Par from 
respecting us as fellow human beings, the enemy treats us like animals. 
in his order of things there is just no place for us as equal members of 
the human community enjoying even the most basic of human rights and 
freedoms. The Arab enemy hunted us down as animals in the forests and in 
the hills; he chased us across international borders. We could do nothing 
but turn back on our enemy and fight him. 
OUR CULTURE AND TRADITIONS 
The enemy looks down upon our customs and traditions. He believed his 
Arab culture and traditions are superior and should therefore be imposed 
on us, if necessary by force. This is just another way, on the spiritual 
level, of destroying us as a people. our answer to this kind of attack is 
simple: you Arabs keep your Arab culture and traditions and let us 
Africans keep ours. And if you try to impose on us your ways by force, 
you will be met by force. We shall not stand by idly and watch the Arab 
intruder change our identity to his. we shall fight to preserve and 
develop still further our rich African values. 
SOUTH SUDAN IS AFRICAN 
Since independence was granted to Sudan in 1956 the Arabs of the North 
have never regarded the South as a real part of their country and the 
Southerners as a people with equal status. They regarded the South as a 
colony left to them by the previous colonial regime and they felt 
themselves free to exploit this land and enslave its people. The enemy 
cannot even conceive of independent or autonomous existence for our 
country because he considers it his property. So force must be used to 
prove to the enemy his ignorance and stupidity, to make him accept and 
recognize our national identity. We had not been a colony of the North 
when the whole of the Sudan was under Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule. 
The North and South won independence together as equals, now freedom must 
also be equal for all. 
DEFENDING BLACK AFRICA 
our brothers and sisters in East Africa must realize that ever since the 
first Arabs reached Malakal, Juba and Wau, we, the people of South Sudan, 
have been defending not only ourselves but also them from the onslaught 
of Arab Colonialism. We have never ceased the struggle against those 
barbarians and we never shall until we triumph. The harder and more 
successfully we struggle the more our neighbours will recognize the vital 
importance of our struggle to them and the more ready they will be to 
support us. 
No war is easy. Every national struggle like ours always entails great 
sacrifices, without which no victory can ever be worn. So let us not be 
discouraged or diverted from our path. Let us always bear in mind that we 
are fighting a war for a just and noble cause, and that while we fight 
this war we also protect our brother Africans in East and Central Africa. 
we protect them from Imperialist-Colonialist forces far more brutal and 
potentially more dangerous than any others known in the past. For the 
Sudanese Arabs are not alone; behind them are other Arab and Imperialist 
Communist forces which support them, the same forces that not long ago 
already tried to reach Congo, the very heart of black Africa, through 
South Sudan. Therefore we, the African People and soldiers of South 
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Sudan, must keep bringing these facts to the attention and consciousness 
of black Africans all over the continent until they realize the full 
significance of our struggle and understand why our struggle is also 
their own. 
CHAPTER 4: FIGHTING AND BUILDING 
The sole duty of the soldier in any army is to fight for his country. The 
duty of the Anya-Nya soldier- is not only to fight but also to build. We 
have to fight in order to liberate South Sudan from Arab domination and 
at the same time we have to build in it a nation. The Anya-Nya soldier, 
while fighting the Arab enemy is also working to make the peoples of 
South Sudan one people. The Anya-Nya is an army that resembles the white 
ants; everybody is busy all the time, either fighting or building. 
We fight in defence of our homes and African values. We have been forced 
into this war by the Arabs and we do not regret it. We have been fighting 
for years in defence of our human rights, and we shall go on fighting for 
years if necessary until victory is ours. 
Fighting for our African values means in the first place our right to 
live as Africans, not as Arabs. it means our right to decide for 
ourselves what we are, and we say - we are Africans and we belong to 
Africa by race, culture, geography and history. We were, we are and we 
shall always be Africans. No power in the world will ever succeed in 
turning us into Arabs. 
Every Anya-Nya soldier must understand this very clearly and thoroughly 
because it is most important: this is the basic reason for our struggle. 
The Anya-Nya soldier should consider is his duty to teach and explain 
this matter to the people, and especially to the youth. 
only well-trained and disciplined soldiers can win a war. To achieve 
victory we must first be good soldiers who respect the principles of 
command and discipline. These two - command and discipline - are the 
cement which holds any army together. Discipline can succeed only when 
the officers know how to command and the soldiers why they must obey 
orders. Discipline should not be used as an excuse to forbid criticism, 
but neither can criticism serve as an excuse to disobey orders. A 
soldier's commander may have come from a different province and speaks a 
different language - but this is all the more reason for obeying his 
orders because by so doing you strengthen the ties that bind our peoples 
together in our common struggle. 
soldiers, the Anya-Nya Armed Forces are the only national institution 
that we have in South Sudan to which all our people look in confidence 
and hope for a better future. This fact places on us great 
responsibilities. By becoming a symbol of national unity and liberation, 
every one of us Anya-Nya soldiers must remember that our behaviour and 
actions should be exemplary so that our people can admire and imitate 
them. Unlike other soldiers in other armies, Anya-Nya soldiers are not 
professional soldiers and have not joined the A. N. A. F. in order to earn their living. The Anya-Nya soldier is a patriot motivated by the will of his people to fight against the Neo-Colonialist and imperialist plans of the Arabs of the North, together with their other Arab and Communist 
allies. As an example to his people, the Anya Nya soldier should take the 
lead in all works to which he can contribute. In his village, he 
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cultivates for his family, he helps in communal enterprises such as 
building a dispensary or teaching the children how to read and write. He 
gathers around him the children and explains to them the principles of 
our revolution and the history of our struggle. He helps in treating the 
sick and wounded and explains the importance of good health in order to 
be fit to fight and to win. He is carrying out a building revolution, not 
only a fighting revolution. 
Building is construction whereas war is destruction. We must learn to 
combine the two in our struggle, because only by total mobilization and 
unity of our people we shall be able to ensure victory for our 
revolutionary Movement. 
CHAPTER 5: OUR GOAL 
The goal of our struggle is clear and straightforward - the right of 
self-determination for our people. We want our people to be able, of its 
own free will and under no threat or fear, to determine its destiny: 
either to remain in a unitary Sudan as a truly autonomous region, or to 
have nothing whatsoever to do with the North and tie our future with that 
of our African brothers in their states on our southern borders. We shall 
accept no unity imposed on us by the North, nor shall we consider any 
arrangements concluded by Southerners in the service of their Arab 
masters. The future of the South can be decided only through a settlement 
negotiated with the Anya-Nya/SSLM. 
Southerners who prefer staying with the Arab enemy and thereby create 
favourable conditions for his continued occupation of the South cannot 
represent the South because they often have to act against the Southern 
cause by opposing the Anya-Nya. The appointment of some of them to high 
positions in the enemy's government only serves the purpose of the enemy. 
These appointments are temporary and were made possible only by the 
existence of the Anya-Nya and the pressure it exerts on the enemy. if 
this pressure will be lifted tomorrow, can any reasonable Southerner 
doubt that conditions will revert to what they were before? The 
opportunities cannot see this, of course, because they are mindful only 
of what they got now. The fate of their people in the countryside, of the 
Anya-Nya whose fight has brought about the change, of the hundreds of 
thousands of Southern refugees - all this concern them very little. 
Anya-Nya soldiers, you have fought and suffered for the freedom of South 
Sudan. You must with equal tenacity and dedication be prepared to protect 
what you have fought for from such men who, for their personal interests, 
will be ready to have you destroyed so that they can reach some 
settlement with the enemy. We are sure that to prevent such a calamity, 
which in fact will amount to a sell-out to the enemy, You will spare no 
effort to fight on until true victory is won. 
There is only one kind of settlement to which the true Southern 
Nationalist can agree - a. settlement that will be reached with the Anya- 
Nya/SSLM on the basis of self-determination for the African people of 
South Sudan. 
CHAPTER 6: FIVE ESSENTIALS 
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Leadershi 
To become a good leader, a man must have both paternal and brotherly 
feelings toward those that he has to lead. Once in a position of 
leadership of a group of men, one has to imagine oneself as the head of a 
family much larger than the family one came from. In the army these 
feelings of belonging together and of close comradeship are even more 
important because in battle comrades risk their lives to protect and save 
each other from enemy fire. 
A military commander is at one and the same time the father and the elder 
brother in a family. When the family is challenged he is there at their 
head to protect them and to lead them in battle against the external 
enemy. He does not send his children or younger brothers to face the 
danger and himself stays behind only to hear sad news of destruction. if 
he does that, his senior position in the group will become meaningless 
and his men will remain without a leader and without a leader and without 
the protection and confidence which they need. They will then scatter in 
every direction. The same is true in the army. A brave commander who 
personally leads his unit in battle will gain the respect of his men and 
they will hold on to him because they will have confidence in him. But if 
he will order them into action but himself stay behind, they will do 
likewise. During our long struggle we have seen such cases; we have seen 
units which did not fight well under certain commanders fight very well 
when led by other commanders. 
Bravery is essential to the commander but by itself it is not enough to 
make him a good commander. He must have other qualities too. He should be 
able to organize his men quickly and efficiently, especially in battle. 
Because he is not expected only to fight personally but also to direct 
others how and where to f ight. Moreover, in the middle of battle he must 
be capable of controlling his men and of estimating the changing 
situation correctly and quickly in order to manoeuvre his force 
accordingly. He must be able to endure and persevere under difficult 
conditions and not give up. In the heat of battle, just as in 
competitions, all feel tired and tend to give up. Those who fall off 
lose, those who hold on win. 
initiative, too, is a most important quality of the good commander. Such 
a commander will not wait passively and allow his enemy to gain the 
initiative and strike first. He will do everything in his power to keep 
the enemy engaged and on the defensive so that the enemy cannot have the 
time he requires to plan an attack. 
in conclusion, good commanders are leaders who share the hardships and 
dangers of war with their men. They look after their men first, before 
thinking of their own comfort. In battle they in person lead their men 
whom they control effectively throughout the fight. They are quick to 
estimate the situation and to decide. They guard the initiative# keep on 
attacking the enemy and maintaining the pressure on him. 
Responsibility 
Responsibility is the feeling of concern within the individual for 
everything - men, equipment, duties - that has been entrusted to him. it 
is the attitude which prods and urges a man to give his full attention to 
anything placed in his charge, and to do his best to carry out the task 
assigned to him. 
Anya-Nya commanders of all ranks must feel resPonsible for their men &S 
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they would for members of their own family. Close personal attention 
given by the commander to his men will help him understand their problems 
and solve them better. on the other hand when you take good care of your 
soldier you free him of his worries and enable him to fight much better. 
Responsibility for our arms and equipment is of vital importance because 
our fighting capability and the fate of our struggle depend on them. 
Without them the enemy could have conquered the whole of our country long 
ago. This is why we must care for our arms and equipment as we care for 
ourselves and our children. Every Anya-Nya soldier must feel responsible 
for his gun, guard it well, keep it always clean and ready for use as if 
it is part of his own body. All commanders must stress this point to 
their men and make them feel personally responsible for the arms and 
other equipment placed in their charge - even when not under supervision. 
We are fighting for our country. We want our country in our hands. 
Whatever we do in the Anya-Nya, we do it for our country. This Is our 
supreme responsibility, which includes all others. 
Fighting Offensively 
For a revolutionary army like ours which is waging a war of liberation, 
there is only one way of fighting - the offensive way. We should always 
seek to attack the enemy, because victory can be achieved only in this 
way in order to win we must maintain aggressive fighting spirit 
throughout our units. We must attack because only through attacking the 
enemy we can gain ground from him and take full advantage of our mobility 
and high morale. Fighting in defence of our homes we are in a better 
position than the enemy, who is very far from his own home. He knows this 
and must also be made to feel it strongly all the time. 
The Anya-Nya Armed Forces are conducting a guerilla war, which means a 
small war. Our enemy is a professional modern army equipped with 
everything including tanks, heavy guns and an air force. We have only 
light weapons. If we try to beat the enemy in open battle in the open 
field, we would do exactly what the enemy wants us to do because then we 
would be defeated quickly by his superior weapons. To avoid this, we 
chose the guerilla method of war which gives us many advantages while 
placing the Arabs at a disadvantage. And so long as we fight this kind of 
war, the enemy will never be able to defeat us. 
But to be effective the guerilla war must be offensive in spirit as well 
as in action. Never wait for the enemy to move, you move first, and hit 
him at his weak points which are many. If we keep at it long enough, if 
we keep attacking and harassing them whenever and wherever possiblet in 
the end the Arabs will have no other choice but to come to terms with us. 
From Tribes to One Nation 
our motto is unity through pluralism. When two or three stand together 
they make a stronger force than when each one stands alone. By standing 
together they do not abolish the individual's personality and special 
characteristics: they maintain them and at the same time they also enjoy 
the advantage of combined strength. 
This is also true of tribes within a nation. No matter how large and 
strong one or more tribes may be, it is vital for the purpose of nation 
building that all tribes without exception join hands together and unite 
their forces in matters of supreme national importance. 
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In our drive to bring the tribes of South Sudan into one national 
framework we do not want the special tribal characteristics to be harmed 
in any way. On the contrary, we respect and cherish them because they 
create the variety which makes our national culture rich. At the same 
time we fully understand that no one tribe can face the enemy alone. We 
shall survive only if we stand together and face the enemy as a united 
people. And this way we shall also become one nation. 
Relations with the Civilian Population 
Soldiers of any army are recruited from among the citizens of the same 
country. They and the civilian population are therefore not strangers to 
one another. They are all fellow nationals. The same applies to the Anya- 
Nya in relation to the civilian of the South. Anya-Nya soldiers must 
always remember that they are part of this population and should not 
regard the civilians as their lessers. Together, soldiers and civilians 
form one people. Together they struggle against the same enemy. 
Good relations between soldiers and civilians are very important for the 
successful conduct of war. This is especially true in the case of Anya- 
Nya whose forces depend to a large extent on the population for their 
existence. 
When a soldier uses force on a civilian from whom he wants some service 
or help, he does not contribute much to the cause of the common struggle. 
on the contrary, such behaviour only discourages the civilian from future 
cooperation. There are many better ways of enlisting the support of the 
civilian population such as by being good to them, by showing them 
respect as fellow human beings, or by appealing to their patriotism and 
solidarity as Africans who suffer as we do from the common Arab enemy. A 
civilian whom you have convinced will help you much more than the one 
whose service you have acquired by force. 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMING UP 
For many years now we have been fighting for our life. To wage such a 
long and difficult war we had to acquire not only the necessary material 
means - arms, ammunition and various equipment; we have also had to 
believe in our cause and to have strong faith in the justness of our 
struggle. we evidently have this faith because without it we would never 
have been unable to endure the terrible test of war and to last that 
long. 
How then should we sum up, after almost seventeen years of struggle, what 
we believe in? 
we believe 
That despite the enemy's machinations aimed at dominating our people and 
colonizing our country, the just struggle that we lead will end 
victoriously. 
That our specifically African - as distinct from Arab - identity and the 
common aspirations which unite all our tribes in a common struggle fully 
qualify us for nationhood and the-right of self-determination. 
That by rejecting the attempted Arabization of South Sudan and by 
adhering to our African identity and heritage we exercise a basic human 
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right which is bound to be recognized by everybody sooner or later. 
That by waging our own war of liberation we also block Arab and Russian 
imperialistic expansionism southwards and protect our brothers in East 
and Central Africa. 
That if the enemy persists in refusing our just demands we are capable of 
going on fighting indefinitely, and so shall we do - until we win. 
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APPENDIX 13 
In the Name of God The Merciful. the Compassionate 
Date, 5.10.1987 
STATEMENT TO THE SUDANESE PEOPLE 
God Said, "Oh, People, we have created you from male and female 
and made your peoples and tribes to know each other, the best 
of you is the true Believer. " 
A group calling itself the Arab Grouping in Darfur had issued a Statement 
claiming that it had the right to have more than other groups, to govern 
Darfur because it owns the economy, it is the group with the greater 
population and covering the largest area, the highest rate of education 
and have brought and defended Arabism and Islamic Civilization. 
The D. R. F. rejects and condemns this childish action which denies all the 
Islamic traditions and heritage. The tribes of our common Dafur through 
its history had lived in peace and cooperation. They have been 
intermarried and formed one community. The tribal origin on the colour 
had never been a condition for governmental post or for obtaining a 
fortune. 
The people of Darfur have united in spite of their tribal origins in all 
their struggles against colonialism, backwardness and dependency whether 
this struggle was in Darfur itself or outside it. 
The publication of the aforementioned statement is a call to disunity and 
separation. It is a call for side-battle which aims at the destruction of 
the effort of sons of Darfur for the renaissance and development of their 
region. 
Such a call is a hard blow to all the history of Darfur and to the 
struggle for the dignity of Darfurian human being. This call is a 
poisonous dagger aimed at stabbing this region which suffered and to 
bring suffering from armed raids. The Statement is a scale of disgrace on 
the faces of those who issued it who would be hunted by the condemnation 
of history and of Darfurian sons for ever. 
The Darfur Renaissance Front considers that statement as expressing the 
opinion of those who signed it only and does not express the attitudes of 
the tribes who the signatories claim to represent. 
we call upon all the sons of Darfur, the Sudanese people represented in 
all political parties, social and popular organizations to condemn that 
statement which calls for disunity and calamity. We call upon all tribes 
which the signatories claim to represent to deny that and to reject that 
Statement. 
Oh the masses of Darfur Renaissance Front: We ring the Bell of Dangerl We 
demand you all to stand against this conspiracy which is plotted by the 
enemies of Darfur, against the people of Darfur. 
Long live Darfur United 
Long live Darfur Renaissance Front 
Defeat and Disgrace for those calling for disunity and differences. 
Darfur Renaissance rront, 
Khartoum 
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APPENDIX 14 
THE SUDANESE PEACE INITIATIVE 
Preamble 
inspired by the deep understanding of the suffering of the Sudanese 
masses who are yearning for genuine peace and stability: 
Committed to the unity of the people and territorial integrity of our 
country: 
Rejecting the old policies that aim at escalating the war, destruction 
and deprivation in all forms, such policies that will ultimately lead to 
disunity: 
Resolute in the necessity of persistent efforts to consolidate and enrich 
the democratic practice within the beloved Sudan: 
Convinced that genuine peace in Sudan cannot be attained in the context 
of the so-called "Southern Problem" but on the appreciation that the 
problem is national in nature and hence, its resolution is only possible 
through a serious sincere and continuous dialogue among the Sudanese 
political forces on an equal basis in the proposed National 
Constitutional Conference: 
Now therefore, the Sudan People's Liberation movement and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Army SPLM/SPLA and the Democratic Unionist Party DUP, 
after frank and sincere discussions and exchange of views at this 
critical juncture in our country's history, hereby agree to conclude this 
agreement. 
A. Cognizant of the fact that the convening of the National 
Constitutional Conference is an urgent national necessity that 
demands of all the Sudanese political forces sincere and persistent 
efforts to bring about a conducive atmosphere for the convening of 
the conference, the two parties are totally convinced that the basic 
and necessary prerequisites to create this conducive atmosphere are: - 
1. Although the firm stand of the SPLM/SPLA remains the repeal 
of the September 1983 Laws and to be replaced by the 1974 
Laws, it nevertheless, and because of its keenness on the 
convening of the National Constitutional Conference has at 
this stage agreed with the DUP that in the period preceding 
the convening of the National Constitutional Conference all 
the provisions involving the "houdoud" and related articles 
that are contained in the September 1983 Laws be frozen and 
that there shall be no legislation on any laws that contain 
such articles until the National Constitution Conference is 
held and final agreement is reached on the alternative laws. 
2. The abrogation of the military pacts concluded between Sudan 
and other countries and which impinge on Sudan's sovereignty. 
3. The lifting of the state of emergency. 
4. Cease fire. 
B. A national preparatory committee shall be Convened to agree on the 
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draft agenda, place and the procedures of bolding the National 
Constitutional Conference. The first meeting of this committee shall 
take place soon after its formation. 
C. The two parties have agreed that the venue of the National 
Constitutional Conference shall be at a place agreed upon by the 
national preparatory committee where security is guaranteed to the 
satisfaction of all the parties concerned. 
D. The two parties have agreed on the necessity of holding the National 
Constitutional Conference by 31st December 1988 provided that the 
prerequisites mentioned in this agreement would have been implemented 
to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. 
E. The two parties call upon all the Sudanese political forces to 
immediately join this sincere national effort so as to bring about 
peace and stability in our country. 
Signed this day, the 16th of November 1988 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Dr. John Garang de Mabior, El Sayed Mohammed Osman El Mirghani, 
Chairman of Sudan People's Leader of the Democratic Unionist 
Liberation Movement and Party, DUP. 
Commander in Chief of 
Sudan People's Liveration Army, 
SPLM/SPLA. 
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APPENDIX 15 
Southern Sudan S. S. P. A. 
Political Association 
Secretariate General Khartoum (2) 
P. O. Box 399, 
Date: 18.8.87. 
Proposed Charter for National Government 
Preamble 
The time has dawned for the nation to pose questions as to what are the 
causes of the present problems facing the Sudan. It is even appropriate 
to enlist the actual problems so as to give each problem a causative 
label and attempts be made to provide possible solution to each or 
collectively. 
In the light of the above situation, we the undersigned political 
parties, desirous of forming a Government for national Reconciliation, 
and aware of the vast and difficult problems now facing the nation and 
interested to get permanent solution to the problems which ar the causes 
of the Nation sufferings, hereby write and sign this charter. 
1. Identification of Problems 
The Sudan now lives in the following problems which are the causes of 
insecurity, deteriorating services and stagnation of economic growth and 
worsening foreign relations: 
a) The raging civil war in the country. 
b) Deterioration of national economy. 
C) Nationality problem in the Sudan. 
d) The role and place of religion in the state. 
e) Unfair sharing of national wealth. 
f) Unbalanced sharing of power in the country. 
2. Solutions to these problems 
A. Short immediate solutions. 
1. Revival of the spirit of April's Uprising: 
a. Review of the charter of April's Uprising with the view to 
returning the nation to its spirit and to up-dating its 
contents. 
b. Priority tasks be determined for the period of the national 
government whose life time should be 18 months within which 
the following programmes be executed: 
2. a. Identification of the causes of civil war and programme for 
convening the national constitutional conference be drawn up with the 
contribution of all active political Parties in and outside the Sudan 
based on the Koka Dam Declaration. 
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b. The Parties that did not participate in the Koka Dam conference 
shall have their views included through the committee responsible for 
coordination. 
3. Reestablishment of the regional system of Government in the Northern 
Sudan and the local autonomous Government in the South in its present 
decentralized form and within the spirit of the Self-Government Act 
1972. 
4. Restructuring of the national economy and eradicating the causes of 
inflation and improvement of the means of local production at both 
private and public levels. 
5. Strengthening the Sudan foreign relations with emphasis and adherence 
to good neighbourliness with the view to encouraging foreign 
contribution to the development of the Sudan and settlement of some 
of its outstanding problems. 
6. Temporary rehabilitation of the war displaced populations. 
7. Lifting of the state of emergency so as to provide conducive 
political atmosphere for dialogue and eventual negotiation for 
peaceful settlement. 
8. Respect for fundamental human rights and corrective measures be taken 
to stop human right abuses as follows: 
a. Immediate release of the political detainees who have no charges made 
against them and speedy trial of those who have cases opened against 
them. 
b. Stoppage of illegal arrests, Kasha and forced labour. 
9. Abolition of armed militias and campaign for collection of arms 
immediately undertaken and strict security measures be taken for 
control of arms trafficking all over the country. 
The following issues should be given thorough studies and discussions_, M 
as to constitute the agenda of the proposed constitutional conference a 
lonq term proqrammes for the national Government: 
1. The system of Government whether unitary, decentralized system: local 
Governments, Regional Governments or Federal State etc.... 
2. The question of power sharing which should be discussed largely in 
the context of the type of constitution the Sudan should adopt which 
shall determine the manner of constitutional power sharing. 
3. manner of sharing of wealth and development of national revenues and 
other resources. 
4. The nationality problem in the Sudan and its impact on nation 
building. 
5. The place and role of religion in the state and the role of the state in religious propaganda. 
Sharing of National Government 
1. The going-to-be national Government shall be shared between the 
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Parties who shall sign the charter and committed to its programmes 
for full implementation. The Trade Union Alliance shall be 
represented in the national Government so as to have the spirit of 
the April's Uprising maintained. 
2. The national Government shall adopt the 1956 constitution amended 
1964 with provisions of article 16 of 1985 constitution incorporation 
in the new version. 
3. The national Government shall dissolve itself at the conclusion of 
the constitutional conference and a broad based Transitional national 
Government formed which shall include the Parties who shall sign the 
agreement reached in the national conference. 
4. The functions of that Government shall include running of a general 
election and drafting of a constitution to be passed by the 
constituent Assembly when elected. Relevant parts of the agreement 
shall be incorporated in the draft constitution. 
Secretariate General. 
SSPA, Khartoum 2. 
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APPENDI 16 
The objective of this study is to investigate the origins and process 
of contemporary uneven development, regional disparities and political 
violence as reflected in the recurrent civil wars In Sudan. 
In seeking for explanations and answers surrounding the above mentioned 
issues the following questions have been set: - 
1) why socio-economic and political development in the Sudan has 
always been concentrated in particular areas, the so-called the 
triangle i. e. Khartoum, Gezira, Kassala, and Northern region? egion 
2) what precipitated the emergence of various political and liberation 
movements including the SPLA/SPLM in the Sudan? 
why is regional nationalism dominant in Sudanese politics? 
4) why is Islam ic sectarian political - parties do-minant in the 
Arab oriontated regions In general and Sudanese political and economic 
arena In particular? 
5) Is the recurrent political instabilities in the Sudan a result 
of the weakness of the dominant sectarian ruling parties 
6) why hav-e military takeovers been common In the Sudan? 
7) Is SPLA/SPLM a national movement, or a regional liberation movement 
8) If SPLA/SPLM is a national movement how many non-Southern Sudanese 
are there in it SPLA/SPLM? 
9) why all the attempts by successive governments in Khartoum to solve 
the current problems have failed? 
lo) who is to blame for the current crises? 
Can there be a lasting peaceful solution to the Sudan political 
crises, without disintegration of the countr 
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In order to ascertain reliable answers for the above 
mentioned questions, interviews were conducted using 
both radio recorder and verbal discussions with the 
interviewed. 
The use of interviews as a method of research or of 
collecting data because it was easy to manage and monitor. 
Those interviewed were mostly members of varioua Political 
parties, liberation movements, minority groups, members of 
the armed forces, police, Prisons, civil service, merchant 
capitalists, trade unions and several others. Those inter- 
viewed were randomly selected and were as follows: - 
1: 200 leading politicians of all backgrounds. 
2: 150 merchant capitalists 
3: 100 RetaIL TRADERS 
$* ''60 academics or intellectuals 
5: 30-military officers 
6: 20 police officers 
7 10 prisons officers 
8 50 senior civil servants 
9: - 20 members of Black Bloc 
10 30 women en kag 6d in various retail trade 
11: 20 members of SPLA/SPLM. 
12: 20 members of Sudan Rural Solidarity 
13: 20, members of Anya-nya II 
14: 30 members of the trade unions. 
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15.100 of displaced people in Khartoum and Port Sudan. 
16.30 members of the Union of Southern and Northern Funj and nFunj 
Ingesna 
17.100 members of hawkers 
IS 60 policemen. 
The following libraries were visited by the author: - 
I. Various libraries of university of Khartoum. 
2. National Records Office. 
3. Juba University librar-Y 
Gezir university library 
Regional Government Archivies Juba 
6. Regional Records in al-Obeid region 
7. Regional Records in Fashir 
S. Local Records in Port Sudan. 
9. Regional Records in Dongola and Atbara. 
10. Various political manifestoes from the political parties during 
1986 General elections. 
The research in the Sudan was done by the Author and his assistants 
under terrible insecurity, whereby the author was subjected to police 
harrassment and detention without trial. Sometimes the author's 
research materials were confiscated by police becuase he was suspected 
as a "fifth column" or SPLA/SPLM supporter. - 
Consequently most of those interviewed were frightened during the 
interviews. It also follows that most of the people interviewed had 
their names omitted for the reasons that they may be subjected to 
police persecution. 
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